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I. INTRODUCTION
We are well into President Obama's second year in office and long past
the deadline set out in his executive order directing the closure of the Guan-
tanamo Bay detention facility by January of 2010.' Meanwhile, the debate
continues to rage over where the masterminds of the 9/11 attacks should be
tried. Initial efforts to move the 9/11 co-conspirators to New York and try
them in federal district court have been rebuffed,2 and President Obama and
Attorney General Holder have been roundly criticized by some for their ini-
tial efforts to move these cases to federal court. These, and other cases that
originated under military commissions proceedings, remain in legal limbo
and the question of where to try these suspects has become a sort of "third
rail" that no politician wants to touch, lest they are accused of being soft on
terrorists.4
* Professor Victor Hansen is a Professor of Law at New England Law in Boston where
he teaches Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Evidence and National Security Law. The
author wishes to thank Elizabeth Funk for her invaluable research assistance.
1. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan. 22, 2009).
2. See generally Members of the Senate Hold a News Conference on Funding for the
Trials of the Alleged 9/11 Conspirators (Feb. 2, 2010) (transcript available at
http:/Agraham.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressRoom.PressReleases&ContentR
ecordid=9156B7E2-802A-23AD-4C29-A2B I3359E IB2).
3. Charlie Savage, U.S. to Try Avowed 9/11 Mastermind Before Civilian Court in New
York, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 14, 2009, at Al.
4. In December Congress passed legislation significantly restricting the ability of the
President to move people from Guantanamo by prohibiting funding of those efforts. Also, on
March 7th the President signed an Executive Order, which among other things, allows for the
resumption of military commissions at Guantanamo, expresses a desire to close Guantanamo,
establishes a system of periodic review of those detainees at Guantanamo who will not face
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Many in legal academia-including myself-have criticized this current
debate as being superficial and unprincipled. Nevertheless, it is clear that
those opposed to trying suspected terrorists in federal court have tapped into
a genuine and powerful force, and there is no question that this opposition
raises legitimate and important questions about national security and the role
the law should play in balancing the need for security against individual
rights and freedoms.
Up to this point, the question has been framed as: What is the best fo-
rum for trying these suspected terrorists? Perhaps it is time to re-frame the
question. Instead of asking what forum is best suited to try the 9/11 co-
conspirators and others currently detained at Guantanamo, maybe we should
be asking what legal accommodations must be made if we try these suspects
at all, and whether one choice offers an alternative that will be less corrosive
to our system of justice.
Later generations will look back at our legal responses to terrorism just
as we have looked at our own history-sometimes with pride and other times
with shame and regret. In times of trial, the legitimacy of our legal system is
upheld by close adherence to principles upon which that system is based. If
we only adhere to those principles in times of peace and abandon them in
times of trouble, or when difficulties arise, there is little justification for pre-
serving such a system. Reframing the debate to ask what compromises and
accommodations must be made to our system of justice in order to bring ac-
cused terrorists to justice might allow us to get closer to this fundamental
question.
Refraining the debate in this way also allows us to better see the mo-
tives behind many government programs such as extraordinary renditions,
enhanced interrogation techniques, and the formation of military commis-
sions. Once we see these motives more clearly, we can better determine their
legitimacy.
By reframing the question to focus on the legal accommodations needed
to bring these suspects to justice, I believe two inescapable conclusions fol-
low. First, our decision to use extraordinary renditions, "black sites," and
military commission of federal trial but will still be detained, and preserves the fight to try
certain individuals in federal court. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,277 (Mar. 7,
2011). Neither this legislation nor the Executive Order resolves this question of where to try
suspected terrorists like KSM. On April 4, 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder reversed an
earlier decision and announced that the so called "9/11 co-conspirators" would be tried by
military commission, not in federal court as had been previously announced. Attorney Gen-
eral Holder said that while he believed that trial in federal court was the better option, recent
congressional action had made that option virtually impossible. Statement of the Attorney
General on the Prosecution of the 9/11 Conspirators, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Apr. 4, 2011,
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/201 I/ag-speech-I !0404.html.
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enhanced interrogation techniques has had far reaching implications on our
system of justice, and has affected that system in very specific ways that
were likely unanticipated by the proponents of these programs.' Second,
with respect to the evidence obtained by coercion, the greatest corrosion to
our system of justice will occur if we opt to try these suspects by the current
formulation of the military commissions system, though ultimately the ad-
verse effects of these programs will be realized in any forum these terrorist
suspects are tried.
It is useful to go back and ask what the government hoped to achieve by
holding suspected terrorists like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in CIA "black
sites" located in third countries, subjecting them to water boarding and other
interrogation techniques that are certainly cruel, inhumane, and degrading,
even if not classified as torture.6 The concern here is not the legality or ille-
gality of these practices, but the "products" that the government hoped to
obtain by using these practices.
There were at least two primary products the government hoped would
come from these practices: First, to gain usable, actionable intelligence to
detect and disrupt terrorist networks and prevent future attacks against the
United States' interests;' and second, to use information obtained in subse-
quent prosecutions of specific terrorist suspects.8 I believe it is fair to as-
sume the reason the United States sought to achieve these objectives by
means of extraordinary rendition is because the government wanted to em-
ploy techniques of questionable legality, if not outright torture to obtain this
information.
There is clearly an inherent tension in seeking useful intelligence to
prevent future terrorist attacks and simultaneously collecting information for
subsequent prosecution. That tension is nothing new and compromises must
5. In military terminology, a "black site" is a location at which an unacknowledged
black project is conducted. Recently, the term has gained notoriety in describing secret pris-
ons operated by the United States (U.S.) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), generally outside
of U.S. territory and legal jurisdiction. It can refer to the facilities that are controlled by the
CIA used by the U.S. government in its War on Terror to detain alleged unlawful enemy com-
batants. U.S. President George W. Bush acknowledged the existence of secret prisons operat-
ed by the CIA during a speech on September 6, 2006. See Bush Admits to CIA Secret Prisons,
BBC NEWS, (Sept. 7, 2006,4:18 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5321606.stm.
6. Gregory S. McNeal, A Cup of Coffee After the Waterboard: Seemingly Voluntary
Post-Abuse Statements, 59 DEPAUL L. REv. 943, 947-48 (2010).
7. Dakota S. Rudesill, Foreign Public Opinion and National Security, J. OF NAT'L SEC.
F., in 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 5223, 5235 (2010).
8. See George W. Bush, President of the United States, President Bush's Statement
regarding Secret Detention Centers in the EU (Sept. 6, 2006) (transcript available at
http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/president-bushs-statementregarding-secret-detention-centers-
eu/p 15060).
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be made if information is going to be used for both purposes. Moreover,
there is an ongoing debate whether information obtained by torture or other
coercive interrogation techniques really provides useful intelligence. While
both of these issues are important, they are not the focus of this essay.
The primary concern here is with the use of coerced statements in any
subsequent criminal prosecution of suspected terrorists. I seek to examine
how schemes of rights infringements, such as extraordinary renditions and
coercive interrogations, translate into specific and corrosive questions of
accommodation. If accommodations are made now to bring these suspects to
justice, does choosing one system over another at least reduce, if not elimi-
nate the accommodations that must be made, so as to limit the corrosive im-
pact on our system of justice?
Currently, there are three proffered alternatives for prosecuting individ-
uals who were subject to extraordinary rendition and coercive interrogations.
The first alternative is trying them in federal district court. The second alter-
native is trying them via a court-martial proceeding under the Uniform Code
of Military Justice. The third option is to try them by military commission.
What are the consequences of embarking on a practice of extraordinary ren-
ditions, torture, and coercive interrogations when the government later wants
to prosecute those suspects? Specifically, how would each of these forums
address the admissibility of coerced statements?
II. TRIAL IN FEDERAL COURT
Prior to the creation of military commissions, trying terrorists in federal
court was the norm and despite the existence of military commissions, the
vast majority of terrorist cases are still being tried in federal district courts.9
Even so, the cases that have been tried in federal courts are different in na-
ture than the cases we are talking about. With the exception of Ghailani case
recently tried in a New York federal court,' ° the cases tried in federal courts
involved terrorist acts, attempts, or plots by suspects apprehended within the
United States." These cases did not involve issues of extraordinary rendi-
9. See CTR. ON LAW & SEc., N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE TERRORIST
TRIAL REPORT CARD 2001-2009: LESSONS LEARNED 5 (2009).
10. United States v. Ghailani, No. SI0 98 Crim. 1023 (LAK), 2010 WL 3956807, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2010). It is interesting to note that the judge in that case recently ruled
that evidence that was derived from unlawful interrogation techniques could not be admitted
at trial. See Benjamin Weiser, Judge Prohibits Key U.S. Witness in Terror Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 2010, at At.
11. See generally United States v. Ressam, 593 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2010); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (amended 2009).
[Vol. 35
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tion, allegations of torture, or other coercive interrogations, and therefore the
more complicated questions involved in the possible trial of Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed and the other 9/11 co-conspirators have not yet been addressed
by the federal courts.
Nevertheless, trial in federal court provides the most familiar method
for prosecuting even these more complex cases. So, if we move forward
with a federal court trial, potential questions are: How are the federal courts
going to address the admissibility of coerced confessions? What accommo-
dations would have to be made in order for this evidence to be admitted and
considered? And what type of impact would that have on the more run-of-
the-mine cases?
Before addressing these questions, one fundamental issue needs to be
considered: To what extent, if any, do the constitutional protections against
coerced confessions even apply to cases where the alleged crimes, capture,
rendition, and interrogations took place outside of the United States? This is
not an easy question and while it is not the primary focus here, some though-
ts about it are important.1 2
There is much dispute over if and how constitutional protections that
are a routine part of domestic criminal prosecutions would apply to criminal
prosecutions of these suspected terrorists, whose connection to the United
States is tenuous at best.'3 While the Supreme Court of the United States has
not addressed this issue directly, past cases do provide some guidance. The
two most recent cases where the Court addressed the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Constitution are United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez14 and Boume-
diene v. Bush.15 From these cases, we can glean principles that may provide
guidance in the trial of cases that involved extraordinary renditions and coer-
cive interrogations.
Verdigo-Urquidez dealt with the warrantless search of the defendant's
home in Mexico by DEA agents and Mexican law enforcement officials.
16
12. These issues are relevant to some degree regardless of the forum used to try these
suspects. If certain constitutional protections are available to terrorist suspects in federal
court, there is the possibility that these protections should also apply to military commissions.
Even though the Court in In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), limited its review in that case to
questions of jurisdiction of the military commission appointed to try General Yamashita, that
Court noted that while it does not make the laws of war, it respects them "so far as they do not
conflict with the commands of Congress or the Constitution." In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 7-
8, 16.
13. See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
14. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
15. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
16. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 263.
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Although the defendant was a Mexican citizen, the Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement applied to
this search outside of the U.S. border. 17 Applying a social contract theory, a
plurality reasoned that since the defendant was not a citizen or legal alien,
and because he had no significant contacts with the United States, the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to this search. 8
Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote upholding the search, but took a
different approach to the extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amend-
ment.19 Adopting the Court's earlier test in what has become known as the
Insular Cases, ° Justice Kennedy asked whether the application of the Fourth
Amendment in this situation was "impracticable and anomalous. 21 Justice
Kennedy reasoned it was and determined the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirements did not apply.22 Justice Kennedy did seem to suggest, however,
that other constitutional protections that relate to fundamental due process
might apply.2
3
Later, in Boumediene, Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, holding
the constitutional right to habeas corpus applied to the detainees being held
on a military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.24 As in his concurrence in
Verdugo-Urquidez, Justice Kennedy took a practical approach to the extra-
territorial application of the Constitution. 5 In Boumediene, Justice Kennedy
listed three primary factors relevant to determining the extraterritorial appli-
cation of the right to habeas corpus. 26 These factors are: "(1) the [detai-
nees'] citizenship and status . . . and the adequacy of the process through
which that status [was determined]; (2) the nature of the sites where appre-
hension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inhe-
rent in resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ., 27 These factors reject
formalism and instead take a pragmatic view of the Constitution's extraterri-
torial application.
17. Id. at 261.
18. ld. at 274-75.
19. Id. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
20. The Insular Cases, as they are referred to, are the following cases: Balzac v. Porto
Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi,
190 U.S. 197 (1903); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
21. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 730, 771 (2008).
25. Id. at 766-7 1.
26. Id. at 766.
27. Id.
[Vol. 35
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While this approach is driven by context and lacks the clarity of bright
line rules, it does provide some guidance for questions of whether, and to
what extent, due process requirements would apply to confessions obtained
overseas by government agents using coercive interrogation techniques. In
light of these cases, it seems likely that fundamental due process protections
against the admissibility of coerced confessions will apply, even though the
confessions were obtained outside of the United States. This is particularly
true, since these trials would most likely be conducted in the United States.
It is much less certain whether the Court-created Miranda rights warnings
would be required. This is so for a number of reasons, not the least of which
is that the Court has never held that Miranda warnings are an independent
constitutional requirement.
28
One concern of those opposed to trying these suspects in federal court is
a "watered down" constitutional effect.29 If these constitutional protections
are applied to the confessions and any derivative evidence obtained from
these confessions, the evidence will either be suppressed completely, or the
courts will have to "water down" certain constitutional protections. The ef-
fect will be a risk to the rights of ordinary non-terrorist citizens.
Assuming that, at a minimum, due process prohibitions against coerced
confessions would apply to statements obtained while these suspects were
being held at overseas locations, what might these cases look like? We can
assume from public statements about the interrogation methods used that
some of these suspects were subjected to water boarding, sleep deprivation,
slapping, shoving, and long periods of isolation and uninterrupted interroga-
tions.30 So what are the courts likely to say about the confessions and deriva-
tive evidence that were the products of these interrogations?
Nearly eighty years ago, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Mississippi
3
'
invalidated the confessions of three black defendants because those confes-
sions were the product of whipping, hanging, and other physical torture.
32
The Court ruled that:
The due process clause requires "that state action, whether through
one agency or another, shall be consistent with the fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
28. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434-35 (2000).
29. See, e.g., McNeal, supra note 5, at 954.
30. Detention at Guantanamo Bay-Part 1: H. before the H. Foreign Affairs Subcomm.
on Int7 Orgs., Human Rights, and Oversight, 110th Cong. 1- 12 (2008), [hereinafter Guanta-
namo Bay Hearing], available at www.justice.gov/oig/testimony/t0806.pdf (statement of
Glenn A. Fine, Inspector Gen.).
31. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
32. Id. at 281-82.
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and political institutions." It would be difficult to conceive of me-
thods more revolting to the sense of justice than those taken to
procure the confessions of these petitioners, and the use of the con-
fessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was
a clear denial of due process.
33
In subsequent cases, the Court looked at other forms of coercion short
of physical torture, such as long hours of uninterrupted isolation and interro-
gation, and ruled that these techniques can also violate due process. 34 The
Court's concern is with both the reliability of the confessions that followed
from coercion, and that confessions obtained via this degree of coercion vi-
olate basic principles of fundamental fairness. 3
5
With these principles as a backdrop, it is difficult to see how a court
could admit the statements obtained by water boarding, extreme sleep depri-
vation, and various other interrogation techniques the government has publi-
cally acknowledged. These techniques seem to be intended to overbear the
will of the detainees and to obtain confessions.36 It can be said of water
boarding, extreme sleep deprivation, slapping, pushing, and other such tech-
niques as was said by the Court in Brown, "the use of the confessions thus
obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence [would be] a clear denial of
due process. 37
This is not, however, the end of the matter. In past years, the Court de-
veloped a number of exceptions to excluding evidence so as to allow the
admissibility of some evidence even when a suspect's constitutional rights
were violated.38 How might these exceptions apply to confessions obtained
in cases involving the extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects? The three
most likely exceptions the courts may look to apply are: (1) the independent
source, (2) inevitable discovery, and (3) the attenuation exception to the ex-
clusionary rule. 39 Each of these exceptions was created by the Court to avoid
giving the criminal defendant an undeserved windfall from the application of
the exclusionary rule.n° These exceptions were also created to ensure that
law enforcement is not placed in a worse position by the exclusionary rule
33. Id. at 286 (quoting Hebert v. Lousiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
34. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155 (1944).
35. See generally id.
36. See generally Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
37. Brown, 297 U.S. at 286.
38. See generally Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-44 (1988).
39. See id. at 536-39.
40. Id. at 537.
[Vol. 35
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than they would have had they complied with the constitutional require-
ments.4'
The first of these exceptions, the independent source exception, states if
lawful evidence was obtained independent of the illegal police conduct, that
evidence should not be excluded from trial.42 There are two variations to the
independent source exception.43 In the first variation, police misconduct
leads to certain facts X and Y.44 However, if fact Z is discovered by inde-
pendent legal methods, courts will say that fact Z was obtained by an inde-
pendent legal method and not subject to the exclusionary rule.45 In the
second variation, both legal and illegal methods led to the same facts. 46 So
long as the legal methods for discovering the facts are completely separated
from the illegal methods, the evidence was obtained by an independent legal
source and the evidence will not be excluded.47
The Court has applied this exception to searches conducted in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.48 Could it also apply to confessions obtained by
coercion and torture? Publicly available information suggests that after a
number of terrorist suspects were subjected to extraordinary renditions and
coercive interrogations, the government subsequently developed "clean
teams" to interrogate these suspects. 49  These "clean teams" would re-
interrogate the terrorist suspects without using coercion, torture or other
questionable interrogating methods but would instead gain the detainee's
trust and establish rapport as a precursor to obtaining statements. ° It seems
that the government is hoping that some version of the independent source
doctrine might apply to statements obtained by these "clean teams."
It is uncertain whether this approach will work. The critical aspect of
the independent source doctrine is that the evidence was obtained free of any
illegality.5" The government will have a difficult time making this predicate
showing since the questioning by these clean teams followed the coercive
interrogations and it cannot be said that these statements are free of the initial
taint. The Court has addressed this issue in the context of Miranda viola-
41. Id.
42. Id. at 537-38.
43. Murray, 487 U.S. at 537.
44. Id. at 538.
45. Id.
46. See id at 538-39.
47. See id. at 537-39.
48. E.g,. Murray, 487 U.S. at 542-43.
49. Gregory S. McNeal, A Cup of Coffee After the Waterboard: Seemingly Voluntary
Post-Abuse Statements, 59 DEPAUL L. REv. 943, 954 (2010).
50. See id. at 954-55.
51. See Murray, 487 U.S. at 537-38.
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tions and held that when the initial violation involved a Miranda violation
that was not otherwise coercive, the subsequent questioning was free from
the initial Miranda taint.52
The Supreme Court in Oregon v. Elstad was careful to point out that the
only constitutional violation was a failure to read the suspect his Miranda
warnings and that the interrogation was not otherwise coercive.53 In the case
of terrorist suspects rendered to third countries where they were tortured and
coerced, we have much more than a mere Miranda issue. As currently for-
mulated, it is very unlikely that a federal court could apply the independent
source doctrine to statements obtained by these so called "clean teams."
In order for the independent source doctrine to apply to these state-
ments, the doctrine would have to be modified and diluted. Courts might
reason that after a certain amount of time has passed, statements that were
initially obtained by torture and coercion can be discovered independently so
long as that subsequent discovery did not involve coercion. Another possi-
bility is that courts might create some kind of terrorist exception to the nor-
mal application of the independent source doctrine. This exception might
allow for evidence that may still contain the taint of the initial illegality to be
admitted. This might be because the evidence is crucial to the prosecution,
and because the nature of the crimes charged are so serious that we simply
cannot afford to exclude this evidence from the trial.
Modifying and diluting the independent source doctrine in either of
these ways would be problematic because once the doctrine is diluted in this
context, what is to prevent the courts from diluting it in other more ordinary
cases? There is also the larger problem of creating lesser protections for
certain kinds of crimes or criminal suspects before guilt has been established.
Such an approach harkens back to a system that was long ago rejected-and
rightly so-by our legal system.
Inevitable discovery is another exception to the exclusionary rule.54
Under this exception, courts may admit evidence that was illegally obtained
if the government can show it would have inevitably found the evidence by
legal means.55 This exception differs from the independent source exception
because under the inevitable discovery exception, the government will not be
able to show that it actually obtained the evidence by legal means.56 Instead,
52. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985).
53. Id. at 318.
54. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).
55. Id.
56. See id.
[Vol. 35
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the government must demonstrate that hypothetically, if given enough time,
it would have inevitably discovered the evidence legally.57
As with the independent source exception, the government will be hard-
pressed to show that the evidence obtained by coercive interrogations would
have eventually been discovered by legal means, at least as the inevitable
discovery exception is currently formulated. This is primarily because the
very justification most often used for employing coercive interrogation tech-
niques was the difficulty of obtaining necessary information any other way.
Other than getting the suspected 9/11 terrorists themselves to divulge infor-
mation about past and future plots, it is unlikely the government could dem-
onstrate the evidence contained in the 9/11 terrorist confessions was about to
be discovered by lawful means. This is so, based on our intelligence failures
leading up to the 9/11 attacks, and the fact that terrorist cells tend to be com-
partmentalized and isolated.
If the inevitable discovery exception were to work, courts would be
forced to modify and most probably dilute the exception. Modifications
might come by expanding the time between the illegal discovery and the
inevitable discovery. Or courts possibly might find that once the information
from a coercive confession is verified, it is possible the government could
have put the pieces together without the tainted evidence. Either of these or
some other modifications to the exception would be problematic and once
used in this context, there is always the possibility that they would be ex-
panded to other types of cases.
The third, and quite possibly the most likely exception to the exclusio-
nary rule is the attenuation exception being applied not to the statements
obtained by torture and coercion, but to other evidence derived from those
interrogations. 8 This differs from the independent source exception because
with attenuation there is no legal source for the evidence. 9 It differs from
inevitable discovery in that the government is not required to show a poten-
tial legal source for the evidence existed.60 The rationale for the attenuation
doctrine is that at some point, the consequences of the government's illegal
conduct are so removed from the evidence that the effect of deterrence is
outweighed by the interests in admitting relevant evidence.6'
57. See id.
58. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 (1975).
59. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) (quoting Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)).
60. Id. at 487.
61. See Brown, 422 U.S. at 612 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,447 (1974)).
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In Brown v. Illinois,62 the Court noted three factors to help determine if
there is sufficient attenuation between the constitutional violation and the
evidence which the government seeks to admit. 63 The first factor is the tem-
poral proximity between the illegal conduct and the evidence that is being
offered.64 The second factor considers what intervening circumstances, if
any, occurred which might sever the connection between the government's
illegality and the evidence.65 The third factor is the flagrancy of the govern-
ment's conduct.66
Applying these factors to the confessions obtained by torture and coer-
cion during extraordinary rendition, one can hardly say the confessions were
attenuated from the illegality since the confessions were the very product of
the illegality. But one should ask about the information that was subsequent-
ly developed from these interrogations. Is it possible that some of this deriv-
ative information is so attenuated from the coercion that the loss of this evi-
dence at trial is too high of a cost to pay? It is hard to formulate specific
factual situations where the attenuation exception might apply, but it is poss-
ible to see how such a potential might exist which would allow the govern-
ment to offer evidence derived from the confession even if it is not allowed
to offer the confession itself. Depending on the quality and quantity of this
evidence, the government might determine that it has sufficient evidence to
convict these terrorist suspects in federal court. While the government has
not made the evidence publically available it would use if Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed and the other 9/11 conspirators were tried in federal court, it is
very likely to rely in part on the attenuation doctrine to get this evidence be-
fore a federal jury.
Courts applying the attenuation exception have recognized that the ap-
plication of this doctrine is contextual, requiring a very specific factual ap-
plication.67 As a result, there may be less likelihood that if the attenuation
exception were applied to the evidence derived from these confessions, it
would have a bleed over diluting effect on other cases outside of the terror-
ism realm. Nevertheless, that concern still exists, particularly in light of the
government's initial decision to ignore basic constitutional protections was
62. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
63. Id. at 603-04.
64. Id. at 603.
65. Id. at 603-04.
66. Id. at 604.
67. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 353 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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hardly inadvertent.68 If derivative evidence from these blatant violations can
be attenuated, when would the attenuation exception not apply?
m. TRIAL IN MILITARY COURTS-MARTIAL
Prosecuting suspected terrorists who have been subjected to extraordi-
nary renditions, torture, and coercion in federal court presents enormous evi-
dentiary challenges if the government hopes to admit either the evidence of
their confessions or evidence derived from those confessions. These chal-
lenges may not be insurmountable, but there is a very legitimate concern that
courts would have to so dilute some fundamental constitutional protections
in order for the evidence to be admitted that basic protections enjoyed by all
citizens would be placed at risk. For some, this is the strongest argument
against trying these suspects in federal court and instead using some alternate
process so that our fundamental protections would remain intact. How might
this type of evidence fair in an alternative system, and would fundamental
protections outside of the terrorism context remain viable?
Other than federal court, the next most obvious and readily available
system would be trial of these terrorist suspects in a military court-martial.
Military courts have jurisdiction to try these suspects.69 Article 18 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice Congress specifically grants jurisdiction to
military courts to try violations of the law of war.7 ° While there is debate
over exactly which offenses fall under the law of war, there is little doubt
that murder of innocent, civilian non-combatants is a war crime. As prin-
ciples and accessories to murder, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and others who
had been held at CIA sites in foreign countries could come under court-
martial jurisdiction. How would the admissibility of coerced confessions be
treated in this forum?
The protections against self incrimination and the prohibition of coerced
confessions in the military follow virtually the same constitutional frame-
work as in federal court. There are no special exceptions or allowances for
coerced confessions in the military system. 71 The due process protections are
equally applicable.7 2 This means that the litigation and resolution of confes-
68. David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights as
Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 367 (2003).
69. UNIF. CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 18; 10 U.S.C.A § 818 (West 2009).
70. See UNIF. CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 18.
71. See Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953).
72. See United States v. Griffin, 50 M.J. 278, 283 (1999); United States v. Ford, 51 M.J.
445, 450 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
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sions obtained by torture and coercion are likely to be the same in the court-
martial system as they are in federal court.
Likewise, the application of the exclusionary rule works much the same
in military courts-martial as in federal court. Statements that are obtained by
coercion are not admissible.7 3 Like their federal counterparts, military courts
also reason that even if a subsequent statement was free of coercion, if the
initial statement was the product of coercion, the independent source and
inevitable discovery exceptions to the exclusionary rule are not likely to ap-
ply. 74
In addition to these protections, military law imposes greater require-
ments for rights warnings than the requirements imposed by the Court in
Miranda and subsequent cases. Article 3 1(b) of the UCMJ requires that any
person suspected of committing an offense be warned of his right against self
incrimination.75 This protection is broader than Miranda warnings in two
ways. First, the warnings are not contingent on the suspect being placed in
custody. Second, the warnings are a statutory requirement, not a court
created protection. The warnings are required by statute, and therefore,
courts have much less flexibility to create exceptions to the rule's require-
ments than the Supreme Court has done in limiting Miranda.
IV. TRIAL BY MILITARY COMMISSION
What this means is that those who are concerned that federal courts may
prove to be too difficult of a forum in which to try terrorist suspects are not
likely to see military courts-martial as a better option, or as good of an op-
tion. In order for these confessions and other derivative evidence to be ad-
mitted, military courts would have to dilute constitutional protections in
much the same way as federal courts.
Creating a completely separate system to try only these terrorist sus-
pects seems, for many, to be the better approach. Because the system would
be cabined off from the rest of the criminal justice system, decisions by these
courts as to the admissibility of confessions would have no precedential val-
ue in the regular court system, so the argument goes.
The Bush administration was never completely clear as to why it initial-
ly opted for military commissions.76 John Altenburg, who was selected by
73. United States v. Freeman, 65 M.J. 451, 453 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
74. See United States v. Gardinier, 65 M.J. 60, 63 (C.A.A.F. 2007), rev'd by 67 M.J. 304
(C.A.F.F. 2009).
75. UNIF. CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 31(b); see also 10 U.S.C. § 831 (2006).
76. See generally News Release, Defense Department Briefing on Military Commissions
Hearings, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE (Aug. 17 2004, 1:35 PM), http://www.defense.gov/
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the then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to serve as the Appointing Authority
for the military commissions, articulated the rationale for the military com-
missions as follows:
[T]he government chose for many different reasons to use a mili-
tary commission process. It doesn't mean that the others were
wrong. It just means that the government chose on balance, given
the nature of the allegations that were being made and I think es-
pecially national security interests, that they chose to use the
commission process, thinking that, that would meet the balanced
needs.77
This is hardly a clear and specific explanation of the rationale for military
commissions.
The government's brief in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld78 likely offers the most
specific justification for the military commissions. According to the gov-
ernment, military commissions have a long history under United States and
international law.79 Under United States law, military commissions are the
military's 'common-law war courts."'8 These commissions are not bound
by an established set of rules or procedure. Rather, the commissions and
their procedures are created and 'adapted in each instance' to meet the
needs of that specific occasion.81 Certainly, one of the needs in this specific
occasion is the challenge of getting confessions and derivative evidence be-
fore a fact finder that was the product of torture and coercion.
Looking to the evolution of the military commissions process from its
initial inception in 2002 to its current form in 2009, how the commissions
treat coerced confessions has been a particular point of focus. The initial
rule regarding the admissibility of evidence stated broadly:
Evidence shall be admitted if, in the opinion of the Presiding Of-
ficer (or instead, if any other member of the Commission so re-
quests at the time the Presiding Officer renders that opinion, the
transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2648 [hereinafter Briefing on Military Commission
Hearings].
77. Id.
78. 548 U.S. 557 (2006), superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub.
L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
79. Brief for Respondent at 1, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184),;
Press Release, Kathleen T. Rhem, Am. Forces Press Servs., Dep't of Defense, Long History
Behind Military Commissions (Aug. 19, 2004), http://www.defense.gove/news/
newsarticle.apx?id=25489 [hereinafter Long History behind Military Commissions].
80. Brief for Respondent, supra note 78, at 44.
81. Id. at 45 (quoting Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 347-48 (1952)).
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opinion of the Commission rendered at that time by a majority of
the Commission), the evidence would have probative value to a
reasonable person. 82
Under this broad rule coerced confessions, like any other evidence
could be admitted and considered if a majority of the commission believed
the confessions had probative value. This would be true for derivative evi-
dence as well.
Since this first attempt at military commissions, there have been at least
four major modifications.83 The latest version is reflected in the Military
Commissions Act as amended in 2009.84 This version of the commissions
system is unquestionably a much more sophisticated and robust criminal
justice system then what was first proposed in 2002.85 In spite of the clear
advancements in the process, even this latest version of military commissions
carves out special rules designed to allow for greater admissibility of coerced
confessions than would be permissible either in federal court or in a military
court-martial. 86 These rules are reflected most clearly in both the act itself
and the Manual for Military Commissions, which sets out the specific proce-
dural rules that govern the commissions.
87
Commissions Rule of Evidence 304 titled "Confessions, admissions,
and other statements" set out the current rules as follows:
(a) "General Rules...
(1) Exclusion of Statements Obtained by Torture or Cruel, Inhu-
mane, or Degrading Treatment. No statement, obtained by the use
of torture or by cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment (as de-
fined by section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (42
U.S.C. 2000dd)), whether or not under color of law, shall be ad-
missible in a [trial by] military commission . . . except against a
person accused of torture or such treatment as evidence that the
statement was made.
82. 32 C.F.R. § 9.6(d)(1) (2003).
83. See generally Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2574
(2009) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 948a-950t (West 2009)).
84. See id.
85. Compare id., with S. 1937, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002).
86. See generally Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat.
2574.
87. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMM'NS (2010) [hereinafter
MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMM'NS].
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(2) Other Statements of the Accused. A statement of the accused
may be admitted in evidence in a military commission only if the
military judge finds-
(A) that the totality of the circumstances renders the statement re-
liable and possessing sufficient probative value; and
(3) that-
(i) the statement was made incident to lawful conduct during mili-
tary operations at the point of capture or during closely related ac-
tive combat engagement, and the interests of justice would best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence; or
(ii) the statement was voluntarily given."
(3) Statements from persons other than the accused allegedly pro-
duced by coercion. When the degree of coercion inherent in the
production of a statement from a person other than the accused, of-
fered by either party, is disputed, such statement may only be ad-
mitted if the military judge finds that-
(A) the totality of the circumstances renders the statement reliable
and possessing sufficient probative value;
(B) the interests of justice would best be served by admission of
the statement into evidence; and
(C) the statement was not obtained through the use of torture or
cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment as defined in section
1003(d) of the Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. L. 109-148 (2005)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000dd(d)).
(4) "Determination of Voluntariness. In determining for purposes
of [(a)(2)(B)(ii)], whether a statement was voluntarily given, the
military judge shall consider the totality of the circumstances, in-
cluding, as appropriate, the following:
(A) The details of the taking of the statement, accounting for the
circumstances of the conduct of military and intelligence opera-
tions during hostilities[;]
(B) [tihe characteristics of the accused, such as military training,
age, and education level[; and]
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(C) the lapse of time, change of place, or change in identity of the
questioners between the statement sought to be admitted and any
prior questioning of the accused."
(5) Derivative Evidence.
(A) Evidence Derived from Statements Obtained by Torture or
Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading Treatment. Evidence derived
from a statement that would be excluded under section (a)(I) of
this rule "may not be received in evidence against an accused who
made the statement if the accused makes a timely motion to sup-
press or an objection," unless the military judge determines by a
preponderance of the evidence that-
(i) "the evidence would have been obtained even if the statement
had not been made N;" or
(ii) use of such evidence would otherwise be consistent with the
interests of justice.
(B) Evidence Derived from Other Excludable Statements of the
Accused. Evidence derived from a statement that would be ex-
cluded under section (a)(2) of this rule may not be received in evi-
dence against an accused who made the statement if the accused
makes a timely motion to suppress or an objection, unless the mili-
tary judge determines by a preponderance of the evidence that-
(i) "the totality of the circumstances renders the evidence reliable
and possessing sufficient probative value; and"
(ii) use of such evidence would be consistent with the interests of
justice.88
A close examination of these rules shows that they are designed to al-
low for admission of the very kind of confession evidence, which is likely to
be excluded in federal court and military courts-martial. First, the section
provides for a uniform definition of torture, cruel, inhumane, and degrading
treatment. Second, it establishes a per se exclusion of confessions obtained
by these methods. Of course the devil is in the details, and there continues to
88. The statutory analysis is compiled from MIL. COMM. R. EvID. 304, MIL. R. EVID. 304,
and 10 U.S.C. § 948r (2006), with quoted material primarily from the United States Code,
Title 10, section 948r and rule 304 MIL. COMM. R. EvID.
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be debate over whether specific techniques, such as water boarding and other
coercion, fall within this definition.
Coercion that does not rise to the level of torture or cruel, inhumane, or
degrading may still be coercive, but the rules do not establish a per se exclu-
sion. If statements taken from an accused were obtained by some lower level
of coercion, those statements may be admitted against the accused if the mili-
tary judge determines the evidence is reliable, probative, and was either ob-
tained in circumstances closely related to combat operations, or was volunta-
ry.89 Under this rule, it seems unlikely that statements obtained while sus-
pects were rendered to CIA "black sites" in third country sites would be
closely related to combat operations. 90
The real issue is whether such statements are voluntary. In considering
whether the statement was voluntary, Rule 304(c) sets out three factors: (1)
the context under which the statement was taken; (2) the personal characte-
ristics of the accused/declarant; and (3) the attenuation between the alleged
coercion and the statement. 9' The attenuation factor seems to have been
created for the express purpose of allowing statements to be admitted and
considered even if coercion was involved. As noted above, federal courts
and military courts-martial have typically taken a much more restrictive view
of attenuation. 92 It is certainly possible and foreseeable that a commissions
judge would determine that a statement given under these circumstances
might be voluntary in a military commission, even if it would not be volunta-
ry or admissible in federal court or a court-martial.
If the statements were made by someone other than the accused and al-
legations are made that the statements were coerced, those statements can be
admitted if: (1) they are reliable and probative; (2) they were not obtained
by coercion that rises to the level of torture, cruel, inhumane, or degrading
treatment; and (3) the admission would satisfy the vague standard of being in
the interests of justice.93 This rule potentially allows for greater admissibility
of statements than would be permissible in the other two forums.
Finally, the rule defines the standards for admitting evidence that was
derived from confessions obtained by torture, cruel, inhumane, or degrading
treatment.94 If derivative evidence is being offered against the accused, the
89. See 10 U.S.C. § 948r(c).
90. The government of course might argue that given the nature of the unique threat
posed by terrorism, the battlefield and combat operations are not limited by space and time
and thus exists at all times and in all places.
91. See IOU.S.C.§948r(d)(l)-(3).
92. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,603-04(1975).
93. See MIL. COMM. R. EvID. 304(b).
94. See id.; see also 10 U.S.C. § 948(r)(a) 2009.
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government must show an independent source for the evidence, prove inevit-
able discovery, or prove that admission of the derivative evidence would be
in the interests of justice.95 It is this "interests of justice" prong that is a sig-
nificant departure from established practice in federal court and military
courts-martial. As detailed above, the independent source and inevitable
discovery doctrines are well recognized.96 Even though these exceptions
may be difficult to establish in situations where the evidence was derived
from coercive interrogations, that possibility exists. But this second, much
broader "interests of justice" basis is not recognized as an independent ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule. Since this standard is so vague and mallea-
ble, it might be much easier for a judge to admit evidence under this standard
that was derived from torture-particularly given the emotionally and politi-
cally charged nature of the offenses with which the terrorism suspect is ac-
cused.
If the derivative evidence came from coercive statements but did not
rise to the level of torture, or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment, the
admissibility of this derivative evidence is even easier. The evidence need
only be relevant and probative, and admission must satisfy the interests of
justice.97 Looking at these rules in light of the challenges for admitting
coerced statements and derivative evidence in federal court and military
courts-martial, the rules seem to be specifically crafted to get around many of
those difficulties.
V. THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM WITH MILITARY COMMISSIONS
One might ask, is this a better approach? It could be argued that creat-
ing this separate system to deal with problematic evidence is a better ap-
proach because it allows for some form of justice, while not as protective as
what would be found in federal court or military courts-martial, but protec-
tive enough. One could also argue it has the added advantage of creating a
completely separate system, so that there is little risk that any dilution of
protections would bleed over into those other forums.
But these arguments warrant close scrutiny. It is important to remember
the problem of admitting confessions and other evidence obtained by torture
and other coercive methods is a problem of our own making. Neither the
suspected terrorists nor the crime of terrorism created the dilemma that we
now face. Our response to the attacks of September 11 th, combined with our
95. See MIL. COMM. R. EVID. 304(b)(3); MIL. COMM. R. EVID. 304(c).
96. See generally Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988).
97. 10 U.S.C. §948(r)(c).
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fear that more attacks might follow, led the government to employ extraordi-
nary renditions and harsh interrogation methods. It is critical to keep this
point in mind as we consider whether creating a separate system allowing for
greater admissibility of this evidence is really the best way to maintain fun-
damental protections against coercive questioning in the regular criminal
justice system.
A system created for the purpose of allowing the government to avoid
the consequences that come from obtaining information in violation of basic
due process protections is morally suspect. This is even more so for the very
reason that the problem was one of the government's own making. The gov-
ernment had a choice not to go down this road and instead to follow a well-
established precedent for the treatment of detainees. In choosing to disregard
that option, the government was certainly aware of the risks. Can a system
of justice be legitimate when, at its core, it is designed to allow the govern-
ment to avoid these consequences?
I would argue that a justice system created under this premise is a sys-
tem that has the greatest potential to dilute fundamental protections not only
for suspected terrorists, but for ordinary citizens who will never face the pos-
sibility of being tried in a military commission. This is so for several rea-
sons.
Concepts of terrorism, terrorist acts, terrorist organizations, unlawful
enemy combatants, unprivileged belligerents, and a host of other terms used
to identify the category of crimes and suspects selected for trial by military
commission, are not clear or precise. If today members of Al Qaeda fit this
category because of the threat they pose to our security, what is to prevent
members of a drug cartel operating on the border of the United States from
being defined as terrorists at some future date and subjected to trial by mili-
tary commission as part of a "war on drugs?" The precedent set by these
military commissions could certainly allow for that.
Second, there is the risk of establishing a precedent that, whenever the
government finds the current protections too restrictive, it will simply create
an alternative means of trying defendants. In reality, this is the unfortunate
legacy of many past military commissions. While military commissions
have a long history in our legal system, it is not necessarily a proud history.
Creating a special set of rules for the current situation creates a new incentive
for the government to both disregard important protections and then avoid
the consequences of those violations.
The government undoubtedly looked to this dubious legacy when it
created the initial commission's procedures. Even though the current round
of military commission's rules are a vast improvement from the first proce-
dures created in early 2002, many of the changes have come only after in-
volvement by the courts and later, by Congress. Even after involvement by
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the courts and Congress, in the end many of the commission procedures were
created for the very purpose of denying-or at least avoiding-fundamental
protections. It is difficult to imagine how a system with such a bad pedigree
could not have a corrosive impact on the protections against coerced testi-
mony. The corrosive impact of creating a completely separate system that
avoids basic protections is not easy to measure, but it is likely not any less
corrosive than some possible dilution of protections that might occur if these
cases are tried in federal court or in a court-martial.
In addition to these problems, trying terrorist suspects in military com-
missions puts this entire legal system in untested waters. Under this system,
there is no controlling precedent to turn to. Commission judges are required
in the first instance to determine if evidence derived from torture should be
admitted in the "interests of justice." There is no telling what this even
means, or how a judge could ever find that such evidence satisfies the inter-
ests of justice. Because there is no precedent for these decisions, judges will
be on their own, and given the broad standard that they are applying, it is
doubtful that these decisions will have consistency or transparency.
Contrast that process with how judges in federal court or a court-martial
would decide the admissibility of confessions. These judges have an estab-
lished body of case law before them on which to base their decisions. Be-
cause of that established precedent, these judges will also be less likely to
take extreme positions, and because their decisions are subject to review
under a well established process, those decisions have the important added
value of transparency. All of these protections will help to ensure that basic
due process protections will not be stretched to the breaking point, either for
those suspected terrorists or for citizens accused of other crimes. No similar
limitations or protections exist if these cases are tried by military commis-
sion.
VI. CONCLUSION
The government under the Bush administration started down a very
troubling path when it opted to engage in extraordinary renditions, torture,
and cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment in hopes of getting confessions
from suspected terrorists. Beyond the important moral and legal issues
raised by engaging in this conduct, there are the second and third order ef-
fects that we are now left to deal with. Whether these effects were fully con-
templated or anticipated at the time is unknown, but now, as we debate
which forum is best suited for trying terrorism suspects, the problems and
challenges have come into focus. If it was not clear before, it certainly is
now that introducing evidence obtained by these means can have a corrosive
effect on our broader legal system.
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When we ask what forum for these trials would have the least corrosive
impact on our system of justice, we see the unfortunate, if not unsurprising,
answer is that introducing evidence that is a product of coercion in any forum
is likely to dilute fundamental protections that all citizens enjoy. One con-
clusion might be that the problems of admitting confessions and derivative
evidence that are the products of torture and coercion are intractable and
there is no forum suitable for these cases. That seems to me to be an extreme
and unrealistic position. That fact is that, for several reasons, the govern-
ment and the public in general expect these suspects to be brought to justice.
If we are going to try them, then we must ask which forum really is best
suited to ensure that they can be brought to justice without jeopardizing fun-
damental protections against coerced confessions.
At first blush, trying terrorist suspects who have been subjected to tor-
ture and other coercive questioning in a separate military commissions sys-
tem seems like a good answer. It compartmentalizes these cases and argua-
bly protects against compromises which are made in this system from bleed-
ing over to more mainstream cases. Closer examination of this issue leads to
a different conclusion. First, the category of who can be tried by military
commission is hardly airtight. Today's criminals can easily become tomor-
row's terrorists if the government sees the threat as serious enough to broa-
den the category.
A system so subject to manipulation is not protective of fundamental
due process rights. There is also the problem that those making the decisions
on questions of admissibility in the military commissions system are without
the guidance of precedent. They are left to their own determinations to apply
concepts so broad as to lack any real meaning. This does not bode well for
the kind of careful and reasoned opinions we have come to expect from
judges in our criminal justice system.
More corrosive than this is the illegitimacy of a system that was created
for the purpose of watering down fundamental protections. The decision to
torture and coerce confessions in order to obtain evidence was wrong. These
are interrogation methods that have long been rejected, and rightly so, in our
system of justice. The errors in resorting to these discarded methods should
not be compounded by creating a system that specifically seeks an end-run
around basic protections in order for this evidence to be admitted. A system
such as this lacks fundamental legitimacy. It is a system that puts the rights
of everyone at risk.
Those who argue that we need to move these cases to military commis-
sions in order to protect the rights of ordinary citizens ignore these even
greater risks of corrosion and dilution. In other words, moving these cases to
military commissions as presently constituted would cause the very result
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that the proponents of that choice claim they want to prevent. On this basis,
military commissions are not the better option.
Introducing or attempting to introduce coerced confessions or derivative
evidence in federal court is problematic. As noted above, even if the court
applied exceptions to the exclusionary as currently formulated, it will be
difficult for much of this evidence to be admitted. Some accommodations
will likely have to be made if this evidence is to be considered. While creat-
ing such accommodations is not ideal, it is certainly less extreme than com-
pletely revamping a justice system for the express purpose of eliminating
fundamental protections altogether.
Even if accommodations are made to admit this evidence in federal
court, there are added protections within the system that will limit the corro-
sive effects of these accommodations. Federal court proceedings are more
transparent than the proceedings we have thus far seen from military com-
missions. By transparency, I am referring to both the courtroom procedures
and the development of the evidentiary and other rules governing those pro-
cedures. I also include the rulings and opinions of federal court judges. Be-
cause of the transparency of both the process and the decisions, federal
judges are bound to more clearly identify and explain when and why they
might be modifying established protections found in the exclusionary rule in
order to admit certain evidence. Moreover, consistency and following estab-
lished precedent are critical aspects of judicial decision-making. Transpa-
rency and consistency thus serve as important checks that are likely to limit
any diluting and corrosive impacts that might otherwise occur from trying
these terrorist suspects in federal court.
In addition to these protections, there are multiple levels of review of
any trial court's decisions and rulings. This review process also helps to
ensure consistency, as well as prevent trial courts from ignoring or diluting
the law in order to reach a desired outcome.
These protections have a double benefit. First, in the trial of the actual
terrorist suspects, these protections will limit the possible corrosive impacts
from occurring. Second, in other, more ordinary trials not involving terrorist
suspects, these checks will limit any accommodations made under the unique
facts of a terrorist case from encroaching into these more ordinary cases.
These various structural protections, anchored in the values of consis-
tency and transparency, would not be nearly as robust in a military commis-
sions system created for the express purpose of watering down fundamental
rights. Put simply, trial in federal court is preferable because the dilution of
rights is less likely in that system than it would be in a military commissions
system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida's system for providing protection and safety to children in the
State's child welfare system has changed over the past decade. Regretfully,
the changes do not appear to have had a significant impact in two areas:
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increasing the safety and protection of children in the system' and providing
children with independent attorneys to advocate on their behalf.2 Investiga-
tions, lawsuits, grand juries, amendments to court rules,3 and newspaper ar-
I. "Florida ranks third in the nation in the rate of children killed by abuse" and neglect.
Sofia Santana, Report: Florida Child Death Rate High, SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 21, 2009, at 6B;
see Kids Count Overall Rank 2010, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND, http://datacenter.
kidscount.org/data/bystate/StateLanding.aspx?state=FL (last visited Apr. 20, 2011); J. KATE
STOWELL, POLICY GRP. FOR FLA.'S FAMILIES & CHILDREN, THE STATE OF FLORIDA'S CHILD: A
REPORT FOR THE FLORIDA CHILDREN AND YOUTH CABINET 5 (2009), available at
http://childrensmovementflorida.org/research/the-state of-floridaschildren/the-state-of-flor
idas child-report.pdf; Daphne Taylor, Murder-Suicide Leaves Six Dead, S. FLA. TIMES (Sept.
28, 2010), http://www.sfltimes.comindex.phpoption=com-content &task=view&id=5431 &
ltemid=199 (describing the failure of Florida Department of Children and Families in protect-
ing children). But see George Sheldon, Secretary Sheldon's Speech to the FCC Conference
(Oct. 28, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.FLchildren.org/news/51671 /Central-NWS-
Secretary-Sheldon's-Speech-to-the-FCC-Confrence.htm); Tom Lyons, Helping Bad Parents
Learn to Become Better, SARASOTA HERALD TRIB., Sept. 28, 2010, at BNI; Jerome Burdi,
Child Abuse Cases Rise in S. Florida-Recession and Reporting System Are Factors in In-
crease, SUN SENTINEL, Jan. 2, 2011, at I B; John Lantigua, DCF Head Defends Agency's Han-
dling of Abused Twins, PALM BEACH POST (Feb. 18, 2011, 9:59 AM), http://www.palm
beachpost.com/news/crime/dcf-head-defends-agencys-handling-of-abused-twins-
1263618.html; Anna Valdes, DCF Looking into Worker in Twins Abuse Case, PALM BEACH
POST (Feb. 19, 2011, 9:10 PM), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/palm-beach/fl-dcf-abuse-
follow-20110219,0,5353291.story. See also DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't. of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 189 (1989). An analysis of the harm to children who do not enter the
Florida welfare system because of the agency's failure to investigate conditions in the home
and remove the children is beyond the scope of this article. According to the Department of
Children and Families' "Quick Facts" publication, the budget of the Office of Family Safety
as of August 30, 2010, was $1,025,913,287.00. FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, DCF
QUICK FACTS 21 (2010) [hereinafter DCF QUICK FACTS], available at www.dcfstate.flus/
newsroomldocs/quickfacts.pdf.
2. For a review of both issues through 2001, see Michael J. Dale, Providing Counsel to
Children in Dependency Proceedings in Florida, 25 NOVA L. REV. 769 (2001) [hereinafter
Dale, Providing Counsel]. A Florida Bar supported effort to provide counsel to some children
in the child welfare system, SB 1860, discussed in this article, never made it out of committee
during the 2010 legislative session. See infra Part IV. According to the 2002 Blue Ribbon
Panel Report on the disappearance of Rilya Wilson, "Sixteen times since 1985, other scandals
have prompted governors to appoint 11 special panels and state's attorneys to convene...
separate grand juries, to investigate DCF or its predecessor ... ,the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services. Now this gubernatorial panel, the 12th, has answered a governor's
call to do the same." BLUE RIBBON PANEL, BLUE RIBBON PANEL REPORT (2002) [hereinafter
BLUE RIBBON PANEL REPORT]; see also 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1261-62
(I 1th Cir. 2003). For a discussion of the latest DCF review, see Anna Valdes, DCF Head
Names 3 to Review Agency's Handling of Dead Girl, Injured Boy, PALM BEACH POST (Feb.
21, 2011, 5:45 PM), http://www.palmbeachpost.connews/crime/dcf-head-names-3-to-
review-agencys-handling- 1271212.html.
3. See generally In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Judicial Admin., the Fla. Rules
of Juvenile Procedure, and the Fla. Rules of Appellate Procedure-Implementation of the
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ticles continue to demonstrate the myriad failures in the Florida system.4
Two notorious examples hi-lite the shortcomings: 5 the cases of the foster
child, Rilya Wilson, who disappeared in 2001, and Gabriel Myers, who was
found dead by hanging in his foster home in 2008. Rilya Wilson's disap-
pearance produced articles around the country and a detailed investigation
which has exposed serious flaws in Florida's child welfare system.6 The
Wilson case produced legislation, the Rilya Wilson Act, which requires
coordination between the Department of Children and Families (DCF) and
community-based providers with local school readiness coalitions and li-
censed early education child care providers.7 The Act also dramatically in-
creased the prominence and significance of the role of the Guardian Ad Li-
tern Program (GAL Program).
Comm'n on Dist. Court of Appeal Performance and Accountability Recommendations, 24 So.
3d 47 (Fla. 2009) [hereinafter In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Judicial Admin.].
I wholeheartedly concur with the Court's adoption of the recommendations of the Commission
on District Court Performance and Accountability to address ongoing issues of unnecessary
delay in dependency and termination of parental rights appeals. The Commission's recom-
mendations and this Court's adoption of these amendments are based on the recognition that
for every day of delay on appeal, which is added to the length of the prior ongoing court pro-
ceedings, the future of the child is in limbo to his or her potential detriment.
Id. at 52 (Pariente, J., concurring); see, e.g., Settlement Agreement Between Plaintiffs and
Defendant Big Bend Community Based Care, Inc., Foster Children Susan C. v. Dep't of
Children & Families, No. 27-2006-CA-00076 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 2006) [hereinafter Settlement
Agreement]; see also Dale, Providing Counsel, supra note 2, at 784; BLUE RIBBON PANEL
REPORT, supra note 2; 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1255.
4. Who's Financially Responsible: DCF or Private Contractors?, DAILY Bus. REV.
(May 27, 2010, 2:30 AM), http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/PubArticleDBR.
jsp?id=1202469823751&hbxlogin=l; Kelli Kennedy, Florida Case Could Hold Private
Firms, Insurers Liable for Foster Kids' Injuries, INS. J. (May 26, 2010),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast2010/05/26/110185.htm; DCF Launches
Probe Into Death of Child Found in Cooler, 2WESH.com, (Jan. 26, 2011, 11:56 AM),
http://www.wesh.com/news/26631951/detail.html; Foster Care Tot Suffers Skull Injury, SUN-
SENTINEL, Feb. 10, 2011, at lB.
5. A third example of deficiencies in the system came to light as this article was under-
going a final edit by the Nova Law Review. Carol Marbin Miller, State Steps in Less, and
More Kids Die, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 26, 2011), http://www.miamiherald.com/20ll/02/24/v-
fullstory/2087601/state-steps-in-less-and-more-kids.html; Valdes, supra note 2; Child Abuse
Investigation of the Barahona Twins: DCF's "Ugly Past", PALM BEACH POST,
http://www.palmbeachpost.comnews/1284134.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2011); John Lanti-
gua, Guardian Claims He Was Pulled from Barahona Case with No Explanation, PALM
BEACH POST (Feb. 25, 2011, 11:59 AM), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/guardian-
claims-he-was-pulled-from-barahona-twins- 1280905.html.
6. See Abby Goodnough, Woman Accused of Killing a Missing Child in Florida, N.Y.
TimES, Mar. 17, 2005, at A24; see also BLUE RIBBON PANEL REPORT, supra note 2.
7. FLA. STAT. § 39.604(3) (2010).
8. See BLUE RIBBON PANEL REPORT, supra note 2.
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Seven-year old Gabriel Myers was found hanged in the bathroom of the
foster home in which he lived while being administered a number of psycho-
tropic medications.9 His death resulted in a DCF investigation, which pro-
duced a report containing 107 findings related to shortcomings in the child
welfare system's approach to children with mental health medication is-
sues. I0 The central finding in the report was: "It is clear that, throughout his
9. Fred Grimm, So Much Bluster, But Foster Drug Nightmare Goes On, MIAMI
HERALD, May 2, 2010, at IB; Tom Lyons, In Another Tragic Death, Another Lesson for DCF,
SARASOTA HERALD TRIB., June 2, 2009, at BNI; Carol Marbin Miller, Child-Welfare Panel:
Drugs Misused on Foster Kids, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 13, 2009, at 7A.
10. GABRIEL MYERS WORK GRP, FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, REPORT OF
GABRIEL MYERS WORK GROUP ON CHILD-ON-CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 3 (May 14, 2010) [herei-
nafter GABRIEL MYERS REPORT MAY 2010], available at http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/initiatives/
GMWorkgroup/docs/Gabriel%20myers%20COC%20report%20May%2014%20201 0.pdf.
First, it does not appear in the report that an expert in suicidology was an active resource.
This is a particularly significant shortcoming because research discloses that the number of
suicides by children ages 5-7 in 2007 in the United States was 2 out of a population of ap-
proximately 12 million. WISQARS Injury Mortality Report, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/fatal.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2011) (Fol-
low "Fatal Injury Reports 1999-2007" hyperlink; then select "suicide" and "custom age range
5 to 7"; then follow "submit request" hyperlink). See also SUICIDE PREVENTION CTR., WHAT
FOSTER PARENTS CAN DO TO PREVENT SUICIDE (Dec. 2010), http://www.sprc.org/
Featuredresources/customized/pdf/FosterParents.pdf. Second, additional findings were that:
"While the child's [GAL] [is] responsib[le] for ascertaining and informing the court of the
child's position, it is not clear that this is happening [on a regular and consistent basis]. Fur-
thermore, not all [foster] children . . .have a [GAL]." GABRIEL MYERS WORK GRP., FLA.
DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, REPORT OF GABRIEL MYERS WORK GROUP 12 (Nov. 19, 2009)
[hereinafter GABRIEL MYERS REPORT Nov. 2009], available at http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/
initiativeslGMWorkgroupldocs/GabrielMyersWorkGroupReportO82009Fina.pdf.
The Work Group heard a number of advocates express their view that the court
should appoint an attorney for each child whose mental health needs suggest use of psycho-
tropic medication. BERNARD P. PERLMU'ITER, THE ROLES OF THE CHILD'S ATTORNEY AD
LITEM AND THE CHILD'S PERSPECTIVE IN PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATION HEARINGS 4-5 (Aug. 5,
2009), available at http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/initiatives/GMWorkgroup/docs/meeting
080509/BPGMYERSPRES_20090810113031 .pdf. Further, many proffered that the best
practice is for all children in dependency to be appointed an attorney (with sufficient training
and experience to provide meaningful and effective assistance of counsel). See id. at 12. The
problem of lack of counsel is magnified when one reviews Florida Administrative Rule 65c-
35.005 entitled "Child Involvement in Treatment Planning." FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65C-
35.005 (2010). Under the regulation, the only way a child may obtain counsel is if "a child of
sufficient age, understanding, and maturity declines to assent to the psychotropic [drugs]" or
"[w]henever the child requests the discontinuation of the psychotropic medication, and the
prescribing physician refuses to order the discontinuation .... Id. r. 65C-35.005(3)(b), (4).
In both situations, the matter must be referred to a DCF CLS lawyer who shall request an
attorney be appointed. Id. The ethical issues this raises for lawyers representing DCF should
be obvious.
[Vol. 35
30
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss2/1
RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN
placement in foster care, and although he was attended by many well-
meaning professionals, Gabriel Myers was 'no one's child'. ... No [] indi-
vidual or agency became a champion to ensure that he was understood and
that his needs were identified and met in a timely manner."'" It appears that
Myers had not been appointed an independent attorney, although two differ-
ent individuals had acted as his guardian ad litem (GAL). 12
Two years earlier, the Florida Statewide Advocacy Council reviewed
1180 DCF family files and determined that 652 or more of the children were,
or had been, on psychotropic medications.13 This information was filed with
the Supreme Court of Florida and resulted in an amendment to the Florida
Rules of Juvenile Procedure, requiring hearings for children receiving such
medication.14 However, that number appears to have increased. In a non-
final report in August 2010, DCF reported approximately 2583 children from
ages zero to seventeen were being prescribed psychotropic medications.' 5
The Florida media also regularly reports on other deaths and injuries in the
An effort to correct the perceived psychotropic medication issue in the Florida Legis-
lature, in the Spring of 2010, failed. S.B. 1860 2010 Leg. (Fla. 2010) (died in Comm. on
Children, Families, & Elder Affairs Apr. 30, 2010); H.B. 1567 2010 Leg. (Fla. 2010) (died in
Health Care Servs. Policy Comm. Apr. 30, 2010); Grimm, supra note 9; Carol Marbin Miller
& Marc Caputo, Effort to Protect Children from Overmedication Fails, MIAMI HERALD, Apr.
30, 2010, at7B.
11. GABRIEL MYERS REPORT Nov. 2009, supra note 10, at 4.
12. See id. at 5-6. It is significant that the Myers tragedy arose despite the presence of
two GALs, given that the 2002 Blue Ribbon Report on the Rilya Wilson matter found imple-
mentation of a robust GAL Program to be central to the correction of children's foster care
problems. See BLUE RIBBON PANEL REPORT, supra note 2. Inexplicably, the Gabriel Myers
report contains no discussion of the role of the GALs in the case. The Myers report also re-
commends that DCF "[i]dentify and hold accountable a champion, normally the case manag-
er, to ensure the child is treated as a prudent parent would treat their own child." GABRIEL
MYERS REPORT Nov. 2009, supra note 10, at 6 (emphasis added). This irony is now com-
pounded by the fact that under the current contract between DCF and the private lead agencies
in the Florida child welfare system, legal decision making rests with DCF CLS lawyer and not
with the case manager. See Contract between Fla. Dep't of Children & Families and Child &
Family Connections, Inc., 45 (July 1, 2009) [hereinafter Contract] (on file with Nova Law
Review).
13. Jan Pudlow, Court Examines Representation for Foster Kids, FLA. BAR NEWS (Dec.
1, 2006), http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNNews0l.nsf (search "Court Examines
Representation for Foster Kids"; then follow hyperlink).
14. In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 952 So. 2d 517, 522 (Fla.
2007) (Pariente, J., concurring) (per curiam).
15. DCF QUICK FACTS, supra note 1, at 20. A 2010 Bill suspended the procedures go-
verning administration of psychotropic drugs. H.B. 1567 2010 Leg. (Fla. 2010) (died in
Health Care Servs. Policy Comm. Apr. 30, 2010).
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child welfare system.' 6 More recently, Florida has moved toward a reduction
of the number of children in foster care. 7 However, Florida still ranks low in
comparison to other states in national surveys of child welfare services. 8
Most importantly for the discussion here, since 2000 there has been al-
most no change in the system of independent legal representation of children
in child welfare proceedings in Florida.19 Children in Florida still have no
absolute right to an independent attorney as a matter of case law precedent,
state statute, or public policy. 20 Thus, independent legal representation takes
place, if at all, on an ad hoc basis if the trial judge so decides. 2' This is the
case despite the fact that the Florida GAL 2009 Annual Report states in the
first paragraph on the first page that the child's "champion is the GAL Pro-
gram. The Program is uniquely independent. Even as the volunteer learns
the child's wishes, and . . .express[es] [his or her] wishes to the court, the
Program is not bound by [those] wishes. Our only obligation ... is to advo-
cate for the child's best interest.
22
16. 23-Month-Old Dies in Foster Care, NEws4JAx.CoM, (Apr. 22, 2005),
http://www.news4jax.com/news/4407580/detail.html; Carol Marbin Miller, Cries for Help Go
Unheeded by DCF by Design, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 29, 2009, at IA; Michael Mayo, 2003
Child Abuse Tally: 81 Dead, Infinite Heartbreak, SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 19, 2004, at I B; Carol
Marbin Miller et al., DCF Lapses Proved Fatal for 37 Kids, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 3, 2002, at
I A; Foster Care Tot Suffers Skull Injury, SUN-SENTINEL, supra note 4.
17. Erik Eckholm, Florida Shifts Child-Welfare System's Focus to Saving Families, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2009, at Al 2.
18. Kids Count Overall Rank-2010, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., http://datacenter.
kidscount.org/data/acrossstates/Rankings.aspx?ind=37 (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
19. Compare id. (showing Florida's nationwide ranking in 2010 at thirty-five out of fifty
states), with Kids Count Overall Rank-2002, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND.,
http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/acrossstates/Rankings.aspx?loct=2&by=v&order=a&ind=
137&dtm=10657&tf=13 (last visited Apr. 20, 2011) (showing Florida's nationwide ranking in
2002 at thirty-five out of fifty states). Limited exceptions include the Foster Children's
Project (FCP) of the Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach County and the Legal Aid Service of
Broward County Dependency Law Project, which represent some children in dependency
proceedings. LEGAL AID SOC'Y OF PALM BEACH CNTY., INC., FOSTER CHILDREN'S PROJECT 2
(2009), available at http://www.legalaidpbc.org/downloads/brochures/Foster-Childrens-
Project.pdf; Children's Advocacy Project, LEGAL AID SERV. OF BROWARD CNTY., INC.,
http://www.legalaid.org/broward/childrens-advocacy.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
20. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.217; In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 87 (Fla. 1980); Dale, Providing
Counsel, supra note 2, at 770.
21. SeeFLA.R.Juv.P. 8.217.
22. FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM 2009 ANNUAL
REPORT 2 (2009) [hereinafter GAL 2009 REPORT], available at http://www.guardianadlitem
.org/documents/GAL-2009AnnualReport.pdf (emphasis added). This statement is particularly
ironic because in November the report of the Gabriel Meyers work group stated that what was
needed for each child was "a champion." GABRIEL MYERS REPORT Nov. 2009, supra note 10,
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On the other hand, counsel for the parents employed by the Office of
Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel (Office of Regional Counsel),
DCF, and the State of Florida's GAL Program have each dramatically ex-
panded and changed since 2000. In addition, an inexplicable oddity in Flori-
da is that the GAL Program has been statutorily named as a free-standing
independent party in a dependency and termination of parental right (TPR)
case2 3 with attorneys of its own, separate from the child who, although unre-
presented by an attorney, is also a party.24 The child is, therefore, the only
unrepresented party in a dependency proceeding. 2 As this article shall dem-
onstrate, the Florida system is fundamentally flawed. It is a gerry-rigged
scheme that produces irreconcilable ethical conflicts for the attorneys work-
ing in the system, is pragmatically unworkable, and most importantly, inde-
fensibly denies children the right to an independent attorney to represent
them.
This article begins with a statement of the problem and then provides an
overview of changes in the Florida child welfare system since 2000. It fo-
cuses on changes in the approach to legal representation in the GAL Pro-
gram, DCF, and the system of providing attorneys for parents now known as
the Office of Regional Counsel. It then reviews the irreconcilable conflicts,
confusion, and serious ethical constraints faced by the attorneys practicing in
the system; reviews the current professional thinking as to the role of attor-
neys for children outside the State of Florida; discusses Florida constitutional
principles that entitle children to attorneys; and then concludes by arguing in
favor of providing independent attorneys for all children in Florida from the
beginning of a dependency case through TPRs.
1U. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The right to an attorney is one of America's most basic civil, legal privi-
leges. Yet, children in Florida have no absolute right to independent attorney
at 6. Myers had two GALs whom the GAL Annual Report says are "champion[s]" for the
child. See id.
STANDARDS OF OPERATION 23. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(51) (2010). Florida is one of only
three states that uses this approach; the others are Ohio and Oklahoma. See OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2151.281 (2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-4-306 (2010). The Florida scheme would
be impossible in the Federal Court system because of the case and controversy clause of the
United States Constitution, Article III, Section 2, Clause I. See Muskrat v. United States, 219
U.S. 346, 351, 353-55 (1911) (citing U.S. Const. art. Ill, § 2, cl. I); see also Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968).
24. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(51).
25. See GAL 2009 REPORT, supra note 22, at 4.
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representation in dependency and termination of parental rights cases.26 The
majority of child advocate attorneys argue that attorneys for these children
should represent their clients' "expressed wishes" rather than "best interest"
and that children are entitled to be heard in court.27 Most representation and
determinations under a best interest model "take[] place without the child
being heard, without the necessary resources, and without the trained, quali-
fied investigation and deliberation that would best serve the child. 28
A child's attorney "provides legal services for a child and . . . owes all
of the same duties that are due [to] an adult client, including undivided loyal-
ty, confidentiality, diligence, conflict of interest, communication, duty to
advise, and competent representation. 29  Under the traditional, client-
directed, or expressed wishes model, the attorney-client evidentiary privilege
applies.3" Attorneys are governed by ethics rules that impose a duty includ-
26. See CHILDREN'S ADVOCACY INST. & FIRST STAR, A CHILD'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL: A
NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN
7 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter NATIONAL REPORT CARD, SECOND EDITION], available at
http://www.caichildlaw.org/misc/final-rtc 2nd-editionjIr.pdf.
27. Id. at 17.
28. CHILDREN'S ADVOCACY INST. & FIRST STAR, A CHILD'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL: FIRST
STAR'S NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR CHILDREN 5 (1st ed. 2007),
[hereinafter NATIONAL REPORT CARD, FIRST EDITION], available at http://www.firststar.org/
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ZhOLWwpfvRA%3d&tabid=74. In 2007, thirty-seven states and
other U.S. jurisdictions provided for counsel either as best interest representation or traditional
counsel. JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS:
ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS 59 (3d Int'l ed. 2007); see also CHILD WELFARE
INFORMATION GATEWAY, REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
PROCEEDINGS: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS 6 (2009), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/
systemwidelaws-policies/statutes/representall.pdf. New York has provided counsel for child-
ren since the 1960s. Claire Sandt Chiamulera, New York Legislation Lowers Caseloads for
Children's Attorneys, 26 A.B.A. CHILD L. PRAC. 124, 124 (2007). For a detailed analysis of
the position of the Legal Aid Society of the City of New York that children have independent
attorneys, see generally GARY SOLOMON, LEGAL AID SOCIETY, GIVING THE CHILDREN A
MEANINGFUL VOICE: THE ROLE OF THE CHILD'S LAWYER IN CHILD PROTECTIVE, PERMANENCY
AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PROCEEDINGS (2010), available at http://www.legal-
aid.org/media/6845 I /role%20of%20jrp%201awyer%2010-08.pdf; COMM. ON CHILDREN & THE
LAW, N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR ATTORNEYS REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN NEW
YORK CHILD PROTECTIVE, FOSTER CARE, & TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PROCEEDINGS
(2007), available at http://www.nysba.org/am/template.cfm?section=law-guardian-represent
ationstandards&template=/cm/contentdisplay.cfm&contentid= 1559. In Pennsylvania,
children have had the right to counsel since 1972. Lucy JOHNSTON-WALSH ET AL., ASSESSING
THE QUALITY OF CHILD ADVOCACY IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS IN PENNSYLVANIA 9 (2010)
(citing Stapleton v. Dauphin Cnty. Child Care Serv., 324 A.2d 562, 566 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974),
overruled in part by In re G.C., 673 A.2d 932, 939 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996), aff'd per curiam,
735 A.2d 1226 (Pa. 1999)).
29. NATIONAL REPORT CARD, SECOND EDITION, supra note 26, at 151.
30. FED. R. EVID. 502; FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (2010).
34
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ing, but not limited to, maintaining the child's confidences, counseling, and
advising the client.31 The attorney abides by the child client's expressed
wishes concerning the objectives of the representation, counseling him or her
on those objectives. 32 If an attorney reasonably believes that the child's ex-
pressed wishes conflict with the child's legal interests, including being con-
trary to the child's best interests, and the attorney has been unable in his or
her efforts to successfully counsel and advise the client, and a child cannot
adequately act in the child's own interest as described in the Florida Rules of
Professional Conduct, then as a last step the attorney may seek to have a
GAL appointed to advocate for the child's legal interests.33 Alternatively, an
attorney may ethically withdraw from representation. 34 The American Bar
Association (ABA) has made it clear that a "nonlawyer guardian ad litem
cannot and should not be expected to perform any legal functions on behalf
of a child. 35
According to a 2009 report by the Washington, D.C. based nonprofit
organization First Star, 63% of the states mandated the appointment of attor-
neys for the child.36 Fifty-one percent of the states mandated that the child's
attorney, when appointed, serve in a client-directed capacity.37 Since First
Star's first report in 2007, seventeen states improved their state laws govern-
ing children client-directed legal representation for child victims in depen-
dency court and foster care proceedings.38 According to First Star, nationally
between 2007 and 2009 the number of states providing independent attorney
representation to children increased.3 9 Florida was not among them. n° In
31. MODELRULES OF PROF'L CONDUCTR. 1.4, 1.14 (2003).
32. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4, 1.14; R. REG. THE FLA. BAR R. 4-1.14
(1993); Katherine Hunt Federle, Righting Wrongs: A Reply to the Uniform Law Commis-
sion's Uniform Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Custody Proceedings Act,
42 FAM. L.Q. 103, 106 (2008).
33. Federle, supra note 32, at 106. ABA Model Rule 1.14(b) provides greater guidance
to the lawyer. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(b). It says: "[w]hen the lawyer
reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical,
financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client's own
interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including ... appoint-
ment of a [GAL]." Id.
34. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b).
35. AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN
IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES 2 (1996) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE], availa-
ble at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/family/reports/standards-abuse
neglect.authcheckdam.pdf.
36. NATIONAL REPORT CARD, SECOND EDITION, supra note 26, at 8.
37. Id.
38. Id. at9.
39. Compare NATIONAL REPORT CARD, FIRST EDITION, supra note 28, at 13, with
NATIONAL REPORT CARD, SECOND EDITION, supra note 26, at 8.
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fact, in First Star's first report, Florida received a grade of an F.4 Then, in
First Star's second report, Florida again received an F.42
As things stand now, the Florida system is structured in a manner that
provides no attorney for a child, but does provide GAL Program representa-
tion of the child's best interest in dependency proceedings through a separate
party, the GAL Program, with whom the child has no legal relationship rec-
ognized under American law.43
lII. OVERVIEW OF RECENT CHANGES IN FLORIDA
A. Recent History
The Florida Legislature has declared "that the health and safety of
children [is] of paramount concern" in the administration of child welfare
services." However, when it comes to the representation of children in the
dependency system, Florida law establishes a system of competing interests
between what is best for the child and the child's legal rights. Florida law
provides that children in foster care have a GAL who is a separate party.45
As a matter of practice, the GAL Program is appointed as the party to
represent the child's best interests.46 It then assigns a GAL, usually a volun-
teer layperson, for the child. 47 The GAL Program then also assigns a staff
40. NATIONAL REPORT CARD, FIRST EDITION, supra note 28, at 33.
41. Id.
42. NATIONAL REPORT CARD, SECOND EDITION, supra note 26, at 46. Florida's GAL
Program Executive Director, Theresa A. Flury, stated: "The Report also fails to acknowledge
that when the child's ability to make decisions in regard to representation is impaired, accord-
ing to the Florida Bar Rules, an attorney may have to act as 'de facto guardian' for that child."
Press Release, Theresa A. Flury, Fla. Statewide Guardian Ad Litem Office, Florida's Guar-
dian Ad Litem Program Rejects Florida's Grade (Oct. 2009), http://www.guardianadlitem.org/
documents/FinalPressRelease 101609.pdf [hereinafter GAL Rejects Grade].
43. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.402(8)(c), .822(1) (2010); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.215; In re D.B., 385 So.
2d 83, 87 (Fla. 1980). In effect, under Florida law one represents another party. See FLA.
STAT. §§ 39.402(8)(c), .822(1); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.215; In re D.B., 385 So. 2d at 87.
44. FLA. STAT. § 39.4085.
45. Id. § 39.01(51);FLA.R.Juv.P. 8.215.
46. FLA. STAT. § 39.4085(20). The term "attorney ad litem" (AAL) is rarely used nation-
ally. It is defined in Florida as "an attorney who has completed any additional requirements as
provided by law. The AAL shall have the responsibilities provided by law." FLA. R. Juv. P.
8.217(c). The attorney is appointed "to represent the child in any proceeding." FLA. R. Juv.
P. 8.217(b); see, e.g., TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 34A (West 1956). In Arkansas, attorneys ad
litem represent children in abuse and neglect cases. See Administrative Order No. 15, ARK.
JUDICIARY, https://courts.arkansas.gov/adlitem/public/order_15.cfm (last visited Apr. 20,
2011).
47. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.215(b)-(c).
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attorney to represent it.48 An "attorney ad litem" (AAL) may only be ap-
pointed, in the discretion of the court, to represent the child's legal inter-
ests.49 As the following discussion illustrates, children are rarely appointed
an independent attorney.
Since 2000, the argument in Florida over what kind of "representation"
dependent children should have in dependency proceedings, GALs, AALs,
or a combination of both, has been the subject of sharp debate. 50 As one
judge who sat as a member of the Florida Bar Commission on the Legal
Needs of Children Representation Subcommittee said in 2001, while GALs
are required to advocate the child's wishes to the court, they "are duty bound
to recommend what [is in the] best [interest of] the child, not necessarily
what the child wants.' Some juvenile court judges in Florida oppose across
the board independent representation of children by attorneys.5 2 One judge
has called it "'harmful to children,' unnecessary, and too expensive to be
feasible,"53 and argued that only some children, not all, need an AAL.
54
Another judge has stated that she "does not believe that every child in her
courtroom needs an attorney. 55 One judge explained that "a lawyer is bound
by the attorney-client privilege to keep the secret as the client wishes. But a
GAL can tell the child's secret without violating any ethical canons-and is
actually prohibited from advocating contrary to the safety of the child.
56
This judge argued further that under the lawyer-driven model, "lawyers ei-
ther violate their ethics or hurt children. 57 The judge also said, "Where we
48. Id.
49. Id. at 8.217(a), (b).
50. See Jan Pudlow, Should All Children in Court Be Represented?, FLA. BAR NEWS
(Nov. 1, 2001), http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/jnnews0l.nsf (search "Should All
Children in Court Be Represented"; then follow hyperlink); James H. Seals, Legal Represen-
tation of Children in Dependency Proceedings Presented to the Legal Subcommittee of the
Task Force For Fostering Services; Michael J. Dale & Louis M. Reidenberg, Letters to The
Florida Bar News, Lawyers for Kids, FLA. BAR NEWS (Apr. 15, 2010),
http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/jnnews0l.nsf (search "Lawyers for Kids"; then fol-
low hyperlink dated Apr. 15, 2010); Gary Blankenship, Lawyers v. GALS-What Is Best for a
Child in Dependency Court?, FLA. BAR NEWS (Jan. 1, 2010), http://www.floridabar.org/
DIVCOM/JN/jnnews01.nsf (search "Lawyers v. GALs-What Is Best for a Child in Depen-
dency Court?"; then follow hyperlink).
51. Pudlow, supra note 50; see also FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.215(c)(3).
52. Pudlow, supra note 50.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Jacqueline Charles, Changes Sought for Child Guardian Program, MIAMI HERALD,
Feb. 18, 2002, at l B.
56. Pudlow, supra note 50.
57. Id. While provocative, these statements demonstrate a fundamental failure in under-
standing lawyers' ethics. For a discussion of this topic, see infra Part IV.
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differ is when it comes to the best interest of the child. If the model is attor-
ney-driven, you cannot have best interest. 58 Another judge has said that
lawyers representing children will argue that their client should get a tattoo.59
In an earlier article, one of the authors of this article argued that the best in-
terest of the child versus the child's stated interest is a "red herring," and that
attorneys should be hired in every case.60 Both authors of this article support
this proposition. Finally, at one time an attorney who lobbies the Legislature
to fund advocacy programs stated, "Every child needs a well-trained lawyer.
... We can't pick and choose which children should be saved. 61
Over the past decade, public policy decisions have resulted in expansion
of the GAL Program in Florida rather than instituting a system of indepen-
dent attorneys for children. When it amended Chapter 39 to establish the
Statewide GAL office in 2003, the Legislature found "that the Governor's
Blue Ribbon [Panel] concluded that 'if there is any program that costs the
least and benefits the most, this one is it,' and that the volunteer is an 'indis-
pensable intermediary between the child and the court, between the child and
DCF.' 62
These legislative findings are suspect for a number of reasons. First, re-
search discloses no objective documentation supporting the Blue Ribbon
Panel's findings.63 Second, at the time the Legislature relied upon the Blue
Ribbon Panel findings to increase funding,64 the GAL Program consisted
almost exclusively of volunteers, and its funding was limited. Today, the
Legislature funded budget of the program, with a large full-time staff, ex-
ceeds $30 million.65 Third, at the time the Legislature relied upon the Blue
Ribbon Panel findings, there was no other program existing in Florida with
which to compare the GAL Program in terms of benefits and costs. Finally,
58. Id.
59. Blankenship, supra note 50.
60. See Dale, Providing Counsel, supra note 2, at 813.
61. FLA. BAR, COMM'N ON THE LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN 9 (2002), available at
http://www.fl oridabar.org/TFB/TFB Resources.nsf/Attachments/07 1834628281 0A0985256BE
A00684438/$FILE/finalLNCversionfromJan%20website%20file.pdf?OpenElement [hereinaf-
ter LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN].
62. FLA. STAT. § 39.8296(1)(c) (2010) (amended 2003) (quoting BLUE RIBBON PANEL
REPORT, supra note 2).
63. The Panel appears to have based its opinion upon the statements of a number of wit-
nesses who urged the Panel to place GALS among its highest priorities and statistics in DCF
District II. See generally BLUE RIBBON PANEL REPORT, supra note 2.
64. FLA. STAT. § 39.8296(l)(c).
65. Research discloses various other sources of statewide GAL Program income in indi-
vidual counties from, for example, a series of foundations, such as Voices for Children, and in
kind contributions from the counties. A detailed discussion of GAL funding follows at Part
III(B) infra.
[Vol. 35
38
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss2/1
2011] RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN
the Legislature made no independent findings to support its conclusion, per-
haps because there is very little professional literature supporting the effec-
tiveness of GALs or CASAs in child welfare cases.'
In fact, to date the Legislature has not mandated, nor has there been, an
objective in-depth study of the effectiveness of the GAL Program; still, the
debate continues. The following discussion summarizes the ongoing debate
about attorneys for children in Florida.
66. One seeking such professional literature is faced with scant results. See generally
e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., FINAL REPORT ON THE VALIDATION AND
EFFECTIVENESS STUDY OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION THROUGH GUARDIAN AD LITEM (1994);
CALIBER Assocs., EVALUATION OF CASA REPRESENTATION (2004), available at
http://www.nccpr.org/reports/casa.pdf; ORG. RESEARCH SERVS., EVALUATION OF COURT
APPOINTED SPECIAL ADVOCATES/GUARDIANS AD LITEM VOLUNTEER IMPACT 1 (2005), availa-
ble at http://nc.casaforchildren.org/files/public/community/judges/Judges-Survey-Full Report.
pdf; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. AUDIT DIV., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL COURT-
APPOINTED SPECIAL ADVOCATE PROGRAM, (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/
oig/reports/OJP/a0704/final.pdf; OFFICE OF PROGRAM EVALUATION & GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OF THE MAINE STATE LEGISLATURE, REPORT No. SR-GAL-05, PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF
GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTION CASES-PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
CONTROLS NEEDED TO IMPROVE QUALITY OF GUARDIAN SERVICES, AND ASSURE EFFECTIVE
ADVOCACY OF CHILDREN'S BEST INTERESTS (2006), available at http://www.maine.gov/
legis/opega/reports/Guardians ad-litem/GAL%20Final%20Report.pdf; S.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY
LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COUNCIL, A REVIEW OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA GUARDIAN AD LITEM
PROGRAM (2007), available at http://lac.sc.gov/NR/rdonlyres /35476BBD-2BC0-4C4F-
879B-EFC0IF296ABE/01 GAL.pdf; OFFICE OF THE FAMILY & CHILDREN'S OMBUDSMAN,
REPORT ON GUARDIAN AD LITEM REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS § 1 (1999), available at http://www.govemor.wa.gov/ofco/reports/
ofco_199901.pdf; ERIK S. PITCHAL ET AL., NAT'L ASS'N OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN,
EVALUATION OF THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM SYS. IN NEBRASKA (2009), available at
http://ppc.nebraska.edu/userfiles/fileDocuments/projects/GuardianLB961 /NACC%20(Report
%20plus%2OAppendices).pdf. One empirical study which will result in such literature is in
the works. The Children's Bureau of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
"awarded the University of Michigan Law School a five-year, 5 million dollar grant to serve
as the National Quality Improvement Center on the Representation of Children in the Child
Welfare System (QIC-ChildRep)" in 2009. National Quality Improvement Center on the
Representation of Children in the Child Welfare System, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH.,
http://www.law.umich.edu/CENTERSANDPROGRAMS/CCL/Pages/NationalQualitylmprov
ementCenterontheRepresentationofChildrenintheChildWelfareSystem.aspx (last visited Apr.
20, 2011) [hereinafter QlC-ChildRep], FY 2009 Children's Bureau Discretionary Awards,
ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ef/programsfund/
discretionary/2009.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). The study was approved "to gather, de-
velop, and communicate knowledge on child representation that presents the strengths and
weaknesses of varying methods of representing children, promotes consensus on the role of
the child's legal representative, and provides an empirically based analysis of how legal repre-
sentation for the child might best be delivered." QIC-ChildRep, supra; see also PITCHAL ET
AL., supra, at 179-80.
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1. The Bar Commission
In 2002, the Florida Bar Commission on the Legal Needs of Children, a
committee composed of a variety of child advocates, issued a report with
recommendations to improve Florida's system of child representation in
court proceedings.67 The Commission found that "[c]hildren should have
Legal Counsel and/or a [GAL] represent them in court whenever their inter-
ests may be at stake" in child abuse, neglect, and TPR cases.68 While judges
should maintain discretion to appoint counsel for children in certain proceed-
ings, the Commission advocated that judges "shall" appoint legal counsel
"[i]n cases where the state is seeking commitment or placement of a depen-
dent child, for longer than 24 hours" in a staff-secure or physically secured
facility.
69
"Children in court proceedings have specific legal needs and rights, and
often they are the only unrepresented party," the Commission said.70 "Child-
ren are entitled to the same zealous advocacy adult clients expect of their
lawyers. Yet, too often, children come to court powerless, with no one
representing them at all .... Judges are left to make life-altering decisions
about a child without sufficient information to back up sound decisions.
"'Florida needs to catch up with the majority of states that protect children
by providing them counsel. . . . [It is] the only way that Florida can protect
against tragedies in the lives of children in foster care, and shorten the
amount of time they stay in care."' 72
In 2002, the Florida Bar Commission on the Legal Needs of Children's
Representation Subcommittee supported Senate Bill 686 to provide attorneys
for abused and neglected children in dependency proceedings with the goal
that "no child go unrepresented in court. 73 The bill would have increased
the GAL Program budget by $12 million but it was pulled before it was
heard by the House.74 Judge Kathleen Kearney, former secretary for DCF
67. See generally LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN, supra note 61.
68. Id. at 10.
69. Id. at 11.
70. Id. at 6.
71. Id. at 5; Thomas Tryon, Kids in Court: Into the Lion's Den, Without Legal Counsel,
SARASOTA HERALD TRIB., Aug. 4, 2002, at Fl (quoting LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN, supra
note 61, at 5).
72. Carol Marbin Miller, Lawyers Sought for Kids in State Care, MIAMI HERALD, Nov.
21, 2001, at 1 B (quoting Howard Talenfeld, a Broward County child advocate).
73. Jan Pudlow, Bill to Double GAL Budget Down but, Maybe, Not Out, FLA. BAR NEWS
(Apr. 15, 2002), http://www.floridabar.orglDIV/COM/JN/JNNews0I.nsf/Articles7BCE5713
787C8BB085256B950049EE6A.
74. Id.
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and a former juvenile court judge, was an opponent of the bill and was said
to be "of the opinion there are too many lawyers in the courtroom right
now." 75 She was quoted as saying, "There are some areas of the country
where every child gets an attorney and in the fight in court, the child's well-
being, safety, and permanency get lost. It ends up not being about the child,
but about who wins. '76 Judge Kearney felt that the best way to represent
children is through GALs and that attorneys should only be appointed at the
judge's discretion.77
Even though Senate Bill 686 did not pass in 2002, the GAL Program
budget was increased by $7.5 million. 8 $1.7 million of this funding was
used to finance the Ninth Judicial Circuit AAL Project in Orange County,
where GALs were appointed in every case and attorneys were appointed on a
case-by-case basis in the judge's discretion.7 9 "Of the $7.5 million for legal
representation for children, 'only about $3 million of that [was] actually ear-
marked for attorneys, and the majority of that [was] ear-marked for attorneys
for the GAL Program.' 8 0 The program was discontinued after one year.8 '
2. The Blue Ribbon Panel
In 2002, Governor Jeb Bush convened a Blue Ribbon Panel on Child
Protection to investigate Florida's child welfare system after the disappear-
ance of Rilya Wilson. 82 The five-year-old disappeared from Florida's foster
care system for sixteen months before it was discovered that she was miss-
ing, and that she had neither a GAL nor an attorney.83 At the time of her
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. This statement appears to be at odds with the New York experience where all
children have been provided with independent counsel since the late 1960's. Merril Sobie,
The Child Client: Representing Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 22 ToURo L. REV.
745, 752 (2006); Erik Pitchal, Children's Constitutional Right to Counsel in Dependency
Cases, 15 TEMPLE POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 663, 665 (2006).
78. Jan Pudlow, New Money Appropriated for Dependency Cases, FLA. BAR NEWS (July
1, 2002), http://www.floridabar.orgIDIVCOM/JN/JNNews0I.nsf/Articles/8B6575674B76FD
B885256BE30068DDCD.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Jan Pudlow, Children's Programs Take a Hard Hit, FLA. BAR NEWS (June 15, 2003),
http://www.floridabar.org/DlVCOM/JN/JNNewsO 1 .nsf/Articles/53964376F5B661 Al 85256D
410073BF5A.
82. Carol Marbin Miller, Legislators Reluctant to Fund Child Welfare, MIAMI HERALD,
May 15, 2002, at 2B; FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, 25 YEARS OF CHILD ADVOCACY 14
[hereinafter GAL 25 YEARS OF CHILD ADVOCACY], available at http://www.guardian
adlitem.org/forms/GAL25thReport.pdf.
83. BLUE RIBBON PANEL REPORT, supra note 2; Miller, supra note 82.
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disappearance, it was estimated that 50% of dependent children did not have
a GAL. 84 The Blue Ribbon Panel also found DCF to be "'underfunded, un-
derstaffed, underappreciated' and 'overworked . . . overburdened, over-
whelmed."' 85  It found that Florida's child protection system had been
through twenty-two revisions in thirty-three years.86
"[T]he panel recommended that the Florida Legislature set among its
highest priorities the full funding of the [GAL] Program [so] that every child
under [DCF supervision] [w]ould have a GAL. 87 The Legislature then reite-
rated the unsupported statement of the Governor's Blue Ribbon Panel that
"'if there is any program that costs the least and benefits the most, this one is
it,' and that the GAL volunteer is an 'indispensable intermediary between the
child and the court, between the child and DCF.' ' 88 As noted, research dis-
closes no documentary support for this statement. 89
Since its inception, the GAL Program had been supervised by court ad-
ministration within the circuit courts. 90 However, this was perceived as a
conflict of interest because the program was being supervised by judges be-
fore whom the GALs were to appear.9' As a result of the Blue Ribbon Pan-
el's finding, a Statewide GAL Office was created within the Justice Admin-
istrative Commission in 2004, in order to "provide a statewide infrastructure
to increase functioning and standardization among the local programs cur-
rently operating in the [twenty] judicial circuits. '92
3. Privatization
In the late 1990's the Florida Legislature enacted legislation, entitled
"PRIVATIZATION," championed by then-Governor Jeb Bush, to turn
around the foster care services system in Florida which had been tarnished
by scandal for many years.93 The legislation expressed the specific intent
84. Miller, supra note 82.
85. Commentary, More Reforms in Order for Child Protection System, TAMPA TRIB.,
June 2, 2002, at 2.
86. Id.
87. GAL 25 YEARS OF CHILD ADVOCACY, supra note 82, at 14.
88. FLA. STAT. § 39.8296(I)(c) (2010); Sarah Herald, Carol Licko, Sister Jeanne
O' Laughlin, & David Lawrence, Chair, Blue Ribbon Panel Report (2002).
89. See supra note 65, and accompanying text.
90. FLA. STAT. § 39.8296(I)(b).
91. Id.
92. Id. § 39.8296(2), (l)(d).
93. FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, BRIEFING BOOK 10 (2006) [hereinafter
BRIEFING BOOK, available at http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/admin/publications/docs/visionvalue
voices2006full.pdf; Alvin W. Wolfe, What's Wrong With Florida's Child Welfare System?
They Kept the Communities Out of Community Based Care, FLA. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
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that DCF privatize or outsource (i.e., contract with competent community
based agencies) "the provision of foster care and related services state-
wide." 94 The legislation provided a three year time period within which to
phase in and accomplish "privatization" statewide, beginning on January 1,
2000. 9' The process was intended to transform a child welfare system that
had been monopolized by government and charities through combining and
outsourcing foster care and related services to service agencies with in-
creased local ownership of both service delivery and design.96 Services were
to be provided by not-for-profit-lead agencies that developed and managed
comprehensive, community based-networks of providers who were equipped
to deliver all services and supports necessary to meet the needs of child vic-
tims and their families.97 Protective investigation remained with the state or
a few sheriff departments.98
The lead agencies were to have the capacity to carry out a number of
tasks, including: "family preservation, independent living, emergency shel-
ter, residential group care, foster care, therapeutic foster care, intensive resi-
dential treatment, foster care supervision, case management, postplacement
supervision, permanent foster care, and family reunification." 99 Safety of
children was to be, at all times, the foremost concern.1l° The impact of this
change as it relates to the need for attorneys for children is clear. First, an
outside private agency with different perspectives and leadership impacts the
quality and quantity of care children receive in foster care. It is one step
removed from DCF, and accountability becomes more attenuated.
Second, the standard DCF contract with lead agencies provides that
Children's Legal Services (CLS), which defines itself as a "statewide law
BD., INC., http://www.fhhsb.orgWhat%201s%20Wrong%20with%20Florida.html (last visited
Apr. 20, 2011); see KATHRYN ALBOwIcz, FLORIDA'S EXPERIMENT WITH PRIVATIZING CHILD
WELFARE SERVICES 2 (2004), available at http://www.afscme.org/docs/flchild.pdf. (criticizing
privatization, but citing to other studies).
94. FLA. STAT. § 409.1671(1)(a) (2010).
95. Id. The label describing this process was also changed by the 2000 Florida Legisla-
ture from "privatization" to "community based child welfare" and then thereafter changed to
"community based care." For a discussion of the underlying reasons for the changes, see
Wolfe, supra note 93.
96. Children, Youth and Families, FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, http://www.dcf.
state.fl.us/programs/cbc (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
97. Id.
98. FLA. STAT. § 39.3065 (2010).
99. Id. § 409.1671(1)(a).
100. EVALUATION OF COMMUNITY-BASED CARE IN FOSTER CARE AND RELATED SERVICES
IN FLORIDA, at v (2001), available at http://www.dcf.state.fl.usladnrinlpublications/docs
executive summary-toc.pdf.
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firm,"'0 ' has all "legal decision-making authority pertaining to any depen-
dency and termination of parental rights proceeding from inception to com-
pletion."'10 2 This scheme adversely affects children because it places tradi-
tional child welfare party decision-making in the hands of a non-party client-
less state-wide law firm within the Department--CLS. 0 3 Put differently, it is
as though CLS lawyers are representing themselves.'O°
4. The 2010 Bar Bill
Beginning in 2008, the Legal Needs of Children Committee of the Flor-
ida Bar began developing proposed legislation to provide counsel to children
in some dependency and TPR cases.' °5 Relying on the work of this Commit-
tee, the Florida Bar through its then president announced its strong support
for the Committee's Bill. 0 6 The 2010 bill provided that children would be
represented by attorneys in certain articulated cases, including children who
have been in and out of home care for more than two years and in whose
cases no TPR petition has been filed, children with developmental disabili-
ties, and children faced with psychotropic medication.0 7 Significantly, it did
not include children when they first entered the child welfare system. 10 8 The
101. Contract, supra note 12, at 44.
102. Id. at 45.
103. See DEP'T OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES LEGAL WORKGROUP, REP. OF THE DEP'T OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES LEGAL WORKGROUP 17-18 (Sept. 17, 2007) (on file with Dep't of
Children and Families) [hereinafter LEGAL WORKGROUP].
104. See Contract, supra note 12, at 44. At the same time, Exhibit B of the lead agency
contract states key parties and the critical witnesses in the case are the case managers and
child protective investigators. Id.
105. See Fla. Comm. on Fla. Children First for the Fla. Bar Standing Comm. on the Legal
Needs of Children, Ch. 39.820 (Proposed draft of July 18, 2008) (on file with the Nova Law
Review) [hereinafter Fla. Children First].
106. Gary Blankenship, Bar to Support Legislation to Provide Lawyers for Kids in Depen-
dency Court, FLA. BAR NEWS (Jan. 1, 2010), http://www.floridabar.orgfDlVCOM/
JN/jnnews01 .nsf (search "Bar to Support Legislation to Provide Lawyers for Kids in Depen-
dency Court"; then follow hyperlink); Julie Levin, Lawyers Go to Bat for Children in State
Care, MI I HERALD, July 26, 2009, at 6BE.
107. S.B. 1860 2010 Leg. (Fla. 2010) (died in Comm. on Children, Families, & Elder
Affairs Apr. 30, 2010). At some point in the legislative process this category of child was
removed from the bill. See generally id.
108. See id. The authors of this article opposed the Bill. Michael J. Dale & Louis M.
Reidenberg, Op-Ed., All Florida's Abused Kids Deserve Lawyers, SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 28,
2010, at 4F. Curiously, one of the major supporters of the Bill was quoted as saying, "[floster
care is like being in the ocean . . .[t]he longer children are there, the better chance they'll
drown." Blankenship, supra note 50. One would have thought that this view would have
justified a provision in the bill that all children receive an independent attorney at the begin-
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bill died when it reached the Committee on Children, Families, and Elder
Affairs.' 9 Thus, by the fall of 2010, children in Florida still had no right to
independent legal representation, while substantial changes had, however,
occurred in the legal representation of the other three parties in Chapter 39
proceedings-the GAL Program, DCF, and parents.
B. The Guardian Ad Litem Program
Florida's system of GAL participation in dependency proceedings has
dramatically changed since 2001. In order to understand how Florida's GAL
Program works, it is first important to understand its sources of funding. The
origin of the GAL approach to child protection is the federal Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act of 1975 (CAPTA)," 0 a federal funding statute.
In compliance with the federal law, in 1984 Florida enacted juvenile court
rules "[r]equiring that the appointed GAL represents the best interests of the
child as opposed to representing the child within the context of the counsel-
client relationship."1 1
To receive funding under CAPTA, a state must have:
provisions and procedures requiring that in every case involving an
abused or neglected child which results in a judicial proceeding, a
[GAL], who has received training appropriate to the role, and who
may be an attorney or a court appointed special advocate who has
received training appropriate to that role (or both), shall be ap-
pointed to represent the child in such proceedings.
12
Although CAPTA does not clearly delineate the duties a GAL must per-
form, CAPTA does specify two purposes for which a GAL must be ap-
pointed: "to obtain first-hand, a clear understanding of the situation and
needs of the child; and to make recommendations to the court concerning the
ning of a dependency case, as the authors of this article argued when the bill was pending and
argue now. Id.
109. Florida Senate Website Archive-S1860 Attorney Representation for Children,
http://archive.flsenate.gov/session/index.cfm?Mode=Bills&SubMenu= 1 &BlMode=ViewBill
lnfo&BillNum=1860&Year=-2010 (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a (2006). CAPTA was recently reauthorized by Congress. Clara
Totenberg Green, Congress Reauthorizes Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act and the
Family Violence Prevention and Services Act, LEGAL MOMENTUM (Dec. 14, 2010),
http://egalmomentum.typepad.com/blog/2010/12/congress-reauthorizes-child-abuse-
prevention-and-treatment-act-and-the-family-violence-prevention-an.html.
11l. Petition of the Fla. Bar to Amend the Fla. Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 462 So. 2d
399, 426 (Fla. 1984) (per curiam) [hereinafter Petition of the Fla. Bar].
112. § 5106(a)(b)(2)(xiii) (emphasis added).
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best interests of the child."'"1 3 The law allows attorneys to be GALs."4 The
law does not say anything about the issue of the attorney representing the
child as a traditional client with the ethical obligations that attach to it. It
may be argued that a state that allows CAPTA funds to pay for traditional
attorneys to represent children is not in compliance with the law. However,
as Professor Katherine Hunt Federle has noted, no state has ever been found
to be out of compliance for this reason." 5 Florida, as this article explains,
has spent a nominal amount of state GAL Program funds on traditional attor-
neys for children.
Florida has authorized, but never met, the mandate of 100% GAL "re-
presentation" required under CAPTA." 6 Litigation to successfully enforce
CAPTA is unlikely because several federal courts have held that there is no
private right of action under the statute.'17 The remaining remedy, asking the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to cut off funding to Florida, is un-
likely. 18 Despite the federal and state mandates that each child in judicial
dependency proceedings be appointed a GAL, in 2009 there were approx-
imately 5400 children in the dependency system with no advocate." 9 Even
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. See Donald N. Duquette, Legal Representation for Children in Protection Proceed-
ings: Two Distinct Lawyer Roles are Required, 34 FAM. L.Q. 441, 442 n.2 (2000) [hereinafter
Duquette, Two Distinct Roles].
115. Federle, supra note 32, at 108; see generally DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H.
RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY AND PRACTICE (4th ed. 2010); See also
Prefatory Note to UNIF. REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND CUSTODY
PROCEEDINGS ACT 1-10 (amended 2007), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bl/
archives/ulc/rarccda/2007_final.pdf.
116. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.402(8)(c)(1), .807(2)(b)(3) (2010); see also Michael J. Dale,
Juvenile Law: 1998 Survey of Florida Law, 24 NOVA L. REV. 179, 190 (1999) (collecting
opinions stating that failure to appoint a GAL is not reversible error). GAL long range pro-
gram plan projection indicates that 100% GAL appointments will not even be achieved by
2015. STATEWIDE GUARDIAN AD LITEM OFFICE, LONG RANGE PROGRAM PLAN: FISCAL YEARS
2010-2011 THROUGH 2014-2015 4 (2009). This projection seems to be at odds with DCF
report that the number of children in care has decreased.
117. See 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11 th Cir. 2003); Dale, Provid-
ing Counsel, supra note 2, at 779-80. But see Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Guiliani, 929 F.
Supp. 662, 683-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd by 126 F.3d 372 (2d. Cir. 1997); Henry v. Willden,
No. 2: 10-cv-00528-RCJ-PAL, 2010 WL 4362809, at *14 (D. Nev. Oct. 26, 2010); Rodwell v.
Cleveland, No. 08-11437, 2010 WL 1417775, at *5 n.5 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 5, 2010); Hilbert v.
Cnty. of Tioga, No. 3:03-CV-193, 2005 WL 1460316, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. June 21, 2005) (hold-
ing that CAPTA does not provide enforceable rights); Woods v. G.B. Cooley Hosp. Serv.
Dist., No. 07-0926, 2007 WL 4812054, at *3 (W.D. La. Dec. 10, 2007).
118. See note 120 infra.
119. See Press Release, Fla. Statewide Guardian Ad Litem Office, Statewide Guardian Ad
Litem Program Executive Director Marks First Six Months (July 8, 2009) [hereinafter GAL
First Six Months], available at http://www.guardianadlitem.org/documents/PressRelease
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though there is a deficiency, according to the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services Administration for Children and Families, the State will
continue to receive federal funding as long as the governor is making diligent
efforts towards 100% representation.
120
The agency responsible for administration of CAPTA grant funds in
Florida is DCF.I2 ' In 2001, the GAL Program budget was $14.1 million. 22
By 2006-07, the budget had increased to $34,349,313.23 In 2000, a GAL
was actually only involved in 58% of the cases in which the GAL Program
was appointed. 124 The highest number of children represented came in 2007,
when 32,520 children had a GAL, but this number has steadily declined,
according to the Program, due to budget cuts even though the Program con-
sists primarily of volunteers. 25 In 2007-08, the budget was reduced by 4%,
and in 2008-09 it was reduced by an additional 3.2%, totaling over $2.5 mil-
lion in cuts. 126 Furthermore, 4% of the 2007-08 existing appropriation was
withheld. 27 In 2008, the program stated that it was going to request an addi-
tional $5 million in funding in order to comply with the statutory mandate
that all children have a GAL. 28 However, the funding was not received, and
the GAL Program was reduced by an additional 7.5% for the 2009-10 fiscal
07.08.09.pdf. In its 2009 Annual Report, the Program said that it represented eighty percent
of the children under dependency court jurisdiction. GAL 2009 REPORT, supra note 22, at 12.
120. Telephone Interview with Carola Pike, Child Welfare Program Specialist, Atlanta
Region, Admin. for Children & Families (Aug. 17, 2009).
121. See FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, CHILD & FAMILY SERVICES PLAN 2010-
2014 117 (June 30, 2009) [hereinafter CHILD & FAMILY SERVICES PLAN], available at
http://centerforchildwelfare.fmhi.usf.edu/kb/resource/Child%20and%2OFamiily%20Services%
205%2OYear%20Plan%202010%20-%202014.pdf; see FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES,
FLORIDA CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION & TREATMENT ACT (CAPTA) STATE PLAN 8-4 (2004),
available at http://www.uky.edu/SocialWork/crp/states/fl/Floridas2004CAPTAPlan.pdf.
122. OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY, REPORT No. 02-
10, INFORMATION BRIEF: GUARDIAN AD LITEM PLACEMENT MAY SHIFT FOR REASONS OF
FUNDING AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST 2 (2002) [hereinafter INFORMATION BRIEF], available at
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/MonitorDocs/Reports/pdf/021 Orpt.pdf.
123. STATEWIDE GUARDIAN AD LITEM OFFICE, LONG-RANGE PROGRAM PLAN 13 (2007)
[hereinafter 2007 LONG-RANGE PROGRAM PLAN], available at http://www.justiceadmin.org/
gal/GAL%20-LRPP%202008-09%2OFinal.pdf.
124. INFORMATION BRIEF, supra note 122, at 2.
125. FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM 2008 ANNUAL
REPORT 6 (2008) [hereinafter GAL 2008 REPORT], available at http://www.guardianadlitem
.org/documents/GAL2008AnnualReport.pdf.
126. Id. at 2.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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year to a total of $31,986,200.00.129 The total state legislative funded budget
for the GAL Program was $30,427,288. °
For the fiscal year 2009-10, the State received $1,978,011 in CAPTA
funds. 13 ' The CAPTA funds are used by DCF for other child welfare pur-
poses and not for the GAL Program. Nor does the GAL Program receive the
$818,800.00 in funds received by the State of Florida under the federal
Children's Justice Act.132 The federal Children's Justice Act grants to states
the power to develop, establish, and operate programs that improve investi-
gation and prosecution of child abuse and neglect cases. Some states use
these funds to train lawyers who represent parties in these cases. 133 Some
states use the funding to support child advocacy centers or support child fa-
tality review teams. 134 The GAL Program also has resources beyond its state
legislative allocation of funds. These include free office space, county dona-
tions, foundation support, and corporate and public giving. State legislation
has allowed the Statewide GAL Office to "create a direct-support organiza-
tion" to raise funds, obtain grants, gifts, and bequests of various types includ-
ing securities and property for the Statewide GAL Office.135 The GAL Pro-
gram has also developed a series of direct-support non-profit organizations to
129. GAL First Six Months, supra note 119; STATEWIDE GUARDIAN AD LITEM OFFICE,
LONG RANGE PROGRAM PLAN 6 (2009), [hereinafter 2009 LONG RANGE PROGRAM PLAN],
available at http://www.guardianadlitem.org/documents/2009-201OLongRangeProgramPlan
_000.pdf; see also Government Program Summaries: Justice Administrative Commission
Guardian Ad Litem Program, OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY, http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/profiles/1016 (last updated May 5, 2010)
[hereinafter Government Program Summaries] (stating GAL Program Budget is
$30,747,537.00).
130. Government Program Summaries, supra note 129.
131. See CHILD & FAMILY SERVICES PLAN, supra note 121, at 144. It does not appear that
any of the CAPTA funds are actually used to fund either GALs or attorneys for children.
CAPTA funds are spent by DCF for other child welfare purposes. Telephone Conversation
with Darrell Vabaldo, Chief of Resource Mgmt., Family Safety and Preservation Servs., Dep't
of Children & Families, (Dec. 23, 2010); E-mail from Darrell Vabaldo, Chief of Resource
Mgmt., Family Safety and Preservation Servs. to Author, DCF (Dec. 1, 2010, 12:59PM) (on
file with Nova Law Review).
132. See E-mail from Vabaldo to Author, supra note 131; 42 U.S.C. § 5106(c).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 5106(c). Some of these funds are to be used to establish a state task
force on children's justice.
134. Florida spent $515,800 on the DCF Summit. Other funds support the state task force
on children's justice. See E-Mail from Joe Frolick, Communications Director, DCF to Refer-
ence and Instructional Services Librarian, Nova Southeastern Univ. Shepard Broad Law Ctr.
(Dec. 1,2010, 1:23PM) (on file with Nova Law Review).
135. FLA. STAT. § 39.8298(1) (2010). Government Program Summaries, supra note 129.
According to Nathan Ray, the Florida GAL Foundation spent $22,649 on lobbying in 2009.
See FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM SHORT FORM TAx RETURNS (2009); Telephone Conversa-
tion with Nathan Ray, Legislation Dir., GAL Program (Dec. 22, 2010).
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raise private funds for its mission. 36 The GAL Program Annual Report does
not appear to report any of this non general revenue funding income, which
amounts to $6,316,190.49.137
In addition to funding, one needs to understand the role of the GAL
Program in a dependency proceeding in Florida. GALs represent the best
interests of children in court proceedings. 138 Although GALs appear in court,
they do not represent the child in the sense that the law recognizes that term.
Rather, they "represent" to the court what they believe is in the best interests
of the child. 39 Most GALs are volunteer lay people. Attorneys also can
volunteer as GALs. But when they do, they do not have an attorney-client
relationship with the child, do not represent the child's legal interests, have
no confidential relationship with the child, and may not provide legal advice
to the child.' 4° The GAL Program has staff attorneys who appear in court,
but they represent the GAL Program, not the child. 14' Although Florida's
136. GAL 2008 REPORT, supra note 125, at 29. There are 22 foundations working with the
GAL Program statewide. See id. at 29-30. For example, Voices For Children Foundation,
Inc. of Miami, in its fundraising literature, states that: "[GALs] are trained, court-appointed
adults who [represent the best interests of] abused, abandoned, and neglected children in-
volved in dependency court proceedings." Press Release, Voices For Children Found., Voices
for Children Foundation Welcomes Nelson F. Hincapie as Its New President & CEO (May 28,
2009) (on file with Nova Law Review). Voices for Children Foundation raises funds to sup-
port the GAL Program in their efforts to ensure our children have a voice in dependency court
and that their immediate needs are met. Id.; see GAL 2008 REPORT, supra note 125, at 29. In
2009, the Foundation spent $30,657.00 on lobbyists. See Voices for Children 2009 Tax Re-
turn.
137. Nor does the Report contain any valuation of the economic amounts of the services
provided by the volunteer GALs.
138. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.402(c)(1), .820(1); see also Volunteer: Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, http://www.guardianadlitem.org/vol-faq.asp
(last visited Apr. 20, 2011). Curiously, the mission of CLS is to "advocate in the best interests
of children to achieve permanency, stability and security." About the Department: Children's
Legal Services and Counsel for Kids Reference Guide, FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES,
http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/admin/cls/refGuides.shtml (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
139. See M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90, 96 n.16 (Fla. 2000), in which the GAL Program
argued an amicus against application of increased due process protections through Baker Act
requirements to located mental health facility placements for children in the dependency sys-
tem. But see Florida Guardian Ad Litem 2010 Annual Report which states that the Program
provides advocacy that pursues the child's "legal" interests as well as the child's "best" inter-
ests. FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LrrEM 2010 ANNUAL
REPORT 4 (2010) [hereinafter GAL 2010 REPORT], available at http://www.guardian
adlitem.org/documents/GALAnnualReport201 0.pdf.
140. STATEWIDE GUARDIAN AD LITEM OFFCE, STANDARDS OF OPERATION 15 (2006) [he-
reinafter STANDARDS OF OPERATION] ("[GAL] staff and volunteers shall not . . . give legal
advice or otherwise practice law in their capacity as a [GAL], unless the [GAL] is an attor-
ney.").
141. GAL 2009 REPORT, supra note 22, at 4.
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statutory scheme also allows for the appointment of an AAL to represent the
child's legal interests, this is discretionary with the court and is rarely exer-
cised, as this article demonstrates.
42
The next concept to understand is the statutory scheme under which the
GAL Program operates. Chapter 39 and the Florida Rules of Juvenile Proce-
dure define a GAL in inconsistent and contradictory ways. First, a GAL is
defined as:
a certified [GAL] program, a duly certified volunteer, a staff attor-
ney, contract attorney, or certified pro bono attorney working on
behalf of a [GAL] or the program; staff members of a program of-
fice; a court-appointed attorney; or a responsible adult who is ap-
pointed by the court to represent the best interests of a child in a
proceeding ... who is a party to any judicial proceeding as a rep-
resentative of the child, and who serves until discharged by the
court. 1
4 3
The next section of Chapter 39 inconsistently states: "A [GAL] shall be
appointed by the court at the earliest possible time to represent the child in
any child abuse, abandonment, or neglect judicial proceeding, whether civil
or criminal. ' 44 The section of Chapter 39 dealing with taking children into
custody and shelter hearings states: "At the shelter hearing, the court shall..
* [a]ppoint a [GAL] to represent the best interest of the child, unless the court
finds that such representation is unnecessary. 145 In addition to the defini-
tional inconsistency, the section's reference to the court's authority to not
appoint a GAL runs counter to CAPTA, the federal funding statute that
makes the appointment mandatory. 146 Florida, of course, has never had a full
assignment of GALs. 4 7 Under Florida law, the court can also discharge the
GAL at the dependency dispositional hearing, also apparently in violation of
CAPTA. 14 8 At the TPR proceeding, Chapter 39 states that, among the duties
of the GAL, is to "represent the best interests of the child until the jurisdic-
tion of the court over the child terminates or until excused by the court.' 4 9
142. Id. at 20.
143. FLA. STAT. § 39.820(1) (2010) (emphasis added); see also FLA. R. JIy. P. 8.215(b)
(stating "[t]he court shall appoint a [GAL] to represent the child in any proceeding as required
by law.").
144. FLA. STAT. § 39.822(1) (emphasis added).
145. Id. § 39.402(8)(c)(1).
146. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(xiii) (2006).
147. GAL 2009 REPORT, supra note 22, at 12 (stating an 80% representation rate); see also
Dale, Providing Counsel, supra note 2, at 791-92.
148. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.521(1)(d)(5), .621(10)(f).
149. Id. § 39.807(2)(b)(3) (emphasis added).
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The GAL or GAL Program representative is to "review all disposition rec-
ommendations and changes in placements and must be present at all critical
stages of the dependency proceeding or submit a written report of recom-
mendations to the court."'' 5 0 GALs are either volunteers or members of the
staff of the GAL Program acting as parties in child welfare proceedings.' 5'
In June 2009, the GAL Program had nearly 8000 volunteers who represent
the best interests of 27,000 abused and neglected children throughout the
state; 52 according to latest reports, in about 85% of the cases.5 3
Attorneys who volunteer for the GAL Program may
represent the child's best interests as the [GAL], with support from
a case coordinator and a program attorney;.., utilize their area of
expertise to assist the GAL Program, including probate, special
education, guardianship, immigration, administrative law and ap-
peals; [or they] can represent the child in a regular attorney-client
relationship as the attorney ad litem (AAL). 154
The Florida GAL Program materials state that attorneys who volunteer as
GALs do "not owe a duty of confidentiality to the child, and [they advocate]
for what [they] believe is in the child's best interest, rather than what the
child wants.' 55 As of August 2008, there were approximately 700 lawyers
volunteering as GALs.
156
150. Id. § 39.822(4).
151. See id. § 39.820(1); GAL 2009 REPORT, supra note 22, at 4; GAL 2008 REPORT,
supra note 125, at 5.
152. GAL First Six Months, supra note 119; Volunteer: Frequently Asked Questions,
supra note 138.
153. Government Program Summaries, supra note 129.
154. Pro Bono Attorneys: Frequently Asked Questions, FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM
PROGRAM, http://www.guardianadlitem.org/probono-faq.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
155. Id.
156. Jan Pudlow, Attorneys Needed for Aging-out Foster Kids, FLA. BAR NEws (Aug. 1,
2008) http:/lwww.floridabar.orgDIVCOMIJN/JNNewsOl.nsf (search "Attorneys Needed for
Aging-Out Foster Kids"; then follow hyperlink). In Orange County, GALs volunteer through
the Legal Aid Society of the Orange County Bar Association rather than through the Florida
GAL Program. See Guardian ad Litem, Legal Aid Soc'y of the Orange Cnty Bar Ass'n,
http://www.legalaidocba.org/probono/Guardian.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). Only attor-
neys are appointed as GALs in Orange County. Id. This is an anomaly. "By law, the GAL is
actually a party to the dependency proceeding, so an attorney GAL is, in effect, an attorney
representing himself or herself, not an attorney for the child." John R. Hamilton, Letters,
GALS, 29 FLA. BAR NEWS 1, Jan. 1, 2002. But see In Re Conservatorship For William J.
Allen, No.E2010-01625-COA-RIO-CV (Tenn. App. 2010). There are currently 390 pro bono
attorneys and 7 GAL staff attorneys representing 1200 children in Orange County. See Email
from C. Nicholson, to Rebecca Rich, Reference and Instructional Services Librarian, Nova
Southeastern Univ. Shepard Broad Law Ctr. (Jan. 19, 2011) (on file with Nova Law Review).
20111
51
: Nova Law Review 35, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
It is also important to understand how attorneys operate within the GAL
Program. The Florida GAL Program employs approximately 145 staff attor-
neys.'57 According to its literature, "[P]rogram attorneys represent the best
interests and protect the legal interests of children in all phases of court pro-
ceedings from trial through the appellate process."'
158
As this article demonstrates, as a matter of legal standing and legal eth-
ics, the Florida GAL Program attorneys do not and cannot represent the legal
interest of children in dependency or TPR proceedings. There is no statutory
authority enabling them to act on behalf of the legal interests of children.
159
Curiously, however, substantial GAL Program literature says that they do.'r6
For example, in a letter rejecting the First Star Report referred to earlier in
this article, the then GAL Program Executive Director stated:
The Report also fails to acknowledge that when the child's ability
to make decisions in regard to representation is impaired, accord-
ing to the Florida Bar Rules, an attorney may have to act as "de
The pro bono attorneys are asked to accept 2 new cases per year. Id. Each case may have
between I and 7 children. Id. The program receives $659,681.28 in GAL Program contracted
services. See Email from C. Nicholson to Rebecca Rich, supra.
157. Telephone Conversation with Theresa Flury's Office, Former Exec. Dir., Guardian
Ad Litem Program (Apr. 2009). For the past five years GAL Program lawyers have handled
appeals. In one case, an appellate court commented on the role of the GAL lawyer. Dep't of
Children & Families v. S.T., 963 So. 2d 314, 315 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (raising the
issue of whether the GAL Program had standing). In another appeal, the GAL Program de-
scribed itself as "the child's lawyer." See Initial Brief of the Guardian Ad Litem Program at 4,
D.O. v. S.M., No. 4D07-2663 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2007).
158. GAL 25 YEARS OF CHILD ADVOCACY, supra note 82.
159. The GAL Program describes itself as "having a dedicated appellate division to
represent the best interests of children whose cases are appealed." FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM
PROGRAM, FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2010) [hereinafter GAL
2010 REPORT], available at http://www.guardianadlitem.org/documents/GALAnnualReport
2010.pdf. Apparently, "[tihe appellate team makes an appearance in every appeal in which
the GAL Program is appointed in the trial court." Id. This may be the case even when the
issue on appeal has nothing to do with best interests of the child. See e.g., B.T. v. Dep't of
Children & Families, 16 So. 3d 940 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
160.
In order to help guide the advocacy team and leave 'no stone unturned' regarding the child's
legal needs and best interests, the Program utilizes a comprehensive tool called the Advocacy
Framework. The Advocacy Framework is a critical checklist that ensures the advocacy team is
reviewing all aspects of a child's case and making the best recommendations to the court re-
garding the child's placement; mental, physical, and educational needs; and legal and best in-
terests.
GAL 2010 REPORT, supra note 159, at 4 (emphasis added).
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facto guardian" for that child. In this event, the attorney's repre-
sentation would duplicate that of Florida's [GAL] Program.,
61
This statement by the former executive director, an attorney, mischarac-
terizes the concept of legal representation of a client. The child does not
have an attorney in Florida. The child is not the client of the GAL Program.
There is no simpler way to put it. To say the attorney for the GAL Program
duplicates the attorney for a child as a "de facto GAL," demonstrates a fun-
damental misunderstanding of the Florida Rules of Professional Responsibil-
ity. 162 This fundamental misunderstanding has existed since the inception of
the Program and continues to this day. 163 The GAL Program lawyer's client
is the GAL Program, according to the GAL Program Attorney Standards of
Practice. 64
The Statewide GAL Office Standards of Operation state that:
161. GAL Rejects Grade, supra note 42.
162. See FLA. R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.14 (1993). But see GAL Rejects Grade, supra note
42. A powerful example of the distinction is found in a recent Fourth District Court of Appeal
case. See R.F. v. Dep't of Children and Families, 50 So. 3d 1243 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2011). A child in foster care, through his GAL, petitioned the court of appeal for a writ of
certiorari to review a juvenile court order that the boy return to Florida because his continued
stay in New York where he was living successfully with his paternal uncle and aunt violated
the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. Id. at 1243. Despite the fact that the
boy's GAL believed staying with the uncle was in the boy's best interest, CLS and the GAL
Program, through its attorney, argued that "[m]aking an exception in this case would [be]
contrary to this child's best interest as it would be contrary to the best interest of any child."
Id. at 1244-45. The appellate court rejected this argument on the facts and the law. Id. at
1245. The case demonstrates first what could happen when a child does not have an indepen-
dent attorney, and second why neither the GAL nor the attorney for the GAL Program can
adequately represent the child.
163. At least one Florida appellate court has questioned, in dicta, the standing of the GAL
Program on appeal. See Dep't of Children & Families v. S.T., 963 So. 2d 314, 315 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2007). "Because DCF has joined in this petition, we set aside any doubts we
may harbor about GALP's standing or authority in its own name-rather than through the
party represented by a [GAL]-to seek review of orders in these proceedings. Id. at 315; see
also Job Posting for Florida GAL, Executive Director, (on file with Nova Law Review) (stat-
ing among other job qualifications, the ability to "ensure effective legal advocacy and in-
creased representation of children," and the "[a]bility to determine the feasibility or desirabili-
ty of new concepts of ... service delivery designed to preserve the civil and constitutional
rights and fulfill other needs of dependent children"). This statement is contradicted by the
statutory mandate of section 39.820 of the Florida Statutes, which states that the GAL Pro-
gram "is appointed by the Court to represent the best interests of a child in a proceeding as
provided for by law." FLA. STAT. § 39.820(1) (2010).
164. STATEWIDE GUARDIAN AD LITEM OFFICE, GUARDIAN AD LIrEM PROGRAM AT- ORNEY
STANDARDS OF PRACTICE 1.4.1 (2006) [hereinafter ATTORNEY STANDARDS OF PRACTICE].
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From a legal perspective, the volunteer or case coordinators are the
authorized constituents for the GAL Program for purposes of Rule
4-1.13, Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. Therefore, the program
attorney is bound by Rule 4-1.2, Rules Regulating The Florida
Bar, and must abide by the decisions of the volunteer or case coor-
dinator regarding the objectives of representation and must consult
with them regarding the means by which the objectives are pur-
sued.165
The Statewide GAL Program literature also states that GAL Program
staff attorneys provide GALs with legal guidance and represent the GALs,
not the children, at evidentiary hearings.' 66 In fact, the GAL Program attor-
neys represent the GAL staff as employees or agents of the GAL Program
and the volunteers as representatives of the program.
167
C. The Department of Children and Families and Its Lawyers
In 1989, the Supreme Court of Florida required that the state agency,
then known as the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS),
receive adequate legal representation at every stage of the dependency pro-
ceeding. 168 Prior to that time, contested dependency cases were handled by
either the State Attorney or the HRS (now DCF) lawyers. 69 Uncontested
proceedings, however, were handled by non-lawyer HRS caseworkers.
70
After studying the impact of allowing non-lawyer caseworkers to handle
uncontested dependency proceedings, a Supreme Court of Florida committee
determined that allowing non-lawyers to handle these proceedings created
inadequate legal representation, "extensive delays, and the failure of the sys-
tem to adequately meet the needs of abused and neglected children. ' '171 Fol-
lowing the Supreme Court of Florida committee investigation on the impact
165. STANDARDS OF OPERATION, supra note 140, at 20 § 4.6 (2) (discussing FLA. R. PROF.
CONDUCT 4-1.2 (2010)).
166. See ATTORNEY STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 164, at 1.4.1, 2.6. 1.
167. See id. at 1.4.1.
168. OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY, REPORT No. 04-
05, SPECIAL REPORT: CHILD WELFARE LEGAL SERVICES SHOULD BE PROVIDED BY DCF OR
PRIVATE LAW FIRM 1 (2004) [hereinafter OPPAGA Special Report], available at
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/MonitorDocs/Reports/pdf/O4OSrpt.pdf (citing In re Advisory
Op. HRS Nonlawyer Counselor, 547 So. 2d 909, 911 (Fla. 1989)).
169. See In re Advisory Op. HRS Nonlawyer Counselor, 547 So. 2d at 909-10.
170. See id. at 91I.
171. OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY, REPORT No. 96-
44, EVALUATION OF CHILD WELFARE LEGAL SERVICES PILOT PROJECTS 2 (1997), available at
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/MonitorDocs/Reports/pdf/9644rpt.pdf.
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of the use of non-lawyers, the Legislature created Child Welfare Legal Ser-
vices (CWLS) overseen by the Attorney General. 172
In May 2007, then DCF Secretary Robert Butterworth established a Le-
gal Review Work Group---the Office of the General Counsel and CWLS-to
examine the work of attorneys within the Department. 173  The latter, attor-
neys appearing in dependency and TPR cases, according to the Department,
"should be the only attorneys representing the position of the State in depen-
dency and termination of parental rights proceedings.' ' 74 They are currently
referred to as CLS attorneys. 175  As discussed previously, DCF's contracts
with private providers, also known as lead agencies, provide that "CLS has
legal decision making authority pertaining to any dependency and termina-
tion of parental rights proceeding from inception to completion.,'176
In August 2008, Secretary Butterworth's successor, George Sheldon,
announced that DCF general counsel "would continue to represent the inter-
ests of the agency in ...[most] matters," whereas "CLS [lawyers] would
focus on what is best for children.' 77 In furtherance of that mandate, CLS
has repeatedly stated that it acts in a parens patriae role as set forth in Chap-
ter 39.171
172. Id. at 2-3.
173. LEGAL WORKGROUP, supra note 103, at 4.
174. Id. at 19.
175. About the Department: Children's Legal Services, supra note 138. The CLS budget
for 2010 is $43,397,059.00. CHILDREN & YOUTH CABINET, 2010 FLORIDA CHILDREN'S
BUDGET REPORT [hereinafter CHILDREN & YOUTH CABINET BUDGET REPORT] (on file with
Nova Law Review).
176. Contract, supra note 12, at Exhibit B 45. This contractual approach appears to be at
odds with LEGAL WORKGROUP, supra note 103, at 17 ("Providers have been contracted to
make safety decisions regarding the child in all aspects of the dependency case."). An addi-
tional oddity is that as part of the private provider contract with DCF, the provider, although
not the client of the CLS lawyer, shall pay for depositions, expert witnesses, service of process
and costs among others. Contract, supra note 12, at Exhibit B 45-46.
177. George Sheldon, Collaboration for Children, in The Department Launches Law Firm
for Children (Child.'s Legal Services, Tallahassee, Fla.), Aug. 2008, at 2.
178. Contract, supra note 12, at 44 Exhibit B. Indeed, in Exhibit B of its standard con-
tracts with Florida's private lead agencies which have taken on DCF's responsibilities to
provide services to children in the child welfare system, one finds the following description of
CLS' role:
CLS ... [is] a statewide law firm within the Department. CLS attorneys are employed by the
Department and represent the State of Florida, acting through the Department in its parens pa-
triae role, in fulfilling the duties as set forth in Chapter 39, F.S. CLS's duty in representing the
State is to ensure the health, safety and well being of children and the integrity of families
when they come into contact with the Department as a result of an allegation of abuse, aban-
donment or neglect.
2011]
55
: Nova Law Review 35, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
In 2007, Governor Crist established a DCF Task Force on Child Protec-
tion. 179 A Legal Services Subcommittee of the Task Force, among other
things, was charged with "looking at best practices relative to the representa-
tion of children in the legal system."'' 8 0 The subcommittee first noted that all
parties except the child have legal representation. 1 The subcommittee then
recommended inter alia that "[c]hildren in the dependency system are parties
to the case and should be represented by an attorney."' 182 Recognizing li-
mited resources, the subcommittee then suggested that the attorney for the
child should come from resources in the GAL Program-specifically the
GAL Program attorneys who would no longer represent the GAL Program.183
The subcommittee also recommended, "The [GAL] should no longer be a
party to the case."' 84 At the request of DCF Task Force Chairperson, former
Attorney General Butterworth, the Committee deferred these two recom-
mendations.' 85
Despite the changes instituted by the two most recent DCF Secretaries,
the role of CLS attorneys is confused and may adversely affect the unrepre-
sented children. 186 CLS now describes itself on the one hand as "The State-
wide Law Firm for Florida's Children."' 87 Its business card even includes
the phrase "Law Firm for Florida's Children.' 88 A 2009 Florida Office of
179. Press Release, Dep't of Children & Families, Department of Children and Families
Creates Task Force on Child Protection (July 12, 2007), http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/newsroom/
pressreleases/archive/createstaskforceonchildprotection.shtml (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
180. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, TASK FORCE ON CHILD PROTECTION MEETING
SUMMARY 6 (Mar. 9, 2009) [hereinafter DCF TASK FORCE MEETING SUMMARY] (on file with
Nova Law Review); LEGAL SERVS. SUBCOMM., REPORT TO THE TASK FORCE ON CHILD
PROTECTION 3 (on file with Nova Law. Review).
181. LEGAL SERVS. SUBCOMM., supra note 180, at 2.
182. Id. at3.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. DCF TASK FORCE MEETING SUMMARY, supra note 176, at 11.
186. See About the Department: Children's Legal Service and Counsel for Kids Reference
Guide, supra note 138.
187. Id.
188. See CLS business card (on file with the Nova Law Review). The representation
made on the card raises consumer protection issues. See id. Section 501.201 et. seq. of the
Florida Statutes contains Florida's version of the Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act,
sometimes referred to as "UDTPA" or "The Consumer Protection Act." See generally Fla.
Stat. § 501 et. seq. (2010). This statute in section 501.203(8) defines "trade or commerce" to
include the offering by any means a service. Id. § 501.203(8). Further, section 501.212,
which lists the acts or practices excluded from the application of this statute, does not exclude
the activities of CLS from potential application of this statute. See id. § 501.212. A deceptive
act or practice is defined in Florida to mean any act or practice that is a "representation, omis-
sion or practice that is likely to mislead [a] consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances,
to the consumer's detriment." Millennium Commc'ns & Fulfillment, Inc. v. Office of the
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Program Policy and Government Accountability research memorandum con-
tains the following statement: "CLS attorneys, supervisors, and managers
reported a substantial improvement in the quality of the department's legal
representation of dependent children since restructuring CLS."' 8 9 On the
other hand, CLS also says in its descriptive literature that "[t]he CLS Model
can be analogized to that of a prosecutor. Prosecutors and CLS attorneys
have ethical obligations beyond that of other lawyers. Each is expected to
pursue justice rather than simply seeking victory for their clients."' 90 Each of
these statements appears to be legally incorrect, 191 incongruent,' 9 and in all
Att'y Gen., 761 So. 2d 1256, 1263 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000). Therefore, based on the
enactment, prohibition, coverage, definitions, and exemptions provided in the Florida Decep-
tive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, the CLS's representation regarding its status as the law
firm for children may constitute a violation of this statute. In a private right of action, as
permitted by section 501.211 of this statute, children, as persons "aggrieved" would be en-
titled to receive as a remedy injunctive relief, actual damages and prevailing party attorney's
fees and costs. See FLA. STAT. § 501.211(1) (2010).
189. OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY, REPORT
No. 09-S24, CHILDREN'S LEGAL SERVICES HAS MADE CHANGES TO ADDRESS
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT; SOME CHANGES REMAIN (2009), [hereinafter
OPPAGA RESEARCH MEMORANDUM] (emphasis added), available at http://www.oppaga.
state.fl.us/monitordocs/Reports/pdf/09-S24.pdf. In addition, the Florida Child and Family
Services Plan 2010-2014, states: The Florida Department of Children and Families Child and
Families Services "will act as legal advocates for the children and focus on each child's
achieving timely permanency." CHILD & FAMILY SERVICES PLAN, supra note 121, at 25.
Since 1995, the Office of the Attorney General of Florida has been handling dependency and
TPR cases in these counties-Broward, Hillsborough and Manatee. Children's Legal Services
Bureau, OFFICE OF THE ATI"Y. GEN. OF FLA., http://myfloridalegal.com (search "children's
legal"; then follow "Children's Legal Services Bureau" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
It describes its role differently as "legal counsel to the Department of Children and Families"
in Chapter 39 proceedings. Id.
190. About the Department: Children's Legal Services, supra note 138. Some of the
Department's literature makes no sense. For example, a research memo from the Office of
Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability includes the following statement:
Both the workgroup and prior OPPAGA reports had concluded that the department
needed to improve relationships with key stakeholders and better delineate the roles
and responsibilities of the various entities involved in dependency proceedings. To
address these issues, department and CLS administrators announced through writ-
ten and oral communication that CLS attorneys represent the State of Florida, act-
ing through the department, rather than the department or its contracted providers.
OPPAGA RESEARCH MEMORANDUM, supra note 189. Chapter 39 provides that the Depart-
ment is a party in dependency and TPR cases. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(51) (2010); FLA. R. Juv. P.
8.210(a) (2010).
191. See R. REG. FLA. BAR 4-3.8, 4-1.13; see also Meghan Scahill, Prosecuting Attorneys
in Dependency Proceedings in Juvenile Court: Defining and Assessing a Critical Role in
Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 1 J. CENTER CHILD & CTS. 73, 76 (1999); JENNIFER L. RENNE,
LEGAL ETHICS IN CHILD WELFARE CASES, 20-25, (Claire Sandt ed., 2004) (recognizing that
some states use an office of the prosecutor without a client, a concept which is irreconcilable
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likelihood not in conformity with the Florida Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility. 1
93
D. Counsel for Parents
A parent's right to counsel in a dependency case in Florida is purely sta-
tutory. 194  Whether the parent's right to counsel, including government
funded counsel in a dependency case, is provided under the Florida Constitu-
tion, has not been decided by the Supreme Court of Florida. 95 However, the
parent's categorical right to an attorney in a TPR case under the federal con-
stitution was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in Lassiter
v. Department of Social Services 196 and by the Supreme Court of Florida in
In re D.B.197 In Lassiter the court rejected the concept that as a matter of due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment every parent was entitled to a law-
yer leaving it to the trial court to decide on a case-by-case basis. 98 However,
in the D.B. case, which was decided one year before Lassiter, the Supreme
Court of Florida held that all parents must be provided counsel in all TPR
cases and, under limited circumstances, in dependency proceedings. 199 The
Florida Legislature then enacted a statute codifying the opinion.2 In a series
of decisions relying on the new statute, the intermediate appellate courts re-
versed trial court decisions terminating parental rights because of the trial
with the civil nature of the civil protection proceeding); In re Jonathan G., 482 S.E.2d 893,
909 (W. Va. 1996).
192. See generally FLA. STAT. § 501.201 et seq.
193. See R. REG. FLA. BAR 4-1.2; see also State ex rel. Diva P. v. Kaufman, 490 S.E.2d
642, 651 (W. Va. 1997). Another ethical issue is the procedure established by CLS with re-
spect to referrals of children's cases to non-profit agencies who then, presumably, are charged
with the task and responsibility of referring these cases to specific lawyers. About the De-
partment: Children's Legal Services and Counsel for Kids Reference Guide, FLA. DEP'T. OF
CHILDREN & FAMILIES, http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/admin/cls/refGuides.shtml (last visited Apr.
20, 2011). The lawyers then, presumably, represent children, in among other cases, litigation
against the lead agencies whose legal decisions with respect to dependency and TPR cases are
controlled by CLS. See id.; see also Contract, supra note 12.
194. FLA. STAT. § 39.402(5)(b)(2) (2010).
195. The Florida Supreme Court has said several times that "this Court and others have
recognized a long-standing fundamental liberty interest of parents in determining the care and
upbringing of their children ... from the heavy hand of government paternalism." Padgett v.
Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1991); Beagle v. Beagle,
678 So. 2d 1271, 1275 (Fla. 1996).
196. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
197. 385 So. 2d 83 (1980).
198. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32.
199. In re D.B., 385 So. 2d at 90-91.
200. FLA. STAT. § 39.807.
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courts' failure to assign counsel in the earlier dependency proceeding. 2 ' The
repeated rationale for the reversals was the likelihood that a TPR proceeding
would ensue.0 2 As a result, in 1998 the Legislature amended Chapter 39 to
statutorily authorize appointment of counsel for parents in dependency as
well as TPR cases.0 3 Since that time, all indigent parents have been ap-
pointed attorneys in dependency and TPR cases even when no charges are
brought against one of the parties. 20' According to one recent appellate court
opinion:
[A]s a matter of common sense, the 'non-offending parent' may
need, and indeed may be entitled, to take action based upon any
possible relief afforded by DCF to the offending parent. . . . [A]
'non-offending' indigent, non-attorney parent can hardly be ex-
pected to navigate through such proceedings without counsel.20 5
Until recently the attorneys appointed to represent indigent parents in
Florida were private practitioners chosen by the court and paid a statutory
fee.20 6 Then in 2006, the Legislature passed a law, effective October 1, 2007,
setting up an entity entitled the Offices of Criminal Conflict and Civil Re-
gional Counsel which now represents indigent parents in dependency and
TPR cases.20 7 The civil regional counsel offices are located in each one of
the five state appellate court districts.2 8 The Senior Regional Counsel is
appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the State Senate for a four-year
term.2' Despite numerous problems establishing the new offices, including
lawsuits by various complimentary agencies and disputes with county gov-
ernments, the offices are now fully functional and are providing representa-
201. Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law Issues in Florida in 1998, 23 NOVA L. REV. 819, 828-
29 (1999).
202. See id.
203. Act effective Oct. 1, 1998, ch. 98-403, 1998 Fla. Laws 42 (codified as amended in
FLA. STAT. § 39.013(1) (1999)).
204. W.G. v. S.A. (In re A.G.), 40 So. 3d 908, 910 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010); But see
C.L.R. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 913 So. 2d 764, 767 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(per curiam).
205. ln reA.G., 40 So. 3d at 910.
206. See Joseph P. George, Jr., Cost Effective Representation for the Indigent, OFFICE OF
CRIMINAL CONFLICT & CIVIL REG'L COUNSEL THIRD REGION OF FLA., http://rc3fl.com/history/
(last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
207. FLA. STAT. § 27.511(1) (2010). This non-profit public organization also represents
both criminal defendants and juvenile delinquent respondents when the Office of the Public
Defender has a conflict. Id. §27.511(5).
208. Id. § 27.511 (1).
209. Id. § 27.511 (3).
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tion to indigent persons in a much more cost-effective manner than previous-
ly.210 In those cases where the regional counsel cannot serve indigent per-
sons, such as in the case of two parties in a dependency/TPR proceeding
where conflict exists, private court-appointed attorneys still continue to be
assigned and are paid by the State Justice Administrative Commission. 211
E. Counsel for Children
Children currently have no constitutional right to attorneys in Florida.:12
A very limited number of children are represented by independent attorneys
in dependency cases. The attorneys come from several sources: legal aid
programs, law school clinics,213 attorneys hired by the statewide GAL Pro-
gram, and pro-bono volunteers. The funding sources for attorneys who are
paid include the Florida Bar through its IOLTA Program, County Children's
Services Councils, 21 4 and the statewide GAL Program. Research does not
disclose precisely how many attorneys actually represent children in depen-
dency or TPR cases in Florida.
As stated previously, the legislative intent and goal for children in shel-
ter and foster care is to have a GAL appointed to represent the child's best
interests and an AAL appointed, where appropriate, to represent his or her
legal interests. 215 At any stage of dependency proceedings, Florida Rule of
Juvenile Procedure 8.217 allows the court to "consider whether an AAL is
necessary to represent any child alleged to be dependent, if one has not al-
ready been appointed. 2
6
In 2008, only $309,000 was appropriated by the GAL Program to AAL,
allowing for representation of 600 of the more than 35,000 children in the
dependency system.217 In 2009, the GAL Program spent $397,000 on attor-
neys for children or approximately one percent of its $30 million state budg-
210. State Must Pay Cost of Regional Conflict Counsels, HISTORIC CITY NEWS
(July 17, 2009), http://www.historiccity.com2009/staugustine/news/florida/state-must-pay-
cost-of-regional-conflict-counsels- 1475.
211. FLA. STAT. § 27.511(6)(c)(2).
212. In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 87 (Fla. 1980); see also M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90, 97
(Fla. 2000).
213. Marika Lynch, Fostering Fairness, UNIV. OF MIAMI MAGAZINE
http://www6.miami.edulmiami-magazinelsummer2OOfeaturestory4.html (last visited Apr.
20,2011).
214. However, a recent bill in the State Legislature requires a review of these councils and
may possibly cause the demise of these programs. Act effective July 1, 2010, Ch. 2010-210,
2010 Fla. Laws 43 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 125.901(4)(a) (2010)).
215. FLA. STAT. § 39.4085(20); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.217(a).
216. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.217(a).
217. GAL 2008 REPORT, supra note 125, at 7-8.
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et.218 Thus, more often than not, if an AAL is appointed, he or she is a pro-
bono attorney, a legal aid attorney, or legal intern in a law school clinic.219
A leading example of a legal-aid-based program developed since 2001
is in Palm Beach County.220 The Foster Children's Project (FCP) of the Le-
gal Aid Society of Palm Beach County's mission was to advocate for perma-
nency within twelve months for all of its clients.22'
In 2006, the Chapin Hall Center of the University of Chicago 222 con-
ducted an evaluation of the program. Within its first two years of operation,
the average length of stay in foster care for children represented by FCP was
12.5 months less than it was before FCP's inception.223 FCP's success,
among other things, has been attributed to "the filing of legal motions, the
filing of termination of parental rights petitions and recruitment of adoptive
homes, attendance at staffing and case plan meetings, and service advoca-
cy., 224 Chapin Hall found that the number of motions filed in cases where
218. See GAL 2009 REPORT, supra note 22, at 20.
219. Id.
220. LEGAL AID SOC'Y OF PALM BEACH CNTY., INC., supra note 19. The Legal Aid Socie-
ty of Broward County also operates a grant-funded legal advocacy program, "The Dependen-
cy Law Project," for dependent children. Children's Advocacy Project, LEGAL AID SERVS. OF
BROWARD CNTY.,INC. http://www.legalaid.org/broward/childrens advocacy.htm (last visited
Apr. 20, 2011). For a listing of legal services programs that represent the interests of children
in a number of contexts, see Florida Legal Assistance to the Poor Programs: Personnel Direc-
tory (2010), available at http://www.floridalegal.org/Directory/2010DirectoryJuly.pdf.
221. FOSTER CHILDREN'S PROJECT, http://www.fosterchildrensproject.org (last visited Apr.
20, 2011).
222. ANDREW E. ZINN & JACK SLOWRIVER, CHAPIN HALL CTR. FOR CHILDREN AT THE UNIV.
OF CHI., EXPEDITING PERMANENCY: LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR FOSTER CHILDREN IN PALM
BEACH COUNTY 1 (2008), available at http:/lwww.chapinhall.orglsites/defaultlfileslold-
reports/428.pdf; John Walsh, Lawyers Make a Difference for Foster Children: Palm Beach
Project, FLA.'S CHILDREN FIRST, http://floridaschildrenfirst.org/fcfRefDocuments
_053_repr_ofchildren.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). This is the first major report of its
type evaluating outcomes in child welfare cases where children are represented by lawyers.
For a recent study of the quality of legal representation by lawyers representing children in
child welfare proceedings in Pennsylvania, see JOHNSTON-WALSH ET AL., supra note 28, at 9
(citing Stapleton v. Dauphin Cnty. Child Care Serv., 324 A.2d 562, 573 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974,
overruled in part by In re G.C., 673 A.2d 932, 939 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)), aff'd per curiam,
735 A.2d 1226 (Pa. 1999); SUSAN A. SNYDER, JUVENILE LAW CENTER, PROMISES KEPT,
PROMISES BROKEN: AN ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN DEPENDENCY
HEARINGS IN PENNSYLVANIA (2001), available at http://jlc.org/publications/promises-kept_
promisesbroken/; see also Michael T. Dolce, A Better Day for Children: A Study of Flori-
da's Dependency System with Legislative Recommendations, 25 NOVA L. REV. 547, 548
(2001); Daniella Levine, To Assert Children's Legal Rights or Promote Children's Needs:
How to Attain Both Goals, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2023, 2033 (1996).
223. Walsh, supra note 222.
224. ZINN & SLOWRIVER, supra note 222, at 9.
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FCP was involved was 46.5% higher than in cases with similar situations
where they were not involved. 25 Similarly, the number of status checks was
49.6% higher than comparison cases.226 FCP children exited to permanency
at rates between 1.38 and 1.59 times higher than comparison cases. 2 7
IV. ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE FLORIDA SYSTEM
Much has been written and argued in Florida and nationally about the
claimed inherent conflict regarding the "best interests" of a child client
"represented" by a GAL and what the authors refer to in this article as the
"legal interests" approach where the child client is represented by an attorney
as all clients are represented. 228 This so-called dichotomy is first illustrated
by a review of the relevant applicable ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct which are based upon
the ABA Model Rules, and the ABA Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who
Represent Children In Abuse And Neglect Cases. Second, it is illustrated by
an examination of the Florida approach, which the authors conclude is rep-
lete with irreconcilable ethical conflicts and contradictions for attorneys
representing CLS and the GAL Program, that can only be rectified by the
introduction of independent attorneys for children.
For almost a century, the ABA has been the leader in establishing the
professional obligations of the legal profession. 229 The ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct are intended to serve as the regulatory principles go-
verning the legal profession as to the ethical considerations and professional
responsibilities of American attorneys. 230 The basic duties, as they are set
out-including knowledge, preparation, skill, and competence-apply equal-
ly to attorneys representing children as they do to attorneys representing
adults. By reading both the Preamble and Scope to the Model Rules of Pro-
225. Id.
226. id. at9-10.
227. Id. at 15. In 2007, the program had an operating budget of $1.7 million. "Taking
into consideration the estimated costs of substitute care, ongoing adoption subsidies, and FCP
representation, the net cost of FCP associated with each additional day of permanency [post-
permanency] was estimated to be as low as $32." ZINN & SLOWRIVER, supra note 218, at 1.
However, the estimated daily per-child cost associated with FCP representation pre-
permanency is only $13.31. Id. at 22. The total cost of the program is approximately $2,264
per child. Walsh, supra note 222. When compared to the money saved in foster care pay-
ments, caseworker time, court time, and emotional effects on children lingering in foster care,
this cost seems very reasonable.
228. See generally Diane Geraghty, Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children
in Illinois: Roles, Rules and Reforms, 29 LoY. U. CHIi. L.J. 289 (1998).
229. James Podgers, Work in Progress, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2008 at 25, 25.
230. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF' L CONDUCT (2010).
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fessional Conduct, one clearly can distinguish between the responsibilities of
an attorney representing a child client and a GAL who is not bound by the
same responsibilities.
The Preamble and Scope of the ABA Model Rules and the Florida
Rules begin with the following statement: "A lawyer, as a member of the
legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system
and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice." '231
The term "Representative" appears throughout both Rules. Here too, it
is a term of art that has specific meaning in law, and it has meaning separate
and apart from the term as used in Chapter 39 to apply to GALs. The term in
the Model Rules describes a professional relationship with another individual
or entity (the client) that includes being an advisor, advocate, negotiator, and
evaluator as to that person or entity's legal rights, obligations, and posi-
tion.232 The Preamble also recognizes that in order to be a representative of a
client, including a child, the attorney must have a confidential relationship
with the client. As the Preamble states, "a lawyer can be sure that preserving
client confidences ordinarily serves the public interest because people are
more likely to seek legal advice, and thereby heed their legal obligations,
when they know their communications will be private. 233
A discussion of certain Model Rules sheds further light on the distinc-
tion between best interests representation of a child, and representation of a
child client's "legal interests." First, Model Rule 4-1.2, Scope of Represen-
tation, governing allocation of authority between client and attorney reads in
significant part: "[A] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning
the objectives of representation, and, as required by rule 4-1.4, shall reasona-
bly consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pur-
sued. 234
Second, ABA Model Rule 1.14, amended most recently in 2002, is also
crucial to the representation and requires careful review. It states:
(a) When a client's capacity to make adequately considered deci-
sions in connection with a representation is diminished, whether
because of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason,
the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal
client-lawyer relationship with the client.
231. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2003).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See RULES REGULATING FLA. BAR R. 4-1.2(a) (2010).
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(b) When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has dimi-
nished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other
harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the
client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary
protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities
that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in ap-
propriate cases, seeking the appointment of a [GAL], conservator
or guardian.
(c) Information relating to the representation of a client with dimi-
nished capacity is protected by Rule 1.6. When taking protective
action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly autho-
rized under Rule 1.6(a) to reveal information about the client, but
only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client's in-
terests.
235
The earlier ABA Code of Professional Conduct did not provide any di-
rect guidance for the attorney representing a child.236  While the current
Model Rules do not specifically state that they apply to child clients, Rule
1.14 does address the issue of dealing with a client with diminished capacity.
The Commentary to Rule 1.14 does, however, reference children.2 37 It pro-
vides: "Furthermore, to an increasing extent the law recognizes intermediate
degrees of competence. "For example, children as young as 5 or 6 years of
age, and certainly those of 10 or 12, are regarded as having opinions that are
entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody. ' 238
The expected position, therefore, is for the child's attorney to maintain
as normal an attorney-client relationship as possible. Florida's comparable
Rule of Professional Conduct, Rule 4-1.2(a), reads as follows: "Subject to
subdivisions (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concern-
ing the objectives of representation, and, as required by rule 4-1.4, shall rea-
sonably consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pur-
sued. '239 The differing language, i.e., "reasonably," appears to heighten the
obligation of an attorney to a client under a disability.
ABA Model Rule 1.14(a) is entitled "Client with Diminished Capaci-
ty.''24° The title of the Florida Rule is "Client Under a Disability. '"241 In the
235. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2003) (addressing the client-lawyer
relationship with a client possessing diminished capacity).
236. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-12 (1980).
237. RULES REGULATING FLA. BAR R. 4-1.14 cmt. (2010).
238. Id. at R. 4-1.2(a).
239. RULES REGULATING FLA. BAR R. 4-1.2(a) (2010) (emphasis added).
240. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a) (2003).
241. RULES REGULATING FLA. BAR R. 4-1.14(a).
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body of subpart (a), the only major difference appears to be the use of the
word "diminished" in the ABA Rule instead of the word "impaired. 242 In
the Florida Rule, the difference in terminology appears to be merely form
over substance. Subdivision (b) of the ABA and Florida Rules differ to some
degree in language and emphasis.243 The ABA Model Rule provides greater
latitude for attorneys to consult with others to protect the client before seek-
ing appointment of a guardian.24  The Florida Rule appears to limit the
course an attorney can take prior to seeking a guardian when an attorney
believes that the client cannot adequately act in his or her own interest.245
The Comments to Rules 1.14 and 4-1.14 provide further guidance to the at-
torney but also differ in certain respects.
Comments 5, 6, and 7 to ABA Model Rule 1.14 in turn describe how
the attorney may take what is referred to as "protective action" where the
attorney reasonably believes the client is at risk of substantial physical or
other harm.246 Protective action includes employing third parties to assist the
attorney. The attorney, of course, is obligated to carefully weigh the client's
diminished capacity when considering protective action. The Comments
speak to a process for considering and balancing the various factors in eva-
luating the child's decision making capacity. At the same time, the Com-
ments urge the attorney to tread softly, "intruding into the client's decision
making autonomy to the least extent feasible. 247 In so doing, the attorney is
guided by the wishes and values of the client and the client's best interests.248
These comments give guidance to the child's attorney who wishes to take
action on behalf of the child client.
Model Rule 1.6 and the Comments to it even further amplify the ability
of the attorney for a child to take protective action.249 The ABA Model Rules
and the Florida Rules differ in several significant ways with reference to the
circumstances under which an attorney may reveal the child client's commu-
nications in order to take "protective action. 25° The Model Rules were
242. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a), with RULES REGULATING FLA. BAR R.
4-1.14(a).
243. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(b), with RULES REGULATING
FLA. BAR R. 4-1.14(b).
244. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14.
245. See RULES REGULATING FLA. BAR R. 4-1.14.
246. MODELRULESOFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 1.14 cmts. 5-7.
247. Id. cmt. 5.
248. Id.
249. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmts. 5-6.
250. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, with RULES REGULATING FLA.
BAR R. 4-1.6.
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amended in 1993 and are more expansive.25 ' They allow an attorney to re-
veal information which may prevent substantial bodily harm-harm which
may be caused by or to the client.252 The older ABA Model Code had li-
mited the disclosure to harm caused by the client.25 3 The Florida Rule, which
follows the older Model Code, should be amended to protect all clients, in-
cluding children, from harm to themselves.
The Comments to ABA Model Rule 1.6 also stand in stark contrast to
what opponents of providing attorneys to children in Florida argue-that
attorneys will routinely carry out the harmful wishes of their young clients.
The Comment says, "Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all
clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld. 254 Thus, Model Rule
1.6 and the Comments thereto specifically address the concerns and issues
raised by many regarding the attorney's obligation to protect his or her child
clients from harm of any kind after disclosure to the attorney of information,
in confidence, which the child client does not and would not reveal otherwise
to anyone, whether a GAL, caseworker, or attorney with whom the child
does not have a confidential relationship.
Under the Florida Rules, which do not go as far as the ABA Model
Rules, attorneys for children are still bound by ethical principles so that they
may not carry out the harmful wishes of their child clients. First, attorneys
have an advisory function, under Florida Rule 4-2.1, to give candid advice to
their client.255 Second, Florida Rule 4-3.3, Candor Toward the Tribunal,
provides that an attorney shall not permit the child client to testify or provide
evidence the attorney knows to be false, such as the child's denial of prior or
future harm.256 Third, Florida Rule 4-1.16, Declining or Terminating Repre-
sentation, provides that an attorney may withdraw from representation if "the
client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant, impru-
dent, or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement. 257
Finally, an ethical consideration for GAL Program attorneys, CLS at-
torneys and parents' attorneys is Florida Rule 4-4.3, Dealing with Unrepre-
251. See Morgan Cloud, Privileges Lost? Privileges Retained?, 69 TENN. L. REV. 65, 68
(2001).
252. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1).
253. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002).
254. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2003).
255. RULES REGULATING FLA. BAR R. 4-2.1 (2006). "In representing a client, a lawyer
shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering
advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, econom-
ic, social, and political factors that may be relevant to the client's situation." Id.
256. RULEs REGULATING FLA. BARR. 4-3.3 (2010).
257. RULES REGULATING FLA. BAR R. 4-1.16(b)(2) (2006).
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sented Persons. These lawyers need to proceed carefully as the children are
unrepresented parties in the Chapter 39 proceeding. 8
In 1996, the ABA adopted Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who
Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases.259 The Preface to the Stan-
dards states that all children in dependency proceedings should have an at-
torney. 260 The definitional section states: "The term 'child's attorney' means
a lawyer who provides legal services for a child and who owes the same du-
ties of undivided loyalty, confidentiality, and competent representation to the
child as is due an adult client.",
26
'
The Standards recognize that in a number of states an attorney is ap-
pointed as a GAL in a way that an attorney is not appointed in Florida.262
The Standards state: "A lawyer appointed as [GAL] for a child is an officer
of the court appointed to protect the child's interests without being bound by
the child's expressed preferences. 263
The Commentary to the Standards attempts to explain the dual role:
Where the local law permits, the lawyer is expected to act in the
dual role of [GAL] and lawyer of record. The chief distinguishing
factor between the roles is the manner and method to be followed
in determining the legal position to be advocated. While a GAL
should take the child's point of view into account, the child's pre-
ferences are not binding, irrespective of the child's age and the
ability or willingness of the child to express preferences. Moreo-
ver, in many states, a [GAL] may be required by statute or custom
to perform specific tasks, such as submitting a report or testifying
as a fact or expert witness. These tasks are not part of functioning
as a "lawyer.
' 264
While the Standards recognize the existence of these two roles, they do
not discuss nor do they solve the problem of how to carry out the dual roles.
First, the Standards do not discuss the full role of the GAL, which this article
describes as standing in the shoes of the child as a fiduciary and carrying out
258. See CANDICE L. MAZE, ADVOCATING FOR VERY YOUNG CHILDREN IN DEPENDENCY
PROCEEDINGS: THE HALLMARKS OF EFFECTIVE, ETHICAL REPRESENTATION, 19 (2010), availa-
ble at http://new.abanet.org/childlPublicDocuments/ethicalrep-final-1 01 0.pdf.
259. ABA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 35, at 1.
260. Id.
261. Id. § A-1 at 1.
262. See supra Section IlI.B discussing the role of an attorney appointed as a GAL in
Florida.
263. ABA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 35, at § A-2 at 2.
264. Id.
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the child's legal interests. 65 Second, to the extent that the child and the GAL
are at odds over the child's legal interests, the Standards do not resolve this
conflict.266
The problem with this approach is that an attorney may be obligated to
take a position that produces an irreconcilable conflict with the attorney's
ethical duty to his or her client. The answer is that an attorney should never
be the child's GAL.267 Furthermore, when the attorney is representing the
child in the traditional role of independent counsel, the attorney should only
seek the appointment of a GAL when ABA Model Rule 1.4, governing re-
presentation of a client with diminished capacity provides for such action, as
well as the ABA Standard providing a detailed explanation of how the attor-
ney should go about representing a child as a client under a disability relying
heavily on the ABA Model Rule. 68
The false conundrum, which has kept the area of law tied in knots in
Florida for years, should be untied. Review and analysis of the principles
enunciated by the ABA, in both the Model Rules and the ABA Standards,
clearly demonstrate the justification for independent attorneys for children as
opposed to GALs.
V. THE THINKING OUTSIDE FLORIDA
The Supreme Court of the United States has found that children are
"persons" under the Constitution, and they possess "fundamental rights
which the State must respect. 2 69 Consequently, "Constitutional rights do not
mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-
defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Con-
stitution and possess constitutional rights. '270 The Supreme Court has not yet
recognized a due process right to counsel for children in dependency or TPR
265. See id. § A-I, at 1. "A guardian, usually a lawyer, appointed by the court to appear in
a lawsuit on behalf of an incompetent or minor party". BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 608 (9th
ed. 2010).
266. Id. § B-2, at 3.
267. See RENNE, supra note 191, at 80-81; Ann. M. Haralambie, The Role of the Child's
Attorney in Protecting the Child Throughout the Litigation Process, 71 N.D. L. REV. 939, 941
(1995); DONALD N. DUQUETTE, ADVOCATING FOR THE CHILD IN PROTECTION PROCEEDINGS: A
HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND COURT APPOINTED SPECIAL ADVOCATES 23 (1990).
268. See ABA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 35, at §§ B-3 to 4 at 4-6, § B4 &
attendant Commentary.
269. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Schl Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969); see also
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260, 266 (1988); see Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22
(1967).
270. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
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proceedings. 271 However, children's rights attorneys advocate that "children
are citizens entitled to rights and ... children need a voice through lawyer
representation when their liberty and custody are at stake. '272 A growing
body of professional literature supports this position.273
A. Client-Directed Representation
"A major question regarding the representation of children and youth is
what interests children's attorneys serve and who defines those interests: the
state, the attorney, the parents, or the children themselves. 274  Client-
directed lawyers owe traditional duties of loyalty, confidentiality and compe-
tent representation to the child client.2 7 5 They "ensure that the child's inde-
pendent voice is heard" by advocating the child's position or the child's ex-
pressed wishes.276  Opponents of the client-directed approach argue that
children do not have capacity to form an attorney-client relationship or to
271. ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 115; Dale, Providing Counsel, supra note 2, at 782.
But see Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2005); Roe v.
Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 780 (M.D. Ala. 1976); In re Jamie TI, 599 N.Y.S.2d 892, 895 (App.
Div. 1993) (recognizing a right to counsel).
272. Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: It Is the "Right" Thing to Do,
27 PACE L. REV. 869, 870 (2007); See generally Kasey L. Wassenaar, Comment, Defenseless
Children: Achieving Competent Representation for Children in Abuse and Neglect Proceed-
ings Through Statutory Reform in South Dakota, 56 S.D. L. Rev. 182 (2011). The article goes
into the debate on the proper role for attorneys representing children (best interests or client-
directed).
273. See generally supra notes 28, 267-268; notes 315, 318 infra; DVD: Fostering the
Future: Strengthening Courts for Children in Foster Care, Pew Commission on Children in
Foster Care (Courter Films 2004) [hereinafter Fostering the Future DVD]; DONALD N.
DUQUETrE & MARK HARDIN, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., ADOPTION 2002:
THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE, GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC POLICY
AND STATE LEGISLATION GOVERNING PERMANENCE FOR CHILDREN (1999), available at
http://openlibrary.org/works/OL4781680W/Guidelinesfor-public.policy-and-state -legislati
on.governing.permanence forschildren; Duquette, Two Distinct Roles, supra note 114, at
442.
274. Annette Ruth Appell, Representing Children Representing What?: Critical Reflec-
tions on Lawyering for Children, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 573, 595 (2008); see general-
ly Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm For Determining The Role of Counsel For Children, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1399 (1996); ASTRA OUTLEY, REPRESENTATION FOR CHILDREN AND
PARENTS IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS 5, available at http://pewfostercare.org/research/docs/
Representation.pdf; Fostering the Future DVD, supra note 273; PETERS, supra note 28.
275. Elrod, supra note 272, at 906.
276. Id. at 905.
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direct the representation. 7 However, proponents argue that whether a child
has the capacity to form an attorney-client relationship and thereby direct the
attorney should be determined on a case by case basis relying on the attor-
ney's sound discretion under Rule 1.14 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.27 8 Some even think that the presumption of incapacity should be
reversed and that one should start with a presumption that minor children
have capacity to direct their attorney.279
Determining an attorney's role when the child is too young to direct re-
presentation can be very challenging.2 80 Advocates suggest that the "key to
child-centered representation is to understand the wishes and needs of a par-
ticular child in the context of the child's family and the type of litigation. ''8 S
However, this issue can be difficult to resolve because in "contrast to par-
ents, attorneys are unlikely to share the same socio-economic background,
[or] cultural values ... as the children they represent; nor are they likely to
know the children better than the children's parents. 282 Children's attorneys
need to continuously consult with their clients on important decisions regard-
ing their client's express wishes and "keep their clients apprised of case de-
velopments. 283
B. Best Interest Representation
"Best interest attorneys" advocate for the child's best interests and, un-
like client-directed attorneys, they can reveal confidential information that
the child discloses. 284 The most common criticism of the best interests attor-
ney, including a lawyer who is acting as GAL, is that "the attorney can subs-
titute his or her view of what is in the child's best interest. 2 85 "[I]f the attor-
neys are inserting or substituting their own substantive values into the repre-
sentation," they need to be careful not to displace "the values of the child or
the parents, who are the traditional arbiters of children's lives and values. 286
277. Katherine Hunt Federle, Righting Wrongs: A Reply to the Uniform Law Commis-
sion's Uniform Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Custody Proceedings Act,
42 FAM. L.Q. 103, 104 (2008).
278. Id.
279. Elrod, supra note 272, at 912.
280. Appell, supra note 274, at 598.
281. Elrod, supra note 272, at 915.
282. Appell, supra note 274, at 595; see generally Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Deter-
mining the Role of Counsel for Children, supra note 270.
283. Appell, supra note 274, at 598, 633.
284. Elrod, supra note 272, at 910-11.
285. Id. at 911.
286. Appell, supra note 274, at 596.
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C. Recent Colloquia and Model Acts
In 1995, Fordham Law School convened a conference entitled "Ethical
Issues in the Legal Representation of Children. ' 287 The Conference made
numerous recommendations with respect to child representation.288 In 2006,
the Law School at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV) hosted a
conference entitled "Representing Children in Families: Children's Advoca-
cy and Justice Ten Years After Fordham," which reexamined the recommen-
dations of the Fordham Conference. 289  The recommendations from the
UNLV Conference reaffirmed the Fordham Conference's core principles.
All children in child welfare proceedings should be represented by client-
directed attorneys.29°
A review of two Model Acts in the field support the proposition that at-
torneys should represent the legal interests of children in all dependency and
TPR proceedings.291 The ABA Model Act Governing the Representation of
Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings provides that a
"[clhild's lawyer--or lawyer for children-means a lawyer who provides
legal services for a child and who owes all of the same duties that are due an
adult client, including loyalty, confidentiality, diligence, client direction,
communication, duty to advise .... and competent representation. 292  A
second model law, the Uniform Representation of Children in Abuse, Neg-
lect, and Custody Proceedings Act (URCANCPA or The Uniform Act),
which was adopted by the Uniform Law Commission in 2007, uses a dual
287. See generally Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal
Representation of Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301 (1996).
288. Id.
289. See generally Recommendations of the UNLV Conference on Representing Children
in Families: Child Advocacy and Justice Ten Years After Fordham, 6 NEV. L.J. 592 (2006).
290. Id. at 611.
291. See NAT'L ASs'N OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN, NACC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES 13-15 (2001), available at
http://www.naccchildlaw.org/resource/resmgr/docs/nacc-standards-and-recommend.pdf;
AM. BAR ASS'N MODEL ACT GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE,
NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS § I (Proposed Official Draft 2009); IJA-ABA
JOINT COMM'N ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR
PRIVATE PARTIES § 1.1 (Draft 1976).
292. AM. BAR. Ass'N MODEL ACT GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN
ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS § 1(c). The model Act relies upon Rule
1.14 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs
on Unif. State Laws, Uniform Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Custody
Proceedings Act, 42 FAM. L.Q. 1, 10 n.28 (2008).
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approach.293  It establishes two categories of attorneys for children-the
child's attorney and a best interests attorney. The Uniform Act "does not
endorse the hybrid category of attorney/GAL. 29a The child's attorney is
described as having a traditional lawyer-client relationship rather than advo-
cating what the attorney decides is in the child's best interests. 295 However,
The Uniform Act provides for a limited setting in which the lawyer may ex-
ercise "substituted judgment" when the child client is "incapable of directing
or refuses to direct representation as to a particular issue. 296 In addition, in
the situation where "a child's expressed goals would put the child at risk of
substantial harm, and the child persists in that position despite the attorney's
advice and counsel," The Uniform Act requires that the attorney "request a
best interests advocate or best interests attorney for the child or withdraw
from representation and request the appointment of a best interests attor-
ney. 297
VI. MAKING THE CASE FOR INDEPENDENT LEGAL REPRESENTATION IN
FLORIDA
There are many reasons why a child needs an independent attorney as-
signed to represent the child in Florida. First, there are practical reasons.
The attorney should commence representation as soon as the child welfare
proceeding begins because the adverse effect upon the child, other than the
alleged abuse or neglect in the home, is greatest at the point of the initial
disruption in the child's life by way of possible removal from the home.298
The injury to the child caused by removal from the home can be irreversible,
according to a substantial body of professional literature2 99 and case law.3°°
293. See generally Barbara Ann Atwood, The Uniform Representation of Children in
Abuse, Neglect, and Custody Proceedings Act: Bridging the Divide Between Pragmatism and
Idealism, 42 FAM. L.Q. 63 (2008); Federle, supra note 32, at 103.
294. Nat'l Conference of Commr's on Unif. State Laws, supra note 292 at 10.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Comm. on Early Childhood, Adoption and Dependent Care, American Academy of
Pediatrics, Abstract, Developmental Issues for Young Children in Foster Care, 106
PEDIATRICS 1145 (2000); Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Children Protection and Child Outcomes:
Measuring the Effects of Foster Care, 95 AM. ECON. REV 1589 (2007).
299. MAzEsupra note 258 at 2-3; In re Nicholson, 181 F. Supp. 2d 182, 185 (E.D.N.Y.
2002); See Martin Guggenheim, Somebody's Children: Sustaining the Family's Place in
Child Welfare Policy, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1716, 1724 (2000) (reviewing ELIZABETH
BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION
ALTERNATIVE (1999) (arguing that studies show many children in foster care can safely re-
main at home)).
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On the other hand, just the opposite may be true.30 ' A child's attorney is
necessary at the outset to make certain that initial intervention and removal
by the State is required as tested against Chapter 39. The child's position as
to removal should be presented by the child's attorney using the skills of
examination and cross examination of witnesses based upon a level of under-
standing of the child's situation that can only be gained through a confiden-
tial relationship. Children often spend long periods of time out of home care
while in the child welfare system.30 2 Substantial literature and studies recog-
nize this fact.303 This is a particularly serious problem because, among other
things, children's understanding of time is different than that of adults. 304
Thus, having an independent attorney to test the need for continued removal
from the vantage point of the child is very important. The attorney has the
ability to conduct discovery and then file motions with the court seeking
expedited rulings. The child's attorney can also collect information that no
one else can and maintain the child's right to privacy, 35 as well as build a
unique relationship of trust with the child.3°
Unlike volunteer GALs, who in Florida receive thirty hours of train-
ing,307 attorneys for children are regulated by the ABA Model Rules and
Florida Rules of Professional Responsibility must have the requisite skill and
competence to represent children in cases that involve, among other matters,
complex, sensitive, and diverse cultural, racial, moral, and religious issues.30 8
300. See In re N.M.W., 461 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (Sackett, J. dissent-
ing).
301. DCF Launches Probe Into Death of Child Found in Cooler, supra note 4.
302. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L, No. 96-272, 94 Stat.
501 (1980); Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(1997); 42 U.S.C. § 671 et seq. A discussion of the "reasonable efforts" standard to return
children to their parents and the time frame to move to permanency is beyond the scope of this
article.
303. See Fostering the Future DVD, supra note 273.
304. In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Judicial Admin., 24 So. 3d 47, 52 (Fla. 2009)
(Pariente, J., concurring).
305. See S.C. v. Guardian Ad Litem, 845 So. 2d 953, 956-57 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2003); see also E.C. v. Guardian Ad Litem Program, 867 So. 2d 1193, 1194 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2004) (recognizing that a child who is the subject of a dependency proceeding has the
right to assert the psychotherapist/patient privilege pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 90.503 "to pre-
vent a court-appointed [GAL] from having access to records covered by the privilege").
306. See M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90, 108 (Fla. 2000) (discussing treating children with
dignity so that they are listened to and their opinion is taken into account).
307. STANDARDS OF OPERATION supra note 140, at 12; see also Hilary Baldwin, Termina-
tion of Parental Rights: Statistical Study and Proposed Solutions, 28 J. LEGIS. 239, 240
(2002).
308. KAREN AILEEN HOWZE, MAKING DIFFERENCES WORK: CULTURAL CONTEXT IN ABUSE
AND NEGLECT PRACTICE FOR JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS 7-8 (1996); Martin Guggenheim, Texas
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In addition, the child's attorney has ongoing responsibilities to protect the
child client's interests while the child is in and out of the home care.309 A
detailed discussion of the quality of attorney representation of children in
dependency proceedings is beyond the scope of this article. It is, nonethe-
less, a very important issue that has been the subject of analysis in other
states.31
Second, the introduction of attorneys for particularly young children can
have significant benefits beyond the technical contours of the dependency
proceeding. 31I There is substantial evidence of benefits that accrue to young
children from investment in early education occurring as a result of stable
and supportive parenting that can be enabled by effective children's attor-
neys.312 Third, if attorneys for the other parties and the judge fail to properly
discharge their responsibilities, the solution lies in improving their perfor-
mance, not in twisting out of shape their roles and ethical responsibilities, as
this article suggests is happening in Florida. Moreover, independent attor-
neys for children need to hold CLS, parents' attorneys and their clients, as
well as the CBC's accountable. CLS attorneys and parents' attorneys, while
they may have opposing positions, do not fully protect children either on the
question of whether there is proof of dependency or TPR or on questions of
services and safety to children once they are in state care.313 DCF and CLS
do not always properly carry out their parens patriae role, and even when
they do, their obligation, both legally and ethically, is not to represent the
child's position. 3 4 And parents' attorneys have a singular obligation to-their
client, not to the child. Indeed, "'[i]f the strength of the adversary process
lies in the full presentation and consideration of different points of view, then
Polygamy and Child Welfare, 46 Hous. L. REv. 759, 762 (2009) (discussing state officials'
authority to regulate on notions of morality).
309. See 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1270-71 (11 th Cir. 2003); see also
supra note 28 and accompanying text; I MICHAEL J. DALE, REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT,
2.03(2)(a) (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2010) [hereinafter I DALE, REPRESENTING THE CHILD
CLIENT]. Conditions in and out of home care, for Florida's children specifically and children
in general, have been the subject of numerous lawsuits.
310. See generally JOHNSTON-WALSH ET AL, supra note 28; ERIK S. PITCHAL Er AL., supra
note 66.
311. See MAZE, supra note 258.
312. See WIS. COUNCIL ON CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF
INVESTING IN EARLY LEARNING 1 (2009), available at http://www.wccf.org/pdf/great-start-
investment-ece.pdf. [hereinafter ECONOMIC BENEFITS].
313. See supra Part I (discussing the historical inadequacies in the Florida child welfare
system).
314. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982). The Supreme Court of the United
States said that "[a]t the factfinding, the State cannot presume that a child and his parents are
adversaries." Id.
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giving a greater voice to the child should not impair either fact-finding or
decision-making.' ' 315  GAL Program attorneys represent the Program.316
They have no attorney-client relationship with the child. Their ability to
even speak with the child, as an unrepresented party, is limited by ethical
constraints.317 The same, of course, is true for CLS attorneys and parents'
attorneys. Thus, the child should have the right to be heard and be present in
court with and through his or her own attorney.318
Fourth, children have basic state and federal constitutional rights that
require enforcement. Their constitutional rights emanate from the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and
Article I, Sections 21 and 23 of the Florida Constitution. This article posits
that children possess these separate constitutional rights entitling them to
attorneys in dependency and TPR cases: A right of privacy in their home, a
liberty interest in their freedom from or while in state care and control, and
the equal right of access to court.
On the one hand, it may be difficult to make out a federal constitutional
claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for child-
ren because the Supreme Court of the United States in Lassiter, held that,
despite the significance of the interest at stake, parents did not have an abso-
lute and categorical right to counsel in a TPR case.31 9 The Supreme Court
has never ruled on whether or not children have a federal due process right to
counsel in dependency and TPR cases. The right to an attorney for a child
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would be based
upon the privacy right of the child, similar to the privacy right of the parent,
which is only penumbral in nature under the federal constitution.32 °
However, on the other hand, the argument under the Florida Constitu-
tion is different and persuasive as to the right to privacy. The Florida electo-
315. GARY SOLOMON, LEGAL AID SOCIETY, GIVING THE CHILDREN A MEANINGFUL VOICE:
THE ROLE OF THE CHILD'S LAWYER IN CHILD PROTECTIVE, PERMANENCY AND TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS PROCEEDINGS 23 (2010), available at http://www.legal-aid.org/media/
68451/role%20of%20jrp%201awyer%2010-08.pdf (alteration in original) (quoting Ann M.
Haralambie, Response to the Working Group on Determining the Best Interest of the Child, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 2013, 2017 (1996)).
316. See supra notes 165-167 and accompanying text. The positions of the GAL and the
child may also be adversarial.
317. RULES REGULATING FLA. BAR R. 4-4.3(a) (2006).
318. See generally Erik S. Pitchal, Where Are All the Children? Increasing Youth Partici-
pation in Dependency Proceedings, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 233 (2008).
319. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs,, of Durham Cnty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 33-34 (1981).
320. Id. at 24. "For all its consequence, 'due process' has never been, and perhaps can
never be, precisely defined. '[U]nlike some legal rules,' this Court has said, due process 'is
not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances."'
Id. (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
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rate in 1980 voted for a constitutional amendment-Article I, Section 23-
which provides that all natural persons in Florida have a right of privacy. 32,
The Supreme Court of Florida has interpreted this provision on a number of
occasions in a way that supports the argument that children in dependency
proceedings in Florida are entitled to an attorney. In In re T. W., 322 the Su-
preme Court of Florida ruled that, as a matter of constitutional law under
Article I, Section 23, a parental consent statute governing a minor's right to
obtain an abortion in Florida was unconstitutional.3 3 In so doing, the Court
held that it need not apply the federal Constitution, that the Florida constitu-
tional provision regarding the right of privacy was more expansive than the
federal right of privacy, 324 and most importantly, that the right applied to
minors because the Florida Constitution referenced all natural persons as
within its ambit.325 At least in the context of the right to make a decision
regarding pregnancy, the court found, "In proceedings wherein a minor can
be wholly deprived of authority to exercise her fundamental right to privacy,
counsel is required under our state constitution. 326 The court then added:
"Requiring an indigent minor to handle her case all alone is to risk deterring
many minors from pursuing their rights because they are unable to under-
stand how to navigate the complicated court system on their own or because
they are too intimidated by the seeming complexity to try. 327
The analysis is comparable to the dependency and TPR setting.328 The
Supreme Court of Florida has applied the expanded right of privacy in sever-
al other contexts, including the grandparent visitation statute.329 As the Court
321. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. See also Ben F. Overton & Katherine E. Giddings, The
Right of Privacy in Florida in the Age of Technology and the Twenty-First Century: A Need
for Protection from Private and Commercial Intrusion, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 25, 26 (1997)
for a discussion of the expansive nature of Article I, § 23.
322. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
323. Id. at 1188.
324. Id. at 1192.
325. Id. at 1193.
326. Id. at 1196.
327. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1196 (quoting Ind. Planned Parenthood Affiliates Ass'n v.
Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127, 1138 (7th Cir. 1983)).
328. J.C. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 26 So. 3d 665, 665 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2010) (describing TPR as a "drastic remedy as to either child[ren] or either parent.").
329. See also N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs. Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612,
619 (Fla. 2003); Saul v. Brunetti, 753 So. 2d 26, 28 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam); Von Eiff v.
Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510, 514 (Fla. 1998); Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1275 (Fla. 1996);
Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Waging, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985); Burton v. State, 49
So. 3d 263, 265 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2010); S.C. v. Guardian Ad Litem, 845 So. 2d 953,
958 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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said in one of a series of cases addressing this issue, in Von Eiff v. Azicri,33 °
"The potential harm to a child flowing from the death of a parent does not
constitute the kind of harm this Court has previously found to authorize gov-
ernment[al] intervention. '33' Thus, in the absence of harm to the child, the
State cannot intervene against the wishes of a parent.332 Similarly, the child
has a right to privacy within his or her natural home that is protected by the
Florida Constitution.333
A child also possesses a second separate and independent liberty inter-
est under the Florida Constitution that requires protection by an attorney.
That second liberty interest is the right to freedom from unnecessary and
harmful confinement in out of home care.3 4 In M.W. v. Davis,335 the Su-
preme Court of Florida did not decide the issue, but after discussing the sta-
tutory framework in the context of placement of a dependent child in a resi-
dential institution, stated in dicta:
We are thus concerned that, although there are various procedures
in Chapter 39 that could be construed to require a hearing before a
trial court orders a commitment, neither Chapter 39 nor our own
procedural rules adequately address whether an attorney for the
child should ... have the right to put on evidence before the court
orders a placement in a residential psychiatric facility.
336
The second due process claim arises from the Supreme Court of the
United States opinions in Estelle v. Gamble337 and Youngberg v. Romeo.338
In these cases the Court recognized the state's obligation to grant people held
against their will-incarcerated prisoners in Estelle and involuntarily com-
mitted patients in Youngberg-some adequate assurance of safety. 339 This
right is premised upon the concept that when individuals are taken into state
custody and thus lose liberty,34° they are entitled to reasonably safe condi-
330. 720 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1998)
331. Id. at 515.
332. Id. at 514.
333. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989).
334. Deshaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989).
335. 756 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2000).
336. Id. at 106-07, not deciding the issue of the right to counsel in the context of a depen-
dent child committed to a residential facility because counsel was appointed to represent the
child in that case; see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600, 611 n.18 (1979).
337. 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
338. 457 U.S. 307, 309 (1982).
339. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 309; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102-05.
340. An argument may also be made that when a father's parental rights are terminated,
the child loses a due process property interest-as in the estate of the parent-as a result of
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tions and general freedom from undue bodily restraint.34' In a number of
cases involving children in the foster care system, federal courts have ex-
tended the right to these children including those in Florida. 2 There is am-
ple evidence that conditions in foster care in Florida can constitute a depriva-
tion of liberty, create harm for young people, and thus may violate children's
Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 23 due process rights. 
3
A subpart of the due process constitutional right to freedom from harm
at issue here is the right to family integrity. The federal court in Marisol A.
ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani344 said:
Plaintiffs family integrity claims are closely related to those per-
taining to the duration of foster care and, by extension, [are found]
within the concept of harm for substantive due process purposes.
Indeed, [P]laintiffs suggest that [D]efendants unnecessarily
place[d] children in foster care and allow[ed] children properly in
foster care to languish without taking steps to reunite them with
their biological famil[ies] where appropriate.345
Because two liberty interests are at stake, the question becomes what
procedures are necessary to protect that child. The analysis of what proce-
dures are necessary in a proceeding in Florida under the State Constitution is
evaluated using the well-known tripartite test that originated in the Supreme
Court of the United States in 1976 in Mathews v. Eldridge.34 6 The Supreme
Court recognized that procedural due process imposes constraints on deci-
sions by governments that deprive individuals of liberty interests within the
Due Process Clause. 47 The Florida state courts have followed this think-
state action. See C.A. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 16 So. 3d 888, 889-90 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2009).
341. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at318.
342. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263, 265 (1984); Norfleet v. Ark. Dep't. of Hu-
man Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 292 (8th Cir. 1993); Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d
474, 476 (6th Cir. 1990); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 794, 797 (11 th Cir. 1987); Doe v.
N.Y.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 1981); Roes v. Fla. Dep't of Children
& Family Servs., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1318-19 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes
v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd by 126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1997).
343. See supra notes 1,309.
344. 929 F.Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'dby 126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir 1997).
345. Id. at 677.
346. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The tripartite test from Matthews has been applied in
several cases. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120-21 (1996); Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 754-68 (1982); see also Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., of Durham Cnty., N.C.,
452 U.S. 18, 27-31 (1981).
347. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
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ing. 48 So did a federal court in Georgia which employed the Mathews anal-
ysis in finding that dependent children in that state were entitled to coun-
sel. 349 The three elements of the Mathews test are:
[T]he private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of ad-
ditional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
[g]overnment's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that [an] additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.350
First, the degree of potential deprivation is obvious here. The loss to a
child of a parent is immeasurable; the professional literature in support of
that proposition is voluminous. 35' The length of the possible loss can be a
lifetime.352 The loss of freedom occasioned by placement in foster care,
group homes, or institutions, is clear beyond peradventure.353 Second, the
fairness and reliability of the procedures involved are significant, and the
best possible safeguard known in the American system is the right to an at-
torney. While one may argue that the CLS attorney and the attorney for the
parent together with the GAL Program adequately protect the child's legal
and best interest, the evidence in Florida, as described in this article, is to the
contrary.
Holdings in two cases involving class action challenges to the Florida
child welfare system, and a state appellate case in dicta, 354 also support the
proposition that lawyers for children are necessary and that the other lawyers
in the case will not adequately protect the child. In 31 Foster Children v.
348. N.S.H. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 843 So. 2d 898, 903 (Fla. 2003).
349. Kenny A. ex rel Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360, (N.D. Ga. 2006), va-
cated by,, Perdue v. Kenny A., 130 S. Ct. 1662 (2010).
350. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
351. See generally CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES
OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (2008), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/
factsheetslong-termconsequences.pdf; Duquette, Two Distinct Roles, supra note 114, at
446, 448.
352. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981);
id. at 39-40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
353. Conditions of out-of-home care have been the subject of substantial litigation and
literature. I DALE, REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT, supra note 309, at 2.03(2); see gener-
ally supra notes 177, 342.
354. W.G. v. S.A. (In re A.G.), 40 So. 3d 908, 910 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (provid-
ing an attorney to a non-offending parent in a dependency proceeding and stating that "a 'non-
offending' indigent, non-attorney parent can hardly be expected to navigate through such
proceedings without counsel.").
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Bush355 and Ward v. Kearney356 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
and the District Court for the Southern District of Florida abstained from
class action challenges to the conditions in out of home care for Florida's
foster children.357 The courts did so, in major part, upon the ground that the
children had an adequate remedy in the dependency court.358 The children,
the Eleventh Circuit held in 31 Foster Children and the District Court held in
Ward, could get relief for their claims in a dependency court.359 Although
the plaintiffs' counsel in both cases argued that relief in a dependency court
was illusory, the plaintiff children were denied the right to proceed in class
action form in the federal courts.36  Included in the arguments made by
counsel in these cases was the fact that the children did not have lawyers in
the dependency court.361 Thus, to protect the children before the dependency
court, as the federal courts said could be done, lawyers are necessary to inde-
pendently represent the children. No other form of third party "representa-
tion" is viable.
Finally, Florida's Constitution specifically guarantees a citizen's access
to courts.362 The purpose of this section is to give vitality to the maxim that
"for every wrong there is a remedy. '363 Indeed, the Supreme Court of Floi-
da has a duty to ensure access to the courts for every citizen3' and has itself
made clear that "[t]he right to access is specifically mentioned in Florida's
constitution. Therefore, it deserves more protection than those rights found
only by implication. '365 The right to go to court to resolve a dispute is a fun-
355. 329 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2003).
356. Settlement Agreement at 3, Ward v. Kearney, No. 98-7137-CIV-MORENO (S.D.
Fla. 26, 2000) [hereinafter Ward Settlement Agreement].
357. 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11 th Cir. 2003); Ward Settlement
Agreement, supra note 356, at 3.
358. 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1279; Ward Settlement Agreement, supra note 356,
at3.
359. Id. at 1-15.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 1.
362. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521, 527 (Fla. 2001) (per
curiam).
363. Holland v. Mayes, 19 So. 2d 709, 711 (Fla. 1944).
364. Lussy v. Fourth Dist. Court of Appeal, 828 So. 2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 2002) (per cu-
riam); Peterson v. State, 817 So. 2d 838, 840 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam); State v. Spencer, 751
So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla. 1999); Rivera v. State, 728 So. 2d 1165, 1166 (Fla. 1998); Henriquez v.
State, 774 So. 2d 34, 35 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curim).
365. Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 527 (citation omitted).
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damental right,366 and access to the courts guaranteed to every person must
not be unreasonably burdened.367
Florida's "courts are generally opposed to any burden being [imposed]
on the rights of aggrieved persons to enter the courts because of the constitu-
tional guaranty of access. '368 In accordance with this opposition, any restric-
tions on the constitutional right of access "should be construed so as to favor
the constitutional right. '369 Before access to the courts may be restricted by
the state legislature, "a reasonable alternative remedy or commensurate bene-
fit" must be provided; otherwise, the legislature "must make a showing of an
overpowering public necessity justifying a restriction with a finding that
there is no alternative method of meeting such public necessity. 370
Article I, Section 21 is violated if a "statute obstructs or infringes that
right to any substantial degree. '371 To find that the right of access has been
violated, it is not necessary for a statute to present an impossible procedural
obstacle-just a significantly difficult one.3 72 If a statute significantly in-
fringes upon the right of access to courts, it is in violation of the state consti-
tutional mandate.373
Article I, Section 21 also severely curtails the state's ability to impose
financial obstacles to the assertion of claims in court.374 Although reasonable
financial requirements, such as filing fees, have been upheld, Florida courts
frown upon financial prerequisites that amount to a substantial financial bur-
den on a person's fight to have his case heard. 375 Likewise, certain procedur-
al hurdles may violate the constitutional guarantee of access.3 76 For example,
a dismissal with prejudice as a result of a failure to comply with discovery
orders burdens the right of access in nearly all cases, unless egregiousness is
present; because of this, explicit findings of willful or flagrant disregard are
requisite.377
366. Psychiatric Assocs. v. Siegel, 610 So. 2d 419, 424 (Fla. 1992).
367. Preferred Med. Plan, Inc. v. Ramos, 742 So. 2d 322, 323 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1999); Swain v. Curry, 595 So. 2d 168, 174 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
368. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 805 (Fla. 1976).
369. Westside EKG Assocs. v. Found. Health, 932 So. 2d 214, 218 n.2 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2005), affd by 944 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 2006) (citing Hicks v. Hicks, 715 So. 2d 304, 306
n.2 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
370. Westside EKG Assocs., 932 So. 2d at 218 n.2.
371. Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521, 527 (Fla. 2001).
372. Id., quoted in T.A. Enters., Inc. v. Olarte, Inc., 931 So. 2d 1016, 1018 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2006).
373. Id.
374. Psychiatric Assocs. v. Siegel, 610 So. 2d 419, 424 (Fla. 1992).
375. Id., quoted in T.A. Enters., 931 So. 2d at 1018
376. Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 527.
377. Kinney v. R.H. Halt Assocs., Inc., 927 So. 2d 920, 921 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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However,
"a classification having some reasonable basis does not offend [the
state constitution simply because] ... it is not made with mathe-
matical nicety or because in practice it may result in some inequa-
lity; also, one who assails the classification in such a law must car-
ry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable
basis, but is essentially arbitrary."
378
"[I]f the classification being challenged is based on a suspect classifica-
tion . . . . then the means or method employed by the statute to remedy the
asserted problem must meet not only the rational basis test, but also the strict
scrutiny test.
379
The third Mathews element is societal costs and administrative bur-
dens. 380 The financial cost of providing attorneys is not insignificant, al-
though money is available. 38' For example, as noted earlier, the State of
Florida spends over $30 million on the GAL Program, which includes paying
145 lawyers to represent the Program382 at the trial and appellate level, with
no objective proof that this approach successfully protects children. These
GAL attorneys could represent children as their attorneys at a comparable
cost to the amount spent by the State to pay for CLS and regional counsel
attorneys.383 While the Court in Mathews recognized that "[a]t some point
the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual affected by the admi-
nister[ed] action and to society in terms of increased assurance that the action
is just, may be outweighed by the cost, 384 the Court also said that
"[f]inancial cost alone is not a controlling weight in determining whether due
process requires a particular procedural safeguard prior to some administra-
tive decision., 385 Thus, the balancing test applied in Mathews, as the materi-
al found throughout this article demonstrates, weighs heavily in favor of at-
torneys for the child in these proceedings. A careful reading of Lassiter sug-
gests that under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, a parent at
least was entitled to an attorney on a case-by-case basis in a TPR case, indi-
cating the strong interest at stake and the balance of costs. Where, here in
Florida, the constitutional provision is explicit, more expansive than the fed-
378. McMillan v. Nelson, 5 So. 2d 867, 870 (Fla. 1942).
379. Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 527.
380. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976).
381. Id.
382. See supra notes 129, 130 and accompanying text.
383. See CHILDREN & YOUTH CABINET BUDGET REPORT, supra note 175. The CLS budget
for 2010 is $43,397,059.00. Id.
384. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348.
385. Id.
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eral provision which is unstated in the federal Constitution, and which has
been explicitly applied to children, the fight to an attorney should be recog-
nized.
It should be noted that, in M.W. v. Davis,386 the case in which the Su-
preme Court of Florida established evidentiary obligations where a child was
to be placed in a closed mental health setting as part of a dependency pro-
ceeding, the Court did not reach the question of the right to an attorney for
the child.387 It failed to do so because, while it was asserted that the child
had a right to privacy, the right to an attorney argument was not raised in the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus and thus was not preserved for review.388
In the M.W opinion, the Court did recognize that "[a]lthough in D.B. [in-
deed] we discussed the constitutional rights of parents whose parental rights
the Department sought to terminate, we did not discuss the nature and extent
of the child's constitutional rights in a dependency proceeding except to find
that there was 'no constitutional right to counsel.' 3 89 The Court also noted
in a footnote that "[t]he issue of whether a child who was being committed to
a residential facility would be entitled to counsel is not before us because in
this case counsel was appointed to represent M.W.'s 'express preferences'
and 'actual positions.' 390
While neither T. W. nor M. W. involved the question of a right to an at-
torney for children whose parental rights were being terminated, or for child-
ren who were being taken away from their parents in a dependency proceed-
ing, the fight of privacy, given the explicit nature of the Florida Constitution,
is the signal factor that mandates an attorney for children in these cases.39'
Adding the constitutional rights of freedom from harm and loss of liberty in
the child welfare system as well as equal access to the court only magnifies
the child's right to counsel.
386. 756 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2000).
387. Id. at 97 n.18.
388. Id. at97 n.17.
389. Id. at 97 (quoting In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 91 (Fla. 1980)). In making this state-
ment and citing In re D.B., the court made no referral to Article I, Section 23. See id.
390. M.W., 756 So. 2d at97 n.18.
391. Such children have explicit statutory rights that require enforcement. See Individuals
With Disabilities Education Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 108-446, §601(d)(B), 118 Stat.
2647, 2651 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006)); ADA Amendments Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(1), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (2008) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§12101-13 (2006)); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504(a), 87
Stat. 394 (1973) (codified as amended at 88 Stat. 1617 (1974)); Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, § 3, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§
1901-63 (2006)).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Child advocates continue to debate the most appropriate form of repre-
sentation for children in dependency and TPR proceedings. The majority
favors client-directed attorneys who represent the child's expressed wishes
under an attorney-client relationship and are bound by ethical rules. Others
argue for a form of best interest representation, whether it is by an attorney
or a traditional GAL standing in the child's shoes. Florida uses none of these
approaches. It employs a convoluted GAL model of representation that
meets no constitutional, pragmatic, best thinking, or ethical standard. Flori-
da's system does not even comply with federal and state mandates that each
child in dependency proceedings be represented by a GAL, despite expendi-
tures in excess of $30 million per year. Florida's system is in need of imme-
diate and fundamental reform. The authors of this article propose the follow-
ing:
1. That Chapter 39 be amended to provide that every child in every de-
pendency and TPR proceeding have an independent attorney acting in the
role of a traditional attorney from inception to completion of the case.
2. That the GAL Program no longer be a party in dependency or TPR
proceedings, but may be appointed by the court as a non-party advisor to
assist the court in determining the child's best interests and that almost all
GAL Program attorneys be separately housed in an organization similar to
the Civil Regional Counsel and independently represent the legal interests of
children.
3. That Florida's Rules of Professional Conduct, particularly 4-1.14 and
4-1.6, be amended to conform to the ABA Model Rules, so that children are
entitled to ethical protection as clients with diminished capacity and that
lawyers for children may reveal information to prevent substantial harm to
the child client.
4. That CLS lawyers represent their client, DCF, as a party in a civil
proceeding, and not in the role of a clientless quasi-prosecutor.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA),' which took effect
on April 24, 1996, requires a sentencing court to order a defendant to make
restitution to victims of crimes for the full amount of their losses, without
consideration of the defendant's economic circumstances.2 On June 14,
2010, the Supreme Court of the United States rendered its decision in Dolan
* Assistant General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, J.D., University of Miami
School of Law, 2002. It is with warm sentiment that I express that this article be dedicated to
the late Professor John Arthur, whose teachings left an indelible mark on me, to this day.
Having taught for 30 years prior to his death, not only was he a highly respected professor of
philosophy at Binghamton University, State University of New York, he served for 18 years
as its Director of the Program in Philosophy, Politics, and Law. He is an immortal among
great minds and teachers.
+ WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, The Merchant of Venice, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
SHAKESPEARE, act 4, sc. 1, lines 121-122 (George Lyman Kittredge ed., 1936).
I. Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 204, 110 Stat.
1214, 1227-1241(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (2006).
2. Id. Its predecessor was the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA). See
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 5, 96 Stat. 1248, 1253.
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v. United States,3 deciding five to four, in favor of allowing MVRA restitu-
tion to be imposed, even after the expiration of 90 days, in federal criminal
cases.4 One might have expected to see a split of justices, along the lines of
the conservative wing against the liberal wing. That would result in a theo-
retical majority of Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito,
and Kennedy. The corresponding minority would have been Justices Breyer,
Stevens, Ginsberg, and Sotomayor. However, anyone harboring such expec-
tations would have been soundly disappointed, as the actual majority opinion
was written by Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Thomas, Ginsberg, Alito,
and Sotomayor.5 The dissenting opinion was written by Chief Justice Ro-
berts, joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy.6
The split represented a divergence in views that could not be easily re-
conciled by a simplistic rank and file orientation of ideology. Rather, the
conflict drew lines as to those members of the Court willing to impose a flex-
ible interpretation of the federal statute, versus those who refused to deviate
even an iota from the plain text. Another way to frame the divisions is be-
tween those who felt the statute removed restitution from the general rule of
sentencing finality, versus those who did not.
The MVRA, codified largely at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A and 3664, requires
the court, with few exceptions, to enter an order of restitution to the victims
of certain crimes.7 "If the law permits restitution, the probation officer must
conduct an investigation and submit a report [containing] sufficient informa-
tion for the court to order restitution."8 Section 3663A(a) provides, in perti-
nent part, that:
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when sentencing a
defendant convicted of an offense described in subsection (c), the
court shall order, in addition to, or in the case of a misdemeanor, in
addition to or in lieu of, any other penalty authorized by law, that
the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense ....
(2) For the purposes of this section, the term "victim" means a per-
son directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission
of an offense for which restitution may be ordered including, in the
case of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspira-
3. 130 S. Ct. 2533 (2010).
4. Id. at 2537.
5. Id. at 2536.
6. Id. at 2544.
7. See Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 204, 110
Stat. 1214, 1227-1241.
8. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(I)(B) (2009).
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cy, or pattern of criminal activity, any person directly harmed by
the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme [or]
conspiracy .... 9
Hence, because of the narrow definition of who constitutes a "victim,"
section 3663A(a)(1) does not authorize a court to order a defendant to pay
restitution to any person not a victim of the offense to which the defendant is
ultimately convicted of.1° However, should the parties so choose to enter
into a plea agreement, restitution may be ordered to be paid to persons other
than the victim of the offense."
Subsection (c)(3) also provides, however, that:
[t]his section shall not apply in the case of an offense described in
paragraph (1)(A)(ii) if the court finds, from facts on the record,
that-
(B) determining complex issues of fact related to the cause or
amount of the victim's losses would complicate or prolong the
sentencing process to a degree that the need to provide restitution
to any victim is outweighed by the burden on the sentencing
process.
12
The restitution order "shall be issued and enforced in accordance with
section 3664."' 3 The burden is on the government to identify the victims of
the defendant's offense. 4 Additionally, "The burden of demonstrating the
amount of the loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense shall be on
the attorney for the Government."'15 The sentencing court is required to "or-
der the probation officer to obtain and include in its presentence report, or in
a separate report, as the court may direct," among other things, "to the extent
practicable, a complete accounting of the losses to each victim.' ' 16 The pro-
bation officer must obtain victim information from the prosecuting attor-
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1)-(2).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Rand, 403 F.3d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Hughey v.
United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413 (1990), superseded by statute, Crime Control Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(3).
12. Id. § 3663A(c)(3).
13. Id. § 3663A(d).
14. See id. § 3664(d)(1), (e).
15. Id. § 3664(e).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a).
20111
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ney."7 The prosecuting attorney is required to consult with all identified vic-
tims and "promptly provide the probation officer with a listing of the
amounts subject to restitution.' ' 8
If it is clearly impracticable to satisfy or comply with this requirement,
the probation officer "shall so inform the court."' 9 If the victim's losses can-
not be determined by ten days before sentencing, "the attorney for the Gov-
ernment or the probation officer shall so inform the court," and the court
shall set a date for a final determination, the date of which is "not to exceed
90 days after sentencing., 20 The summary determination proceeding should
not constitute a full blown evidentiary hearing.2' A private settlement of an
involved or related amount will not bar restitution, but restitution must be
offset against the civil settlement amount.22 When determining restitution,
regardless of the defendant's financial circumstances, section 3664 provides
that the court "shall order restitution to each victim in the full amount of each
victim's losses as determined by the court.
23
Criminal restitution under the MVRA differs from other forms of sen-
tencing, particularly in that, judges-not juries-make factual determinations
as to the amounts imposed. 24 Many unsuccessful defendants have brought
challenges that determinations of this nature, as opposed to those based on
findings by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or on the defendants' own ad-
missions, violate Sixth Amendment principles as spelled out in Blakely v.
17. Id. § 3664(d)(1).
18. Id.
19. Id. § 3664(a).
20. Id. § 3664(d)(5).
21. S. REP. No. 104-179, at 20 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 933. ('The
committee is concerned that without this clarification, the restitution phase of the sentencing
process could devolve into a full-scale evidentiary hearing. The committee believes that such
a development would be contrary to the interests of the swift administration of justice.").
22. United States v. Gallant, 537 F.3d 1202, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States
v. Harmon, 156 Fed. App'x 674, 676 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (court shall reduce restitu-
tion award under the MVRA by civil settlement amount); United States v. Doe, 374 F.3d 851,
856 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Bright, 353 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004))
("Where victims covered by a restitution order later recover 'compensatory damages' in a
civil proceeding for the same loss, the restitution order is accordingly reduced.").
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(I)(A).
24. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 53 n.14 (1986) (citing Bonnie Arnett Von Roed-
er, Note, The Right to a Jury Trial to Determine Restitution Under the Victim and Witness
Protection Act of 1982, 63 TEX. L. REV. 671, 684-85 (1984) ("Under [the federal Victim and
Witness Protection Act], defendants have no right to jury trial as to the amount of restitution,
even though the Seventh Amendment would require such a trial if the issue were decided in a
civil case.").
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Washington.2 ' Further, considering the Supreme Court's 2005 holding in
United States v. Booker,26 there have been a number of arguments brought to
the courts calling for the application of Booker to orders of restitution.27 The
gist of these arguments is that entering restitution orders solely based on
judicial findings constitutes sentencing error violating the Sixth Amendment,
as enunciated in Apprendi v. New Jersey,2s the predecessor to Blakely and
Booker.
One circuit court of appeals in the decision of United States v. George,29
which rejected such an Apprendi-Blakely-Booker challenge to the process of
a bench determination of restitution, described criminal restitution as "a civil
remedy administered for convenience by courts that have entered criminal
convictions. Other courts of appeal have similarly observed that there is
no Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial,31 likewise describing criminal resti-
tution as either being civil or not constituting criminal punishment.32 How-
ever, these opinions would appear to be treating wording to the contrary in
Pasquantino v. United States33 as dicta, in so doing. The Supreme Court of
the United States opined, "The purpose of awarding restitution . . . [is] to
mete out appropriate criminal punishment for that conduct. ' ' 34 Nonetheless,
the circuit courts of appeal have uniformly decided that there is no right to a
jury trial, not only in restitution proceedings under the MVRA, but also un-
der other similar restitution statutes.35
25. 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 491-97
(2000)).
26. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
27. See e.g., United States v. King, 414 F.3d 1329, 1330 n.l (11th Cir. 2005) (per cu-
riam) (citing United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2005)) ("Every circuit that
has addressed this issue directly has held that Blakely and Booker do not apply to restitution
orders.").
28. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
29. 403 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2005).
30. Id. at 473 (citing United States v. Bach, 172 F.3d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531, 542 (7th Cir. 1998)).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law
.... "1).
32. United States v. Visinaiz, 428 F.3d 1300, 1316 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding restitution is
not criminal punishment for purposes of the Sixth Amendment); United States v. Carruth, 418
F.3d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 2005) ("[l]t is essentially a civil remedy created by Congress and
incorporated into criminal proceedings for reasons of economy and practicality.").
33. 544 U.S. 349 (2005).
34. Id. at 365.
35. United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 260 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding a criminal
defendant statutorily required to pay restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 1593 for peonage, slavery,
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Moreover, the degree of proof in MVRA criminal restitution is less than
for a criminal conviction; the latter requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, whereas the former does not.36 Like the degree of proof in a civil mat-
ter, "[t]he burden is on the government to prove the amount of restitution
based on a preponderance of the evidence. 37  Such a standard has been
summarized, as when the finder of fact believes it is more probable that a
fact exists, than the fact not existing. 38 If an order of a district court deter-
mining the amount of restitution is challenged on appeal, the standard is
whether the determination amounts to clear error.39 Although one could ar-
gue that an order to pay restitution is a financial burden constituting a re-
straint on liberty, restitution has no effect on a defendant's custody status,
and courts have not permitted the use of the writ of habeas corpus to chal-
lenge a restitution order.n°
Additionally, even in cases where restitution under the MVRA was im-
posed, where the crime had been committed under prior versions of the fed-
eral statute, such impositions did not violate the Ex Post Facto clause of the
Constitution because restitution did not constitute criminal punishment.4
Despite the mandatory nature of this restitution, and the financial burden it
imposes on defendants, MyRA restitution is not considered "cruel and un-
usual punishment" and does not violate the Eighth Amendment of the Con-
42
stitution.
or trafficking in humans is not entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment on the
amount of restitution due).
Suffice it to say that the issue of whether an employer has a Seventh Amendment right to a
jury in a civil case in which an employee or the government is seeking back pay and liquidated
damages is analytically distinct from the question whether a criminal defendant who is re-
quired by statute to pay restitution is entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment on the
amount of restitution due. This court has already held that the answer to the latter question is
"no" in the context of awards made pursuant to other restitution statutes.
Id. (citing United States v. Tin Yat Chin, 476 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 2007)).
36. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 98 n.2 (1986).
37. United States v. DeRosier, 501 F.3d 888, 896 (8th Cir. 2007).
38. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
39. United States v. Statman, 604 F.3d 529, 535 (8th Cir. 2010).
40. See, e.g., Amaiz v. Warden, Fed. Satellite Low, 594 F.3d 1326, 1329-30 (11 th Cir.
2010) (per curiam); see also Mamone v. United States, 559 F.3d 1209, 1211 (11 th Cir. 2009)
(per curiam) (holding that a section 2255 motion could not be used to collaterally attack a
noncustodial part of a sentence like restitution).
41. United States v. Wells, 177 F.3d 603, 610 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Nichols,
169 F.3d 1255, 1280 (10th Cir. 1999).
42. United States v. Arledge, 553 F.3d 881, 899-900 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 342
(4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Williams, 128 F.3d 1239, 1242 (8th Cir. 1997).
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This article will initially focus on the development of the concept of res-
titution historically, leading to the eventual development Federal Probation
Act of 1925. The next part of this article will explain the changes in the law
of restitution with the enacting of the VWPA and the subsequent MVRA.
The fourth part will describe the course of the Dolan v. United States43 ap-
peal, the majority decision, and the dissent. Then in the fifth and final part,
the article will explore the effect of the case outcome, and any potential fu-
ture implications.
II. THE HISTORY OF CRIMINAL RESTITUTION AND THE FEDERAL
PROBATION ACT OF 1925
Criminal restitution, which focuses on the recovery of losses attributa-
ble to criminal conduct, dates as far back as biblical times, if not further. 44 In
fact, the rules given in these times "resulted in one of the first moral statutes
of criminal restitution.,, 45 These rules additionally served to appease the vic-
tim and helped to prevent retaliation by the victim or victim's family against
the criminal defendant.46  Biblical traditionalists for centuries embraced "a
premodern notion of natural law molded by Biblical scripture and Judeo-
Christian doctrine.' 47 Under the traditionalist approach, restitution was very
43. 130 S. Ct. 2533 (2010).
44. See Leviticus 6:1-5 (NIV). The following appears in the Book of Leviticus:
The LORD said to Moses: "If anyone sins and is unfaithful to the LORD by deceiving his
neighbor about something entrusted to him or left in his care or stolen, or if he cheats him, or if
he finds lost property and lies about it, or if he swears falsely, or if he commits any such sin
that people may do-when he thus sins and becomes guilty, he must return what he has stolen
or taken by extortion, or what was entrusted to him, or the lost property he found, or whatever
it was he swore falsely about. He must make restitution in full, add a fifth of the value to it
and give it all to the owner on the day he presents his guilt offering."
Id. (internal cross references omitted).
45. Lionel M. Lavenue, The Corporation as a Criminal Defendant and Restitution as a
Criminal Remedy: Application of the Victim and Witness Protection Act by the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines for Organizations, 18 J. CORP. L. 441, 514 (1993).
46. See generally Thomas M. Kelly, Note, Where Offenders Pay for Their Crimes: Vic-
tim Restitution and Its Constitutionality, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 685, 686-90 (1984) [herei-
nafter Victim Restitution and Its Constitutionality].
The harsh and destructive blood-feud eventually gave way to a process known as composition,
with the offending group paying the victim pursuant to an agreement produced by negotiations
between the two groups. The advent of economic stability has been credited with spanning the
transition from blood-feud to composition. The system of composition, said to have begun in
the Middle Ages primarily in Germanic areas, marked the beginning of restitution in a proper
sense, that is, as being closely related to the concept of punishment.
Id.
47. Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 33 (2006);
see also 2 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 174 (Fathers of the English
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closely intertwined with retribution because by paying for one's crime, "the
suffering experienced via the infliction of criminal punishment acts as a pen-
ance which helps the wrongdoer atone for his or her crime, thereby becoming
morally reformed." 48 With time, however, secular philosophy would come
to replace religion; as religions clashed, the safer course, was to isolate mo-
rality from the plurality of belief systems:
In Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity, Stephen
Toulmin argues that the Enlightenment (usually seen as the begin-
ning of Modernity) had two beginnings. The Renaissance human-
ists from Erasmus on, who are too often ignored, constituted the
first beginning. He characterizes the humanists as embracing a
more modest understanding of reason (thought and conduct must
be reasonable rather than certain) that is more tolerant of "social,
cultural, and intellectual diversity." The seventeenth century ra-
tionalists constituted the second beginning of the Enlightenment as
a "Quest for Certainty." Contrary to conventional accounts of ra-
tionalists as engaged in pure abstract thought, Toulmin maintains
that the rationalist theories of 17th-century philosophers were "a
timely response to a specific historical challenge-the political,
social, and theological chaos embodied in the Thirty Years' War."
For example, Ren6 Descartes gave up on the modest skepticism of
the 16th century humanists and attempted to provide "clear, dis-
tinct, and certain" foundations for knowledge that provided "a new
way of establishing ... central truths and ideas: one that was in-
dependent of, and neutral between, particular religious loyalties."
Similarly, Grotius "reorganized the general rules of practical law
into a system whose principles were the counterparts of Euclid's
axioms" and in the Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes tried to establish
political theory on principles established with the same kind of
geometrical certainty.
49
However, restitution and retribution became increasingly discrete con-
cepts, which were rarely intermingled by this point; retribution often ex-
ceeded civil restitution, and by imposing additional concerns such as deter-
rence, criminal punishment sought to protect society. 50 While Utilitarians
Dominican Province, trans., Benzinger Bros. 1918) [hereinafter 2 SUMMA THEOLOGICA] ("On
the contrary, Restitution belongs to justice, because it re-establishes equality.").
48. Henry F. Fradella, Mixed Signals and Muddied Waters: Making Sense of the Propor-
tionality Principle and the Eighth Amendment, 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 498, 502 (2006).
49. Mark C. Modak-Truran, Beyond Theocracy and Secularism (Part i): Toward a New
Paradigm for Law and Religion, 27 Miss. C. L. REV. 159, 174-75 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
50. Albin Eser, The Nature and Rationale of Punishment, 28 CARDozO L. REV. 2427,
2430, 2433-34 (2007).
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such as Jeremy Bentham argued against the distinction, Lord Mansfield con-
tended "that there is no distinction better known, than the [difference] be-
tween" criminal and civil redress. 51 The focus shifted away from remedies
like restitution, and torture, humiliation, and death, became common forms
of punishment within the penal system, particularly in early America.
52
Incarceration was becoming increasingly popular as well, and reformer
John Howard, wrote chilling details about the horrors he encountered during
his 1777 tours of various British prisons. 53 America responded by moving
towards the development of solitary cells for serious offenders, and larger
cells for other inmates to avoid overcrowding conditions.54 John Augustus,
in the mid-19th century, promoted rehabilitation rather than jail, and was
able to convince a number of courts to release first-time offenders capable of
being reformed, into his custody to be supervised. 55 Probation as a criminal
sentence was the product of a movement in America to find alternatives to
incarceration for those who were confined.56 Though arguably, the new
placement of emphasis on the offender shifted the focus away from the vic-
tim.,,
51. Alan T. Harland, Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime: Assessing the Role of
the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REV. 52 (1982).
52. Joshua Logan Pennel, Comment, The End of Indeterminate Sentencing in New York:
The Death and Rebirth of Rehabilitation, 58 BuFF. L. REV. 507, 511 -12 (2010).
New York, during the colonial period, had more than 200 crimes which could result in the
death penalty. Long-term incarceration was rare. 'County jails were reserved primarily for
pretrial detainees and debtors.' Harsh penalties that consisted of public shaming or death were
'intended to frighten, and thereby deter, the would-be offender from committing a crime.
Id.
53. Hadar Aviram, Defining the Problem, 7 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 161, 161
(2010).
54. Will Tress, Unintended Collateral Consequences: Defining Felony in the Early
American Republic, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 461, 469 (2009).
55. Major Tyesha E. Lowery, One "Get Out of Jail Free" Card: Should Probation Be
an Authorized Courts-Martial Punishment?, 198 MIL. L. REV. 165, 169-70 (2008).
Augustus' probationers performed remarkably well and seemingly reformed their lives. Even
then, Augustus frustrated law enforcement officials 'who wanted the offenders punished, not
helped.' Nevertheless, it was difficult to argue with his success and his ideas spread. 'In 1878,
Massachusetts was the first state to adopt a formal probation law for juveniles.' By 1910,
twenty-one states had probation statutes ....
Id.
56. Kellie Brady, Some People Just Shouldn't Have Kids!: Probation Conditions Limit-
ing the Fundamental Right to Procreate and How Texas Courts Should Handle the Issue, 16
TEx. WESLEYAN L. REV. 225, 227 (2010).
57. Kelly, supra note 47, at 686. "'History suggests that growing interest in the reforma-
tion of the criminal is matched by decreasing care for the victim."' Id. (quoting STEPHEN
SCHAFER, COMPENSATION AND RESTITUTION TO VICTIMS OF CRIME 12 (2d ed. 1970)).
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The notions of probation and rehabilitation became popular and spread
across the states.5 s In the late 1800's, many federal courts were resorting to
the use of a suspended entry of sentence, which led to a legal issue that
would be decided after the turn of the century.59 Congress had attempted to
pass a probation statute in 1916, but met great difficulties:
Establishing probation as a sentencing option in the federal courts
did not happen quickly or easily. Opinion on the wisdom of doing
so was sharply divided. Some federal judges were for probation,
seeing it as an alternative to the sometimes harsh penalties they
were compelled to impose. Other federal judges were against pro-
bation, finding it too lenient. Congress could not reach agreement
on a national plan. The first bills for a federal probation law had
been introduced in Congress in 1909. But it was not until 1925-
and after more than [thirty] bills had been introduced-that one
such bill became law.
60
In 1916, in the decision of Ex Parte United States,61 the Supreme Court
of the United States, in addressing a writ of mandamus brought by both the
U.S. Attorney General and the U.S. Solicitor General, held that a district
court judge named John M. Killits was without power to suspend a sentence
indefinitely. 62 This ruling became more commonly known as the "Killits
decision" and became the impetus for the enactment of the Federal Probation
Act of 1925 (FPA),63 which allowed the courts to suspend the imposition of a
sentence and place an offender on probation. 64 District courts were now free
to place offenders on probation up to an amount of time not to exceed five
years "upon such terms and conditions as they... deem[ed] best" when the
58. See Beginnings of Probation and Pretrial Services, U.S. COURTS,
http:lhost4.uscourts.gov/fedproblhistorylbeginnings.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
59. Id. ("Increasingly, however, the U.S. Department of Justice disapproved of the use of
the suspended sentence, believing that it infringed upon executive pardoning power and there-
fore was unconstitutional.").
60. Id.
61. 242 U.S. 27 (1916).
62. Id. at 51-52 (1916), superseded by statute, Federal Probation Act of 1925, ch. 521 §
1,, 43 Stat. 1259 (codified as amended at 18 USC § 3651) (repealed 1987), as stated in Af-
fronti v. U.S., 350 U.S. 79 (1955) ("[Wle can see no reason for saying that we may now hold
that the right exists to continue a practice which is inconsistent with the Constitution, since its
exercise, in the very nature of things amounts to a refusal by the judicial power to perform a
duty resting upon it, and, as a consequence thereof, to an interference with both the legislative
and executive authority as fixed by the Constitution.").
63. Federal Probation Act of 1925, ch. 521, § I.
64. Id.
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court was satisfied that "the ends of justice and the best interests of the pub-
lic, as well as the defendant," would be served thereby.65
The discretionary power of this new law also "permitted federal courts
to issue restitution orders as a condition of probation." 66 To be sure though,
there was no specific mention of restitution or reparation on the statute books
of most laws of many states or in the federal code, even going into the late
1930s. Nonetheless, the power to grant restitution had been implicitly read
into the statutory provisions permitting suspended sentence and probation
conditions, notwithstanding silence on the issue.67 Subsequent amendments
to section 3651 would change this condition from an implied one to an ex-
pressed one, as it provided that a probationer "[m]ay be required to make
restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss
caused by the offense for which conviction was had. 68 Also, by implication,
a district court was not authorized to order restitution while a defendant was
incarcerated since "the FPA authorizes a district court to impose restitution
only as a condition of [a] defendant's probation. 69
However, the judicial determination of the offender's ability to pay
compensation was a requirement of any imposition of restitution.70 Also it
was impermissible to order compensation in excess of the actual loss. 7 1 The
Government could qualify as a victim where the offense involved defrauding
the Internal Revenue Service, but the restitution still had to be limited to only
that which stemmed from the offenses for which the defendant was actually
convicted.72 If a district court ordered restitution for amounts which were not
determined to be due and owing, that order would not only be premature, but
in excess of the statutory authority.73 The ability to impose restitution also
65. Id.
66. Kelly, supra note 47, at 691.
67. Id.; see also Federal Probation Act of 1925, § I.
68. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1948), repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984).
69. United States v. Angelica, 859 F.2d 1390, 1392 (9th Cir. 1988).
70. United States v. Boswell, 605 F.2d 171, 175 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Wilson,
469 F.2d 368, 370 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Taylor, 321 F.2d 339, 341 (4th Cir. 1963).
71. See Karrell v. United States, 181 F.2d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 1950).
72. United States v. Taylor, 305 F.2d 183, 187 (4th Cir. 1962).
The judge could, however, properly require, as a condition of probation, payment of those tax-
es reported by the defendant as due for 1958, 1959 and 1960 since such liability is admitted
and no question of restitution of fraudulently evaded taxes would be involved. Amounts in
excess of defendant's admitted tax liability may not, as a condition of probation, be directed to
be paid during the probationary period prior to the time such amounts are finally and legally
determined, and then only if collection is not barred by a statute of limitation.
Id.
73. United States v. Stoehr, 196 F.2d 276, 284 (3d Cir. 1952).
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extended to probation sentences under the Federal Youth Corrections Act.74
The district courts had the discretion to impose restitution in combination
with probation as a sentencing alternative to juveniles.7 5 Probation with res-
titution was even extended in a case involving criminal liability of a corpora-
tion.76
However, as to most, it was infrequently used as a tool between 1925
and 1982, and a clarion call for change would revolutionize this cumbersome
approach that dominated the early to mid-twentieth century.77 Margery Fry,
a criminal justice reformer and one of the first women in Britain to become a
magistrate, championed the cause of restitution and brought it to the fore-
front of both English and American thinking.78
III. THE CHANGING NEEDS OF AMERICAN SOCIETY AND RESTITUTION IN
FEDERAL SENTENCING
Centuries before the dialogue on restitution came to penal law in Amer-
ica, Bentham, in his work, Theory of Legislation, laid the groundwork for
restitution within the criminal justice system.79 It, therefore, is ironic that he
is cited as having laid the foundations for the shift towards a greater retribu-
tive model and that Fry had to re-raise the dialogue about victim compensa-
tion.80 Fry was aided by two other proponents, Stephen Schafer and Albert
Eglash, who also suggested newer paradigms for a model of criminal jus-
74. United States v. Hix, 545 F.2d 1247, 1247 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) ("Although a
fine is inherently punitive, restitution is not. So long as repayment is made to the victim and
does not exceed the damage caused by the offense, restitution is essentially rehabilitative, and
hence consistent with the purpose of the Youth Corrections Act.").
75. United States v. Buechler, 557 F.2d 1002, 1007 (3d Cir. 1977).
In any event, the youth will have learned the first lesson that society-in its effort to rehabili-
tate all offenders-tries to teach: society, whenever it can help it, will not allow crime to pay.
In view of substantial scholarly support for the proposition that restitution may be rehabilita-
tive in certain cases, we decline the invitation to read the Federal Youth Corrections Act as
proscribing it.
Id. (footnote omitted).
76. United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58, 61 (7th Cir. 1972) ("If suspen-
sion of the imposition of a fine to enable an individual to make restitution is appropriate in
certain cases, a similar suspension may well be suitable for corporate defendants in appropri-
ate cases as well.").
77. See S. REP. No. 97-532, at 30 (1982) ("As simple as the principle of restitution is, it
lost its priority status in the sentencing procedures of our federal courts long ago.").
78. See THE VICTIM IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 12 (Hans Joachim Schneider ed.,
1982).
79. JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 288 (R. Hildreth trans., Trubner & Co.
2d ed. 1864).
80. See Thad H. Westbrook, Note, At Least Treat Us Like Criminals!: South Carolina
Responds to Victims' Pleas for Equal Rights, 49 S.C. L. REv. 575, 578 n.23 (1998).
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tice.8 1 The ensuing victims' rights movement began to alter the role of the
victim, as follows:
The goal of the movement was to force the justice system to rea-
lign itself to better represent the interests of victims. As part of
that overall goal, the movement urged several substantive changes,
including that offenders be required to make full monetary restitu-
tion to the victims of their criminal acts. The movement's success
and influence was evidenced by the formation of a task force on
crime authorized by President Reagan, which, in its final report in
1982, echoed the desires of most victims: increased significance
of victims' rights in the administration of criminal justice. 82
Thus, in the decade prior to the Reagan task force on crime, the move-
ment reflected public sentiment that the criminal justice system had become
overly focused on the offender and not focused enough on the victim.83 With
the Supreme Court handing down decisions in Mapp v. Ohio,84 Gideon v.
Wainwright,s5 and Miranda v. Arizona,s6 the public feared for its protection
because it perceived that the law had made it easier for criminals to escape
on legal technicalities. 87  As a response, the President's Task Force con-
ducted a national study of the plight of crime victims and proposed recom-
mendations in the improvement of compensation to ameliorate their condi-
tion.88  Taking this advice, Congress passed legislation-which had been
sorely needed-granting direct authority to federal courts to order restitution
81. See generally Stephen Schafer, Compensation of Victims of Criminal Offenses, 10
CRIM. L. BULL. 605 (1974); Albert Eglash, Creative Restitution: Some Suggestions for Prison
Rehabilitation Programs, 28 AM. J. CORRECTION 20 (1958).
82. Brian Kleinhaus, Note, Serving Two Masters: Evaluating the Criminal or Civil Na-
ture of the VWPA and MVRA Through the Lens of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Abatement
Doctrine, and the Sixth Amendment, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2711, 2720 (2005) (footnotes omit-
ted).
83. Id. at 2719-20 ("The victims' rights movement arose as a response to a societal fear
of crime in America.").
84. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (establishing the exclusionary rule suppressing the eviden-
tiary fruits of unlawful police action, which violated the Fourth Amendment).
85. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (mandating that the indigent criminally accused who faces
the risk of incarceration is entitled to the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment).
86. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that under the Fifth Amendment, the exclusionary
rule applies to confessions extracted when law enforcement has not first advised persons
under arrest of their rights).
87. See David G. Barnum, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial Decision
Making in the Post-New Deal Period, 47 J. POL. 652, 660 (1985).
88. See Final Report of the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, OFFICE FOR
VICTIMS OF CRIME, http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlovc/publications/presidentstskforcrprt/
welcome.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
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to victims of crime in the Victim and Witness Protection Act.89 Congress
intended with the Act to make restitution an integral part of the federal sen-
tencing process.90
By both authorizing courts to impose restitution independent of proba-
tion, the VWPA was a groundbreaking alteration of the federal restitution
framework. However, there were many opposed to it that challenged its con-
stitutionality because of the lack of a provision providing for a jury trial
complying with the Seventh Amendment. 9 As one commentator opined:
The restitution provisions of the Victim and Witness Protec-
tion Act will in some cases violate the seventh amendment right of
the offender to a civil jury trial. Where the restitution amounts to
first category relief under the VWPA, it may constitutionally be
ordered without a jury trial. Courts ordered this type of relief
without a separate civil action in England in 1791 and the seventh
amendment, being historically grounded, permits actions to be
tried without a jury when they were so tried at the time of the
amendment's ratification. Where, however, the restitution amounts
to compensatory damages, awarding it without a jury trial violates
the seventh amendment. The structure of the VWPA and its legis-
lative history reflect that the restitutionary remedy was intended to
replace the civil remedy; given this, the protections attached to that
civil remedy must attach to any replacement of it. Moreover, resti-
tution awards under the VWPA cannot be viewed as the adjudica-
tion of a public right, which would render the seventh amendment
inapplicable.
92
The circuit courts rejected Seventh Amendment challenges.93  The
VWPA was also attacked on Fifth Amendment grounds94 that it did not pro-
89. See Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 5, 96 Stat. 1248, 1253 (1982) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 3663 (2006)).
90. See S. REP. No. 97-532, at 30 (1982) ("The principle of restitution is an integral part
of virtually every formal system of criminal justice, of every culture and every time. It holds
that, whatever else the sanctioning power of society does to punish its wrongdoers, it should
also insure [sic] that the wrongdoer is required to the degree possible to restore the victim to
his or her prior state of well-being.").
91. The Seventh Amendment states that "[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." U.S.
CONST. amend. VII.
92. Margaret Raymond, Note, The Unconstitutionality of the Victim and Witness Protec-
tion Act Under the Seventh Amendment, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1590, 1615 (1984).
93. See United States v. Keith, 754 F.2d 1388, 1391-92 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Watchman, 749 F.2d 616, 617 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905, 908
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vide adequate due process.95 Such due process challenges have also been
disallowed.96 The VWPA was also attacked under Fourteenth Amendment
grounds that it did not provide equal protection under the law.97 This ground
was rejected because it is necessarily the case that individualized circums-
tances pertaining to victims and defendants will result in different treatment,
and mere disparity alone is insufficient to violate equal protection.98 Like-
wise, Sixth Amendment criminal jury trial and Eighth Amendment cruel and
unusual punishment challenges were also largely unsuccessful. 99
Though the VWPA greatly enhanced federal courts' discretionary pow-
er to order restitution, there were drawbacks. Under section 3664(a), when
deciding whether to impose restitution and the amount of restitution, courts
were required to consider the amount of the loss sustained by any victim as a
result of the offense, as well as "the financial resources of the defendant....
financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's de-
pendents, and such other ... factors as the court deems appropriate."'' t  As
the court in United States v. Copple'0 ' observed, this provision had the prac-
tical effect of ensuring that restitution judgments did not exceed offenders'
ability to pay.102 Defendants could not be set up to fail, so to speak. 0 3 The
(2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 836-37 (1 1th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Florence, 741 F.2d 1066, 1067-68 (8th Cir. 1984).
94. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
95. Under the Fifth Amendment, "A criminal defendant must be afforded.., due process
at a sentencing proceeding." United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 477 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948)).
96. Id.
97. See United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 841 (11 th Cir. 1984). It is not consti-
tutionally impermissible to treat similarly situated defendants differently. Id.
98. Palma, 760 F.2d at 478-79.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Keith, 754 F.2d 1388, 1390-92 (9th Cir. 1985).
100. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(3) (2006).
101. 74 F.3d 479 (3d Cir. 1996).
102. Id. at 485.
Even if the government is correct that Copple has retained $623,334 in assets, under the court's
order Copple must come up with over $3.6 million in five years to satisfy the restitution order,
plus an additional $665,859 to pay off back taxes. Copple is currently incarcerated, has a wife
and two children to support after he completes his term, and faces his employment prospects
with fraud and tax evasion convictions in tow. The value of a college degree notwithstanding,
we cannot say-in the absence of the factual findings discussed-that on substantive review
we could conclude the court's order to be factually supportable.
Id.
103. See id.
The relevant determination in favor of an order of restitution, therefore, is not a court's vague
appreciation of a defendant's "potential to succeed" financially at some point in the undefined
future, but, rather, its finding by a preponderance of the evidence that there exists a realistic
prospect that defendant will be able to pay the required amount within five years.
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Copple court understood that crafty offenders might well be very good at
hiding the ill-gotten proceeds:
We do not suggest that a defendant who has become expert at
secreting the proceeds of the crime can avoid the obligation to dis-
gorge them. The proceeds from a defendant's illegal conduct that
the defendant still retains or can recoup are certainly encompassed
within the "financial resources of the defendant," 18 U.S.C. §
3664(a), that the district court should consider in fashioning a res-
titution order. Of course, the continued existence of such proceeds
is a factual issue that should be accompanied by "specific find-
ings."
Although we have not seen it applied elsewhere, we believe
there is a method by which the court can fashion a restitution order
that accounts for the court's reasonable belief that there are se-
creted assets and that satisfies the court's obligation to make the
necessary supporting findings. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d), the
sentencing court has broad discretion to assign to either party
"[t]he burden of demonstrating such other matters as the court
deems appropriate" in the course of its fact-finding. It would be
sufficient for a district court that believes, based on the record, that
such proceeds are still available to determine the amount properly
attributable to the defendant with reasonable precision.' 04
Therefore, the court of appeal believed that the district court could not
skirt its burden to specifically demonstrate how it believed the defendant
could pay, notwithstanding the defendant's resourcefulness at concealing his
assets. 10 5 Still, in some cases, this could pose some difficulty in doing.
10 6
Id.
104. Copple, 74 F.3d at 484.
105. Id. Judge (now Justice) Alito's concurrence is of great interest, in that, while he
concurred with the majority, he suggested that the burden of proof be on the defendant, and
not the Government. See id. at 485-86 (Alito, J., concurring). He wrote:
Defendants convicted of fraud offenses are sometimes masters at hiding assets. There-
fore, if the government bore the burden of proving that such defendants still possess illegally
obtained assets, the government would be unable to locate hidden assets, those assets would
not be taken into account in framing the restitution orders, and the defendants would continue
to profit at the expense of the innocent victims. This would be unconscionable.
Id. at 486. The solution is to place the burden of proof on the defendant to show what has
happened to all of the illegally obtained assets. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(3) (2006). All the
assets for which the defendant cannot account may be included in the amount of restitution
ordered. See id. To the extent that records are unavailable, the risk of inaccuracy should be
borne by the defendant rather than the victims. See id. As the MVRA was enacted the same
year as the Copple decision, Congress saw fit to do that: The change placed the entirety of the
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Another further issue that also posed some difficulty with interpretation
of the VWPA was that "[t]he statutes did not further define what constituted
the financial resources of the defendant."'0 7 Additionally, most governmen-
tal agencies can qualify as victims under the VWPA to whom restitution
must be paid. °8 However, a governmental agency could not be a victim un-
der the VWPA when it actively created the conditions leading to the loss,
due to a law enforcement sting operation. 109
With the exception of several minor amendments, the federal restitution
structure remained relatively intact until Congress passed the Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) in 1996.'10 The MVRA made restitution
mandatory in almost all cases where the victim suffered an identifiable mon-
etary loss from an enumerated crime."' The MVRA removed from the dis-
trict courts the ability to fashion restitution orders based on an offender's
ability to pay.1 2 The MVRA was and now remains "all about mandating
restitution" and removing the power to decide otherwise from a district
burden on ability to pay on offenders, by eliminating it as a consideration altogether from the
amount determination. Compare id. (placing the entirety of the burden on ability to pay on
offenders), with United States v. St. Gelais, 952 F.2d 90, 98 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding Defen-
dant fully responsible for entire amount of substantiated loss, where court attempted to ascer-
tain Defendant's ability to pay, but Defendant was uncooperative and not forthcoming).
106. 1 had the experience of prosecuting a defendant in a Florida state circuit court for
first-degree felony grand theft exceeding $100,000. While in the middle of a lengthy eviden-
tiary hearing to determine the amount of restitution and the repayment schedule, during cross-
examination, I posed a question to the defendant concerning the whereabouts of the proceeds
from her home. The home had been sold for more than $400,000. Florida law required that
the state establish the defendant's financial resources and ability to pay when ordering a sche-
dule of repayment. The defendant promptly and incredulously replied that she had squan-
dered the money, and was now living in poverty. She then gratuitously injected, "Being poor
isn't something people like you would ever understand." The court admonished the defen-
dant, directing her to better spend her time answering the questions, and to avoid answers
attacking the prosecutor. Suffice it to say, based on the many theft and fraud cases that I
previously prosecuted, I am quite aware of just how difficult many offenders can be, and the
lengths of evasiveness they will go to in avoiding revealing the extent of their financial affairs.
107. GOODWIN ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL RESTITUTION § 9:10 (2010 ed. 2010).
108. See § 3664(i); see also United States v. Lincoln, 277 F.3d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 2002)
(noting that the language of § 3664(i) refers to cases in which the government is a victim).
109. United States v. Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 35-36 (Ist Cir. 1994) (holding the VWPA
applies to passive victims, not active ones, and that the ambiguity had to be resolved in favor
of the offender under the rule of lenity).
110. See generally Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
204, 110 Stat. 1214, 1227-41.
111. See United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 201 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding that a restitu-
tion order in the amount of $938,965.59 was mandatory where defendant is convicted of a
Title 18 offense against property and the victim has suffered pecuniary loss).
112. United States v. Williams, 612 F.3d 500, 509 (6th Cir. 2010).
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court.' 13 "No longer is the decision whether to order restitution for certain
crimes left to the discretion of the district court."
' 14
A district court is now required to "order restitution to each victim in
the full amount of each victim's losses as determined by the court and with-
out consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant.""1,5 How-
ever, the MVRA does require judges to consider the defendant's financial
resources when putting together a schedule of repayment. 1 6 There had been
the belief that the prior VWPA had often times left victims with an incom-
plete recovery of their losses."' 7 By removing judicial discretion and man-
dating that judges order restitution in the full amount of victims' losses,
Congress attempted to ensure adequate compensation."' While it might be
argued that restitution served other purposes, such as rehabilitation of the
offender," 9 this was not the primary purpose of the MVRA. The MVRA
reflected a shift towards a more victim-centric system of justice, one that was
well received by the public, and which remains to this day the law of restitu-
tion in federal sentencing. 20 However, the drawback with the wording of the
statute is that it has been difficult to determine whether the MVRA is a crim-
113. United States v. Dolan, 571 F.3d 1022, 1026 (10th Cir. 2009), aff'd by 130 S. Ct.
2533 (2010).
114. Id.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A) (2006); United States v. Taylor, 41 F. App'x. 380, 383
(10th Cir. 2002).
116. § 3664(f)(2)(A).
117. H.R. REP. No. 104-116, at 4 (1995) (stating that the new statute needed "to ensure
that criminals pay full restitution to their victims for all damages caused as a result of the
crime").
118. Heidi Grogan, Comment, Characterizing Criminal Restitution Pursuant to the Man-
datory Victims Restitution Act: Focus on the Third Circuit, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1079, 1101
(2005).
Most illuminating are the opening remarks by one of the co-sponsors of the Senate bill, Sena-
tor Orrin G. Hatch, at the initial Senate Hearing on mandatory victim restitution:
"[R]ecompense for loss is unrelated to a judge's discretion to fashion a sentence. Restitution is
not an alternative to punishment, nor is it even part of the sentence imposed. Rather, it is what
the victim is due irrespective of any other punishment." Senator Hatch's use of the word "oth-
er" is similar to the language of the MVRA. It is unfortunate that this careless choice of words
("any other punishment") is reflected in the MVRA's statutory language, because it is clear
that Senator Hatch did not wish to make restitution an addition to a defendant's criminal pu-
nishment. Rather, by giving a victim "what he is due," Senator Hatch intended restitution to
restore a victim to his pre-crime state.
Id. at 1102 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
119. S. REP. No. 104-179, at 12 (1995) (pointing out that the MVRA "ensure[s] that the
offender realizes the damage caused by the offense and pays the debt owed to the victim as
well as to society").
120. See, e.g., United States v. Grimes, 173 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[Ihe intended
beneficiaries are the victims, not the victimizers.").
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inal punishment or civil compensation for purposes of many of the chal-
lenges that were mounted against it.
121
Nonetheless, aside from the previously mentioned attacks on the consti-
tutionality of the MVRA, a new issue would unfold: the statute's proscrip-
tion that restitution should be imposed at the time of sentence, or no later
than 90 days thereafter. 22 Even where additional losses become ascertaina-
ble at a later date, section 3664(d)(5) provides for an amended order of resti-
tution within 60 days after discovery of the losses.1 23 What would happen in
those restitution cases, where adhering to this time deadline would not be
possible?
IV. DOLAN V. UNITED STATES
In September of 2006, Brian Russell Dolan, a member of the Mescalero
Apache Indian Tribe, while intoxicated, severely injured a fellow tribe mem-
ber, Evan Ray Tissnolthtos, in a fight which took place on tribal reservation
grounds. 24 When Dolan' s sister learned of the fight, she contacted the local
police who discovered Tissnolthos bleeding on the side of the road. 125 Tiss-
nolthos was transported by helicopter to a hospital and treated for his inju-
ries. 126 His medical bills were paid by the Indian Health Service medical
program, a governmental agency. 127  Dolan was charged federally1 28 with
121. Matthew Spohn, Note, A Statutory Chameleon: The Mandatory Victim Restitution
Act's Challenge to the Civil/Criminal Divide, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1013, 1041 (2001).
Finally, the resolution of this debate brings into focus the challenge of determining whether
statutes are criminal or civil. In this endeavor, courts should not forget the purposes behind the
Supreme Court's civil/criminal test. This test is needed only because Congress has sometimes
sought to evade the procedural protections defendants receive in criminal proceedings by giv-
ing criminal sanctions civil labels.
Id.
122. See United States v. Stevens, 211 F.3d 1, 4-5 (2d Cir. 2000) (addressing whether a
restitution order issued 117 days after sentencing was invalid).
123. 18 U.S.C.§ 3664(d)(5) (2006); see also United States v. Minneman, 143 F.3d 274,
284 (7th Cir. 1998).
124. United States v. Dolan, 571 F.3d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir. 2009) aff'd by 130 S. Ct. 2533
(2010); Brief for Petitioner at 5, Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533 (2010) (No. 09-367).
125. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 125, at 5.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2006).
Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other person any
of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under
chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon,
assault resulting in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), an assault
against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, felony child abuse or neglect,
arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian country,
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assault resulting in serious bodily injury, and was prosecuted in the United
States District Court of New Mexico.129 Dolan pled guilty on February 8,
2007.130 In May of 2007, the Office of Probation filed its Presentence Inves-
tigation Report (PSR), but was unable to provide any amounts for restitution
pertaining to the victim's medical bills, because the Indian Health Service
failed to respond timely to their requests for documentation.
1 31
The district court attempted to set the matter for sentencing on June 28,
2007, but on June 27, 2007, the Government requested a continuance of the
sentencing.1 32 The sentencing was reset and eventually took place on July
30, 2007.13 3 The district court sentenced Dolan to twenty-one months in
prison followed by three years supervised release, but was unable to deter-
mine the amount of restitution134 because the Government was still unable to
provide documentation of victim restitution. 135
The district court first gave the impression that it wanted to reset the
matter for another 90-days, but then proceeded to verbally order restitution
on the date of sentencing, but left the matter open due to insufficient infor-
mation before it. 136 On August 8, 2007, the district court entered judgment,
using the standard Administrative Office form but left the restitution amount
blank and indicated the following in the section regarding payment schedule:
"'Pursuant to the Mandatory Restitution Act, restitution is applicable; how-
ever, no information has been received regarding possible restitution pay-
ments that may be owed. Therefore, the Court will not order restitution at
this time. ' ' 137
On October 5, 2007, the probation office created an addendum to the
PSR indicating that the total of the victim's medical bills was $105,559.78.38
The 90-day deadline from the sentencing hearing date expired on October
28, 2007.139 The district court did not hold a hearing to determine restitution
shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above
offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
Id.
129. Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2537 (2010).
130. Id.
131. Id.; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 125, at 6.
132. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 125, at 6.
133. Dolan, 130 S. Ct. at 2537.
134. Id. The Government's victim advocate indicated the victim allegedly had an out-
standing bill of $80,000, but was unable to obtain confirmation or reach the victim. Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 125, at 6.
135. Dolan, 130 S. Ct. at 2537.
136. Id.; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 125, at 7.
137. Dolan, 130 S. Ct. at 2537.
138. Dolan, 571 F.3d at 1024.
139. Id. at 1025.
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until February 4, 2008.'" At the time, Dolan objected on grounds of juris-
diction, as more than six months had elapsed since sentencing. 41 The court
requested the parties submit briefs on the 90-day limitation provision, and
later held oral argument on the jurisdiction issue. 142
The district court determined that it retained jurisdiction and entered an
opinion and restitution order requiring Dolan to pay the Indian Health Ser-
vice $104,649.78, with scheduled payments of $250 per month. 143  Dolan
timely appealed the restitution order to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
arguing inter alia, that the district court erred in imposing a void order.'
4
"
The court of appeals affirmed on the grounds that the congressional intent of
section 3664 would be frustrated if jurisdiction could be lost due to timing. 45
Thus, it held that because section 3664 is in the nature of a claims processing
rule, it was never intended that somehow an offender's due process rights
and need for sentencing finality could outweigh the victim's right to restitu-
tion. 146  Dolan filed a writ for petition of certiorari; the Supreme Court
granted the petition. 14
7
The Tenth Circuit was not alone in its line of thinking at the time. The
Sixth Circuit held that the 90-day provision is not a jurisdictional limitation,
because this would be inconsistent with the 60-day provision for an amended
order at a later date. 48 The Second and Third Circuits permitted tolling of
the 90-day provision, where the reason for delay is occasioned by the offend-
er.149 The First and Fourth Circuits also held the passing of the 90-day dead-
line did not divest the district court of further subject matter jurisdiction. 5 1
The Ninth Circuit further held that violation of the timing requirements of
section 3664 did not result in a loss of jurisdiction to order restitution. 15
140. Id.
141. Id.; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 125, at 8.
142. Dolan, 571 F.3d at 1025.
143. Id.; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 125, at 8-9.
144. Dolan, 571 F.3d at 1025.
145. Id. at 1029-30.
146. Id. at 1031.
147. See Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2537 (2010).
148. United States v. Vandeberg, 201 F.3d 805, 814 (6th Cir. 2000).
149. United States v. Terlingo, 327 F.3d 216, 222-23 (3d Cir. 2003) (allowing for time
greater than the 90-day time period, where the defendant's actions are cause for the delay);
United States v. Stevens, 211 F.3d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 2000) (also tolling 90-day deadline for defen-
dant's delay); see also United States v. Douglas, 525 F.3d 225, 252-53 (2d Cir. 2008).
150. See United States v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 187, 199 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Cheal, 389 F.3d 35, 48-49 (1st Cir. 2004).
151. United States v. Cienfuegos, 462 F.3d 1160, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2006).
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However, the Sixth Circuit decided the matter differently in another
opinion.'52 The Seventh Circuit also held that a late entered restitution order
was void for failing to observe the 90-day requirement. 153 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit likewise found that a restitution order violating the deadline was without
jurisdiction.' 54 There was a true split within the circuits.
On review, Justice Breyer delivered the majority opinion, holding that
even when a sentencing court misses MyRA's 90-day deadline to make final
determination of victim's losses and impose restitution, it retains jurisdiction
over restitution, where that court made clear prior to the deadline's expira-
tion that it would order restitution. 5 5 The Court seeks to strike a balance, but
admits that the victim's right to mandatory restitution outweighs the offend-
er's need for finality. 156 The Court advises that an offender can use manda-
mus as a remedy for any transgressions by the district court, where the sen-
tencing court has truly failed to observe the requirements of section 3664.57
Finally, the Court dismisses the "rule of lenity" argument, finding that there
is no ambiguity within the MVRA in need of resolution.158
Chief Justice Roberts delivered a powerful dissent. 59 He cautioned that
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not permit the indefi-
nite extension of time to comply with ordering restitution under the MVRA,
which the majority ignores. 16° He reminded the majority, that all sentencing
must be completed on the date of sentencing; any extension of time beyond
that must be specifically provided for by rule. 16 1 He scathingly summarized
152. United States v. Jolivette, 257 F.3d 581, 584 (6th Cir. 2001).
Accordingly, we hold that when the 90-day clock runs out, the judgment of conviction and
sentence, including the restitution provision, becomes final by operation of the statute. We
therefore have jurisdiction to review the judgment of conviction and sentence. It follows that
because there was no timely judicial determination of the restitution amount, the judgment
contains no enforceable restitution provision.
Id. at 584-85.
153. United States v. Farr, 419 F.3d 621, 625-26 (7th Cir. 2005) (invalidating restitution
order for lack of jurisdiction. However, the court noted that had the government proposed
theories for the delay, the result may have been different).
154. United States v. Maung, 267 F.3d 1113, 1122 (1 lth Cir. 2001) (finding no authority
to enter a restitution order beyond the ninety days).
155. Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2542 (2010).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 2544.
159. Id. "[T]wo wrongs do not make a right, and that mistake gave the court no authority
to amend Dolan's sentence later, beyond the 90 days allowed to add a sentencing term requir-
ing restitution." Dolan, 130 S. Ct. at 2549 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 2545 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 2546 ("Section 3664(d)(5) is self-executing: It grants authority subject to a
deadline, and if the deadline is not met, the authority is no longer available.").
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the rule announced by the majority: "[O]nce the camel's nose of some per-
mitted delay sneaks under the tent, any further delay is permissible."'162 He
cautioned that the majority does not seem "to need [section] 3664(d)(5) at
all.' ' 163 He concluded, if there is any balancing to be done, the job belongs to
Congress, not to the Court.' 64 Although he never referenced the term, it is
clear that Chief Justice Roberts' impression of the majority decision is that it
is a dangerous move of judicial activism.
V. WHO SAID THERE WAS NO SUCH THING AS "DEBTOR'S PRISON"?
The obvious effect of the Dolan decision is that less offenders will be
able to escape the imposition of restitution based on legal technicality. Con-
sidering the Congressional intent behind the MVRA, this serves its purpose
because the MVRA was a reactionary measure to the public backlash against
those Supreme Court decisions that afforded greater protections to the cimi-
nal accused in America. However, one has to question the wisdom of a rule,
which allows a district court to suggest that it is thinking about ordering res-
titution, to sufficiently serve to toll the 90-day deadline. The offender has
little expectation of finality.
The decision seemed more of a Solomonic compromise, rather than a
true reading of the statute in question. If the government were right, then it
should not matter whether the district court announces on the record, to alert
an offender that it wants to impose restitution in the future. The deadline
should not apply at all. Restitution should be ordered, when the Government
has sufficient information to bring the matter before the court. However, it is
said that the 90-day suggestive deadline is for the benefit of the victim, in
that it encourages the courts to address these matters sooner than later.
If the defendant were right, then the 90-day deadline should be strictly
adhered to, as restitution is purely a creature of statute. Failure to observe
the statute should result in the court lacking jurisdiction over the defendant
because the court's authority cannot exceed what is provided for in the sta-
tute.
The Supreme Court, in supplanting its own directive, appears to be le-
gislating what Congress did not provide for.165 If Congress wanted to devise
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2548.
164. Dolan, 130 S. Ct. at 2549.
165. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 487-88 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting). The dissent stated:
Indeed, there is reason to believe that some legislative bodies have welcomed judicial activism
with respect to a subject so inherently difficult and so politically sensitive that the prospect of
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such a convoluted rule, it would have provided for it directly in the MVRA.
The Dolan decision, read in the negative, stands for the proposition that the
district court loses jurisdiction if it fails to announce at any time during sen-
tencing, or the 90 days thereafter, that it intends to impose restitution.
66
Therefore, offenders have some right to insist upon escaping restitution if the
district court fails to make at least some type of signal of how it intends to
proceed prior to the deadline expiration. 67 Two cases that were decided after
Dolan have tried to clarify what is sufficient enough to constitute that signal.
In Fu Sheng Kuo v. United States,168 the Supreme Court reviewed on pe-
tition for writ of certiorari the court of appeals' affirming decision of the
timing of a district court's restitution order exceeding the 90-day deadline. 69
The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for consideration in
light of its prior decision in Dolan.7 ° On remand, the Ninth Circuit in Unit-
ed States v. Fu Sheng Kuo, 17 1 held that even where the written order did not
reflect that the district court ordered restitution, the transcript reflected that
the district court orally pronounced this and that the oral pronouncement
controlled. 17
2
Shortly prior to the Fu Sheng Kuo decision, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed a district court's imposition of a restitution amount eight
days after the expiration of the 90-day deadline in United States v. Pickett.1
7
'
Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Dolan, the court of appeals
affirmed, pointing to the record which reflected that the district court in-
tended to order restitution, but delayed only as to the determination of the
amount. 74 "Those statements, each of which was made before the expiration
of the ninety-day period, left no doubt that restitution would be imposed."'75
More likely than not though, absent total misstep and silence, it does not
others confronting it seems inviting. Federal courts no longer should encourage this deference
by the appropriate authorities-no matter how willing they may be to defer.
Id.; see also Keenan D. Kmiec, Comment, The Origin and Current Meanings of "Judi-
cial Activism", 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1441, 1472 (2004) ("In short, courts are less competent
policy-making bodies than the legislature.").
166. See Dolan, 130 S. Ct. at 2537.
167. Id. at 2541 ("Though a deliberate failure of the sentencing court to comply with the
statute seems improbable, should that occur, the defendant can also seek mandamus.").
168. 130 S. Ct. 3458 (2010).
169. Id. at 3458.
170. Id.
171. 620 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2010).
172. Id. at 1163.
173. 612 F.3d 147, 148 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
174. Id. at 149.
175. Id.
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seem likely that there will be an occasion where a district court will fail to be
deemed as ordering restitution.
Moving away from subsequent decisions, to more carefully explore the
implications of Dolan, one has to look towards failure: What happens when
the offender fails to pay restitution imposed? While there are a variety of
recourses, the most common and harsh sanction is to revoke probation and
sentence the offender to incarceration. The Supreme Court in Bearden v.
Georgia'76 outlined the test district courts are to follow in considering revo-
cation based on violation of repayment conditions of supervised release.'77
Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion of the Court.178 Reviewing
such cases under a due process "fundamental fairness" analysis under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 79 the Court held that "if the State determines a fine
or restitution to be the appropriate and adequate penalty for the crime, it may
not thereafter imprison a person solely because he [or she] lacked the re-
sources to pay it.' 180 However, should a district court find that the failure to
repay has been willful, then the court need not take into consideration wheth-
er the defendant lacks the resources or not.'"' Making it abundantly clear
that a defendant's poverty status in no way protects him or her from punish-
ment the Court concluded:
We hold, therefore, that in revocation proceedings for failure to
pay a fine or restitution, a sentencing court must inquire into the
reasons for the failure to pay. If the probationer willfully refused
176. 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
177. See id. at 666-67.
178. Id. at661.
179. The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of cit-
izens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
180. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 667-68.
181. Id. at668.
This distinction, based on the reasons for nonpayment, is of critical importance here. If the
probationer has willfully refused to pay the fine or restitution when he has the means to pay,
the State is perfectly justified in using imprisonment as a sanction to enforce collection. Simi-
larly, a probationer's failure to make sufficient bona fide efforts to seek employment or borrow
money in order to pay the fine or restitution may reflect an insufficient concern for paying the
debt he owes to society for his crime. In such a situation, the State is likewise justified in re-
voking probation and using imprisonment as an appropriate penalty for the offense. But if the
probationer has made all reasonable efforts to pay the fine or restitution, and yet cannot do so
through no fault of his own, it is fundamentally unfair to revoke probation automatically with-
out considering whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the defendant are available.
Id. at 668-69 (citation omitted).
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to pay or failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts legally to ac-
quire the resources to pay, the court may revoke probation and
sentence the defendant to imprisonment within the authorized
range of its sentencing authority. If the probationer could not pay
despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do
so, the court must consider alternative measures of punishment
other than imprisonment. Only if alternative measures are not
adequate to meet the State's interests in punishment and deterrence
may the court imprison a probationer who has made sufficient bo-
na fide efforts to pay. To do otherwise would deprive the proba-
tioner of his conditional freedom simply because, through no fault
of his own, he cannot pay the fine. Such a deprivation would be
contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 82
The Court reversed the revocation of probation, holding that the trial
court's finding that the defendant knew for a long time what he had to do,
and failed to do so, was insufficient to demonstrate how the defendant failed
to make bona fide efforts to repay.
183
Yet contrast the result in the Bearden decision with the outcome of the
offender in United States v. Montgomery.84 The defendant had pled to "four
counts of using the mails to defraud charitable organizations [that assisted]
victims of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks."' 85 After serving a 21-
month prison sentence, the defendant started her 3-year term of supervised
release, the conditions of which involved keeping a steady job and repay-
ment of $63,817.94 in restitution, at the rate of $300 a month. 86 After two
years, she had only paid $474.16, failed to keep a steady job, and told her
probation officer that she could not keep applying for a job because she was
seeking Social Security benefits.'
87
Montgomery introduced testimony that she had made repeated efforts to
keep steady employment, and a mental health counselor testified to the ex-
tent of her mental illnesses. 188 When the Government's vocational rehabilita-
tion counselor was asked about Montgomery's employability, he responded
he had "'some concerns.""' 189 The district court found, based on a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that Montgomery had engaged in a pattern of manipu-
182. Id. at 672-73.
183. Id. at 674.
184. 532 F.3d 811 (8th Cir. 2008).
185. Id. at812-13.
186. Id. at813.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Montgomery, 532 F.3d at 813.
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lation and did not find her efforts to be bona fide,"9 revoking supervised
release and sentencing her to an additional eleven months of incarceration. 9'
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the revocation, finding
the district court did not commit clear error. 92 The circuit court applied the
Bearden analysis but found that the district court had found Montgomery
willfully failed "'to acquire the resources to pay"' and, in light of such will-
fulness, did not need to consider fundamental fairness or "alternative meas-
ures of punishment," as argued by her counsel. 193 The question is, however:
Should someone suffering from mental illness be factually found to be will-
fully not attempting to make bona fide efforts?' 94 In a factual close call, the
circuit courts of appeal are in no position to disturb the rulings of a district
court judge based on a cold record.' 95
Are we moving in the right direction? "If poverty tends to criminalize
people, it is also true that criminalization inexorably impoverishes them."'' 96
Professors Baird and Jackson described the laws of early English history as
"'viciously punitive from the perspective of the debtor."" 97 History has not
been kind to deadbeats, as:
190. Id. at 814. Particularly of note to the district court was the fact that she had found
work at varying times, but then lost her jobs subsequently thereafter. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 815.
193. Montgomery, 532 F.3d at 814.
194. See Ellen Byers, Mentally Ill Criminal Offenders and the Strict Liability Effect: Is
There Hope for a Just Jurisprudence in an Era of Responsibility/Consequences Talk?, 57
ARK. L. REV. 447, 520 (2004).
Today's evidence reveals that the problem posed by mentally ill offenders goes beyond the
narrow question of how many raise the defense, successfully or not, in their court cases be-
cause this number remains very small. But millions of severely mentally ill persons are ware-
housed in the modem-day equivalent of the sanitariums of the 1930s and 1940s, dark "pest-
houses" where "patients" were held for custody, not cure. Despite congressional recognition
in the 1950s that such conditions were barbaric, today many sick individuals exist in an equally
repugnant environment, often locked away in solitary confinement where self-mutilation, sui-
cide attempts, and other desperate cries for help are answered with inhumane punitive meas-
ures justified under findings of "rule violations." Political reaction to unfounded fears wound
up creating a situation many times worse, and much more intractable, than that originally im-
agined.
Id. at 520-21 (footnotes omitted).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Morin, 889 F.2d 328, 331 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating decision
revoking probation "will not be reversed absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion").
196. Barbara Ehrenreich, Op-Ed., Is It Now a Crime to Be Poor?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
2009, at 9.
197. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 Am.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 7 n.12 (1995) (quoting DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON,
CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 27-28 (2d ed. 1990)).
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English law was not unique in its lack of solicitude for debtors.
History's annals are replete with tales of draconian treatment of
debtors. Punishments inflicted upon debtors included forfeiture of
all property, relinquishment of the consortium of a spouse, impri-
sonment, and death. In Rome, creditors were apparently autho-
rized to carve up the body of the debtor, although scholars debate
the extent to which the letter of that law was actually enforced.'98
History indicates that in the United States, imprisonment for debt was
abolished at the federal level in 1833.'99 However, the decisions of the Su-
preme Court in Tate, Williams, and Bearden suggest that it was not, where
the offender is morally culpable and where sentenced to probation or super-
vised release, willfully fails to satisfy repayment orders, as determined by the
district courts. 200 The decisions in Dolan, Fu Sheng Kuo, and Pickett suggest
that mandatory restitution means no less than mandatory restitution, regard-
less of due process concerns. 201 It would seem the direction we are moving
in is the direction of our past.
Incarceration, followed by supervised release, followed by incarceration
upon failure to pay, seems to be perpetuating a jailhouse cycle.20 2 Moreover,
the presumption that jailing a probationer for nonpayment of debt is the best
way to ensure repayment falls short when as Justice O'Connor suggests in
Bearden, that to avoid more prison, the probationer may well resort to crimi-
nal activity to repay his or her obligations.2 3 The "tough on crime" selling
point of the victims' rights movement and the statutes enacted in response,
198. Tabb, supra note 198, at 7. "Imprisonment for debt was the order of the day, from
the time of the Statute of Merchants in 1285, until Dickens' time in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury." Id.
199. Id. at 16.
200. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 670 (1983); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 400-
01 (1971); United States v. Williams, 128 F.3d 1239, 1241 (8th Cir. 1997).
201. See Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2539 (2010); United States v. Fu Sheng
Kuo, 620 F.3d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pickett, 612 F.3d 147, 149 (2d Cir.
2010).
202. See Wendy McElroy, The Return of Debtors' Prison?, FREEMAN Apr. 2008, at 30, 34.
Imprisonment... is an unnecessary and dangerous exception to the due process to which
every individual is entitled both by the Constitution and by natural right. It also involves a
confusing, inconstant maze of laws that collapse the traditional distinction between criminal
and civil courts. As Justice Black observed, "It would be no overstatement... to say that the
offense with the most ill-defined and elastic contours in our law is now punished by the har-
shest procedures known to that law."
Id.
203. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 670-71 (1983).
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are questionable at best.2°4 "The most salient points of this statement should
be underscored-America has increased its incarceration rate 500% in twen-
ty-five years, it has 5% of the world's population but 25% of its prisoners,
and it competes only with Russia for world leadership in putting people in
prisons and jails. °20 5 This may well cast a dystopian shadow on the efficacy
of the MVRA itself, despite the well wishes of the public.
VI. CONCLUSION
When the public considers the damage and harm caused by white collar
criminals such as Martin Frankel-looted more than $200 million from the
insurance industry, Kenneth Lay-participated in Enron's fraud of more than
$1 billion from its shareholders, Bernard Ebbers-complicit with
WorldCom's accounting practices, which resulted in the theft of $3.8 billion
from its shareholders, and Bernard Madoff-ordered to pay $170 million in
restitution of the $64.8 billion in investment fraud he orchestrated, then the
MVRA seems like a blessing and a godsend, and the decision of the Supreme
206Court in Dolan seems like a wise and proper outcome. However, few of-
fenders have a decent enough education to commit large-scale sophisticated
crimes dreamt up in the confines of remote ivory towers.
For the rest of society, consider that mandatory restitution has placed a
Herculean burden on many offenders, particularly the indigent ones. This
actually discourages offender rehabilitation, and the "corresponding econom-
ic hardship can directly and indirectly cause recidivism. 2 °7 A policy of ad-
mittedly acquiescing to a jailhouse cycle surely implicates whether our con-
stitution protections of fundamental fairness have been stripped to the bone.
Additionally, are we doing ourselves any favors when we turn prisons into
warehouses for the sick and indigent, at a heavy price, that we all bear?
Therefore, the outcome of Dolan is another victory for victims, but a
substantial loss for the rehabilitation movement once led by reformers like
Augustus. Augustus was careful to only choose those offenders he felt had a
chance to turn their lives around and make a difference. Augustus never
chose people that arguably would be set up for failure. If we intend to pur-
204. Matthew Dickman, Should Crime Pay?: A Critical Assessment of the Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 1689, 1704 n.] 19 (2009) (discussing
that Congress was made aware that recidivism would increase, but declined to address it).
205. Robert G. Lawson, Difficult Times in Kentucky Corrections-Aftershocks of a
"Tough on Crime" Philosophy, 93 KY. L.J. 305, 309 (2004-2005).
206. See generally Henry Shea, Top 10 List: Lessons Learned From White-Collar Crimi-
nals, ST. THOMAS LAWYER, available at http://www.stthomas.edu/lawmagazine/2008/winter/
topl0list.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
207. Dickman, supra note 205, at 1707.
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sue the slippery slope of the redolent path returning to victim-centric ap-
proach of yore, where will we stop? The Constitution will become meaning-
less if Congress lacks the political courage to draw the line when remedies
like restitution erode the protections of the Bill of Rights as well as the Due
Process Clause. The High Court does no better when it engages in activism.
If we are going to move towards the past, perhaps it is time we start to care-
fully scrutinize which past we choose.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The following pages assess the widely-anticipated' March 30, 2010,
opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Jones v. Harris Asso-
ciates L.P.2 That opinion by Justice Samuel Alito widened the door for fu-
ture litigation brought by, e.g., mutual fund shareholders challenging the fees
accorded to the investment advisers of their funds. Such investment advisers
of mutual funds typically create the funds they thereupon advise and domi-
nate-hence, captive mutual funds. The Investment Company Act of 1940,
as amended in 1970, 3 attached upon an investment adviser of a registered
investment company a fiduciary duty respecting that adviser's compensation
for services paid by such company.4 The Jones controversy reached the Su-
preme Court only after its turbulent vetting in the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit by such notables of the scholarly field of law
1. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Supreme Court Debates Mutual Fund Fee Charges, Bos.
GLOBE, Nov. 03, 2009, at A12. The controversy was one of the October 2009 term's "most
closely watched business cases." David G. Savage, Justices: Funds Can Be Sued Over Fees,
CHI.TRIB., Mar. 31, 2010, at § 1, 19. The March 9, 2009 grant of a petition for writ of certi-
orari, 129 S. Ct. 1579 (2009), had, alone, set abuzz the mutual fund industry because poten-
tially presaging revisions of fees charged to manage money. Tom Sullivan, Money-Market
Fund to Get More Safeguards, BARRON'S, Mar. 23, 2009, at 44. This case proved to be the
initial mutual fund-related case which the Supreme Court had heard in eighteen years. Sam
Mamudi, Decision Could Set Standard on Fees, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2009, at C9.
2. 130S. Ct. 1418 (2010).
3. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 36(b), 84 Stat.
1413, 1428 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35b (2006)), amending Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (1940).
4. See Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 629 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated by 130
S. Ct. 1418 (2010). "Fund advisers owe it to their owners to make as much money as possi-
ble, which they do by collecting fees. But fund directors owe it to shareholders to keep fees."
John Waggoner, Fees Land Mutual Funds in Top Court, USA TODAY, Oct. 30, 2009, at B 1.
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and economics as the Seventh Circuit's Chief Judge Frank H. Easterbrook
and Judge Richard A. Posner.
Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.,5 a 1982 opinion
out of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, so con-
strued the fiduciary duty element of the 1970 amendments to the 1940 Act
that litigation thereafter in excessive fee cases dispensed judgments virtually
uniformly for defendants. Subsequently would experts in the economic
analysis of law, Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, pronounce that nothing
special inheres in fiduciary relationships. Fiduciary duty, rather, is a func-
tion of transaction costs. In Jones, Chief Judge Easterbrook replied to an
attack under the amendments to the Investment Company Act by sharehold-
ers in captive mutual funds against their funds' investment adviser's remune-
ration. Easterbrook broke with Gartenberg in an opinion pitched almost
entirely to the element of the fiduciary-investment adviser's disclosure to its
captive mutual fund's own board. Both the appellate-level opinions in Gar-
tenberg and in Jones brushed aside plaintiff bids to benchmark the invest-
ment advisory fees charged to their captive mutual funds against fees
charged independent clients like pension funds.6 In his dissent from the
denial of rehearing en banc in Jones, Judge Posner contrariwise dwelt on the
Jones investment adviser's charging captive funds more than twice what it
charged to independent funds.7
Justice Alito's opinion tracked less the Easterbrook reasoning in Jones
than the Gartenberg path: To risk liability for breach of its fiduciary duty, an
investment adviser must collect compensation so disproportionately great as
to bear no reasonable relation to the rendered services and as cannot be an
outcome of an arm's-length bargain.8 But Alito submits a Gartenberg-plus
opinion in Jones. It expressly disavows any categorical rule forestalling
comparisons between those fees an adviser charges a captive mutual fund
and those it levies upon independent clients. Unsettlingly, perhaps, for mu-
tual fund investment advisers, economics scholarship immediately post-
Jones reported on the cost structure and performance of a large sampling of
America's pension funds. It disclosed that mutual fund fees substantially
exceed pension fund costs, possibly due in part to pension funds' greater
5. 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
6. Id. at 925; Jones, 527 F.3d at 631.
7. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissent-
ing) (per curiam).
8. See Rob M.M.J. Bauer et al., Pension Fund Performance and Costs: Small Is Beauti-
ful (Soc. Sci. Research Networks, Working Paper, 2010), available at http://ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=965388.
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sizes, which could entail enhanced bargaining power.9 The performances of
defined benefit contribution funds outdo those of defined contribution
pension funds. This suggests that monitoring external managers and invok-
ing bargaining muscle to drive down costs is more efficient in the former,
potentially due to improved incentives.1° And Alito adds that fees can be
excessive even when negotiated by a board possessing all relevant informa-
tion.
Immediately apprehended in numerous quarters was the potential thrust
of the Jones Gartenberg-plus opinion. That tendency could be pressure on
the investment advisers of captive mutual fund boards to justify in detail, and
perhaps to reduce, their investment advisory charges. This pressure would
conduce to the financial benefit of retail-not institutional-investors. Un-
fortunately, the salutary payoffs hopable from Jones had not already been
conjured for investors by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
This 2010 Jones opinion closely comports with the law and economics
propounded neither by Easterbrook-with his linkage of fiduciary duty to
transaction costs-nor by Posner, who links fiduciary duty with the unequal
information costs problem. It squares with the thought of Nobel laureate
economist Sir James A. Mirrlees, and of fiduciary law specialist Tamar
Frankel of Boston University. Mirrlees perceives the distinguishing feature
of principal-agent relationships to be asymmetry in responsibilities, with the
principal as first mover and agent as the second. Frankel teaches that first
mover-mutual fund investors (principals) can be hostages of vulpine second
mover-investment advisers (agents).
II. GARTENBERG v. MERRILL LYNCH ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC.
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit case of
Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 11 two shareholders
(Irving L. Gartenberg and Simone C. Andre) of a money market fund (Mer-
rill Lynch Ready Assets Trust) "appeal[ed] from a judgment of the Southern
District of New York."1 2 That judgment had dismissed their consolidated
derivative actions against Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust and its affiliates,
Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., the adviser and manager thereof, and
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.' 3 The principal claim on appeal
was that the fees paid by Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust to Merrill Lynch
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
12. Id. at 925.
13. Id.
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Asset Management, Inc., for varied services--encompassing investment ad-
vice and the processing of daily orders from fund shareholders-were so
disproportionately large as to represent a breach of fiduciary duty violative of
section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940.14 That provision had
been added in 1970.1
5
Section 36(b) in pertinent part provides:
For the purposes of this subsection, the investment adviser of a
registered investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary
duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of
payments of a material nature, paid by such registered investment
company or by the security holders thereof, to such investment ad-
viser or any affiliated person of such investment adviser. An ac-
tion may be brought under this subsection by the Commission, or
by a security holder of such registered investment company on be-
half of such company, against such investment adviser .... With
respect to any such action the following provisions shall apply:
(1) It shall not be necessary to allege or prove that any defendant
engaged in personal misconduct, and the plaintiff shall have the
burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty.
(2) In any such action approval by the board of directors of such
investment company of such compensation or payments, or of con-
tracts or other arrangements providing for such compensation or
payments, and ratification or approval of such compensation or
payments, or of contracts or other arrangements providing for such
compensation or payments, by the shareholders of such investment
company, shall be given such consideration by the court as is
deemed appropriate under all the circumstances.
6
Appellants contended that the district court had erred in its rejection of a
reasonableness standard toward determining whether Merrill Lynch Asset
Management, Inc. had executed its fiduciary duty in compliance with section
36(b).17 Additionally, they urged district court error in determining whether
14. Id. at 927; see 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006 & Supp. III 2010). "In 1960, the average
expense ratio for a mutual fund was 0.48%, whereas now it stands at more than twice that
amount at 0.98%." Chuck Jaffe, Vanguard's Bogle: Fix the Fund Industry, WALL ST. J., May
21,2010, at C9.
15. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 15(b), 84
Stat. 1413, 1424 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (2006)).
16. Id. § 36(b).
17. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 927.
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there had been a fiduciary duty breach in primary reliance upon other money
market funds' management fees level, and also on the costs to Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 18 They argued that the proper test must be the
rate resultant from "arm's-length negotiations in light of the services to be
rendered."' 9
They argued further (as to such arm's-length negotiated rate) that a fee
percentage, which might have proved reasonable when Merrill Lynch Ready
Assets Trust had been newly-launched, proved unreasonable once that trust
had swelled to its then-huge size.2 ° Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.
charged the Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust an advisory fee hinging upon
a proportion of the Fund's net assets' daily value. 2' That fee graduated
downward as the asset total waxed.22 Director of Mutual Fund Research for
Morningstar, Russel Kinnel, acknowledged in 2010, in context of Jones, that
a higher-cost fund might correspond with a higher-quality fund.2 3 Yet Kin-
nel so stipulated solely in terms of dollars expended upon managing, and not
in terms of fees as a proportion of assets:
For example, Pimco Total Return, run by the estimable Bill Gross,
charges annual management fees of 0.25%. But because the fund,
the nation's largest, holds some $200 billion in assets, Pimco
clears about $500 million a year. Meanwhile, the middling Fede-
rated Bond charges a yearly management fee of 0.75%, which, on
$1.1 billion in assets, generates fees of $8.3 million. So, does Fe-
derated charge triple Pimco's management fee because its bond
pickers are three times better than Pimco's, or are the Federated
folks less talented, as the huge gap between Pimco's and Fede-
rated's revenues implies? I'd say it's the latter.
The fund industry says, rightly, that you can't compare the
fees of funds and separate institutional accounts because retail in-
vestors require more servicing. In many instances, however, a mu-
tual fund's management fee includes a kitchen sink's worth of oth-
er charges, such as distribution costs, that aren't used to pay in-
vestment professionals. Thus, investors and fund directors alike
are in the dark when they compare fees, both between mutual
18. Id.
19. Id. at 928.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 926.
22. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 926.
23. Russel Kinnel, Fund Fees on Trial, KIPLINGER'S PERSONAL FIN., Feb. 2010, at 50.
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funds and institutional accounts and among different mutual
funds.
24
Bear in mind that the fund management group Vanguard, alone among
the biggest fund managers, is a mutual company. 25 Thereby, that manage-
ment company belongs, itself, to the funds it manages.26 Mutual funds are
technically owned by the individual shareholders investing in them.27
All parties recognized, as had the district court, that the test essentially
was to be whether the fee schedule instituted a change beyond the ambit of
that which would have been reached-in light of all surrounding circums-
tances-via arm's-length negotiation. 28 The Gartenberg panel held that to be
guilty of a section 36(b) violation "the adviser-manager must charge a fee...
so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the ser-
24. Id. When weighted by mutual fund assets, the average fund's expense ratio between
1951 and 2009 rose from 60% to some 87%. JOHN C. BOGLE, DON'T COUNT ON IT!:
REFLECTIONS ON INVESTMENT ILLUSIONS, CAPITALISM, "MUTUAL" FUNDS, INDEXING,
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, IDEALISM, AND HEROES 75 (2011). Fund managers arrogated to them-
selves the payoffs from the "economies of scale in managing other people's money." Id. at
150. There has been a central trio of corporate organization types in the financial services
industry: public companies, the partnership, and the mutual. Ironically, supposedly was mu-
tuality a structure finely-suited to providing common services and to the policing of self-
regulation. Such a business was the more capable of eliciting and retaining a small customer's
trust. John Kay, How Trust in Finance Was Carried Off by the Carpetbaggers, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 19, 2011, at 11.
25. John Authers, Bubbles Are the Fault of the Many - Not the Few, FIN. TIMES (London),
Apr. 3, 2010, at 16.
26. Id.
Despite the "mutual fund" label attached to US investment funds, Vanguard is the only
true mutual fund group, owned by investors in its funds. Naturally, Mr. [John] Bogle, [Van-
guard founder], regards this as the best form of ownership. He claims support in this view
from David Swensen, chief investment officer of Yale University's endowment. He quotes
Mr. Swensen: "Investors fare best with funds managed by not-for-profit organisations [sic],
because the management firm focuses exclusively on serving investor interests."
It is true in theory, but not always in practice, as investors in products managed by mu-
tual life assurance companies discovered in the UK. That Vanguard has maintained its inves-
tor focus and stuck it its core principles probably has as much to do with Mr. Bogle's strong
views as with the mutual set-up. But more mutually run institutions would not go amiss.
Mr. Bogle's prescription for a better system is relatively simple: to demand proper fidu-
ciary management from money managers. They must prioritise [sic] client interests, act as re-
sponsible corporate citizens, charge reasonable fees, and eliminate conflicts of interest.
Pauline Skypala, A Vital Remedy for Capitalism's Ills, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 10, 2011, at
6; Paul Menchaca, Big Losses Prompt Fresh Look at Investment Model, FIN. TIMES (London),
Jan. 10, 2011, at 16 ("The approach pioneered by Yale's David Swensen is under scrutiny.").
27. Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 561 F.3d 816, 820 (8th Cir. 2009), vacated by 130 S.
Ct. 2340 (2010).
28. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982).
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vices rendered and could not have been the product of arm's-length bargain-
ing. ' 29
All pertinent facts were to be assessed. 30 Not pertinent was the appel-
lants' proposal that a criterion for ascertaining fair advisory fees for money
market funds (the captive funds) should be the lower fees levied by invest-
ment advisers upon large pension funds (independent clients):
The nature and extent of the services required by each type of fund
differ sharply. As the district court recognized, the pension
fund[s] do not face the myriad of daily purchases and redemptions
throughout the nation which must be handled by the Fund, in
which a purchaser may invest for only a few days.
3 1
During 2009, a panel for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit would suppose that this language constituted a Gartenberg
disclaimer against comparing money market mutual funds (apples) against
equity pension funds (oranges).32 And the Second Circuit panel concluded
that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of proving that the fees le-
vied had been so extreme or unjust as to equal a breach of fiduciary duty
under section 36(b): 33
Our affirmance is not a holding that the fee contract between the
Fund and the Manager is fair and reasonable. We merely conclude
that on this record appellants failed to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence a breach of fiduciary duty. Whether a violation of
[section] 36(b) might be established through more probative evi-
dence of (1) the Broker's processing costs; (2) the offsetting com-
mission benefits realized by the Broker from non-Fund securities
business generated by Fund accounts; and (3) the "float" interest
income gained by the Broker from its method of handling payment
on Fund redemptions, must therefore remain a matter of specula-
tion. Indeed, the independent trustees of the Fund might well be
advised, in the interests of Fund investors, to initiate such stu-
dies. 34
Hence, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.35
29. Id.
30. Id. at 929.
31. Id. at 930 n.3.
32. Gallus, 561 F.3d at 823-24.
33. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 930.
34. Id. at 933.
35. Id. at 934.
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Passage of the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, with its
section 36(b),36 had little impact on the mutual fund industry.37 Section 36(b)
spawned numerous lawsuits, but these met with piddling success. 3s And into
2009, not only had the judiciary applied Gartenberg thinking 39 for upwards
of three decades, but the Securities and Exchange Commission had incorpo-
rated Gartenberg into its own rulemaking.40
I. INTERLUDE: EASTERBROOK AND FISCHEL ON FIDUCIARY DUTY
A seminal article on fiduciary duty in general41 is Contract and Fidu-
ciary Duty42 by Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel. Previously,
they had indicated that the duty of loyalty is a response to the impossibility
of writing a contract specifying entirely the parties' obligations.43 One con-
tracting party might "desire an objective . . . but have neither an idea nor
much concern" about how her end be attained. 44 In place of specified under-
takings, an agent shoulders a loyalty duty respecting reaching the goal, plus a
duty of care in performance. 45 An expertise-hiring principal is reluctant to
expose herself to the mercy of an agent whose inputs and outputs are difficult
to monitor.4 This demarcates the fiduciary package.47
Since Ronald H. Coase published his studies The Federal Communica-
tions Commission48 and The Problem of Social Cost49 in 1959 and 1960 re-
36. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 36(b), 84 Stat.
1413, 1429 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006)).
37. MATTHEW P. FINK, THE RISE OF MUTUAL FUNDS: AN INSIDER'S VIEw 70 (2008).
38. Id.
39. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 933.
40. Troy A. Paredes, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at Indep. Dirs.
Council's 2009 Inv. Co. Dirs. Conference (Nov. 13, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spchIll309tap.htm). "In Gartenberg, the Second
Circuit analyzed § 36(b) and created the framework that has served as the starting point for
interpreting a fund adviser's fiduciary duty." Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 561 F.3d 816,
821 (8th Cir. 2009), vacated by 130 S. Ct. 2340 (2010).
41. Charles W. Wolfram, A Cautionary Tale: Fiduciary Breach as Legal Malpractice,
34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 689, 712 (2006).
42. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J. L. &
EcON. 425 (1993).
43. Id. at 426.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 42, at 426.
48. R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1959)
[hereinafter Coase, The Federal Communications Commission].
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spectively, it has been grasped that the legal rules can minimize the chal-
lenges of fragmentary information and weighty transaction costs, via pre-
scribing results contracting parties would have selected in a world of abun-
dant information and costless negotiations. 50  Transaction costs are those
costs connected with utilizing a specific governance means to conduct trans-
actions, e.g., the negotiation of, the formation of, and the monitoring of con-
tracts, and enforcing performance.51 Coase first introduced into economics
the transaction cost concept.52 Indeed, companies themselves arise when and
where hierarchies provide superior to markets. A reason therefor is the ex-
pense in delineating and overseeing specific contracts. Rather than "detailed
contracts, long-term relationships [built upon] trust need to emerge [within]
businesses, and between businesses and suppliers. 53
Fiduciary duties-Easterbrook and Fischel aver-are not a species apart
from other contractual undertakings. 54  Fiduciary obligations vary across
different underlying transactions, just as do actual contracts vary across mar-
kets.55 Undeniably, fiduciary duties substantially deviate from one agency
relationship to another: e.g., trustee/beneficiary, pension trustee/beneficiary,
guardian/ward, attorney/client, partner/partner, corporate manager/investor,
majority or inside investor/client, labor union/employee, lender/borrower,
and franchisor/franchisee. 56  On the other hand, Professor Robert Flanni-
49. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960) [hereinafter
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost]. Ronald H. Coase was awarded the Alfred Nobel Me-
morial Prize in Economics in 1991. GRAHAM BANNOCK ET AL., DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
61 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1998).
50. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 42, at 426. But, Easterbrook and Fischel cite
only to the Coase article of 1960, not of 1959. See id. at 426.
51. Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Daniel F. Spulber, Trust and Incentives in Agency, 15
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 45, 100 n.202 (2005) (citing R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA 386, 390-92 (1937)).
52. Id.
53. Martin Wolf, Britain's Strategic Chocolate Dilemma, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 29,
2010, at 9.
When transactions are discrete and involve previously anonymous participants, contract doc-
trine reduces transaction costs by guaranteeing that the parties' reasonable expectations will be
met. By contrast, when transactions are ongoing, frequent, and involve close personal con-
tact-when they are "relational," in other words-the purpose and function of contract shift.
Because norms are more likely to provide informal enforcement mechanisms, the benefits de-
rived from ceremony and symbolism are at liberty to come to the fore.
Robert C. Illig, The Dual Nature of Private Law: Private Investment Funds, the Crash of
2008, and Why We Contract 40 (unpublished law review article), available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= I 007&context--robert-illig.
54. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 42, at 427.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 432-34.
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gan-the Canadian expert on the law and economics of fiduciary duty57-
argues that Easterbrook and Fischel err in asserting that fiduciary duty
attributes so deviate among agency relationships.58 Constantly evolving is
the fiduciary principle.59
Scholars of noneconomic bent lack "a unifying approach to fiduciary
duties because they" seek something special in fiduciary relationships; but,
there is naught special-Easterbrook and Fischel aver-to be unearthed. 6°
Once transactions costs prove steep, somebody calls some contractual rela-
tions fiduciary; nevertheless, it is a continuum as Easterbrook and Fischel
allege.6' (On the other hand, Flannigan points out regarding contract and the
general law of fiduciary obligation: "There is no connection at all where
they do not overlap (open access contractual arrangements, non-contractual
fiduciary obligations). ''62) Contract law encompasses the principle of good
faith in implementation, and good faith blurs into fiduciary duties.63 For the
respective good faith, and fiduciary duty, concepts are alike a stab at approx-
57. University of Saskatchewan College of Law Professor Flannigan, awarded the S.J.D.
by the University of Toronto Faculty of Law, is the author of, inter alia, Robert Flannigan,
Fact-Based Fiduciary Accountability in Canada, 36 ADVOCS. Q. 431 (2010) [hereinafter Hlan-
nigan, Fact-Based Fiduciary Accountability in Canada]; Robert Flannigan, Fiduciary Accoun-
tability Transformed, 35 ADvOCS. Q. 334 (2009); Robert Flannigan, The Core Nature of Fidu-
ciary Accountability, 2009 N.Z. L. REV. 375; Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Duty of De-
parting Employees, 14 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 355 (2009); Robert Flannigan, The [Fiduciary]
Duty of Fidelity, 124 L. Q. REV. 274 (2008); Robert Flannigan, Fiduciary Mechanics, 14 CAN.
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 25 (2008); Robert Flannigan, Child Labour: The Partial Fiduciary Accoun-
tability of Parents, 86 CAN. B. REV. 293 (2007); Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Accounta-
bility of Ordinary Employees, 13 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 283 (2007); Robert Flannigan, The
Strict Character of Fiduciary Liability, 2006 N.Z. L. REV. 209; Robert Flannigan, The Adulte-
ration of Fiduciary Doctrine in Corporate Law, 122 L. Q. REV. 449 (2006); Robert Flannigan,
Director Duties: A Fiduciary Duty to Confess, 26 Bus. L. REV. 258 (2005); Robert Flannigan,
A Romantic Conception of Fiduciary Obligation, 84 CAN. B. REV. 391 (2005) (reviewing
LEONARD ROTMAN, FIDUCIARY LAW, (2005)); Robert Flannigan, The Boundaries of Fiduciary
Accountability, 83 CAN. B. REV. 35 (2004).
58. Robert Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L.
393, 421 (2007) [hereinafter Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability]. "Con-
text determines whether opportunism is actionable as a fiduciary breach." Id. at 394. "No
authorities are offered for the supposed attributes and many of those attributes are misleading
or irrelevant." Id. at 421 n.121. The 1993 article was produced by, and was responsive to,
discussions running throughout the 1980s over the suitability and relative efficacy of fiduciary
and contract/market machinery to control managerial behavior. Id. at 422.
59. See, e.g., Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor,
Analogy, and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 897 (1993).
60. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 42, at 438.
61. See id.
62. Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, supra note 58, at 420-21.
63. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 42, at 438.
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imating those terms parties would have negotiated had they anticipated the
circumstances engendering their dispute. 64
Homilizing language in judicial opinions must not divert anyone 65 from
the hypothetical bargain insight.66 True, the remedy for violation of the fidu-
ciary duty of loyalty-disgorgement of all profit obtained thereby-appears
distinctly anti-contractual. 67 Throughout contract law, the presumptive re-
medy is premised upon a promisee's lOSS. 68 On the other hand, today dis-
gorgement remedies likely award a "promisee only the profit net of the op-
portunity cost incurred," i.e., gross profits minus what the promisee could
have obtained chasing alternative opportunities with equal time and effort.
This is not "gross profits [minus] out-of-pocket expenses. 69 In short, if an
actual contract is made, a judge enforces it.70 If actual contracts are feasible,
then courts induce bargaining.71 If transaction costs weigh too heavily, then
judges establish presumptive rules toward maximizing the parties' joint wel-
fare.72 Contract and fiduciary duties align along a continuum.73
On the other hand, Flannigan points out that while default rules are pub-
lic goods accessible to the citizenry to cut transaction costs generally, all
default rules share this public good character. 74 The function of fiduciary
responsibility as a provision of a standard form set of terms to curtail transac-
tion costs therefore presents a generic function, connecting to default status
per se and with no specific content at any given form of legal regulation.75
So such function cannot constitute a "unique substantive rationale for fidu-
ciary accountability. 76
64. Id. at 438 n.28.
65. See id. at 439-40.
66. Id. at 438.
67. Id. at 441.
68. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 42, at 441.
69. Id. (citing E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Dis-
gorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1370-82 (1985)).
70. Id. at 446.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 42, at 446. It is especially in the last thirty or forty
years that transaction-cost economics has informed the investigation of multiple salient topics.
See, e.g., THE ELGAR COMPANION TO TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (Peter G. Klein & Mi-
chael E. Sykuta eds., 2010).
74. Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, supra note 58, at 417.
75. id.
76. Id. In any case, "[t]ransaction cost methodology [demands] the evaluation of relative
costs. Economists [still] have yet to operationalize that methodology for" fiduciary duty law.
Id. at 402-03 n.33 (citing Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Governance, 95 AM. EcON.
REV. 1, 3-7 (2005)).
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And the musings of Frank H. Easterbrook over fiduciary duty would
later loom large over the Jones saga.
IV. JONES v. HARRISASSOCIATESL.P.
In a May 19, 2008" opinion for a unanimous panel, including Circuit
Judges Kanne and Evans,78 United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit Chief Justice Frank H. Easterbrook reviewed a district court conclu-
sion that Harris Associates, adviser to the Oakmark complex of mutual
funds, had not violated section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act, and
the court grant summary judgment in Harris Associates, favor.79 The Oak-
mark complex's open-end funds had grown in recent years because the net
returns thereof had surpassed the market average, and the investment advis-
er's remuneration had grown apace.8° In the Jones v. Harris Associates
L.P.8 controversy, the plaintiffs-who held shares in several Oakmark
funds, captive mutual funds-contended that Harris' investment advisory
fees were excessive.82
What Chief Judge Easterbrook styled "the main event ' 83 of the appeal
was these "plaintiffs' contention that the adviser's fees [had been] exces-
sive." 84 The district court had followed Gartenberg, concluding that Harris
"must prevail because its fees are ordinary. 85 Plaintiffs first asserted that
Gartenberg should not be heeded because the Second Circuit depends too
much upon market prices as its reasonable fees benchmark 86-for plaintiffs
averred that fees are denominated incestuously instead of via competition.
Second, plaintiffs proposed that should any market be invoked as a fee
benchmark, it is the one for advisory services to unaffiliated institutional
clients: independent clients. 87 Plaintiffs asserted that Harris, like many in-
77. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 627 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated by 130 S. Ct.
1418 (2010).
78. Id. at 629.
79. Id. (discussing Jones v. Harris Assocs. L. P., No. 04-C-8305, 2007 WL 627640, at *9
(N.D. 111. Feb. 27, 2007), vacated by 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010)).
80. Id.
81. 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008).
82. Id. at 629.
83. Id. at 630.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 631.
86. Jones, 527 F.3d at 631.
87. Id.
20111
127
: Nova Law Review 35, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
vestment advisers, boasts institutional clients--e.g., pension funds--charged
the less.88
Judge Easterbrook retorted that "just as plaintiffs are skeptical of Gar-
tenberg because it relies too heavily on markets, we are skeptical about Gar-
tenberg because it relies too little on markets. '89 Essentially, Jones disap-
proved the Second Circuit's Gartenberg arm's-length negotiated rate ap-
proach:90
A fiduciary duty differs from rate regulation. A fiduciary must
make full disclosure and play no tricks but is not subject to a cap
on compensation. The trustees (and in the end investors, who vote
with their feet and dollars), rather than a judge or jury, determine
how much advisory services are worth.9 1
After all, to conjure with the fiduciary duty term is to summon up the
law of trusts,92 "[a]nd the rule in trust law is straightforward: A trustee owes
an obligation of candor in negotiation, and honesty in performance, but may
negotiate in his own interest and accept what the settlor or governance insti-
tution agrees to pay., 93 On the other hand, Flannigan teaches:
[I]t is a policy assertion that opportunism is sufficiently controlled
by various markets. There is nothing intrinsically "economic"
about that argument, or, to put it another way, nothing turns on the
fact of its economic character or presentation. It is simply a policy
argument about how we might regulate opportunism.
94
Judge Easterbrook in Jones elaborates:
Things work the same way for business corporations, which
though not trusts are managed by persons who owe fiduciary du-
ties of loyalty to investors. This does not prevent them from de-
manding substantial compensation and bargaining hard to get it.
Publicly traded corporations use the same basic procedures as mu-
tual funds: A committee of independent directors sets the top
managers' compensation. No court has held that this procedure
implies judicial review for "reasonableness" of the resulting salary,
88. Id.
89. Id. at 632.
90. Jones, 527 F.3d at 632.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 242 cmt. f (2009)).
94. Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, supra note 58, at 394.
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bonus, and stock options. These are constrained by competition in
several markets-firms that pay too much to managers have
trouble raising money, because net profits available for distribution
to investors are lower, and these firms also suffer in product mar-
kets because they must charge more and consumers turn else-
where. Competitive processes are imperfect but remain superior to
a "just price" system administered by the judiciary. However
weak competition may be at weeding out errors, the judicial
process is worse-for judges can't be turned out of office or have
their salaries cut if they display poor business judgment.95
Bluntly: "Judicial price-setting does not accompany fiduciary duties. 96
Prior to the development of economic science, people searched for the "just
price" criterion.97 Only "gradually it came to be realized that there is no...
95. Jones, 527 F.3d at 632-33.
96. Id. at 633.
97. MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, POWER & MARKET: GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY 168
(1970). The late Dr. Rothbard was a representative of the Austrian School of Economics, see,
e.g., JEs0s HUERTA DE SOTO, THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL: MARKET ORDER AND ENTREPRENEURIAL
CREATIVITY (2008), HANDBOOK ON CONTEMPORARY AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS (Peter J. Boettke
ed. 2010), AUSTRIAN LAW AND ECONOMICS (Mario Rizzo ed. 2010), a school of surprising
durability and importance. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 844
(1976). That school's most illustrious exponent was the late economist-jurist, Friedrich A.
Hayek, RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 287 (2003) [hereinafter
POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY], recipient in 1974 of the Alfred Nobel Me-
morial Prize in Economics. BANNOCK ET AL., supra note 49, at 185.
Several meanings are attributed to the expression 'neo-Austrian economics.' For the
Bohm-Bawerkian stream of thought, represented by authors such as M. Faber and P. Bernholz,
the central problem is that of offering a coherent and up-to-date formulation of [Eugen von]
Bbhm-Bawerk's theory of capital and interest. For other economists the expression 'neo-
Austrian theory' is associated not so much with a methodology or a specific doctrine as with
an ultra-liberal ideology. For these, being neo-Austrian today means basically being in favour
of the free market. It is mainly to Fritz Machlup (1902-83), and to his interpretation of the
work and thought of von Mises, as presented in Knowledge: Its Creation, Distribution and
Economic Significance (1980-83), that we owe the diffusion of this approach-an approach
which in the last few years has received a great deal of attention from von Mises' most fervent
American follower, Murray Rothbard.
ERNESTO SCREPANTI & STEFANO ZAMAGNI, AN OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC
THOUGHT 389 (David Field trans., 2009).
As Friedrich Hayek might say liberalism fits the distributed knowledge of a creative so-
cial order. It does this because it gives autonomy to individuals and their own spontaneous,
changing organizations. One might take such autonomy to be the central value of liberalism,
or one might take the autonomy to be a means to other things, such as, especially, welfare. For
Adam Smith, economic liberalism is justified as a way to enhance welfare through increased
productivity. Blocking government intervention in the economy for capricious reasons makes
almost all of us better off. Decentralization of knowledge implies two fundamentally impor-
tant facts: popular ignorance and government ignorance. Given government's ignorance of
what it can actually accomplish in many realms, we must want it not to be empowered to act in
those realms.
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objectively determinable quantitative criterion of justice."98 Hence, Easter-
brook's scorn of a "just price" system administered judicially. During 2011,
practically nobody explicitly searches for the so-called just price.99 Price as
reflection of fair value is mythical.1 l° It generally is recognized that any eth-
ical attack must be one against the consumers' values; it is not to be leveled
"against the quantitative price-structure [which] the market establishes on the
basis" thereof.'01 Given a pattern of consumer preferences, the just price is
the market price. 0 2 Economics cannot be value-free. However, once subjec-
tive values have been agreed upon, specific public policies can be pursued.1
0 3
The incest protest of plaintiffs stemmed from the fact that an investment
adviser creates the mutual fund, which the adviser then dominates despite
"the statutory requirement[s] that 40% of trustees be disinterested. ' '° Over
the lifetime since the passage of the Investment Company Act of 1940, fund
directors almost never fired their fund advisers.'0 5 Hence Warren Buffett
"scoffed at fund directors" at least as early as 1993.'06 "Few mutual funds
ever change advisers, and [the Jones] plaintiffs conclud[ed] from this that the
Hayek and the Austrian [S]chool of [Elconomics might better be seen as the Austrian
school of social and political theory. The Austrian vision of distributed knowledge is consis-
tent with John Stuart Mill's grounding for his principle of liberty, that individuals have the best
knowledge of what their interests are.
RUSSELL HARDIN, How Do You KNOW?: THE ECONOMICS OF ORDINARY KNOWLEDGE 83-84
(2009) (footnotes omitted).
Future Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov's father, a physics teacher, JAY BERGMAN,
MEETING THE DEMANDS OF REASON: THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF ANDREI SAKHAROV 8 (2009),
explained experiments to his son on the basis of scientific laws: "This was an idre fixe for
Sakharov as a physicist and later as a dissident, when he believed that political problems were
just as amenable as scientific ones to rational analysis." Id. at 10. But rational analysis in
politics, unlike physics, draws upon subjective, value-judgment premises. And are these
likewise drawn upon in legal-economic theory, see, e.g., JAMES R. HACKNEY JR., UNDER
COVER OF SCIENCE: AMERICAN LEGAL-ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY
(2006), and in economics itself? See, e.g., JULIE A. NELSON, FEMINISM, OBJECTIVITY AND
ECONOMICS (1996).
98. ROTHBARD, supra note 97, at 168-69.
99. Id. at 169.
100. See generally WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRICELESS: THE MYTH OF FAIR VALUE (AND
How TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT) (2010).
101. ROTHBARD, supra note 97, at 169.
102. Id.
103. R.H. Bates, Some Core Assumptions in Development Economics, in ECONOMIC
ANTHROPOLOGY: TOPICS AND THEORIES 361, 378 (Sutti Ortiz ed., 1983) (citing MICHAEL P.
TODARO, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD (1977)).
104. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated by 130 S. Ct.
1418 (2010).
105. FINK, supra note 37, at 188-89.
106. Id. at 189.
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market for advisers is not competitive."'' 7 However, Chief Judge Easter-
brook countered that a fund's investors themselves effectively fire advisers
by shifting their money elsewhere." 8 This they do once advisory fees be-
come too onerous relative to results available from alternative investment
vehicles:'09 "It won't do to reply that most investors are unsophisticated and
don't compare prices. The sophisticated investors who do shop create a
competitive pressure that protects the rest. ' 110
Does Easterbrook mean that an investment adviser as in Jones is off the
hook because sophisticated outsiders who recognize that excessive adviser
fees burden a captive mutual fund would accordingly withhold their own
potential purchases, and thereby protect incumbent investors in that particu-
lar captive mutual fund via a threatened decline in the price of that captive
mutual fund's shares? The threatened decline in share price is, presumably,
seen by Easterbrook as deterring excessive adviser fees. Assuredly, the law
of large numbers so functions in democratic voting that even if some unin-
formed voters opt for incorrect choices, there obtains but slight prospect that
the ultimate majority will opt otherwise than to a perfectly-informed majori-
ty's result.' Contrariwise, commercial comparisons cause complications,
finds Donald A. Wittman:
The law of large numbers may explain the puzzle that the Bill of
Rights protects free speech but not commercial advertising. False
political advertising may fool a minority, yet it will have no harm-
ful effect since votes for the minority will not be translated into
political power. In contrast, a business does not have to persuade a
majority of consumers, only a few, to have any sales. So the ma-
jority may want to protect a minority in the commercial arena.
112
107. Jones, 527 F.3d at 631.
108. Id. at 634.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for
Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387
(1983)).
111. DONALD A. WIrTMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE: WHY POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFICIENT 16 (1995). Wittman's example assumes voters' errors to be
uncorrelated. Id. However, similar results are yielded by more complex models. Id. (citing
Krishna K. Ladha, Condorcet's Jury Theorem in Light of de Finetti's Theorem: Majority-
Rule Voting With Correlated Votes, 10 Soc. CHOICE & WELFARE 69 (1993); Sven Berg, Con-
dorcet's Jury Theorem, Dependency Among Jurors, 10 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 87 (1993)).
112. WITTMAN, supra note 11l, at 16-17. Again, why the difference in harmful effect
between political and commercial markets? "The reason for the difference is that consumers
get what they buy, but voters get what the majority 'buys."' POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND
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That is, a business-captive mutual fund-need not fool a majority of
consumers-potential investors that include sophisticated outsiders-to prof-
itably make its sales of sufficient fund-shares. So the majority of voters act-
ing through Congress could want to protect from harmful effects uninformed
consumers who buy shares of captive mutual funds in the commercial arena.
That voter-majority's protective shield would be section 36(b).
Flannigan points out as to fiduciary issues that a manager cannot credi-
bly argue that her opportunistic benefits prove unobjectionable because the
firm has implicitly consented thereto via accepting an opportunism dis-
count." 3 Such a discount "reflect[s] only the risk of opportunism," i.e., re-
flecting expanded monitoring costs. 114 It is not justification of actual oppor-
tunism."' The law can scarcely swallow the defense that liability is elimi-
nated because the mischief could be foreseen. 16
DEMOCRACY, supra note 97, at 192. Other differences between political and commercial
markets favor the market. According to Milton Friedman, who in 1976 was awarded the
Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, BANNOCK ET. AL., supra note 49, at 166, the latter
"is, in political terms, a system of proportional representation. Each man can vote, as it were,
for the color of tie he wants and get it; he does not have to see what color the majority wants
and then, if he is in the minority, submit." MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 15
(1962).
113. Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, supra note 58, at 406.
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Mana-
gerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Capital Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 317-26 (1976)).
116. Id. "In the narrow sense, agency costs are the costs of opportunism and the costs of
controlling opportunism." Id. at 397 n.12. In the United Kingdom as of 2011, the ease of
giving away capital bases had actually shrunk the mutual sector among the forms of economic
organization. For large loom the intimately-connected institutional issues of governance and
of capital structure:
The public limited company is the dominant form of economic organisation because, im-
perfect though the resolution of these issues within that framework may be, they are neverthe-
less resolved. Most other organisational forms do not achieve scale or permanence because
they lack capital and often have poor governance and less effective management. Mutuals,
which may seem to offer the best solution to these questions, have frequently experienced dif-
ficulties from either overcapitalisation or undercapitalisation; and the mutual sector has shrunk
because legislation made it too easy to give capital bases away. The John Lewis Partnership,
the poster child of the sector today, survives because John Spedan Lewis, its founder, was
shrewd enough to make this virtually impossible.
John Kay, Time for the Big Society to Get Down to the Nitty-Gritty, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb.
23, 2011, at 9. Plain is the crux of the problem:
The critical governance requirement is to devise supervisory structures that include a suf-
ficiently wide enough range of stakeholders to prevent capture by any particular interest. One
common problem that hybrid organisations, including public companies, face is that they end
up run mainly for the benefit of some particular group--employees, financiers, local politi-
cians, or incumbent management.
Id. Does this special interest capture idea sound familiar?
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The unaffiliated institutional clients' fee benchmark proposal of plain-
tiffs, Chief Judge Easterbrook also swept aside:
Harris Associates charges a lower percentage of assets to other
clients, but this does not imply that it must be charging too much
to the Oakmark funds. Different clients call for different commit-
ments of time. Pension funds have low (and predictable) turnover
of assets. Mutual funds may grow or shrink quickly and must hold
some assets in high-liquidity instruments to facilitate redemptions.
That complicates an adviser's task. Joint costs likewise make it
hard to draw inferences from fee levels. Some tasks in research,
valuation, and portfolio design will have benefits for several
clients. In competition those joint costs are apportioned among
paying customers according to their elasticity of demand, not ac-
cording to any rule of equal treatment.
17
Such was the avalanche-momentum of the disclosure element in Judge
Easterbrook's opinion that, the Harris fees being unhidden from investors,
and there being no allegation "that Harris Associates pulled the wool over
the eyes of the disinterested trustees" nor hindered trustees' capacity to nego-
tiate a favorable advisory services price, the judgment of the district court
was affirmed." 8 To be sure, the Easterbrook repudiation of an arm's-length
negotiated rate standard acknowledged imaginable compensation-e.g., by a
university's board of trustees to its president-"so unusual"" 9 as a 25 to I
multiple of that paid to other presidents that a court would infer either deceit,
or abdication of responsibility.' 20 Yet no court inquires whether salaries or-
dinary among comparable institutions mark excess.'
2
'
117. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 634-35 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated by 130 S.
Ct. 1418 (2010).
118. Id.at635.
119. Id. at 632.
120. Id.
121. Id. Indubitably, Easterbrook's Pied Piper theory misled into a conclusion ignoring
the statutory text and history, and nullifying the intended statutory effect. Daniel D. Birk,
Note, Jones v. Harris Associates L.P. and the Limits of Public Choice Textualism, 104 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1587, 1589-90 (2010). "The Seventh Circuit created its own standard to throw out
the case." Associated Press, Mutual-Fund Fee Case Standard Upheld, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
31,2010, at A2.
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V. THE GHOST OF JONES WALKS
An August 8, 2008,122 per curiam opinion from the Easterbrook, Kanne,
and Evans panel announced that panel's unanimous denial of a rehearing
petition. 23 A judge in active service had called for a vote on a suggested
rehearing en banc.'24 No Seventh Circuit majority had favored such en banc
rehearing.1 5 Consequently, the rehearing petition was denied.12 6 Neverthe-
less, Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner, with whom Circuit Judges Rovner,
Wood, Williams, and Tinder joined, dissented from the denial of rehearing
en banc: 127 "Jones is the only appellate opinion noted in Westlaw as disa-
greeing with Gartenberg; there is a slew of positive citations.' ' 128 Indeed:
It's not as if Gartenberg has proved to be too hard on fund advis-
ers. "Subsequent litigation [after Gartenberg] in excessive fee
cases has resulted almost uniformly in judgments for the defen-
dants ... although there have been ... notable settlements wherein
defendants have agreed to prospective reduction in the fee sche-
dule."'
' 29
A. The Law and Economics of Executive Compensation
Posner observes that the Easterbrook panel premised its repudiation of
Gartenberg mainly upon an economic analysis ripe for reexamination. 30
Scholarship probes the law and economics of corporate governance.' 31 Dis-
sected is governance and executive compensation. 3 2 Upon the long genera-
122. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 728 (7th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
123. Id. at 729.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Jones, 537 F.3d at 729 (Posner, J., dissenting). "Circuit Judge Ripple did not partici-
pate in the consideration or decision of this case." Id.
128. Id. at 729 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia, nine opinions).
129. Id. at 730 (Posner, J., dissenting) (quoting JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1211 (3d ed. 2001)).
Gartenberg held that suits can succeed only if the fee is so high that it is outside the
range of what parties might reasonably negotiate in an arm's-length transaction (a fair transac-
tion in which buyers and sellers have no relationship with one another). In nearly three dec-
ades under this standard, no fund company has ever lost a suit over fees.
Russel Kinnel, The High Court on Fees, KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN., June 2010, at 49.
130. Jones, 537 F.3d at 730 (Posner, J., dissenting).
131. See, e.g., THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: CHANGING
PERSPECTIVES (Alessio M. Pacces ed., 2010).
132. See, e.g., GOVERNANCE AND EXECUTIVECOMPENSATION (William Forbes ed., 2011).
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tion of 1980-2010, the free enterprise system bestowed a prosperity beyond
any level hitherto seen. 133 The market encouraged innovation and dazzled
consumers with options. 34 Nevertheless, the market for chief executives
appeared dysfunctional. 135 And the latest academic research indicates that at
the margin those investing in start-ups ought to lay more weight on the busi-
ness itself than its management team.
I36
1. The Shareholders Snooze
Executives' remunerations fattened whatever the welfare or setbacks of
their companies. 137 The Posner dissent explains that indications accumulate
that "executive compensation in large, publicly-traded firms often is exces-
sive., 138 Elsewhere Posner had recounted how corporate legal theory posits
that a controlling shareholder owes a fiduciary obligation to minority share-
holders. 39 Meritorious is this theory in the case of conflict of interest emerg-
ing between the shareholder majority and the minority. 4° Such, many agree,
is the better view.141 Can a standard compensation-model explain the com-
pensation of America's corporate CEOs? 142 For they attract, on average,
approximately double the compensation of their foreign counterparts.
43
133. Michael Skapinker, Business Has Not Yet Found Its Copernicus, FIN. TIMES (Lon-
don), Feb. 16, 2010, at9.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Steven N. Kaplan et al., Should Investors Bet on the Jockey or the Horse? Evidence
from the Evolution of Firms from Early Business Plans to Public Companies, 64 J. FIN. 75, 75
(2009).
137. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 61-63 (2004).
138. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissent-
ing) (per curiam).
139. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 445-46 (7th ed. 2007) [hereinafter
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW].
140. Id.
141. The expert on the law of fiduciary duty, Tamar Frankel, agreed on this as the view to
be preferred. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 127, 129 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
142. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 139, at 447.
143. Id. In 2009, according to Income Data Services, the chief executives of the United
Kingdom's 100 biggest companies earned eighty-one times the pay average of fulltime work-
ers. John Plender, To Avoid the Backlash, Executives Need to Act on Pay, FIN. TIMES (Lon-
don), Apr. 3, 2010, at 7. In 2008, according to the Institute for Policy Studies, U.S. top execu-
tives earned 319 times more than did America's average worker. Id.
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Yes, there is such an explanation: Stock ownership is less concentrated
in the United States than it is abroad.' 44 Shareholders diversifying their port-
folios-and able to sell their shares in liquid markets-sense slight impulse
to assess or monitor company behavior. 145  For the more money she has at
stake, the weightier the incentive a shareholder perceives to monitor the per-
formance of her firm's management. 146  And the more effective proves
shareholder monitoring (the stick), the less the call for incentive-based com-
pensation (the carrot) for a CEO. 147 In widely-held public companies, fail-
ures of corporate governance inevitably crop up. 48 It is in the United States
where traditionally corporate governance has been weak, given denial of
effective voice to shareholders and an unhealthy domination of boards by a
combined chairman/CEO. 149 Thereby could American CEO incomes grow
porkier than would prove the case in a more competitive market for corpo-
rate managers.1
50
For the burden on a major company of even gross overpayments to a
CEO falls so lightly once spread across the shareholders-supposing a dis-
persed stock ownership-that no one shareholder has any incentive to
react.' 5 And it is well-known that the strategy for the individual small inves-
144. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 139, at 447. Nevertheless, an
ownership market (wherein individuals owned over ninety percent of the stock of U.S. corpo-
rations) is eclipsed by an agency market (wherein individuals hold but a quarter of such
stock). JOHN C. BOGLE, COMMON SENSE ON MUTUAL FUNDS 352 (10th anniv. ed. 2010).
Mutual funds, endowment funds, corporate, state and local pension funds, and other funds
managed by professional investment organizations control about seventy-five percent of all
U.S. corporate stock. Id. This contrasts with only twenty percent in 1968. Id.
145. Martin Wolf of the Financial Times states:
Shareholders enjoy limited liability. As a result, the responsibility they bear for the malfeas-
ance or incompetence of management is highly circumscribed. The claim of shareholders is
solely on the residual income of the company. But, since shareholders can diversify their port-
folios with ease, their exposure to the risks generated by an individual company is far less than
the exposure of workers with finn-specific knowledge and skills. Shareholders lack the ability
to assess or monitor a company's performance. If they are able to sell their shares in liquid
markets, they do not have incentives to do so either. Failures of corporate governance in wide-
ly held public companies are, it follows, inevitable.
Wolf, supra note 53.
146. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 139, at 447.
147. Id.
148. Wolf, supra note 53.
149. Tony Jackson, West Must Harness Ingenuity to Bridge Governance Gap, FIN. TIMES
(London), Apr. 26, 2010, at 16.
150. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 139, at 447 (citing LUCIAN
BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 2 (2004)).
151. Id. at448.
Obviously no economist in the great classical tradition can either regret or deny profit
maximization. And none can suppose that it is other than a deeply personal motivation, some-
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tor of investing in index mutual funds indexed to, for example, the Standard
& Poor's 500 Stock Index, has been extolled during the whole generation
past.152 That strategy's merits were sung even after the anguishing October
2007-March 2009 U.S. stock market bust. 153 Even in ideal times, successful
shareholder protests are problematic."5 4 Moreover, should someone own
personally, not through a mutual fund, one-hundred dollars of stock in each
of 500 corporations, even a CEO stuffing himself with a titanic one percent
of that enterprise's wealth costs that shareholder but a single dollar. 155 So
what happens to such a stockholder's reactive incentive?
Worse, should activist stockholders unite to rein their excessively ge-
nerous board of directors, the proximate result could be an intracorporate
succession crisis. Thereby are the intrepid shareholder-revolutionaries likely
to be out of pocket for their insurrection. In the meantime, the stockholders
in other corporations can benefit. For their own boards might witness that
stockholder uprising, and therefore cinch their own belts a bit. 156 No good
deed goes unpunished.
thing one does for oneself and not gratuitously for others. Yet the modem corporation is as-
sumed to require of its management that profit maximization be for others, for stockholders
who are both powerless and unknown. In fact, and often spectacularly in recent times, profit
maximization has come to be for those with the power of decision. Management pay, bonuses
and perquisites, golden parachutes in case of loss in a takeover struggle, are set by manage-
ment for itself.
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS IN PERSPECTIVE: A CRITICAL HISTORY 277 (1987).
And meanwhile, the so-called Keynesian Revolution appeared pass6 after the stagflation of
the 1970s in our modern, "highly organized world with which Keynesianism cannot effective-
ly contend." Id. at 281. Or is Keynesian economics salvageable? See, e.g., The RETURN TO
KEYNES 9 (Bradley W. Bateman et al. eds., 2010). Notwithstanding the enthusiasm of one or
another non-economist, see, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY
313 (2010) [hereinafter POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY], for Keynesian anal-
ysis, contemporary economic thought encompasses insights from money, banking, and law
indicative that the market fully can manage the money and banking sector with neither infla-
tion nor business cycles. Cf JEStuS HUERTA DE SOTO, MONEY, BANK CREDIT, AND ECONOMIC
CYCLES 29 (Melinda A. Stroup trans., 2d ed. 2009).
152. See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET: THE TIME-TESTED
STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL INVESTING 358-63 (2007) (rev. and updated ed.).
153. BURTON G. MALKIEL & CHARLES D. ELLIS, THE ELEMENTS OF INVESTING 34-37
(2010).
154. TIM HARFORD, THE LOGIC OF LIFE: THE RATIONAL ECONOMICS OF AN IRRATIONAL
WORLD 107 (2008).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 108. Sure enough, mutual funds investing in corporate stock seemingly under-
stand that stockholder activism to rein in an excessively generous board can backfire. For
under the "Wall Street rule" a mutual fund merely sells its shares if that sophisticated investor
dislikes a company's management. Editorial, Advisers Will Have Their Hands Full with the
Reform Law, INV. NEWS, July 26, 2010, at 11.
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On the other hand, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010,157 executed by President Barack H. Obama on July
21, provided of the Securities and Exchange Commission:
The Commission may issue rules permitting the use by a share-
holder of proxy solicitation materials supplied by an issuer of se-
curities for the purpose of nominating individuals to membership
on the board of directors of the issuer, under such terms and condi-
tions as the Commission determines are in the interests of share-
holders and for the protection of investors.'
58
Thus, the Commission became empowered to allow investor nomi-
nation of directors, on corporate proxies mailed to shareholders, solely the
companies' own nominees appearing on such theretofore.
159
2. The Directors Doze
The ordinary reactive incentive of the board of directors is weak if that
board is dominated by heavily-remunerated business executives, including
CEOs. 16° According to Commissioner Troy A. Paredes of the Securities and
Exchange Commission-speaking on his own behalf and not that of the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission nor of his fellow Commissioners:
Boards of directors are expected to improve decision making
by spurring deliberation. In acting as a body, the promise is that
boards will draw on the distinct perspectives, experiences, sensi-
bilities, and expertise that different directors offer. The expecta-
tion is that as the group works through a range of ideas and argu-
ments, the ultimate decision will be better as a result of the direc-
tors' collective efforts.
The active engagement of directors is a lynchpin of meaning-
ful deliberation. Decision making should improve when direc-
tors-whether interacting with each other or with management-
engage in open and frank discussions, even if it means being criti-
cal. When assessing some course of action, directors should ask
probing questions and follow-ups of each other and of manage-
157. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. I ll-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
158. Id. at § 971(b).
159. Jesse Westbrook, The SEC's Plan to Pry Open Corporate Boards, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 16-29, 2010, at 29.
160. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 139, at 448.
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ment; should challenge key assumptions; should offer competing
analyses; and should develop competing options to ensure that al-
ternatives are considered and not cast aside too readily. Put
differently, directors should be willing to dissent, and disagree-
ment from others should not be discouraged or suppressed. When
it leads people to engage rigorously, disagreement helps ensure
that the unknown is identified, that information is uncovered, and
that challenges and opportunities are assessed in a more balanced
way. Indeed, a board may want to consider designating one or two
directors whose express charge is to be skeptical and to press when
needed. 161
Paredes' notion of directors being expressly charged to be skeptical was
popularly bandied during the Jones Supreme Court of the United States liti-
gation.1 62 And, for megabanks commanding more than $100 billion in as-
sets, accountable boards of super-directors have been proposed to implement
customized executive compensation systems.1 63 Such a little knot of inde-
161. Paredes, supra note 40.
162. See generally Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010).
Boards often have need of a devil's advocate. But it shouldn't always be the same per-
son, and particularly not a director who was appointed because his or her views differ from the
group's. Anyone who always looks at issues critically may end up being typecast as an "odd-
ball" or a "cynic" whose comments should not be taken too seriously.
One way around the problem is to choose a different director to play devil's advocate at
each meeting. The choice can depend on the issues to be discussed. Or ask for volunteers.
This is also a way to help reluctant lone dissenters test whether others share their
opinion.
Jean-Francois Manzoni et al., Why Diversity Can Backfire on Company Boards, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 25, 2010, at R3.
[Tihere will be a tendency to overestimate how likely or well supported a hypothesis is,
in the absence of procedures designed specifically to call up and consider countervailing evi-
dence. The evidence upon which we base our beliefs is not (in general) a random sample of
the relevant evidence available to us or of the evidence that we already (in some sense) pos-
sess. A striking and salient presentation of some evidence will produce biases in the recall of
other evidence and hence biases in the resulting beliefs. Hence, it is especially important in as-
sessing a possible belief not merely to consider the evidence for and against that we have
thought of but to make particular and systematic efforts to call up all the relevant evidence, for
and against, that we have.
ROBERT NoziCK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 101 (1993) (footnotes omitted) (Nozick's
emphasis) (citing JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahne-
man et al. eds., 1982)). Indeed, in the best-performing U.S. companies there tend to appear
highly contentious boards. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: How MANY MINDS PRODUCE
KNOWLEDGE 201 (2006) (stating Nozick's point). "But a formal requirement of devil's advo-
cacy enhances group performance far less than does authentic dissent." Id. at 211 (stating the
point of Manzoni et al.).
163. ROBERT POZEN, Too BIG TO SAVE? How To FIX THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYsTEM 285
(2010).
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pendent directors" would be added according to a model loosely founded
upon the boards of companies under the control of private equity funds.
65
For inherently feeble are broadly-based bars against executive compensa-
tion.' 66 So ingenious are lawyers in circumventing such restrictions that
these seldom prove effective and occasionally prove counterproductive.
67
During 2010, Stanford University's Kenneth J. Arrow-who in 1972
was awarded the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics168-judged that
the most important innovation in economic theory during the two 1960-2010
generations had been its emphasis upon asymmetric information.' 69 Unfor-
tunately, boards of directors are opaque entities, even to many institutional
investors and corporate executives. 70 Individual shareholders holding small
positions know little who board members are.17 ' Too many board members,
beholden to the CEO ship-captain who piped them aboard, fail to represent
shareholder interests for that reason. 72 The United Kingdom imposes nine-
year term limits upon independent directors, to force board turnover. 73 The
value in reducing cronyism can outweigh the price in lost experience.1
74
Moreover, a board employing a second-best CEO candidate-on the
ground she would serve far more cheaply than would the foremost candi-
date-must expose itself to criticism should she come a cropper. 175 Whereas
the board covers its own assets by paying top dollar for the very best.
176
Should that CEO fail, the directors will appear less blameworthy. 177 Even
competition in a corporation's product and capital markets cannot constrain
even managerial misconduct, which increases corporate costs. 178 The prob-
164. Id. at 285.
165. Id. at 284.
166. POZEN, supra note 163, at 276.
167. Id.
168. BANNOCK ET AL., supra note 49, at 9.
169. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Theory and the Financial Crisis, in THE IRRATIONAL
ECONOMIST: MAKING DECISIONS IN A DANGEROUS WORLD 187 (Erwann Michel-Kerjan &
Paul Slovic eds., 2010). "Insurance companies had long understood the consequences of
asymmetry of information under such headings as moral hazard and adverse selection." Id. at
188 (Arrow's emphasis).
170. JOHN GILLESPIE & DAVID ZWEIG, MONEY FOR NOTHING: How THE FAILURE OF
CORPORATE BOARDS IS RUINING AMERICAN BUSINESS AND COSTING Us TRILLIONS 4 (2010).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 5.
173. Id. at 263.
174. Id.
175. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 139, at 448.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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lem of agency costs inheres in the structure of any big enterprise, and is not
eliminable through competition.'79
3. The Ideal of Fiduciary Duty
Nevertheless, Duke University economist Rachel E. Kranton and
George A. Akerlof, who in 2001 was awarded the Alfred Nobel Memorial
Prize in Economics, propound that the foremost consideration in an execu-
tive's incentives could be her role as a fiduciary. 8° Given limited liability,
an incentive to indulge in excess risk arises at once. The heavier a gamble,
the more stockholders look to gain should the roulette wheel rest upon their
color. Should their bet fail, the larger losses accrue to their corporation's
creditors alone once shareholders' equity is exhausted.'' And a pay for per-
formance scheme attracts, ominously, risktakers. 182  Self-sorting alters the
ratios of various personality types found in various activities. Businessper-
179. Id. The work of Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried includes Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Summer 2003, at 71, and Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction
in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002). Bebchuk & Fried
attribute lush executive compensation to rent seeking. See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK &
JESSE FRIED, supra note 137. Their thesis drew the riposte:
Executive compensation differs substantially among firms and has changed dramatically
over time. Bebchuk and Fried provide no explanation of those differences or changes. They
tell a plausible story that corporate executives have some managerial power, but they make no
case that the differences in executive compensation are explained by the unmeasured differ-
ences in board compliance and the limits on compensation that would not provoke outrage, ei-
ther among firms or over time. In summary, there is no reliable body of evidence that is con-
sistent with substantial managerial power over their own compensation, and the managerial
power perspective provides no explanation of the substantial differences in executive compen-
sation among firms or over time.
WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, REFLECTIONS OF A POLITICAL ECONOMIST: SELECTED ARTICLES ON
GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND POLITICAL PROCESSES 319-20 (2008) (reviewing BEBCHUK &
FRIED, supra).
180. GEORGE A. AKERLOF & RACHEL E. KRANTON, IDENTITY ECONOMICS: How OUR
IDENTITIES SHAPE OUR WORK, WAGES, AND WELL-BEING 59 (2010).
181. Benjamin M. Friedman, Two Roads to Our Financial Catastrophe, N.Y. REV., Apr.
29, 2010, at 27, 27. Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz was asked: "Are the financial reforms now
being debated in Congress strong enough to prevent the next crisis?" His reply, inter alia,
ran:
Another big issue is bonuses and incentives. We've been reluctant to take the kind of
strong measures that the United Kingdom has taken [such as heavy taxation of bonus pay-
ments]. Incentives matter. They affect behavior, and they can encourage excessive risk tak-
ing.
David Futrelle, Why the Bailout Needs a Reboot, MONEY, May 2010, at 113, 114.
182. George Akerlof & Rachel Kranton, It Is Time to Treat Wall Street Like Main Street,
FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 25, 2010, at 9.
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sons are more probably optimists than are librarians. 8 3 Inside an investment
company, traders tend to be the optimists but risk managers the pessimists."
A firm might be bankrupted, and an executive can be-at worst-
dismissed if she has committed no fraud. Extra bonuses rewarding her for
performance during the sunny days go unrepaid during subsequent wintery
times. Therefore, risky investments which are profitless socially-i.e., of a
negative anticipated value, or of a positive anticipated value inadequate to
recompense for a market-determined risk value-can be privately rational for
a decision maker: She need not bear the entirety of those negative conse-
quences she lays upon others.185 Fact-patterns wherein marketplace rational
self-interest elicits socially irrational outcomes are termed cases of "rational
irrationality."' 18
6
Also, during a classic bubble, an asset can command a price steeply
above its fundamentals--e.g., the discounted present value of the imputed
rents of a house-for so long as that price is anticipated to soar the higher.
183. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 151, at 296.
184. Id. Cf NICK TASLER, THE IMPULSE FACTOR: WHY SOME OF US PLAY IT SAFE AND
OTHERS RISK IT ALL (2008). Sure enough, when head of risk at Lehman Brothers Madeline
Antoncic in 2006 suggested that declining housing prices could mean the balance sheet should
come down, President and Chief Operating Officer, Joseph M. "Joe" Gregory, told her she
was not only too fussy but out of line. VICKY WARD, THE DEVIL'S CASINO: FRIENDSHIP,
BETRAYAL, AND THE HIGH STAKES GAMES PLAYED INSIDE LEHMAN BROTHERS 159 (2010).
The general directive from Gregory was "do as much business as you can; take risk." Id.
It is hard to think of business activities with cultures as different as those of retail and in-
vestment banking. The former is intrinsically bureaucratic and hierarchical, relying on the ac-
curate processing of millions of transactions every day with an infinitesimal proportion of er-
rors. It is done best by people who empathise [sic] with their customers. The latter is naturally
buccaneering and entrepreneurial; the people who do it best are aggressive and self-centered.
Successful retail banking is based on relationships; modem investment banking is based on
transactions.
John Kay, We Must Press on with Breaking up Banks, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 15, 2010, at
11.
185. Arrow, supra note 169, at 190. In the view of George Mason University economist
Russell Roberts:
The expectation by creditors that they might be rescued allows financial institutions to
substitute borrowed money for their own capital even as they make riskier and riskier invest-
ments. Because of the large amounts of leverage-the use of debt rather than equity-
executives can more easily generate short-term profits that justify large compensation. While
executives endure some of the pain if short-term gains become losses in the long run, the
downside risk to the decision-makers turns out to be surprisingly small, while the upside gains
can be enormous. Taxpayers ultimately bear much of the downside risk. Until we recognize
the pernicious incentives created by the persistent rescue of creditors, no regulatory reform is
likely to succeed.
RUSSELL ROBERTS, GAMBLING WITH OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: HOW PERVERTED INCENTIVES
CAUSED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 6 (2010).
186. JOHN CASSIDY, How MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC CALAMITIES 142
(2009).
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But as prices zoom ever higher beyond their asset's fundamentals, inves-
tors-to make sense of increasingly-crazy prices---expect them to inflate at
still speedier rates.187 Competitive pressures in a bubble impel a financier to
bet rationally-particularly while gambling her diversified investors' mon-
ey. 188 Short term business horizons translate into the NIMTOF attitude: Not
In My Term of Office. Before 2008, the temptation of hefty annual bonuses
deterred persons from hedging their bets or weighing the chances of a finan-
cial meltdown, such as that transpiring in October 2008.189
In one reading, pay for performance demonstrates mala fides. It in-
forms the employee that she is not trusted to choose the right thing. Any-
way, undiscovered remains the equation for quantifying bonuses and stock
options to correspond with the correct incentive. There is no crystal ball.' 90
Do not CEOs manipulate matters like inventories, collections, or payments,
to monkey with quarterly earnings, and so manipulate their stocks' price,
whereby to see options issued at bargain-basement prices?19' The proper
incentive, conclude Kranton and Akerlof, should be to live up to her respon-
187. Kenneth Rogoff, Spotting the Tell-Tale Signs of Bubbles Approaching, FIN. TIMES
(London), Apr. 8, 2010, at 22. Some hold that a bubble is detectable prior to its burst. Ed-
ward Chancellor, Bubbles: A Victorian Lesson in Mania, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 12, 2010,
at 24. On the other hand, scholars debate whether bubbles are easy to identify. Andrew Od-
lyzko, This Time Is Different: An Example of a Giant, Wildly Speculative, and Successful
Investment Mania (June 21, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.dtc.umn.edu/-odlyzko/doc/mania01 .pdf.
188. See POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY, supra note 151, at 32.
189. Howard Kunreuther, Reflections and Guiding Principles of Dealing with Societal
Risks, in THE IRRATIONAL ECONOMIST: MAKING DECISIONS IN A DANGEROUS WORLD 263, 270
(Erwann Michel-Kerjan & Paul Slovic eds., 2010).
190. AKERLOF& KRANTON, supra note 182.
191. Cf Ivo Ph. Jansen & Lee W. Sanning, Cashing in on Managerial Malfeasance: A
Trading Strategy Around Forecasted Executive Stock Option Grants, 66 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 85,
85 (2010). Discerns U. of Toronto Rotman School of Management Dean Roger Martin:
More than anything else, stock-based incentive compensation is responsible for short-termism
in the modern corporation and the shrinking average tenure of today's chief executives. It is
an incentive for manipulating expectations rather [than] improving real performance.
The solution is to replace stock-based compensation with incentives that affect underly-
ing value-whether that is increasing revenues, profitability, market share, customer service
or, optimally, a combination of all of these. And for longer-term incentives based on the actual
market not the expectations market, use royalties on real results, as are given to designers, in-
ventors and musicians. The bottom line is that if you want to skew reality, use stock-based
compensation. But if you want to build the real company, use incentive compensation anc-
hored in reality-based measures.
Roger Martin, Reward Real Growth, Not Expectations, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 3, 2010, at
10. Comparably, Graef Crystal, the compensation consulting pioneer, "recommends awarding
stock options with a strike price that's the average of the last 90 days and can't be exercised
for five years to avoid 'opportunistic' pricing." Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Alexis Leondis,
How Much Is a CEO Worth?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, May 10-16, 2010, at 70.
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sibilities.' 9' To be sure, entirely self-interested behavior can be abjured in
lieu of a sense of fiduciary responsibility, even independently of a sense of
identification with others.'93 Opines Amartya Sen:
It must, of course, be recognized that the rejection of purely self-
interested behavior does not indicate that one's actions are neces-
sarily influenced by a sense of identity with others. It is quite
possible that a person's behavior may be swayed by other types of
considerations, such as her adherence to some norms of acceptable
conduct (such as financial honesty or a sense of fairness), or by her
sense of duty-or fiduciary responsibility-toward others with
whom one does not identify in any obvious sense. Nevertheless, a
sense of identity with others can be a very important-and rather
complex-influence on one's behavior which can easily go against
narrowly self-interested conduct.
194
Affirmatively, as framed by Kranton and Akerlof: "In the financial
world, it is called fiduciary duty. It is an obligation to serve the client and
the larger good of an organization."' 95 Negatively: "Acting in your own
interest and not in the interest of clients is a failure to carry out the duties of
office, to fulfill one's fiduciary duty.' 96
And the language of fiduciary duty is the language of the Harris Asso-
ciates fees.
B. The Law and Economics of the Harris Associates Fees
In 2009, the distinguished economist Thomas Sowell fumed that many
intellectuals:
find it a weighty consideration that they do not understand how
corporate executives can be worth such high salaries as they re-
ceive-as if there is any inherent reason why third parties should
192. Akerlof & Kranton, supra note 182. Whatever the incentive, some people are self-
motivated. Or, as articulated in a didactic novel by Ralph Nader, the famed consumer protec-
tion lawyer: "That's what successful, self-made people of wealth are like .... They are
chronically averse to procrastination-one definition of an entrepreneur is someone who never
does anything today that could have been done yesterday-and that trait alone gives them a
major advantage over their competent but slower-paced peers." RALPH NADER, ONLY THE
SUPER-RICH CAN SAVE Us! 79 (2009).
193. AMARTYA SEN, IDENTITY AND VIOLENCE: THE ILLUSION OF DESTINY 22-23 (2006).
194. Id. Amartya Sen was awarded the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in
1998.
195. Akerlof & Kranton, supra note 182.
196. Id.
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be expected to understand, or why their understanding or acquies-
cence should be necessary, in order for those who are directly in-
volved in hiring and paying corporate executives to proceed on the
basis of their own knowledge and experience, in a matter in which
they have a stake and intellectuals do not.
197
Supposing that Sowell's belittling of intellectuals' digs against corpo-
rate executives' salaries is meritorious, this line of thought cannot be disposi-
tive of the legal profession's scrutinizing of the compensation collected by
the advisers of registered investment companies. For Section 36(b) lays a
special fiduciary duty upon such advisers. And Section 36(b) further depu-
tizes the security holders of such registered investment companies ("third
parties") to litigate against said investment advisers. Section 36(b) endures
in a financial-regulatory world rocked by the first great recession of the
twentieth century. 198 Therein do fiduciary finance institutions of 2011 like
collective investment vehicles emerge beside insurers and banks as a pillar of
the world's financial system.199
1. The Competition Conundrum
Truly, the functioning of investment firms entailing information asym-
metries might evoke regulation insulating investors from incompetence and
fraud.2° In such respect the regulation of portfolio management displays
affinity with regulation of the free professions. °1 Specifically, opportunistic
behavior often being facilitated through asymmetric information, regulators
avowedly defend consumers from excessive prices extracted by financial
197. THOMAS SOWELL, INTELLECTUALS AND SOCIETY 26-27 (2009).
198. See, e.g., THE FIRST GREAT RECESSION OF THE 2 1sT CENTURY (Oscar Dejudn, Eladio
Febrero, & Maria Christina Marcuzzo eds., 2011); THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE
REGULATION OF FINANCE (Christopher J. Green, Eric J. Pentecost & Tom Weyman-Jones eds.,
2011); FINANCIAL STABILITY (Charles A.E. Goodhart & Dimitrios P. Tsomocos eds., 2011);
THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISES: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Benton E. Gup ed.,
2010). The 2007-09 Great Recession exposed more than the fragility in the financial markets.
See, e.g., FINANCIAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL FRAGILITY (Jan Toporowski ed., 2010). For, as
scholars hearkened, it likewise evoked questions about the adequacy of modem macroeco-
nomic theory and about a seeming parallel incapacity to establish the requisite theoretical
basis underlying financial regulation. See, e.g., MACROECONOMIC THEORY AND ITS FAILINGS:
ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS (Steven Kates ed., 2010).
199. See, e.g., MARTIN GOLD, FIDUCIARY FINANCE: INVESTMENT FUNDS AND THE CRISIS IN
FINANCIAL MARKETS (2011).
200. Dirk Heremans, Regulation of Banking and Financial Markets, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 950, 967 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000).
201. Id.
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service producers and other financial market participants.2 °2 And in this re-
gard regulation addresses not systemic stability, but the efficiency and
integrity of the financial markets.0 3 In sum, the central notions are oppor-
tunism, asymmetric information problems, agency problems, and fiduciary
duty.
Anyway, "[c]ompetition in product and capital markets can't be counted
on to solve" compensation challenges. 204 Both legal scholars and economists
feel aversion to monopoly and so favor competition, generally. 20 5 However,
exactly why is competition welcomed and monopoly scorned? 206 Because
competition guarantees alternatives, whereas monopoly precludes alterna-
tives.20 7 Presence of alternatives checks competitive market firms from gross
misallocation of resources, while monopolistic exploitation of resources
waxes inefficient.20 8 Remember that regulators address the efficiency of fi-
nancial markets.
Still, competition in product and capital markets falters since an identic-
al structure of incentives emerges in all big corporations and similar entities,
e.g., mutual funds.209 Long preceding the February 27, 2007, District Court
opinion in Jones210 had the mutual fund industry been dominated by a hand-
ful of corporations. 21I And does the bracing discipline of additional competi-
tors trigger more intensive competitor-effort and improved service? 212 Sur-
prisingly, in at least some contexts the reply is not congruent with the profes-
sional intuition.2 13 The impact of competition proves an unsettled topic even
regarding pricing.21 4
202. Id. at 965.
203. Id.
204. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissent-
ing) (per curiam).
205. Bingyuan Hsiung, Economic Analysis of Law: An Inquiry of Its Underlying Logic, 2
ERASMUS L. & ECON. REV. 1, 15 (2006).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Jones, 537 F.3d at 730.
210. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., No. 04-C-8305, 2007 WL 627640, at *9 (N.D. II1. Feb.
27, 2007), vacated by 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010).
211. David Hoffman, A Changing Landscape, INV. NEWS, Mar. 29, 2010, at 12. "[B]ut
continuing fallout from the recent [October 2007-March 2009] market downturn and other
structural factors have created opportunities for nimbler, smaller companies to gain more
business." Id.
212. JULIAN L. SIMON, EFFORT, OPPORTUNITY, AND WEALTH 85 (1987).
213. Id.
214. Id. It was the University of Hamburg's Institute of Law and Economics' Ingo C.
Fiedler whose scholarship most recently probed the merits of two-sided competition. See Ingo
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Notably, Posner's special concern in Jones lies in Harris' charging cap-
tive funds over double its charges to independent funds:2 15 "The panel opi-
nion throws out some suggestions on why this difference may be justified,
but the suggestions are offered purely as speculation, rather than anything
having an evidentiary or empirical basis. 2 16  Judge Posner sarcastically
could have quoted to Easterbrook from the Epistles of Saint Paul: "Now
faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.
For eye-popping was a 2009 study by the New York University Stern School
of Business' Thomas Philippon and Ariell Reshef of the University of Vir-
ginia's Department of Economics.1 8 They utilized detailed data about wag-
es, education and occupations toward explaining the U.S. financial sector."9
Wages in finance were excessive from the mid-1990s until 2006.220 For that
interval, rents accounted for an estimated thirty to fifty percent of the wage
differential between the financial sector and the balance of the private sec-
tor.22 ' Rentseeking is inter alia, a socially costly wealth transfer.222 Posner's
dissent cites Professor Camelia M. Kuhnen's observation that "'[w]hen di-
rectors and the management are more connected, advisers capture more rents
and are monitored by the board less intensely.' 223 Kuhnen might bitingly
have quoted from the Gospel of Saint Matthew: "Consider the lilies of the
field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin: And yet I say unto
you, That even Sol'o-mon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of
these., 224 To the extent they reap rents, nattily clad advisers toil not.
C. Fielder, Antitrust in Two-Sided Markets: Is Competition Always Desirable? (Oct. 25,
2010) (unpublished working paper) (on file with Nova Law Review).
215. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissent-
ing) (per curiam).
216. Id.
217. Hebrews 11:1 (King James).
218. See generally Thomas Phillipon & Ariell Reshef, Wages and Human Capital in the
U.S. Financial Industry: 1909-2006 (Jan. 2009) (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 14644), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w]4644.
219. Id. at6.
220. Id. at 5.
221. Id. at 30.
222. See George Steven Swan, The Low and Economics of Interprofessional Frontier
Skirmishing: Financial Planning Association v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 16 U.
MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 75, 127 (2007).
223. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Camelia M. Kuhnen, Social Networks, Corporate Governance and Contracting
in the Mutual Fund Industry (Mar. 1, 2007) (unpublished abstract).
224. Matthew 6:28-29 (King James).
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2. Price Discrimination
Too, Posner elsewhere had addressed the seriousness of information de-
ficiencies in ordinary markets. 5  Most consumers prove to be uncareful
shoppers. Some even suppose price a sign of quality. 26 If half of consumers
are well-informed but half not, then the latter will make numerous errors and
suffer loss of utility.227 Yet these errors are minimized because the unin-
formed are somewhat protected by the informed. This latter phenomenon
emerges because a seller usually cannot easily discriminate between these
two blocs.228 Recall how Chief Judge Easterbrook reassured one that sophis-
ticated investors shopping among alternative investment vehicles generate
229competitive pressure protective of the less sophisticated investors.
Several conditions must obtain for price discrimination to prove profit-
able. Initially, there must be such market segregation as to preclude arbi-
225. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 97, at 192.
226. Id. at 219. Scholars of everyday applied-economics, see, e.g., TIM HARFORD, THE
UNDERCOVER ECONOMIST: EXPOSING WHY THE RICH ARE RICH, THE POOR ARE POOR-AND
WHY YOU CAN NEVER BUY A DECENT USED CAR! (2006), descry a method in such consumer
madness: Price changes the very experience of quality. "Neuro-economists have found, for
instance, that while placebo painkillers work, they work best if the subject thinks they are
expensive. Energy drinks give you less energy if you buy them at a discount. And wine tastes
better if you believe that it is expensive." Tim Harford, Dear Economist: Resolving Readers'
Dilemmas With the Tools of Adam Smith, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 30, 2010, at 2. How
might these neuro-economic findings be explicable? Yale psychologist Professor Paul Bloom
propounds essentialism as the notion that what truly counts is the underlying (not superficial)
reality of a thing. PAUL BLOOM, How PLEASURE WORKS: THE NEW SCIENCE OF WHY WE LIKE
WHAT WE LIKE 9 (2010). It consequently matters whether artwork is an original Picasso. Id.
at 119-20. Human beings are born-essentialists. Id. at xii. For typically do art, sports, games,
music, etc., display such reproductively-relevant capacities as intelligence. People's essential-
ism could emerge as their attraction to a performance's underlying history, due to their plea-
sure derivative from its display of natural gifts. Id. at 154.
227. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 97, at 192. In the appraisal
of S.C. Johnson Distinguished Professor of International Marketing Philip Kotler at Northwes-
tern University's Kellogg School of Management:
Most economists emphasise the role of price in determining choice, to the neglect of oth-
er major forces such as advertising, sales promotion and sales personnel that shape and moti-
vate consumer and business behaviour. My argument has been that besides macro and micro
economics, economists must add "market economics" (ie, marketing) to the study of how the
market place actually works. This advance is already being reflected in the rise of "behaviour-
al economics."
Philip Kotler, Letter to the Editor, Don't Forget the Effect of Marketing, FIN. TIMES (London),
Apr. 20, 2010, at 8.
228. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 97, at 192 n.86, 219.
229. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 634 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated by 130 S. Ct.
1418 (2010).
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trage-i.e., buyers in one market cannot resell into another.23° Second, a
seller must command some monopolistic power in a minimum of one market
because, given competition, prices will be pressed to the cost-level. 231 Third,
buyers in different markets must evince different elasticities of demand.
Sales rise to the higher prices in markets wherein elasticity is low. 232 The
latter explains the willingness of consumers in a first market to pay more
than the consumers in a second market without the seller losing sales in that
second market. Under perfect price discrimination, a different price is char-
geable to each customer.
2 33
More specifically, under what is denominated third degree price dis-
crimination, sellers allot buyers into classes in accordance with those buyers'
demand for elasticity,234 a different price being extracted from each group.2
35
Implausible though it might sound, the real world is abrim with discounted-
price products which actually were more expensive to manufacture than their
full-price counterparts. 236  This dual-marketing nevertheless makes sense
insofar as it smoothes a producer's targeting of its price-increases at a block
of consumers most willing to pay, i.e., for those full-price counterparts. 237
230. BANNOCK ET AL., supra note 49, at 326.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See, e.g., George Steven Swan, The Law and Economics of ERISA and Fiduciary
Duty: LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 403, 444 (2010).
"Elasticity signifies sensitivity to price changes." George Steven Swan, The Political Econo-
my of State Democracy: Romer v. Evans, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1, 47 (1996) (citing
ERWIN ESSER NEMMERS, DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS 140 (1970)).
235. NEMMERS, supra note 234, at 324. According to one law and economics expert,
Emory University economist Paul H. Rubins: "The welfare implications of discriminatory
pricing in general are ambiguous. But if price discrimination makes it possible for firms to
provide goods and services that would otherwise not be available (which is common for vir-
tual goods and services such as software, including cell phone apps) then consumers unambi-
guously benefit." Paul H. Rubin, Op-Ed., Ten Fallacies About Web Privacy, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 30, 2010, at A13.
236. Tim Harford, Dear Economist: Resolving Readers' Dilemmas with the Tools of
Adam Smith, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 27-28, 2010, at 2.
237. Id. Yet, starting with the publication, Fisher Black and Myron S. Scholes, The Pric-
ing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973), finance turned from
common sense to abstraction and self-referentiality. JOHN LANCHESTER, 1. 0. U.: WHY
EVERYONE OWES EVERYONE AND No ONE CAN PAY 45 (2010). Understandably did economist
Lawrence H. Summers acidly distinguish general economists in the Department of Economics
from the ketchup economists (finance economists) in the Department of Ketchup (Department
of Finance). The former ask the right questions: "General economists are concerned with the
fundamental determinants of prices and quantities in the [Kietchup market." Lawrence H.
Summers, On Economics and Finance, 40 J. FIN. 633, 633 (1985). But those sorry ketchup
economists? 'They have shown that two quart bottles of ketchup invariably sell for twice as
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Most enterprises set prices to attract customers and goose the bottomline; it
is traditional to gouge the loyal customers. The solitary recognized justifica-
tion for rewarding fealty is to create it where previously it was nonexistent.238
Such is the lesson of elasticity.
Apply to Jones the three conditions for profitable price discrimination.
Are the effective buyers of Jones independent funds unable to arbitrage-
viz., to resell to the captive funds' effective buyers? Yes. Second, does Har-
ris Associates command some monopolistic power in one market? Yes, evi-
dence suggests. The Seventh Circuit panel merely speculated over why Har-
ris charges captive funds over twice its charges to independent funds. Third,
do different Harris customers evince different elasticities of demand? Yes,
evidence might suggest. Posner muses over the Jones panel assurance that
advisers cannot harvest money from captive funds if Himalayan fees drive
off investors: "That's true; but will high fees drive investors away?, 239
More specifically, respecting this third condition for price discrimina-
tion, customers cannot for fear of the higher price be expected to volunteer
their low elasticity. Consequently, sellers seek something observable and
correlated with this hidden demand characteristic, low elasticity 24°  Sure
enough, experimentation has tested why individuals invest in high-fee index
funds-there being a broad variation of fees in the universe of S&P 500 in-
dex funds. It reveals that even if such funds are reduced to commodities-
i.e., stripped of non-portfolio services-subjects overwhelmingly fail to mi-
nimize fees, due to their own financial illiteracy.24' It proves this "individu-
al," by contrast with "institutional" feature of investors in a captive mutual
fund, demarcates in itself a financially illiterate and thus easily-fleeced flock
with low elasticity of demand. So how protected are the less-informed con-
sumers of investment products by the better-informed investors' competitive
pressure? Imaginably, less-informed consumers are so ill-protected by com-
much as one quart bottles of ketchup except for deviations traceable to transactions costs, and
that one cannot get a bargain on ketchup by buying and combining ingredients once one takes
account of transactions costs." Id. at 634. Ought Summers' ketchup economists go to school
under Harford? For bargains are to be had in the real-world retail ketchup market. MARK DI
VINCENZO, BUY KETCHUP IN MAY AND FLY AT NOON: A GUIDE TO THE BEST TIME TO BUY
THIS, Do THAT AND Go THERE 23 (2009).
238. Tim Harford, Dear Economist: Resolving Readers' Dilemmas with the Tools of
Adam Smith, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 13-14,2010, at 2.
239. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissent-
ing) (per curiam).
240. DONALD E. CAMPBELL, INCENTIVES: MOTIVATION AND THE ECONOMICS OF
INFORMATION 257 (2d ed. 2006).
241. James J. Choi et al., Why Does the Law of One Price Fail? An Experiment on Index
Mutual Funds, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1405, 1408 (2010).
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petitive pressure that the majority of voters summoned the section 36(b) pro-
tection of the ill-informed (as suggested in Sec. IV, supra), such are the va-
garies of contract law and economics.242
3. Informational Disclosure
Nor are the perplexities of befuddled mutual fund investors necessarily
to be resolved by informational disclosure. In the assessment of Loyola Law
School of Los Angeles Professor Lauren E. Willis:
In addition to arithmetic manipulation of data, determining the
expected value of many financial choices requires assessing in-
formation reliability and interpreting results. The skills needed to
take data about the past and information about the future and pre-
dict the probabilities of future events and confidence intervals for
those probabilities are elusive for even sophisticated consumers.
Becoming a Certified Financial Planner therefore requires a pro-
gram of study that includes financial planning, risk management
and insurance, estate planning, retirement planning, employee
benefits, investments and individual income tax, three years of re-
levant experience, a ten-hour exam that requires an integrated ap-
plication of skills and knowledge to particular client situations, and
thirty hours of continuing education every two years to maintain
the credential. Consumers must acquire not only the particular
knowledge and skills described above, but also the ability to em-
ploy all of them at once.
24 3
Human capital resources most efficiently are exploited when persons
perform tasks for which they are best-fitted by predilection or training.
People generally decline to serve as their own attorneys or physicians and for
division of labor efficiency alone should decline, generally, from serving as
242. See, e.g., CONTRACT LAW & ECONOMICS (Gerrit de Geest ed., 2d ed. 2011).
243. Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 224
(2008) (footnotes omitted). Willis' proves a "powerful" article. See Michael Skapinker,
Finance Could Benefit from People's Trust, FIN. TIMES (London), May 25, 2010, at 11. Sure
enough, a mid-2010 review of Australia's 17 year-old mandatory defined contribution pension
system declared that "'member-driven competition through choice of fund has struggled to
deliver a competitive market that reduces costs for members."' Pauline Skypala, How to Put
Scheme Members First, FIN. TIMES (London), July 12, 2010, at 6 (quoting a recent review of
the Australian system). The report discovered participants to be less rational or informed than
had been assumed. Id. Hence, regulators cannot depend on disclosure and market pressures
to control that costly, inefficient system. Id.
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their own financial planner. 244 The staggering expenditure of energy and
time required for someone of average literacy to strive seriously to become
her own financial planner could easily yield a grander welfare return when
invested elsewhere.245
Or, in the words of Commissioner Paredes:
It also is possible for there simply to be too much information for
investors and others to work through constructively. The risk of
"information overload," in other words, is a cost of mandatory dis-
closure. Investors today are inundated with volumes of informa-
tion, so much so they sometimes are unable to distinguish what is
important to their decision making from what is not. As a result,
investors too frequently do not bother carefully studying the in-
formation that is available and get overwhelmed or distracted,
misplacing their focus on less important matters. In short, the
sheer amount of information can frustrate its effective use. The
trouble is that when information is not processed and interpreted
effectively, disclosure does not translate into better decision mak-
ing. Ironically, if investors are overloaded, more disclosure actual-
ly can result in less transparency and worse decisions.
24 6
244. Willis, supra note 243, at 263-64. David Hume wrote maladroitly: "By the partition
of employments, our ability encreases: .... DAVID HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 485
(1992). Hume consequently lost paternity for the modem division of labor phraseology to
Adam Smith. HARDIN, supra note 97, at 10 n.5. The division of labor prevails because it
uncages the economy of scale. HARFORD, supra note 154, at 81. "It is a harsh truth about the
world of work that for many professionals, the more work you have done in the past, the more
productive each additional working hour becomes: a perfect example of economies of scale."
Id. The division of labor mandates professional financial planners, not self-helpers. See id.
But consumers don't even know what a financial planner does. See Sheila McClune,
Consumers Still Unsure About What Financial Planners Do, RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT, Second
Quarter 2010, at 4. And if professional planners are too pricey for the masses, can the gap be
filled by web-based money management? George Mannes, The Future of Investing Advice,
MONEY, June 2010, at 104. "MyMoney.gov is the U.S. government's website dedicated to
teaching all Americans the basics about financial education." MYMONEY,
http://www.mymoney.gov (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). "The site organizes financial educa-
tion help from over 20 different Federal web sites in one place." Id. In 2009, this site only
garnered approximately 85,000 hits monthly. Karen Blumenthal, Is There a Cure for Finan-
cial Illiteracy?, WALL. ST. J., June 19-20, 2010, at B8. But more hopeful is the recent startup,
Veritat Advisers, an online financial planning service. Jason Zweig, Screen Savers: Will
Online Financial Planning Catch on?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7-8, 2010, at B7. Thanks to auto-
mation, Certified Financial PlannerM Tom Mooney at Veritat thinks he can serve 1,000
clients per annum. Id.
245. Willis, supra note 243, at 264.
246. Troy A. Paredes, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the Sympo-
sium on "The Past, Present, and Future of the SEC" (Oct. 16, 2009), (transcript available at
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As more theoretically clarified by Herbert A. Simon-who in 1978 was
awarded the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics:
247
[Given] an information-rich world, the wealth of information
means a dearth of something else: a scarcity of whatever it is that
information consumes. What information consumes is rather ob-
vious: it consumes the attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth
of information creates a poverty of attention and a need to allocate
that attention efficiently among the overabundance of information
sources .... 248
The genuine bottleneck is the attention-time of human decision makers
using incoming data.2 49  The authentic design difficulty is not providing
people with more information. It is allotting the time people have available
for digesting data so decision makers will consume only such data as is most
relevant and important to their decisions.2 50  For attention, being scarce, is
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ll01609tap.htm). Spectacular has proved the failure of
mandated disclosure, modern society's most common technique for protecting personal au-
tonomy. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure 3
(Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Empirical Legal Studies Ctr., Working Paper No. 9, 2010), availa-
ble at http:/law.bepress.com/umichlwps/empirical/art9. "In sum, although better disclosure
and financial education may be helpful, the evidence in this article and Beshears et al. (2008)
indicates that their effect on portfolios is likely to be modest." Choi et al., supra note 241, at
1430 (citing J. Beshears et al., How Does Simplified Disclosure Affect Individuals' Mutual
Fund Choices? I (Nat'l. Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14859, 2009).
247. BANNOCK ET AL., supra note 49, at 381. The most recent book-length, scholarly
application of Simon's theories is JONATHAN BENDOR, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND POLITICS
(2010).
248. Herbert A. Simon, Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World, in
COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 40-41 (Martin Greenberger ed.,
1971).
Plato has Socrates tell the story of Egyptian god Theuth inventing letters and display-
ing his feat to Theban King Thamus. Thamus remonstrates:
To your students you give an appearance of wisdom, not the reality of it; thanks to you,
they will hear many things without being taught them, and will appear to know much when for
the most part they know nothing, and they will be difficult to get along with because they have
acquired the appearance of wisdom instead of wisdom itself.
PLATO, PHAEDRUS 62 (Christopher Rowe trans., 2005). Or: "Where is the wisdom we have
lost in knowledge? Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?" VERNA ALLEE, THE
KNOWLEDGE EVOLUTION: EXPANDING ORGANIZATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 16 (1997) (quoting
T.S. ELIOT, THE ROCK (1934)).
249. HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 143 (3d ed. 1996).
250. Id. at 144. "Time is our most valuable nonrenewable resource, and if we want to treat
it with respect, we need to set priorities." ALBERT-LAszLO BARABA91, BURSTS: THE HIDDEN
PATTERN BEHIND EVERYTHING WE Do 125 (2010).
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precious: "' "Scarcity of attention in an information-rich world can be
measured in terms of a human executive's time.' '212 Hence, the well-known
disutility of data dumps.
Posner did recognize the Easterbrook "so unusual" compensation level
triggering a judicial inference of deceit, or of abdication2 3 Unfortunately,
"The panel's 'so unusual' standard is to be applied solely by comparing the
adviser's fee with the fees charged by other mutual fund advisers. '5 4 Under-
stand: '"The governance structure that enables mutual fund advisers to
charge exorbitant fees is industry-wide, so the panel's comparability ap-
proach would if widely followed allow those fees to become the industry's
floor.
255
C. The Citizenry Seethed While the Judiciary Pondered
Especially because of Judge Posner's connection of mutual fund adviser
fees to executive compensation, his dissent was attended-to in corporate
251. SIMON, supra note 248, at 48. Is there any escape from informational pitfalls menac-
ing even the most sophisticated investors riding the most elaborate computational machinery?
A study by Snajeev Arora and Boaz Barak both of the Princeton U. Computer Science De-
partment and Center for Computational Intractability, Markus Brunnermeier of Princeton's
Department of Economics and Bendheim Center for Finance, and Rong Ge of the Department
of Computer Science and Center for Computer Intractability realized that most analyses of the
2007-2009 financial crises blamed faulty models in pricing derivatives. Yet that evokes the
question of whether a more precise model would prove prophylactic against future problems.
Seemingly, will such pricing problems endure even given superior models? The pricing prob-
lem should grow more difficult for more complicated models.
Traditional economics argues that financial derivatives ameliorate the costs inflicted
by asymmetric information: Alas, using theoretical computer science modes, these authors
argue that derivatives actually can amplify asymmetric information costs. Sanjeev Arora et
al., Computational Complexity and Information Asymmetry in Financial Products 12 (Oct. 19,
2009) (unpublished working paper), available at www.cs.princeton.edu/-rongge/derivative.
pdf. "Note that computational complexity is only a small departure from full rationality since
even highly sophisticated investors are boundedly rational due to a lack of requisite computa-
tional resources." Id. at 1.
252. SIMON, supra note 248, at 41. "[W]e crave speed everywhere because it saves time,
the scarcest resource of all." PETER W. HUBER & MARK P. MILLS, THE BOTTOMLESS WELL:
THE TWILIGHT OF FUEL, THE VIRTUE OF WASTE, AND WHY WE WILL NEVER RUN OUT OF
ENERGY 138-39 (2005).
253. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 732 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) (per curiam).
254. Id.
255. Id. "And in this case there was an alternative comparison, rejected by the panel on
the basis of airy speculation--comparison of the fees that Harris charges independent funds
with the much higher fees that it charges the funds [that] it controls." Id.
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America.2 6 The Jones controversy came to a boil amidst national debate257
over whether the market can be entrusted with naming the pay rates of corpo-
rate executives. 58 And excesses in compensation of the financial executives
crucially inflamed the populace after the stock market meltdown climaxing
in March, 2009.259 A political tempest concerning Goldman Sachs' 2009
compensation 26 preceded a still-roiling public ire over executive compensa-
tion in 2010.261 Between the Supreme Court oral argument in Jones and the
issuance of the Supreme Court's opinion in Jones, President Obama re-
marked in an interview on February 9, 2010, concerning Goldman Sachs
CEO Lloyd Blankfein and J.P. Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon:
Let's talk bonuses for a minute. Lloyd Blankfein: $9 million.
Jamie Dimon: $17 million. Now, those were in stock and less
than what some had expected. But are those numbers O.K.? First
of all, I know both those guys. They are very savvy businessmen.
And I, like most of the American people, don't begrudge
people['s] success or wealth. That is part of the free-market sys-
tem.
I do think that the compensation packages that we have seen over
the last decade, at least, have not matched up always to perfor-
mance. I think that shareholders oftentimes have not had any sig-
nificant say in the pay structures for CEOs.
Seventeen million is a lot for Main Street to stomach.
Listen. $17 million is an extraordinary amount of money. Of
course, there are some baseball players who are making more than
that and don't get to the World Series either, so I am shocked by
that as well.
I guess the main principle we want to promote is safe say on
pay, that shareholders have a chance to actually scrutinize what
CEOs are getting paid, and I think that serves as a restraint and
helps align performance with pay. The other thing we do think is
the more that pay comes in the form of stock that requires proven
256. Ameet Sachdev, Mutual Fund Fee Case Tests What Is a Reasonable Charge, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 3, 2009, at 19.
257. See, e.g., Deborah Solomon & Serena Ng, Fresh Pay Skirmish Erupts at AIG, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 7, 2009, at Al.
258. Adam Liptak, Justices Scrutinize Adviser Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2009, at B 1.
259. POZEN, supra note 163, at 291.
260. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY, supra note 151, at 148-49.
261. d.at Ill.
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performance over a certain period of time, as opposed to quarterly
earnings, is a fairer way of measuring CEO success and, ultimate-
ly, will make the performance of American businesses better.
26 2
Conspicuously does President Obama not signal-as might Chief Judge
Easterbrook-that no corporate executive compensation issue arises if share-
holders can always sell their stock, and thus invest elsewhere? Are corporate
executive tip-top earners truly worth their keep. 63
And Jones caught the eye of the Supreme Court partly because Jones
entailed an unusual clash between Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judge Posn-
er.264 Those jurists number among the American judiciary's foremost law
and economics thinkers.2 65 Each man generally sympathizes with letting
legal questions be settled through marketplace values. 66 Certainly one learns
that legal issues are analyzable from varied angles, many such angles enabl-
ing the harvesting of bountiful yields. 267 That the subdiscipline of law and
economics-roughly a subdiscipline of microeconomics' marketplace val-
ues-thrives is demonstrable because, inter alia, scholars of that area not
merely publish academically, but as United States federal judges can influ-
ence the legal system firsthand.268 When Professor Bingyuan Hsiung of the
National Taiwan University Department of Economics made this latter point,
Hsiung cited as exemplars both and only Easterbrook and Posner.269 The
Supreme Court granted a petition for issuance of a writ of certiorari in Jones
262. Obama's Corporate Messaging, BLOOMBERG Bus. WEEK, Feb. 22, 2010, at 33, 35
(emphasis added).
263. See DAVID BOLCHOVER, PAY CHECK: ARE ToP EARNERS REALLY WORTH IT? (2010);
see, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear
Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257 (2010).
264. Sachdev, supra note 256.
When the full court split on whether to rehear the case, Posner penned a dis-
sent that read like an invitation to the Supreme Court, writing that the notion that
the market can police excessive compensation is "ripe for reexamination."
Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Resists Touching Rule on Mutual Fund Fees, WASH.
POST, Mar. 31, 2010, at A3 [hereinafter Barnes, Mutual Fund Fees] (quoting Jones v.
Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F. 3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting)).
265. Robert Barnes, Justices Tackle Case on Investment Fees, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2009,
at Al I [hereinafter Barnes, Investment Fees]. "The case was set up for the high court by
competing opinions of two of the appeals courts' leading thinkers on economics and the law."
Barnes, Mutual Fund Fees, supra note 264.
266. Sachdev, supra note 256.
267. Hsiung, supra note 205, at 10.
268. Id. at 2.
269. Id. at 2 n.3.
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on March 9, 2009,270 to resolve a split over the proper section 36(b) standard
among the Courts of Appeals.27'
VI. THE ORAL ARGUMENT OF NOVEMBER 2,2009
During the November 2, 2009, oral argument over Jones in the Supreme
Court, Chief Judge Easterbrook's new understanding of the limits upon those
fees that investment advisers can charge mutual funds272 went undefended by
anyone concerned.273 Some among the Justices suggested that a regulatory
body might be better-positioned than is the judiciary to ascertain whether
fees are not appropriate.274 Conservative Justices, shying from the Easter-
brook logic, appeared skeptical of arguments that investors are in need of
court intervention to defend them from the gravid fees that a fund manager
might cut with a board, with which he or she enjoys a chummy relation-
ship.275 Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Antonin Scalia were
the most outspoken in positing that government regulators, or consumers,
were the preferable monitors of these fees.276
In an exchange of Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg with Assistant to the Solicitor General Curtis E. Gannon-
arguing on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the
Jones petitioners-Roberts and Scalia referred to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission as if to imply Congress ought never have attached the
Investment Company Act section 36(b) fiduciary duty at all:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel, if we are going to have
regulation of what fees can be charged, you cite in your brief the
various regulations the SEC has issued. It makes a lot more sense
to have the SEC regulate rates than to have courts do it, doesn't it?
270. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 129 S. Ct. 1579, 1580 (2009).
271. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1422 (2010). "The [Seventh Circuit
panel] opinion [in Jones] is recognized to have created a circuit split, although the panel did
not acknowledge this or circulate its opinion to the full court in advance of publication, as is
required when a panel creates a circuit split." Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 732
(7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting) (per curiam).
272. Jess Bravin, Justices Weigh Fees Investment Advisers Charge Mutual Funds, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 3, 2009, at A6.
273. Liptak, supra note 258.
274. See id.
275. Bravin, supra note 272.
276. Barnes, Investment Fees, supra note 265.
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MR. GANNON: Well, in the abstract, it might make more sense,
Mr. Chief Justice. I think the choice that Congress made here was
to counterbalance the-
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You are not suggesting the SEC
wouldn't have authority to do that, are you?
MR. GANNON: Well, even under this statute, the SEC has the
authority to file suits under section 36(b).
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Has it filed any?
MR. GANNON: It hasn't filed any since-since 1980, Justice
Ginsburg. I think that the SEC in this context-it has-it has pri-
marily directed its resources and energies into encouraging there to
be better disclosure of fees, both the disclosure of information to
the board, disclosure to investors, better education to shareholders
so that they would be able to go-
JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, it must be aware of the-of the diver-
gence between the fees that investment advisers charge to these
companies and what they charge to other clients. Isn't the SEC
aware of that?
MR. GANNON: It is aware of that.
JUSTICE SCALIA: And yet has brought no suits against this in-
dustry?
MR. GANNON: Since 1980 it hasn't used section 36(b). It has
used less formal mechanisms in the context of examinations and
investigators-
JUSTICE SCALIA: For disclosure, just for disclosure. But that
suggests to me that the SEC may think that this is indeed a self-
contained industry and that the comparison with investment advice
given to other entities is-is not a fair one.
277
Yet Justices Stephen G. Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor questioned
278
whether a free market could be relied upon to police fees. Justice Breyer
277. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20-21, Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418
(2010) (No. 08-586).
278. Sachdev, supra note 256; David G. Savage & Walter Hamilton, High Court Debates
Whether Mutual Fund Fees Are Too High, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2009, at B2.
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evinced concern over the cozy relationship with the fee-setting board of di-
rectors.279 Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg appeared
to support the notion that mutual fund boards ought to utilize as their bench-
marks those fees that asset managers levy upon institutional investors, ac-
cording to Chicago-Kent College of Law Assistant Professor William A.
Birdthistle, who attended the hearing.280 Birdthistle had filed a brief in sup-
port of investors on behalf of over twenty law professors.28 1.
Commentators presciently supposed that the Easterbrook opinion was
unlikely to survive the forthcoming Supreme Court opinion in Jones.282
Questioning seemed to signal that the bench was inclined to decide Jones
narrowly.283 It was unclear whether the Justices would return Jones to the
lower courts to forge a new standard, or would tackle that job themselves. 28
Liberal Justices, including Breyer and Ginsburg, appeared disposed toward
the remand of Jones for further proceedings to flesh out disputed fee ar-
rangement facts.285 It remained unclear how substantial a role the Supreme
Court might assign to the comparison with fees charged institutional inves-
tors .2 8 6
VII. INTERLUDE: COMMISSIONER PAREDES ON JONES
A. The Securities and Exchange Commission Guards America
On May 4, 2009, Commissioner Paredes addressed Jones' issues on his
own behalf, and not that of the Securities and Exchange Commission or of
his fellow Commissioners: 287
279. Barnes, Investment Fees, supra note 265.
280. Savage & Hamilton, supra note 278. Professor Birdthistle is an expert in such mat-
ters. See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and Re-
wards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. R. 1401 (2006).
281. See Brief for Jerry N. Jones et al. as Amici Curiae Law Professors Supporting Peti-
tioners, Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010) (No. 08-586).
282. Liptak, supra note 258.
283. Barnes, Investment Fees, supra note 265.
284. Liptak, supra note 258. "Despite a line of questioning that seemed to suggest that the
Supreme Court justices are leery of getting into the business of setting standards, however, it
is hard to tell what the court will ultimately determine." David Hoffman, Advisers: SEC, Not
Courts, Should Set Standards for Mutual Fund Fees, INV. NEWS, Nov. 9, 2009, at 20.
285. Bravin, supra note 272.
286. See Liptak, supra note 258.
287. Troy A. Paredes, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech by SEC Commis-
sioner: Remarks Before the Mutual Fund Directors Forum Ninth Annual Policy Conference
(May 4, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/ spch05O4O9
tap.htm).
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Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act, adopted in 1970,
provides that the "investment adviser of a [mutual fund] shall be
deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of
compensation .... " Section 36(b)'s adoption was driven by the
view that the investment adviser's fee negotiation with the fund is
not at arm's length, but tilts in the adviser's favor, because the
fund, in practice, is captured by the adviser.
288
Yes, the captive mutual fund. At this juncture, Paredes added that the
relevant legislative history sustained his view, quoting a Senate Report:
Since a typical fund is organized by its investment adviser which
provides it with almost all management services and because its
shares are bought by investors who rely on that service, a mutual
fund cannot, as a practical matter sever its relationship with the
adviser. Therefore, the forces of arm's-length bargaining do not
work in the mutual fund industry in the same manner as they do in
other sectors of the American economy.289
This Maytime Paredes here sounded receptive to protection of consum-
ers by the Supreme Court in Jones. Nevertheless, as oral argument in Jones
loomed, the Commissioner on September 24, 2009, seemed to have changed
his tune. Paredes then related-on his own behalf-of Jones:
Much could be said about the case. Indeed, the briefs are exten-
sive. I will limit myself to highlighting two core points, leaving
the details to others.
First, adequate market discipline can obviate the need for more ex-
acting and burdensome regulation, including demanding judicial
scrutiny of advisory fees. One can conceive of the section 36(b)
fiduciary duty as compensating for a lack of competition in the
mutual fund industry. Put differently, the legal accountability of
section 36(b) can be thought of as substituting for a lack of mar-
ket-based accountability. The industry, however, has changed
since section 36(b) was adopted in 1970 and Gartenberg was de-
cided in 1982. To the extent the industry has become more com-
petitive, it may argue for greater judicial deference to the bargain
the adviser and the fund strike. In the face of sufficient market
288. Id. (discussing and citing Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-547, § 36(b), 84 Stat. 1413, 1429 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35b
(2006))).
289. Id. at n.10 (quoting S. REP. No. 91-184 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897,
4901).
[Vol. 35
160
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss2/1
JONES V. HARRIS ASSOCIATES L.P.
forces that constrain advisory fees, the need for courts to monitor
as strictly the adviser/board fee negotiations is mitigated.
Second, courts are not well-positioned to second-guess the busi-
ness decisions that boards and others in business make in good
faith. Judges may exercise expert legal judgment, but not expert
business judgment. A judge may be equipped to monitor a board's
decision-making process, but should steer clear of the temptation
to override substantive outcomes. These sensibilities cut against
reading section 36(b) as implementing a sort of substantive limit
on fees and instead recommend that courts focus on the process by
which the fees were determined.
An especially large advisory fee that appears to be "disproportio-
nate" would seem to evidence that the decision-making process
that produced the fee was inexcusably tainted, giving rise to a sec-
tion 36(b) fiduciary duty breach. However, if on further scrutiny a
court determines that careful, conscientious, and disinterested mu-
tual fund directors agreed to the fee, little, if any, room is left for
the court to declare that the fee is nonetheless so large that it could
not be the result of an arm's-length bargain. To the contrary, if a
faithful, diligent board decided that the fee was appropriate, it
would seem to rebut any preliminary determination that the fee ran
afoul of section 36(b). The prospect that perhaps a better bargain
could have been driven is a slim justification for allowing
judges-who have no comparative expertise negotiating or setting
advisory fees-to substitute their judgment for the collective
judgment of independent directors acting in good faith.29 °
Paredes' language signaling that market discipline obviates the need for
demanding judicial scrutiny, that courts are ill-positioned to second-guess
boards, and board diligence would rebut pro-consumer determinations,
seemed language pro-boards in Jones.
For years observers moaned, even during the Jones Supreme Court liti-
gation,29' that the Securities and Exchange Commission had more and more
290. Troy A. Paredes, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the Invest-
ment Company Institute's Annual Capital Markets Conference (Sept. 24, 2009) (transcript
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spchO92409tap-ici.htm).
291. See, e.g., Jim McTague, The GOP Gets Wired, BARRON'S, Jan. 25, 2010, at 48,49 ("I
don't share his faith in the SEC. It became a captive of the industry under previous adminis-
trations. As for Chairman [Mary] Schapiro, she headed the self-regulatory arm of the Nasdaq
exchange during the time that Nasdaq member Bernie Madoff pulled of the biggest Ponzi
scheme since the launch of Social Security."). On the other hand, additional voices hurrahed a
supposed Securities and Exchange Commission revitalization through, for example, its reor-
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waxed sympathetic to the pleading of potent corporations at cost to its pro-
tection of the public.292 By 2009, when Mary Shapiro assumed the captaincy
of the SEC, it was a laughingstock. 293  By 2010, something of a litany of
Commission limitations, and Commission regulatory failings could be re-
cited. A substantial cause of the mid-September 2008 financial collapse
294
ganization of its enforcement unit. Jack Willoughby, SEC Sharpens Its Teeth, BARRON'S, Jan.
25, 2010, at 45, 45. "The enforcement division is undergoing a transformation intended to
make it quicker in detecting and combating fraud." Kara Scannell, SEC Taking Another Look
at Penalty Policy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6-7, 2010, at B3. Hailed also was the SEC hiring of
Henry T.C. Hu to quarterback the Commission's Division of Risk, Strategy and Financial
Innovation (RiskFin), the Commission's "first new division in 37 years." Kara Scannell, At
SEC, Scholar Who Saw It Coming, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2010, at Cl. For Hu authored Henry
T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise
of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457 (1993). "SEC leaders accept that the real
test of this internal revolution will come in the courts." Jean Eaglesham & Brooke Masters,
No Longer a Doormat, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 27, 2010, at 5.
292. See, e.g., Swan, supra note 222, at 123. Who ultimately is responsible for SEC
lapses? The Supreme Court's June 28, 2010, opinion in Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Ac-
counting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) explained that the parties therein had agreed
that the SEC Commissioners cannot be removed Presidentially, but for cause. Id. at 3148.
Yet Justice Breyer's dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Sotomayor, highlights
"[t]he fact that Congress did not make the SEC Commissioners removable 'for cause."' Id. at
3183 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
293. "A year ago, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission was the target of jeers
such as its lawyers 'couldn't find ice cream at a Dairy Queen."' Jenna Greene, After Drought,
SEC Floods Zone, NAT'L L.J., May 17, 2010, at 1; Donna Rosato, How Well Is the SEC Pro-
tecting You?, CNNMONEY.COM, (Feb. 24, 2010, 8:35AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/
02/24/news/economy/SECSchapiro.moneymag/index.htm. Shapiro shared this exchange
with interviewer Donna Rosato:
Do you have the staff and budget to protect investors?
We clearly don't in order to do the job I want to be done. We are 3,800 people total, and
we regulate 35,000 public entities: 12,000 public companies for their disclosure, 11,300 in-
vestment advisers, 8,000 mutual funds, 5,000 broker-dealers, 600 transfer agents, exchanges,
clearinghouses.
And we are smaller than we were in 2005. We got our budget increased [23%, to $1.1
billion] for fiscal 2010, and we're working hard with Congress and the administration to in-
crease it much more substantially in upcoming years.
Id.
294. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY, supra note 151, at 41. A Commis-
sion sin of omission was its failure to break the longrunning, high-profile Bernard Madoff
Ponzi scheme: "In fact, after Madoff was arrested, his secretary revealed that the few times
SEC investigators had come to the firm most of them had asked for employment applications.
That was typical." HARRY MARKOPOLOS, No ONE WOULD LISTEN: A TRUE FINANCIAL
THRILLER 63 (2010). "My error was in believing the SEC actually was capable of protecting
investors." Id. Madoff case- whistleblower Markopolos even shares his 2005 submission,
concerning that Ponzi scheme, to the SEC. See generally id. at 297-338 (App. B).
Credible is the secretary's report. For: "The revolving door can turn swiftly at the
Securities and Exchange Commission." Tom McGinty, Staffer One Day, Opponent the Next,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2010, at Cl. Sixty-six of its former employees filed 168 letters with the
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was that regulators slept at the switch.295 The Securities and Exchange
Commission brandished all of the statutory authority required to forestall
broker-dealers from shouldering more risk than was prudent for the econo-
my. 296 But according to Judge Posner, the agency completely dropped the
ball.2 97 After all, the Commission is the shop with the attorneys who do their
own photoduplicating, filing, and mail-sorting.298 Such budgetary strategiz-
ing begets thriftily-hired lawyers but gives birth to dearly-hired clerical staff.
The sole practical means of averting an overly large housing bubble-aside
from hiking interest rates-would have been rigorous enforcement by, inter
alia, the Commission of its authority over shadow banks.29 Most of these
Commission's secretary in 2008 and during the initial nine months of 2009 "disclosing clients
or new employers [whom] they planned to represent before the agency." Id. "A Senate panel
asked the Securities and Exchange Commission's inspector general to review the agency's
'revolving door,' which shuttles many SEC staffers into jobs with the companies they once
regulated." Tom McGinty, SEC 'Revolving Door' Under Review, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2010,
at Cl. Fittingly does section 968 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 968, 124 Stat. 1914 (2010), require the U.S. Comptroller
General to conduct a study of the SEC. revolving door. The Comptroller is to submit the
report to Congress in 2011. Id.
295. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY, supra note 151, at 336.
296. Id. (citing Michael J. Halloran, Systemic Risks and the Bear Stearns Crisis, in THE
ROAD AHEAD FOR THE FED 151 (John D. Ciorciari & John B. Taylor eds., 2009)).
297. Id. at 173. "In the immediate wake of the financial crisis, a view held by some was
that the SEC would not survive the then-nascent effort to launch financial regulatory reform."
Erich T. Schwartz, Investor Protection and SEC Enforcement New Authority and Directed
Studies Increase Risks and Costs for Finns, in THE DODD-FRANK ACT: COMMENTARY AND
INSIGHTS 143, 147 (2010).
298. Thomas Frank, Porn Didn't Give Bernie Madoff His Start, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28,
2010, at A15.
299. Editorial, Let's Not Kill the Shadow Banking System, INV. NEWS, Apr. 19, 2010, at
10. The shadow banks sector was so christened by Paul McCulley at Jackson Hole, Wyom-
ing, in an August 2007 speech to economists. Gillian Tett, How the Sector Got Its Name-and
Why It Would Prefer a Different One, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 3, 2011, at 9. The shadow
banking sector is also known, more formally, as the securitization markets. "Indeed, by some
measures, the securitisation 'engine' was providing more than half of credit creation in the US
economy in the first few years of the 21 st century." Gillian Tett, Securitisation Engine Grinds
Down, FIN. TIMES (London) May 10, 2010, at 5. In Britain, a massive shadow banking system
created by a proliferation of structured investment vehicles centered in London swelled invisi-
bly to nearly everyone beyond the specialist credit market. GILLIAN TETr, FOOL'S GOLD:
HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET
GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 97-99, 183, 189-91, 195-96 (2009).
In the United States, between 1980 and approximately 2006 had arisen an "essentially
unregulated shadow banking sub-industry of financial institutions that provided a variety of
banklike services," virtually to a parity with commercial banking. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF
CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY, supra note 151, at 42. The biggest objection to separating commer-
cial banking from shadow banking derives from delineating what is or is not commercial
banking. Id. at 360. Finance Prof. Gary B. Gorton of Yale contends:
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are SEC regulated.300 Yet, according to Judge Posner, the Commission lacks
expertise in systemic risk matters.3 '
In all events, such has proceeded the rise of mutual funds 302 that Com-
missioner Paredes wondered whether industry evolution since the 1970
enactment of the Investment Company Act justifies an expanded judicial
deference to the adviser-fund bargain.0 3 Moreover, after the November
second oral argument in Jones, the Commissioner-on his own behalf-
cautioned concerning comparing retail fund advisory fees against fees levied
against institutional funds:
I would add that if the Court were to require a comparison of fees,
judges still should not second-guess the substance of the indepen-
dent directors' good faith evaluation of the fees charged different
funds and the reasons justifying any fee differences. To say that
the board is to consider a particular factor should not dictate how
that factor is considered and how it impacts a final fee determina-
tion. Simply put, fee comparisons should not morph into fee
caps.
304
Is a watchdog against fee caps the more defending the fund-i.e., inves-
tors-from the adviser, or the more protecting the monied adviser from its
fund? Fittingly was the concept of the Securities and Exchange Commission
as chief defender of mutual fund shareholders fully developed for the Su-
preme Court in Jones in an amicus curiae brief filed by the Mutual Fund
The events of 2007 are essentially a repeat of the 19th century bank runs, only in 2007
some firms ran on other firms. What has become known as the "shadow banking system" is,
in fact, genuine banking and, it turns out, was vulnerable to the same kind of bank runs as in
previous U.S. history.
GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 6 (2010). One major
shadow bank was Bear Stearns and another was Lehman Brothers. John Cassidy, Lessons
From the Collapse of Bear Stearns, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 15, 2010, at 9.
If it quacks, it is a duck. If it borrows short and lends (or invests) long, it is a bank. Offi-
cially, Bear Steams and Lehman Brothers were investment companies; Washington Mutual
was a savings & loan; AIG was an insurance company, GMAC and GE Capital were subsidiar-
ies of industrial corporations; the Reserve Fund was a money market mutual fund. In reality,
all of them were handing out money, or near money, and accumulating illiquid assets. Any
such institution is vulnerable to a run by creditors and regulators should treat them alike-as
banks. Failure to adhere to this principle will result in regulatory arbitrage and more blow-ups.
Id.
300. See POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY, supra note 15 1, at 38, 56.
301. Id. at 352.
302. See, e.g., FINK, supra note 37.
303. Paredes, supra note 40.
304. Id.
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Directors Forum on behalf of Harris Associates. °5 One recollects Assistant
to the Solicitor General Gannon's report to Justice Ginsburg that the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission had filed no suits under section 36(b) since
1980.' 06
B. Washington Guards America
To be sure, Washington might showcase over a half-dozen avowedly-
consumer financial protection bureaus. Who else other than the Securities
and Exchange Commission champions the mass of investors confronting
monied opportunists? The Congressional Oversight Panel was created in
2008 to monitor the Department of the Treasury's bank-bailout, and to re-
view financial market regulation. 07 Harvard Law School Professor Eliza-
beth Warren chairs that Panel.3 °8 In a March 3, 2010 interview, Chair War-
ren held:
Someone said monetary policy was in the penthouse and consumer
protection was in the basement.
It's the stepchild nobody wants. There's nobody in Washington
focused on the economics of the family, focused on the consumer
products-credit cards, mortgages, car loans, overdraft fees. All
the stuff you have to do in your daily life to survive economical-
ly. 
30 9
Chair Warren could expatiate:
305. Jones v. Harris Associates, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/
cases/jones-v-harris-associates/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). Such was highlighted by Stanford
Law School's Connor Williams. Could the Court Look to the SEC to Regulate Advisory
Fees?, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/11/could-the-court-look-to-the-sec-to
regulate-advisory-fees/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
306. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 277, at 20-21 and accompanying text.
307. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL: ABOUT Us, http://cop.senate.gov/aboutl (last
visited Apr. 20, 2011).
308. Charlie Rose, Elizabeth Warren: Outrage and Financial Reform, BLOOMBERG Bus.
WK., Mar. 15, 2010, at 17.
309. Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added). An essay by Professor Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at
Any Rate, is credited widely with planting the seed for the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY: A JOURNAL OF IDEAS
Summer 2007, at 8; Damian Paletta, Hurdles for Warren in Agency Launch, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 18, 2010, at A2, created in Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 1011, 124 Stat. 1964 (2010).
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A whole new bureaucracy even though the Fed has the tools to
start doing it tomorrow?
There are seven bureaucracies in Washington right now that each
own a piece of consumer financial protection. Bloated, inefficient,
and either ignored and ineffective or captured by the large finan-
cial institutions. [This is] the regulatory system we've got now. It
works very well for the large financial institutions because it
means no effective regulation.310
Familiar to students of law and economics is the capture theory of the
regulatory agency.31I Regulated firms capture their own regulators via lob-
bying to promote parochial, not economy-wide, business interests.312 The
capture theory of the regulatory agency proves applicable particularly in the
financial sector.313 Was it not relevant in Jones?
310. Rose, supra note 308, at 18 (bracketed material in original) (emphasis added). There
exist "roughly 115 federal and state financial regulatory bodies." LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF,
JIMMY STEWART IS DEAD: ENDING THE WORLD'S ONGOING FINANCIAL PLAGUE WITH LIMITED
PURPOSE BANKING 126 (2010). Did Warren hope to captain number 116? Warren was on the
short list to be President Obama's appointee as America's first consumer finance-regulator,
directing the newborn Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. Damian Paletta, Consumer
Post Prospect Has Democrats in Knots, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2010, at A5.
311. See Swan, supra note 222, at 120-22. "In the regulatory minuet, the consumer inter-
est and the producer interest are opposed." Id. at 129. The relationship between the Interior
Department's Minerals Management Service and BP proved "a striking example of regulatory
capture." Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr., The Gulf Spill, the Financial Crisis and Government
Failure, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2010, at A] 7.
One place we've already begun to take action is at the agency in charge of regulating
drilling and issuing permits, known as the Minerals Management Service. Over the last dec-
ade, this agency has become emblematic of a failed philosophy that views all regulation with
hostility-a philosophy that says corporations should be allowed to play by their own rules and
police themselves. At this agency, industry insiders were put in charge of industry oversight.
Oil companies showered regulators with gifts and favors, and were essentially allowed to con-
duct their own safety inspections and write their own regulations.
Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill
(June 15, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-officelremarks-
president-nation-bp-oil-spill).
312. Heremans, supra note 220, at 951.
313. Id. at 952.
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VIII. JUSTICE ALITO'S GARTENBERG-PLUS OPINION
A. Jones Ratifies Gartenberg
Justice Samuel Alito's opinion in Jones314 for the Supreme Court at-
tracted a concurrence from Justice Clarence Thomas.315 Jones met with no
dissents. Justice Alito explained that the Court therein measured what mu-
tual fund shareholders must prove to show that their mutual fund adviser has
breached its fiduciary duty under section 36(b).316 The Court, as mentioned
in Section V C, supra, had granted certiorari317 to resolve a division among
the Courts of Appeals over that appropriate section 36(b) standard. 318
In Section I of Jones, Justice Alito acknowledged that a typical ar-
rangement is that a mutual fund, which might have no employees of its own,
is created by a separate entity denominated as an investment adviser.319 This
adviser not only manages the fund investments and delivers other services,
but also selects the fund's directors. 320 Due to this intimate investment ad-
viser-mutual fund symbiosis, a fund oftentimes practically cannot sever the
relationship. 32' This walls-off the normal forces of arm's-length bargain-
in322 Here, Alito echoes the Commissioner Parades of May 24, 2009. Be-
cause of Congressional concern over the potential for abuse consequently
inhering in the investment companies' structure, the Investment Company
Act of 1940323 was adopted.324 In a further response to difficulties relative to
investment company board independence, and to investment adviser com-
pensation, Congress amended that Act in 1970.325 Thereby was reinforced
the independence of the mutual fund board of directors, which scrutinizes
and negotiates the adviser's compensation.326 Also, section 36(b) then im-
posed both the fiduciary duty upon the investment adviser respecting its in-
come from the "mutual fund, and granted [the] individual investor[] [the]
314. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010).
315. Id. at 1431 (Thomas, J., concurring).
316. Id. at 1422.
317. Id. at 1425.
318. Id.
319. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1422 (citing Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480-81 (1979)).
320. Id. at 1422 (citing Burks, 441 U.S. at 481).
321. Id.
322. Id. (citing, inter alia, Burks, 441 U.S. at 481).
323. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-I (2006 & Supp. It 2010).
324. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1422 (citing Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 536
(1984)).
325. Id. at 1422-23.
326. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(19), 80a-10(a), 80a-15(c).
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private right of action for breach of [such] duty. 327 Once more, Alito chan-
nels the May 24 Parades. The fiduciary duty did not, however, permit a
court review for the reasonableness of the compensation agreement.
328
Justice Alito related that the Jones petitioners were "shareholders in
three different mutual funds managed by respondent Harris Associates L.P.,
the investment adviser., 329 Petitioners had sought damages, an injunction,
and the rescission of advisory agreements between their funds and Harris
Associates.330 Their complaint had alleged the violation of section 36(b) in
Harris Associates' charging of fees "'disproportionate to the services ren-
dered"' and beyond the ambit of what would have been reached via arm's-
length negotiations "'in light of all of the surrounding circumstances.'
' 331
The District Court had granted summary judgment for Harris Associates by
applying the Gartenberg standard 332 "The District Court assumed that it was
relevant to compare the challenged fees with those that Harris Associates
charged its other clients. 333 Justice Alito recalled that the Seventh Circuit
panel in Jones had affirmed, but had based its affirmance upon its own Eas-
terbrook reasoning, disavowing Gartenberg.334 That panel's reasoning, as
indicated in Section IV, supra, focused nearly wholly upon the disclosure
element.335 Yet Alito's opinion likewise recalled that upon that Circuit's
denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Posner dissented that this rejection of
Gartenberg was premised on "economic analysis ...ripe for reexamina-
tion. 336
In Section II of Jones, Justice Alito's Jones discussion of Gartenberg
was somewhat detailed: 337
[Wie conclude that Gartenberg was correct in its basic formulation
of what § 36(b) requires: to face liability under § 36(b), an in-
vestment adviser must charge a fee that is so disproportionately
large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services ren-
327. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1423; 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b).
328. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1423.
329. Id. at 1424.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1424.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. (quoting Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner,
J., dissenting) (per curiam)).
337. Id. at 1425-28.
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dered and could not have been the product of arm's length bargain-
ing.
338
Correct in its basic formulation. The Gartenberg approach adheres to
the correct comprehension of fiduciary duty and the section 36(b)(1) imposi-
tion of the burden on the plaintiff:339 Approval of the adviser's fee by the
board of directors is to be awarded as much consideration by the judiciary as
appropriate given all of the circumstances; and the benchmark for reviewing
challenged fees is the range possibly emergent from an arm's-length bar-
gain. 340 The Gartenberg approach also adheres to the requisite role of the
fully-informed mutual fund board encompassing its statutorily-prescribed
disinterested directors: 341 "First, a measure of deference to a board's judg-
ment may be appropriate in some instances. Second, the appropriate meas-
ure of deference varies depending on the circumstances.
' 342
Gartenberg, being thus established as correct in its basic formulation,
what adds Jones to this Gartenberg foundation, sculpting Jones into a Gar-
tenberg-plus?
B. The Jones Additions to Equal a Gartenberg-Plus
In Section Ir-the main event of Jones-Justice Alito, without dissent,
adds these Supreme Court teachings: "The first concerns comparisons be-
tween the fees that an adviser charges a captive mutual fund and the fees that
it charges its independent clients. 343 Gartenberg, as related in Section JV,
supra, rejected the comparison of fees the adviser in Gartenberg had charged
a money market fund (captive mutual fund) and those it had charged a
pension fund (independent client)." Alito contrariwise determined that,
inasmuch as the statute mandates considering every relevant factor:345 "lWe
do not think there can be any categorical rule regarding the comparisons of
338. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1426.
339. Id. at 1427. It is axiomatic in economics that choice proves beneficial (although the
empirical accuracy of the axiom is debatable). BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE:
WIHY MORE IS LEss 19 (2004). Supposedly choice bears little relevance to someone's rational-
ity. RENATA SALECL, CHOICE 143 (2010).
340. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1429-30.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 1428.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 1429-30.
345. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1428.
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the fees charged different types of clients.' '3 6 His explicit preclusion of any
categorical rule marks an Alito addition to Gartenberg:
Instead, courts may give such comparisons the weight that they
merit in light of the similarities and differences between the ser-
vices that the clients in question require, but courts must be wary
of inapt comparisons. As the panel below noted, there may be sig-
nificant differences between the services provided by an invest-
ment adviser to a mutual fund and those it provides to a pension
fund which are attributable to the greater frequency of shareholder
redemptions in a mutual fund, the higher turnover of mutual fund
assets, the more burdensome regulatory and legal obligations, and
higher marketing costs .... If the services rendered are sufficiently
different that a comparison is not probative, then courts must reject
such a comparison. Even if the services provided and fees charged
to an independent fund are relevant, courts should be mindful that
the Act does not necessarily ensure fee parity between mutual
funds and institutional clients contrary to petitioners' conten-
tions.
347
This explicit preclusion of any categorical rule respecting comparing
fees charged to different types of clients developed the law in a pro-plaintiff
direction-fee parity between mutual funds and institutional clients being not
necessarily guaranteed by the Act.
The Alito opinion continues: "By the same token, courts should not re-
ly too heavily on comparisons with fees charged to mutual funds by other
advisers. These comparisons are problematic because these fees, like those
challenged, may not be the product of negotiations conducted at arm's
length."4 8
346. Id. According to one emphatic report: "Next, however, unlike the 2nd Circuit in
Gartenberg, the Supreme Court asserted that 'comparisons between the fees that an adviser
charges a captive mutual fund and the fees that it charges its independent clients' are rele-
vant." Jennifer S. Taub, Jones v. Harris Associates: Let the First Lawsuit Bloom, RACE TO
THE BoTroM (Mar. 30, 2010, 10:36 AM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/miscellaneous/
jones-v-harris-associates-let-the-first-lawsuit-bloom.html (emphasis in original).
347. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1428-29 (citation omitted).
348. Id. at 1429. Likewise had reasoned Circuit Judge Mansfield for the Second Circuit
panel. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 925 (2d Cir. 1982).
Appallingly, comparison of an investment adviser's fee against fees charged to mutual funds
by other advisers are problematic on additional grounds:
Remarkably, most boards allow the fund company to define the peer group. In the Oak-
mark case, for example, Oakmark Fund's fees were compared with those of just nine other
funds. By my count, there are [fifty-one] no-load, actively managed, large-blend funds with
more than $1 billion in assets. So what happened to the other [forty-one] funds that didn't
make the peer analysis?
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Carefully apprehend precisely why courts should not rely too heavily
upon comparisons against fees charged mutual funds by other advisers. The
problem is that those fees, themselves, might not be the outcome of arm's-
length negotiation. Expressly, the Supreme Court grasps that the feared
problem is that such comparison-fees are therefore excessive, and so would
be comparative evidence too pro-defendant-adviser.
Justice Alito instructs: "Finally, a court's evaluation of an investment
adviser's fiduciary duty must take into account both procedure and sub-
stance." 349 Understand:
Thus, if the disinterested directors considered the relevant factors,
their decision to approve a particular fee agreement is entitled to
considerable weight, even if a court might weigh the factors
differently .... This is not to deny that a fee may be excessive
even if it was negotiated by a board in possession of all relevant
information, but such a determination must be based on evidence
that the fee "is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasona-
ble relationship to the services rendered and could not have been
the product of arm's-length bargaining."
In contrast, where the board's process was deficient or the ad-
viser withheld important information, the court must take a more
rigorous look at the outcome.
350
The board of directors' procedures, which Alito here exacts, demand
that the board endorsing a particular fee arrangement not merely have pos-
sessed "all relevant information," but actually have "considered the relevant
factors" behind a fee approval for said approval to merit a "considerable
weight."35' As for substance, explicitly, "a fee may be excessive even if it
was negotiated by a board in possession of all relevant information. 352 And
remember that Jones already declares that since the statute requires board
consideration of all relevant factors even the courts applying the statute, to
say nothing of boards, can balance an adviser's captive fund fees against its
Kinnel, supra note 129, at 49. In its evaluation of charges, a board of directors starts with the
15(c) report, measuring its own fund's fees against those charged to competitors. Id. Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 15(c) (mandating such reports) is further discussed
in the text in Section XA, infra. Whom do captive mutual fund boards of directors really
serve? "No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or
else he will hold to the one, and despise the other." Matthew 6:24; Luke 16:13 (King James).
349. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1429.
350. Id. at 1429-30 (quoting Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928).
351. Id. at 1429.
352. Id.
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independent client fees. Hence, should the board's process-assessing the
relevant factors-prove deficient, the judge can move the more rigorously in
testing the challenged fee.
It is at this juncture that Justice Alito reminds: "It is also important to
note that the standard for fiduciary breach under [section] 36(b) does not call
for judicial second-guessing of informed board decisions. 353  A trifling
shortcoming of this Jones opinion emergent from Justice Alito's pen, or at
least from his chambers, lies in its treatment here, of its Daily Income Fund,
Inc. v. Fox354 precedent. Prior to the 1970 statutory amendments, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission proposed that Congress empower the agency
to launch actions challenging an unreasonable fee, and to intervene in similar
actions brought by, or on the behalf of, an investment company.355 Justice
Alito accurately recounts how industry representatives successfully resisted
such proposal, for fear it "'might in essence provide the Commission with
ratemaking authority.' ' 356 The Commission. Yet the Alito opinion later er-
roneously cites Daily Income Fund for the proposition that Congress repu-
diated a reasonableness requirement under fire for "charging the courts with
rate-setting responsibilities, 357 as distinguished from thus charging the
Commission.
Such a slip might be anyone's in more than a single sense. In the twen-
ty-first century, a Supreme Court Justice who chooses competent clerks, or
merely chooses for herself a capable selector of her judicial clerks, can chum
out impressive opinions absent her personal efforts.358 Today, the service of
353. Id. at 1430. In a sermon unearthed a few months back, Saint Augustine confessed:
'"We who preach and write books... write while we make progress. We learn something
new every day. We dictate at the same time as we explore. We speak as we are still knocking
for understanding."' Lucy Beckett, The Question of What You Love, TIMES LITERARY
SUPPLEMENT (London), Apr. 2, 2010, at 7 (quoting HENRY CHADWICK, AUGUSTINE OF Hippo:
A LIFE xv (2009). Do jurists write opinions to second-guess others, while those daily-learning
jurists themselves still explore for their own understanding?
354. 464 U.S. 523 (1984).
355. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1423.
356. Id. (quoting Daily Income Fund, Inc., 464 U.S. at 538).
357. Id. at 1430. Innocently does Alito alchemize "Commission" into "courts." Noto-
riously did Justice Harlan Stone demote rights "delegated" to rights "surrendered: "'The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.' The amendment states but a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered." United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 123-24 (1941) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X).
358. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 157 (1996)
[hereinafter POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM; see, e.g., BEHIND THE
BENCH: PORTRAITS OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT LAW CLERKS & THEIR JUSTICES (Todd
C. Peppers & Artemis Ward eds., forthcoming 2011); TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE
MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006).
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law clerks in opinion drafting is openly discussed. 59 The tendency has been
increasingly to delegate opinion-drafting responsibilities to the clerks.36 The
jurist herself transmutes from the drafter into an editor.361 In the Supreme
Court, this evolution is all but completed-at least as is determinable from
the length and from the scholarly apparatus of its Justices' opinions. 362 Of
course, to the extent that Alito's slip evidences a misdirected judicial modes-
ty in erroneously supposing that the 1970 Congress chose then to constrict
the leeway-"second guessing" of "the courts"-consequent interpretive
counterbalancing of that misguided judicial modesty facilitates readings of
Jones the yet more expansively pro-judicial authority under the 1970 enact-
ment.
In all events, not to be second-guessed board decisions look to be those
"informed" by not merely a knowledge of, but by the assessment of-"[if]
disinterested directors consider all of the relevant factors" 363-the captive
fund fee/independent client fee comparison. A "court must take a more ri-
gorous look at the outcome '364 should a board-blessed fee appear born of a
board not "informed," or even just behaving as if uninformed "'bears no rea-
sonable relationship to the services rendered' '.365 The judgment of the Court
of Appeals was vacated.366 Jones was remanded.367
C. The Law and Economics of the Thomas Concurrence
According to Vanderbilt political scientist Pamela C. Corley, the expert
on concurrences in the Supreme Court, only some concurrences in the Su-
preme Court support the majority's opinion.368 A concurrence can detract
from the majority opinion's impact by disagreeing with its reasoning. Yet it
359. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM, supra note 358, at 143.
360. Id.
361. Seeid.atl4l.
362. Id. In 2010, former-Justice John Paul Stevens repeatedly was lauded as the solitary
Justice still preparing the initial drafts of his opinions himself. Todd C. Peppers, Junior Jus-
tices?, NAT'L L.J., June 21, 2010, at 30.
363. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1421 (2010).
364. Id. at 1430.
365. Id. at 1429 (quoting Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923,
928 (2d Cir. 1982)).
366. Id.
367. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1431. "The case itself, Jones v. Harris Associates, No. 08-586,
was returned to the lower courts for application of the new standard." Adam Liptak, Courts
Can Oversee Pay at Funds, Justices Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2010, at B3.
368. PAMALA C. CORLEY, CONCURRING OPINION WRITING ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 97
(2010).
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also can clarify the outcome of a case and strengthen it.369 The latter it is
with Justice Clarence Thomas' concurrence in Jones. For Justice Thomas
briefly concurred to explain that he understood that the Alito opinion does
not countenance the free-floating judicial fairness review of fees which
Thomas feared Gartenberg could be read to authorize. 370 Thus is the judi-
ciary instructed by Thomas-in so many words-that the Jones enrichment
of Gartenberg is not to be confused with the banned free-ranging judicial
review of the fairness of fees. 37' The stance against expanding the fiduciary
jurisdiction, into deciding what is fair, is apparent. Flannigan stated, "At-
tempting to determine whether decisions are fair or reasonable is very differ-
ent from attempting to ensure that they are made in good faith without the
distortion of self-regard. 372
Sure enough, Flannigan, the law and economics expert, like Justice
Thomas cautions against a judicial prescriptive construction of fiduciary ob-
ligations373 (positive performance) instead of a proscriptive construction (of
personal abnegation): "Loyalty in the conventional fiduciary sense is the
specific obligation to eschew unauthorized conflicts or benefits. '374 The
former (conflicts) are permitted and, in the captive mutual fund circums-
tances, virtually prescribed under section 36(b). But, the latter (unauthorized
benefits) are proscribed. Hence, the Jones controversy: In such a case is an
investment adviser's conflict of interest perhaps inevitable, but an adviser-
abnegation is statutorily incumbent. Flannigan, like Justice Thomas, dis-
claims a judicial free-ranging fairness review in favor of judges, instead,
ensuring that a fiduciary's actions are taken sans any distorting self-regard.375
Jones, of course, actually exemplified the charge of a fiduciary investment
adviser's fee-taking having been distorted by its self-interest. Flannigan arti-
culates the implicit premises impelling Thomas' seal of approval on Alito's
Gartenberg-plus opinion.
IX. THE FINANCIAL PRESS GREETS GARTENBERG-PLUS
The Jones ruling was hailed alike by fund industry representatives and
by investors' advocates. Sure enough, one report on the morning of Jones
369. Id. at 14. What Corley calls an emphatic concurrence emphasizes an aspect of the
Court's holding, and largely functions as a clarification. Id. at 18.
370. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1431 (Thomas, J., concurring).
371. Id.
372. Flannigan, Fact-Based Fiduciary Accountability in Canada, supra note 57, at 45 1.
373. Id. at 444-45.
374. Id. at 444.
375. Id. at 451.
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was headed: Jones v. Harris Associates: Let the First Lawsuit Bloom.376
The Wall Street Journal at once emphasized that the Supreme Court had
granted "leeway" for fund fee lawsuits. 311 Shortly thereafter, it quoted Pro-
fessor Birdthistle: "'This isn't just Gartenberg, this is Gartenberg-plus ....
The [C]ourt has reconstructed Gartenberg to emphasize the discrepancy be-
tween retail [individual-investor-oriented] and institutional fees."' 3 8 Head-
ing its story Lower Fees, Courtesy of Supreme Court,379 the Journal submit-
ted: "The new, Gartenberg-plus standard may require firms to inform fund
boards how much they charge other clients and explain the difference in
fees-something critics claim will be hard to do. 38° Indeed, Jones "added a
wrinkle that will put more pressure on fund companies to justify charging
individual investors more than big institutional clients. ' '38' Rob Silverblatt
reported that in Alito's opinion "there's a bit of a twist. '382 Jones delivers
"some wiggle room to investors who claim that certain fee differentials are
abusive. 383 Wrinkle. Twist. Pressure. Investment News headed its page-
one news story High Court Ruling Opens Door for More Lawsuits Over Mu-
tual Fund Fees.3 4 It opened:
While the Supreme Court's ruling last week on a controversial
lawsuit over mutual fund fees was viewed as a huge win by the
mutual fund industry, the decision will likely put more pressure on
the boards and managements of fund companies to defend their
fees and could open the door to even more litigation.
385
Pressure. Hard to do. And Investment News editorialized: "Jones v.
Harris, though a loss for the plaintiffs, might well result in a long-term win
for all mutual fund shareholders, if, as seems likely, it leads fund directors to
376. Taub, supra note 346.
377. Brent Kendall & Daisy Maxey, High Court Gives Leeway for Lawsuits on Fund Fees,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 31,2010, at C1.
378. Sam Mamudi, Lower Fees, Courtesy of Supreme Court, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2010, at
C15 (alteration in original).
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Rob Silverblatt, What the Supreme Court's Decision Means for Fund Investors, FUND
OBSERVER (Mar. 30, 2010), http://money.usnews.comlmoneylblogs/Fund-Observer/2010/
03/30/what -the-supreme-courts-decision-means-for-fund-investors.html.
383. Id.
384. Jessica Toonkel Marquez, High Court Ruling Opens Door for More Lawsuits Over
Mutual Fund Fees, INV. NEWS, Apr. 5-9, 2010, at 1.
385. Id.
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exercise their independence more fully, and this leads to better fund gover-
nance and perhaps lower fees." '386 Lower fees.
According to Gregory Ash, chairman of the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act litigation group at Spencer Fane Britt & Browne LLP:
Now, when these cases are filed, courts are going to have to do a
lot more digging to see if the board of directors and fund manage-
ment fulfilled their fiduciary duties .... If a plaintiff is able to
draft a complaint carefully enough to follow what is essentially a
blueprint laid out in this opinion on how to establish a [legally via-
ble] claim, they will at least get to summary judgment.387
Offers Barry Barbash, a partner in Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP and
former director of the Securities and Exchange Commission Division of In-
vestment Management: "'Fund companies are going to need to be a lot more
analytical with looking at their accounts and fees. . . .A data dump isn't
going to work.' 388 Bear in mind the wisdom of Nobel Laureate Simon: A
data dump conceals, not reveals, an investment adviser's dirty laundry.
Morningstar's Russel Kinnel perceived that the Jones understanding of
critical facets of Gartenberg might hand shareholders a tad more power:
"The [C]ourt also said that boards should examine whether the fees paid are
comparable to those paid by other clients when the services and investment
strategy are comparable., 389 On the other hand, the independent chair of
Investco Ltd.'s mutual fund line, Bruce Crockett, asserted that the contention
that Jones would change the industry presumes that fund boards have not
been looking at different fees, but they have: "I don't see how this changes
much .... Plaintiffs bar will continue to try and find areas to test and fees
will be one of them. 39 °
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jones to resolve a split
among the Courts of Appeals concerning what a mutual fund shareholder
must prove to demonstrate that a mutual fund investment adviser had
386. Editorial, Ruling May Benefit Fund Shareholders in the Long Run, INV. NEWS, Apr.
12, 2010, at 8.
387. Marquez, supra note 384. "'With this ruling, a higher standard of conduct has been
placed on mutual fund investment advisers, who help millions of people manage their retire-
ment income.' says Jay Sushelsky, attorney for AARP." John Waggoner, Mutual Fund Fees
Case Goes Back to Lower Court, USA TODAY, Mar. 31, 2010, at B 1.
388. Marquez, supra note 384. Barbash captains the asset management group in Willkie
Farr & Gallagher. Peter Ortiz, SEC Sets Up Fund Investigation Unit, FIN. TIMEs (London),
May 3, 2010, at 6.
389. Kinnel, supra note 129, at 49.
390. Mamudi, supra note 378.
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breached its fiduciary duty as to compensation for services, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit adopted the Gartenberg standard in
Gallus v. Ameriprise Financial, Inc.39' On April 5, 2010, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Gallus, remanding Gallus to the Eighth Circuit for fur-
ther consideration in view of Jones.392 As Professor Birdthistle interpreted
this remand, "It's still difficult to be a plaintiff, but it's easier today that [sic]
it was seven days ago. 393 Then, General Counsel Karrie McMillan of the
Investment Company Institute, a mutual fund industry trade group, opined,
"I don't think the Supreme Court... really changed the way the boards do
things as a practical matter." 394 On the other hand, the Wall Street Journal
reporting on Gallus subheaded its news story: Decisions May Be Making
Suits Easier.3 95
What gap was filled by Justice Alito's Gartenberg-plus opinion in
Jones?
X. WHY THE CRY FOR A GARTENBERG-PLUS OPINION?
A. The Substance of Things Hoped For
The Investment Company Act of 1940 provides in relevant part in sec-
tion 15(a):
It shall be unlawful for any person to serve or act as invest-
ment adviser of a registered investment company, except pursuant
to a written contract, which contract, whether with such registered
company or with an investment adviser of such registered compa-
ny, has been approved by the vote of a majority of the outstanding
voting securities of such registered company, and-
391. 561 F.3d. 816, 817-18, 822 (8th Cir. 2009), vacated by 130 S. Ct. 2340 (2010).
392. Ameriprise Fin., Inc. v. Gallus, 130 S. Ct. 2340 (2010). "In a case that American
Funds won in a lower court and that is now on appeal, evidence showed that for at least two
years American refused to tell directors about portfolio managers' incentives." Kinnel, supra
note 129, at 49.
393. Daisy Maxey, High Court Rules Again on Fund Fees, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2010, at
CII.
394. Id.
395. Id. Harvard Law School Professor Jesse Fried, the corporate-governance specialist,
supra note 179, earlier had predicted that a shareholder win in Jones v. Harris Associates L.P.,
130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010), would incite plaintiffs' lawyers '"for their own selfish reasons [to]
monitor compensation structures .... That will keep the compensation down .... "' Jess
Bravin & Jane J. Kim, Fees Case Strikes at Heart of Mutual Funds, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30,
2009, at C3.
2011]
177
: Nova Law Review 35, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAWREVIEW
(1) precisely describes all compensation to be paid thereunder;
(2) shall continue in effect for a period more than two years from
the date of its execution, only so long as such continuance is spe-
cifically approved at least annually by the board of directors or by
vote of a majority of the outstanding voting securities of such
company;...
That Act further provides, in relevant part, in section 15(c), that:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any registered investment company hav-
ing a board of directors to enter into, renew, or perform any con-
tract or agreement, written or oral, whereby a person undertakes
regularly to serve or act as investment adviser of or principal un-
derwriter for such company, unless the terms of such contract or
agreement and any renewal thereof have been approved by the
vote of a majority of directors, who are not parties to such contract
or agreement or interested persons of any such party, cast in per-
son at a meeting called for the purpose of voting on such approval.
It shall be the duty of the directors of a registered investment com-
pany to request and evaluate, and the duty of an investment adviser
to such company to furnish, such information as may reasonably
be necessary to evaluate the terms of any contract whereby a per-
son undertakes regularly to serve or act as investment adviser of
396such company.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has prepared Form N-1A,
Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933/Registration State-
ment under the Investment Act of 1940.39' Generally, Form N-IA is for the
use of open-end management companies to register under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 and to offer shares under the Securities Act of 1933.398
The S.E.C. designed it to afford investors information, aiding them to decide
concerning investing in such an investment company. 399 The Registrant is
mandated to reveal the Form N-IA information, which the SEC makes pub-
lic.4" The Commission also may exploit this information "in its regulatory,
disclosure review, inspection, and policy making [functions]."' 4 1
396. 15 U.S.C. § 15(c) (2006 & Supp. 111 2010).
397. SEC, FORM N-IA, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn- I a.pdf [herei-
nafter SEC, FORM N-IA].
398. See generally id.
399. Id. at].
400. Id. at 2.
401. Id. at 1.
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Item 27 of Form N-IA is found in Part B thereof: "INFORMATION
REQUIRED IN A STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ' 402
i.e., information additional to that required in a prospectus. The Form N-1A
Item 27 language addressed herein was prepared as a mandatory language in
2004. 03 The SEC was then conscious of specific factors invoked in the Gar-
tenberg Second Circuit opinion toward determining whether an investment
adviser meets section 36(b) fiduciary obligations, including "the adviser-
manager's cost in providing the service, the nature and quality of the service,
the extent to which the adviser-manager realizes economies of scale as the
fund grows larger, and the volume of orders which must be processed by the
manager. ''40 4 In the Gartenberg shareholder derivative challenge to fees paid
a fund adviser, the District Court declared of the unsuccessful challengers of
their fund and its adviser: "Plaintiffs offer as an apt comparison for the
compensation payable by the Fund, the compensation (unspecified) that
pension fund managers are paid which plaintiffs say is only a fraction of the
compensation which the Fund pays. ' '45 So, given the 1940 Act's section
15(c) duty of directors to solicit such data as is reasonably necessary to eva-
luate their investment adviser's contract, and given that the ill-starred Gar-
tenberg plaintiffs had been unarmed with data comparing their adviser's fee
against fees rendered pension fund managers, what disclosures demand the
Commission's Form N-I A?
Item 27(d)(6)(i) provides:
If the board of directors approved any investment advisory con-
tract during the Fund's most recent fiscal half-year, discuss in rea-
sonable detail the material factors and the conclusions with respect
thereto that formed the basis for the board's approval. Include the
following in the discussion:
(i) Factors relating to both the board's selection of the investment
adviser and approval of the advisory fee and any other amounts to
be paid by the Fund under the contract. This would include, but
not be limited to, a discussion of the nature, extent, and quality of
the services to be provided by the investment adviser; the invest-
402. SEC, FORM N-IA, supra note 397, at Part B.
403. See id. at Item 27.
404. Disclosure Regarding Approval of Investment Advisory Contracts by Directors of
Investment Companies, 69 Fed. Reg. 39,798, 39,801 n.31 (June 30, 2004) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 239, 240, 274) (quoting Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d
923, 929 (2d Cir. 1982)).
405. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1038, 1044 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), affd by 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
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ment performance of the Fund and the investment adviser; the
costs of the services to be provided and profits to be realized by
the investment adviser and its affiliates from the relationship with
the Fund; the extent to which economies of scale would be realized
as the Fund grows; and whether fee levels reflect these economies
of scale for the benefit of Fund investors. Also indicate in the dis-
cussion whether the board relied upon comparisons of the services
to be rendered and the amounts to be paid under the contract with
those under other investment advisory contracts, such as contracts
of the same and other investment advisers with other registered in-
vestment companies or other types of clients (e.g., pension funds
and other institutional investors). If the board relied upon such
comparisons, describe the comparisons that were relied on and
how they assisted the board in concluding that the contract should
be approved .... 4 06
Such revelations of factors forming the basis for board endorsement of
an investment advisory contract are the things hoped for.
B. The Substance of Things Not Seen
Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc in Jones, Judge Posner
cited scholarship indicating that the foremost reason for aggravated differ-
ences in advisory fee-levels between equity mutual fund portfolio managers,
and equity pension fund portfolio managers, is that it is in the latter field that
the advisory fees are subject to marketplace arm's-length bargaining. 407
Reassuringly then does Item 27(d)(6)(i) appear, at first glance, geared to post
fund shareholders of how their fund's advisory contract fee measures against
fees paid to the same investment adviser by pension funds or by other institu-
tional advisers: "indicate [in the discussion] whether the board relied upon
comparisons."4 8 At first blush, Item 27(d)(6)(i) seems engineered to notify
fund shareholders of how their fund's board assessed such comparisons "de-
scribe . . . how they assisted the board., 409 Indeed, the Supplementary In-
406. SEC, FORM N-IA, supra note 397, at Item 27(d)(6)(i) (emphasis added).
407. Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 731-32 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dis-
senting) (per curiam) (citing John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory
Fees: The Costs of Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609, 634 (2001)).
408. Disclosure Regarding Approval of Investment Advisory Contracts by Directors of
Investment Companies, 69 Fed. Reg. 39,798, 39,801 (June 30, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 239, 240, 274); SEC, FORM N-I A, supra note 397, at Item 27(d)(6)(i).
409. Disclosure Regarding Approval of Investment Advisory Contracts by Directors of
Investment Companies, 69 Fed. Reg. at 39,802; SEC, FoRM N-IA, supra note 397, at Item
27(d)(6)(i).
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formation with the 2004 Release of the amendatory Final Rule recorded of
this comparison of fees and services provided by the adviser:
410
Several commenters supported the proposed requirement, arguing
that any responsible board would at least seek to compare the
terms of the contract under consideration with relevant terms for
similar funds, and that by encouraging boards to compare the
compensation funds pay to their advisers with the compensation
that other institutional investors pay, there may be a downward
pressure on fund advisory fees.41'
Why then all the shouting in Jones? Remember Investco's Crockett,
who declined to shout, "I don't see how this changes much. 'a2
The Jones fluster arose because real-world boards are not so adequately
responsible as to compare the terms of their own adviser's contract with the
compensation other institutional investors render to that same adviser. These
boards do not so post investors, regarding these matters, in Form N-IA,
which ostensibly is Commission-designed to provide investors data toward
deciding about investing. Therefore, there is no resultant downward pressure
on fund advisory fees. And boards get away with this. How? The cheery,
superficial hints of disclosure by Item 27(d)(6)(i) are belied by the artful
double-negative language of the Commission in its Supplementary Informa-
tion. That passage was drafted to be read by the legal cognoscenti and not
the hapless investors:
As adopted, the amendment requires a description of the compari-
sons upon which the board relied and how they assisted the board
in concluding that the contract should be approved, and does not
require an enumeration of the types of comparisons that the board
413did not use.
Item 27(d)(6)(i) does not require the enumeration of those comparisons
a board did not use.
Shareholders outside the legal or the financial industry, cognoscenti-
perusers of the Federal Register, are not alerted to data not employed to those
shareholders' benefit by their boards: "Little of what the management com-
410. Disclosure Regarding Approval of Investment Advisory Contracts by Directors of
Investment Companies, 69 Fed. Reg. at 39,801.
411. Id. at 39,802.
412. Mamudi, supra note 378.
413. Disclosure Regarding Approval of Investment Advisory Contracts by Directors of
Investment Companies, 69 Fed. Reg. at 39,802.
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pany tells a fund's board or how the board determines fees is in the public
record until a lawsuit is filed. Consequently, investors have to sue first to
find out whether they have a case. 4 14 The retail investors in mutual funds
are not rallied to squeeze fund advisory fees south.
Certain data-assisting investment decision making-which innocent
investors might expect the Securities and Exchange Commission to publish
in Form N-i A exemplify, as St. Paul might preach, things hoped for. True,
some funds such as index funds are comparatively cheaply managed, where-
as others such as international funds are comparatively costly due to unique
hassles or demands for special expertise.415 Nevertheless, the respective in-
vestment advisory fees for mutual funds and for corporate accounts with
identical investments ought to prove identical-whatever the nature of those
potentially diverse underlying investments.416 This is because investment
advisory fees are distinct from those other mutual fund "expenses" properly
charged to the fund shareholders. 417 But a cynical Commission blesses Form
N-1A statements wherein the enumeration of comparisons a board did not
use remain Paul's things not seen. Remember Assistant to the Solicitor Gen-
eral Gannon's pronouncement to Justice Ginsberg that the post-1980 SEC
"has primarily directed its resources and energies into encouraging there to
be better disclosure of fees, both the disclosure of information to the board,
disclosure to investors, better education to shareholders. ' 418 Well, did it?
Fiduciary: from the Latin, fiducia, for trust.419 "Trust can be misplaced. 42 °
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?42 1
414. Kinnel, supra note 129, at 49.
415. Paul S. Atkins, Tort Lawyers Target Mutual Funds, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2009, at
A19.
416. Dan Calabria, Review of Mutual Fund Advisory Fees Is Long Overdue, INV. NEWS,
Nov. 30,2009, at 8.
417. Id.
418. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 277, at 21. The escalating domination over
productive activities in an economy by financial services is dubbed financialization. NINA
BANDEU & ELIZABETH SOWERS, ECONOMY AND STATE: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 78
(2010). Financial services have skyrocketed to prominence within the American economy.
Id. at 79. And economists concur that the defense of rights in private property is a govern-
ment's duty. Id. at 53. For a free market, unvexed by governmental impediment, ranks
among the most familiar of economic tropes. Id. at I. Nevertheless, a major device whereby
governments do regulate firms is that of consumer protection. Id. at 130. Given this, under
standably might America's consumers trust Congress and its Securities and Exchange Com-
mission to insulate private-property owning investors from the avarice of mutual fund invest-
ment-advisers? Well, do they?
419. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 845 (2002).
420. Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 465,471.
421. Who shall guard the guards themselves? JUVENAL, THE SATIRES OF JUVENAL 247
(London, MacMillian & Co. 1897). The SEC touts a new brain trust focusing on, inter alia,
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XI. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF JONES
A. Flannigan on Fiduciary Duty
Generally, "[E]conomic analysis ... holds little utility for the lex lata"
as understood strictly.42 2 It reveals little of how to interpret the law.423 Yet in
some areas economic analysis might be a portion of the lex lata because legal
rules can be understood to refer to economic concepts.24 The economic lite-
rature concerning agency has swelled phenomenally since the early 1970s. 425
And economists assess opportunism in its every single incarnation.426 The
analysis of opportunism by economists is associated, in the legal community,
with principal/agent commentary.427 Still, very few economists have dared
the economic analysis of fiduciary obligation. Their profession's accom-
plishments are yet to shed much fresh light upon fiduciary accountability.
Economists prodigally have lavished research on economic mechanisms to
control opportunism, yet been skittish in evaluating the primary legal de-
vice.428  Also, there remains no consequential empirical data measuring
whether, as to fiduciary accountability, the conventional loyalty duty is effi-
cient.
investment emphasis and investment advisers. Ortiz, supra note 388. This unit, to be headed
by Robert Kaplan, once an assistant director of the Commission's enforcement division, and
Bruce Karpati, once the assistant regional director for the Commission's New York regional
office, was born of frequent criticisms that the SEC lacks adequate mutual fund industry
knowledge and experience to regulate that business. Id.
422. JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2008).
423. Id.; See, e.g., MARIA MANZANO, MODEL THEORY (Ruy J.G.B. de Queiroz trans.,
1999). "Law is, indeed, applied history. It is not applied economics .... " George Steven
Swan, The Law and Economics of State-Sanctioned Medical Marijuana: Gonzales v. Raich, 7
FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 473, 548 (2006). However, the economic analysis of law can cast
"light upon the inchoate thinking of our forebears." Id.
424. Trachtman cites as examples trade law or competition law. TRACHTMAN, supra note
422, at 3. "Specifically, economic analysis discloses the implicit premises of the law."
George Steven Swan, The Economics of Usury and the Litigation Funding Industry: Ranc-
man v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 753, 784 (2003).
425. Casadesus-Masanell & Spulber, supra note 51, at 87 n.132.
426. Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, supra note 58, at 401-02.
427. Id. at 401.
428. Id. at 409 (citing Oliver Hart, An Economist's View of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U.
TORONTO L.J. 299, 299 (1993)).
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1. Production Opportunism
Surely is the loyalty duty, fiduciary accountability, not in opposition to
economic principles.2 9 It transpires that the economic perspective only rep-
licates ancient principle.43° Context determining whether opportunism equals
fiduciary breach,431 Flannigan explains that the context of production is ap-
plied "in its widest sense of shaping human or physical capital for any
end. 432 It encompasses production of exchange just as some firms exist to
broker exchanges.433 Actors undertaking to serve others acquire access to
assets and opportunities connected with their service.434 They can abuse
such access to advance self-interest.435 Mischief is controlled by fiduciary
accountability.
436
2. Exchange Opportunism
Contrast this production opportunism against exchange opportunism.
437
This opportunism occurs between production units at the exchange inter-
face.438 Actors originally agreeing to launch production processes negotiate
the terms of their contributions. 439 For example, a captive mutual fund is
developed by an investment adviser. These firms can permit party actions
affecting renegotiation"---i.e., the renewal of the investment adviser's con-
tract by the captive mutual fund's board of directors. Then may one side be
armed to extract concessions from the other.441 Hypothetically, an invest-
ment adviser bleeds its captive mutual fund. For exchange opportunism aris-
es when actors bargain over their future relationship." 2 Opportunistic con-
tracting in the exchange context is generally nonactionable. 43 This permiss-
ible exchange opportunism is expectable, essentially being competitive be-
429. Id. at 428.
430. Id. at 393.
431. Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, supra note 58, at 394.
432. Id. at 395 n.5.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 394.
435. Id.
436. Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, supra note 58, at 394.
437. Id. at 395.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, supra note 58, at 395.
442. Id. at 396.
443. Id.
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havior at the negotiation stage.444 This might sound heartening for an in-
vestment adviser like Harris Associates L.P.
Why is this exchange opportunism negotiation to be permitted competi-
tive behavior? Flannigan stated, "As such, it is acceptable for all [of] the
reasons that competition is generally acceptable in market economies., 445 So
in turn, why is competition generally acceptable in market economies?
Competition guarantees alternatives. Those alternatives curb the gross mi-
sallocation of resources by competitive market firms. 446 Sure enough, Justice
Alito in Jones discerned that section 36(b) obtains in light of long term Con-
gressional worry over investment board independence and investment advis-
er recompense.447 The competitive market's alternatives being suppressed in
the captive mutual fund context, the preclusion of fiduciary duty-a preclu-
sion typical of exchange opportunism-proves inapropos. Instead, the at-
tachment of fiduciary duty regarding compensation logically emerges. Sure
enough, Congress in 1970 deputized the individual investor to enforce the
investment adviser's fiduciary duty as in Jones.448
3. Consent
Flannigan further explains that opportunism does not equate with ac-
tionable breach of fiduciary duty if there obtains consent. 4 9 For instance,
parties might consent to the existence of a conflict of interest, although never
to actual self-dealing.45° Compare the situation wherein a manager's firm
might accept an opportunism discount reflective of the risk of opportunism-
so corresponding to the firm's heavier costs of monitoring the shifty manag-
er-but never accept his actual opportunism. This means the parties are al-
lowed to act notwithstanding the managerial conflict of interest, but cannot
allow the conflict to impinge upon managerial decisions. For example, di-
rectors oftentimes are allowed to name their own pay rates.451 Compare the
sway of the investment adviser hypothetically dominating its captive mutual
fund board as to compensation. The upshot will be actionable as a fiduciary
breach if it be proved that the conflicting party did succumb to impermissible
self-regard.452
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Hsiung, supra note 205, at 15.
447. Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1423 (2010).
448. See id.
449. Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, supra note 58, at 399.
450. Id. at 399-400.
451. Id. at 400.
452. Id.
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Consider the post-Jones liability of an investment adviser charging a fee
so outsized as to bear no reasonable relation to services rendered. Flannigan
noted, "Because the existence of [a] conflict is permitted, the burden on the
beneficiary changes from proving the conflict to proving actual self-
interested conduct. 4 53 Sure enough, it is ordained in section 35(b)(1) that
the plaintiff carries the burden of proving investment adviser breach of fidu-
ciary duty.454
4. Limited Access Arrangements
Again, how is the law and economics logic of the Alito opinion such
that Thomas could concur? Flannigan found that various conceptions of
fiduciary responsibility bewilder jurisprudence.455 And Flannigan cautioned
that one snare is the view that fiduciary regulation reaches assessing the fair-
ness of an exercise of "authority, notwithstanding the absence of . . .self-
dealing.''4 6  Such befuddlement plagues this comer of the law.457  Sure
enough, the unbefuddled Justice Alito in Jones recalled that in concocting
the 1970 amendments, Congress rejected an investment adviser compensa-
tion reasonableness standard.458 And the unbefuddled Justice Thomas con-
curred to revile a freewheeling judicial fairness review of fees.459
Make no mistake: "The conventional function of fiduciary regulation is
[controlling the] opportunism [to be found] in limited access arrange-
,,460
ments. Such an arrangement obtains if oneparty acquires access to
another's assets toward a defined or limited goal. The backdrop to con-
ventional fiduciary duty is such arrangement of limited access. 4 62 In agency,
the fiduciary-agent's duty to forgo her self-interest in exploiting the afore-
mentioned limited access is a duty required by definition: For it is this shun-
463ning self-interest that limits the access. Recall Flannigan's insistence re-
453. Id. at 400 n.23.
454. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(1) (2006).
455. Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, supra note 58, at 410.
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1423 (2010).
459. See id. at 1431 (Thomas, J., concurring).
460. Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, supra note 58, at 393.
461. Flannigan, Fact-Based Fiduciary Accountability in Canada, supra note 57, at 432
n.3.
462. Id. at 443.
463. Id. at 440. "The duty of loyalty is the distinctive feature of fiduciary law-the en-
tailment of the vulnerability of the beneficiary to the fiduciary's discretion in using or working
with a critical resource (such as information) belonging to the beneficiary." HANOCH DAGAN,
THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 236 (2004) (emphasis added) (citing D. Gordon Smith,
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counted in Section VIII C, supra, upon fiduciary duty as a proscription. Pro-
scribed is exploiting limited access in self-interest.
Flannigan's insight-that the conventional function of fiduciary regula-
tion is the control of limited access arrangement-opportunism-isolates the
implicit logic of Alito and Thomas in comprehending the captive mutual
fund-investment adviser duet. Advisers wield discretionary power in an
access sense, in certain aspects.464 Crucially, they enjoy access to the benefi-
ciary's judgment-for nurturance of the beneficiary's judgment is the nature
of advice.465 That function may be exploitable.46 Therein arises the capaci-
ty to exercise a discretion to extract gain beyond that authorized-a de facto
power.467 In this sense proves discretionary power manifestly one of limited
access.
468
More specifically and crucially, the investment adviser enjoys access to
a captive mutual fund board's judgment at least by hypothesis. Therein aris-
es the investment adviser's capacity to extract profit beyond that authorized
to a fiduciary-a de facto power at least by hypothesis. Such was the sin
alleged in Jones against Harris Associates L.P. 469 Therefore could Alito and
Thomas in Jones fuel the enforcement of the investment adviser's fiduciary
duty while heartily disclaiming judicial enforcement of any nebulous reason-
ableness/fairness standard
B. Mirrlees and Frankel on Agency/Fiduciary Duty
In his capacity as a juridical scientist, Judge Easterbrook and his co-
author Fischel fancy the rationale for fiduciary duty as judicial finessing of
impossibly onerous transaction costs 4 70 (as indicated in Section Hll, supra).
Disavowed was the proposition that fiduciary duty redresses informational or
power inequalities between contracting parties.471 Nevertheless, in his own
capacity as a juridical scientist, Judge Posner doggedly insists that the fidu-
ciary principle indeed is the law's reply to the problem of unequal informa-
tion CoStS. 47 2 On the other hand, Flannigan points out that opportunism just
The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1399, 1402, 1404, 1407-
11, 1449 (2002)).
464. Flannigan, Fact-Based Fiduciary Accountability in Canada, supra note 57, at 454.
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Id. at 455.
468. Id.
469. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1424 (2010).
470. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 42, at 438, 444-46; see also supra Section III
471. Id. at436.
472. POSNER, ECONOMiC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 139, at 114.
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cannot be stamped out through complete contracting with full information.473
Expected repeat interactions dampen opportunism. 474 But agents pursue self-
interest when they spontaneously opt to treat their relation as an end game.475
And markets prove inadequate in addressing end game interactions.
476
1. The Theory of First-Mover Vulnerability
Sir James A. Mirrlees, in 1996, was awarded the Alfred Nobel Memori-
al Prize in Economics 477 "for his work on economic behavior [where] there is
incomplete information. ' 478 The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences hon-
ored Mirrlees, and William Vickery, "for their fundamental contributions to
the economic theory of incentives under asymmetric information.'479 Mir-
rlees' approach notably had proved meritorious in moral hazard situations
like that of principal-agent. 480 Therefore might one presume some Mirrlees
sympathy for Posner's unequal information costs rationale for fiduciary duty,
whether or not one presumed a Mirrlees sympathy for the Easterbrook-
Fischel transaction costs version of the rationale.
However, Mirrlees declares, "It is not so much the asymmetry of infor-
mation that is special about principal-agent relationships, but the asymmetry
of responsibilities, with the principal moving first, the agent following. ' '481
Might this Mirrlees principal-agent finding feed into Jones? True, while
each agent is a fiduciary, not every fiduciary is an agent.482 The Mirrlees
principal first-move insight well might nourish the understanding of Jones.
Boston University School of Law Professor Tamar Frankel is an expert in
fiduciary law,483 in the regulation of money managers, mutual funds, and
473. Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, supra note 58, at 407. After
all, opportunism ordinarily erupts in violation of the contract. Id. at 406.
474. Id. at 407 n.55.
475. Id. at 407.
476. Id. at415.
477. BANNOCK ET AL., supra note 49, at 275.
478. DIANE COYLE, THE SOULFUL SCIENCE: WHAT ECONOMISTS REALLY DO AND WHY IT
MATTERS 122 (2007).
479. Press Release, Royal Swedish Acad. of Sci., The Prize in Economics 1996 (Oct. 8,
1996), http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/economics/laureates/1 996/press.html).
480. Id.
481. JAMES A. MIRRLEES, WELFARE, INCENTIVES, AND TAXATION 21 (2006).
482. Casadesus-Masanell & Spulber, supra note 51, at 68 (citing Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 42).
483. See, e.g., TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW: ANALYSIS, DEFINITIONS,
RELATIONSHIPS, DUTIES, REMEDIES OVER HISTORY & CULTURES (2008); Tamar Frankel, Fidu-
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advisers,48 and in investment management regulation.485 In August 2009,
Professor Frankel explained that fiduciaries may dispose of, as they like, the
compensation they win for their services:
486
The problem arises when fiduciaries have significant influence on
the amount that they receive as compensation for their services.
This situation occurs when client-entrustors are incapable of [sic:
to] freely and independently agree to the commissions or the fees
for the services. In such cases these commission payments are an
exchange in form but not in substance. The greater the entrust-
ment, the more numerous are the entrustors, the less free bargain-
ing power the entrustors may have. In such cases the law might
interfere in containing the fiduciaries' compensation. This is espe-
cially so when the entrustors will sustain costs in severing the rela-
tionship, for example, pay taxes on amounts that would otherwise
be tax deferred.487
At this juncture, Frankel adds a footnote: "For example, mutual fund
investors are numerous and have no opportunity to negotiate the fees they
charge. Redemption of mutual fund shares invested in a pension fund may
involve for entrustors high taxes. 488
Frankel's mutual fund investors, having-as Mirrlees would say-
moved first by entrusting their retirement money to a mutual fund, expe-
rience no opportunity themselves to negotiate over fees charged. Worse,
they also are hostages vulnerable to costs entailed-e.g., taxes on sums oth-
erwise tax-deferred-in an escape from their agent. Remember Flannigan's
insistence, recounted in Section XI A, supra, that fiduciary regulation checks
the opportunism embedded in limited access arrangements. Not only is an
adviser's discretionary power manifestly a power of limited access abstract-
ly, but also Mirrlees' first-mover mutual fund investors hostage-as Frankel
suggests-to the second-mover adviser, are extraordinarily exposed to op-
portunism.
ciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209 (1995); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71
CAL. L. REV. 795 (1983).
484. See, e.g., TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY
MANAGERS: MUTUAL FUNDS AND ADVISERS (2d ed. 2001).
485. See, e.g., TAMAR FRANKEL & CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
REGULATION (3d ed. 2005).
486. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties of Brokers-Advisers-Financial Planners and Money
Managers 8 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 09-36, 2009) available at
http://www.bu.edullaw/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/2009.html (rev. Feb. 17, 2010).
487. Id. (footnote omitted).
488. Id. at 8 n.29.
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2. The Practice of First-Mover Vulnerability
How closely might the Mirrlees-Frankel logic parallel the facts of
Jones? In the November 2nd oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts shared
this exchange with David C. Frederick, appearing on behalf of the Jones
petitioners:
MR. FREDERICK: Here what is happening is that an arm's-length
transaction for the same services-the same manager is going out
and touting his services to the institutional investor, but simply
charging them half as much money for providing the same portfo-
lio of management.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Do technological changes make a
difference in terms of disclosures required? These days all you
have to do is push a button and you find out exactly what the man-
agement fees are. I mean, you just look it up on Morningstar and
it's right there and you can make-as an investor you can make
whatever determination you'd like, including to take your money
out.
MR. FREDERICK: The fact that an investor may know going in
what the fee is does not address the problem Congress was intend-
ing to address, which is that as larger and larger sums of assets
were accreted to the mutual fund, the investor was not obtaining
the benefits of economies of scale. And that's the central point --
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So we could look at-you know, as
the fund grows bigger and he doesn't get those benefits he can go
look at another fund. It takes 30 seconds.
MR. FREDERICK: And that again doesn't address the problem
Congress was trying to get at, which is to protect the company, not
the individual investor. The individual investor might lessen the
damages that that investor suffers, but the fund, the people remain-
ing, continue to pay excessive fees.
JUSTICE SCALIA: No, but he protects the company ultimately,
because when investors leave the company that is charging exces-
sive fees to go to other companies, the company that they are leav-
ing sees that something's wrong and has to lower its compensation
to its adviser. Why doesn't that affect the company at issue?
MR. FREDERICK: A large number of assets under management
in mutual funds, something like 26 to 35 percent according to ma-
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terials that are in the record, are from 401(k) plans, where the in-
vestor is essentially locked into the fund that his or her company
chooses to make that investment. And even as to investors who
are not locked in, there are significant tax consequences where
over time an investor might be in the Oakmark Fund and have to
suffer large tax consequences in order to get the benefit of the sta-
tute-
489
The mutual-fund, the individual investors therein, moves first. Inves-
tors invest in their mutual fund, which hires an investment-adviser. Thereaf-
ter, those investors fail to net the benefits as increasingly heftier sums accrete
to their fund. The investment-adviser, moving second, now charges these
mutual fund investors double its price to institutional investors, for a compa-
rable portfolio of management. The agent-adviser would lack the funds to
manage had investors not moved first. The Jones facts fit like a glove with
the Mirrless-Frankel logic. Understandably, Frankel responded to Jones,
"'If the industry doesn't do anything in response to this ruling,"' then plain-
tiff investors in captive mutual funds "'will have a better time.'
490
True, individual investors who recoil from being burned can abandon
their flaming investment. Nonetheless, the fund and investor-principals per-
severing in the relationship, who supposedly are legally protected from ad-
viser predation by their adviser's fiduciary duty relative to compensation,
continually pay extreme fees. Correspondingly, when Mirrlees identified the
special component of principal-agent relationships as the principal moving
first and the agent following, Mirrlees emphasized that many economic prob-
lems and possibilities involve the relationship such as taxation, contracts,
bargains, and thefts.49'
C. Jones on Fiduciary Duty
Was it in the spirit of the Ninetieth Congress, delivering investors the
section 36(b) guarantee of security from adviser predation through that ad-
viser's fiduciary duty as to compensation, that the traduced investor should
489. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 277, at 12-14 (emphasis added).
Finally, the contention that shareholders are free to move to another, less costly fund at any
time overlooks two facts:
The initial purchase of a fund probably incurred sales charges, and another charge is like-
ly when buying a different fund. At the same time, the sale of a fund is likely to trigger a taxa-
ble event.
Both factors effectively penalize cost-conscious investors-which is simply unfair.
Calabria, supra note 416, at 8.
490. Mamudi, supra note 378.
491. MIRRLEES, supra note 481, at 21.
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simply sell out? In fact, there is some indication that Congress in the In-
vestment Company Act endeavored to secure the investor-mutual fund rela-
tionship from predatory advisers who could leave scorched investors nothing
but retreat from their mutual fund.492 Such retreat would mean a kind of
marketplace waiver of their statutorily-guaranteed right to their mutual fund
adviser's fiduciary duty in regard to their compensation. Section 47 of the
Act ordains:
(a) Waiver of compliance as void
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to
waive compliance with any provision of this title or with any rule,
regulation, or order thereunder shall be void.
(b) Equitable results; rescission; severance
(1) A contract that is made, or whose performance involves,
a violation of this subchapter, or of any rule, regulation, or order
thereunder, is unenforceable by either party (or by a nonparty to
the contract who acquired a right under the contract with know-
ledge of the facts by reason of which the making or performance
violated or would violate any provision of this subchapter or of
any rule, regulation, or order thereunder) unless a court finds that
under the circumstances enforcement would produce a more equit-
able result than nonenforcement and would not be inconsistent
with the purposes of this subchapter.
(2) To the extent that a contract described in paragraph (1)
has been performed, a court may not deny rescission at the in-
stance of any party unless such court finds that under the circums-
tances the denial of rescission would produce a more equitable re-
sult than its grant and would not be inconsistent with the purposes
of this subchapter.
(3) This subsection shall not apply (A) to the lawful portion
of a contract to the extent that it may be severed from the unlawful
portion of the contract, or (B) to preclude recovery against any
person for unjust enrichment.493
Focusing as Congress did upon equity, did Congress disdain the inves-
tor alternative of selling away her right to her fund adviser's performance of
fiduciary duty? In Jones, the Supreme Court responded to a fiduciary rela-
492. See H.R. Rep. No. 96-1341, at 37 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4800,
4819.
493. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 47(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46 (2006).
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tionship wherein the first-moving investors could be held hostage-e.g.,
through a threatened taxation of money otherwise tax-deferred-by an inces-
tuous, second-moving mutual fund-investment adviser dyad. Comparison of
the advisory fees charged to captive mutual funds against fees charged to
independent clients had been a concept belittled in the influential Gartenberg
precedent. The Securities and Exchange Commission ostensibly is deputized
to effectuate the Congressional will through championing investors against
investment adviser breach of fiduciary duty. That commission engaged in
double-negative nods and winks to satisfy investment advisers that mutual
fund boards were neither tasked with the study of any captive mutual
fund/independent client fees contrast nor tasked with informing those boards'
own innocent investors that their board had failed to make such comparison.
The Alito opinion in Jones sagely reacted to this pronounced vulnerabil-
ity of the first mover to the second. It fortified the 1970 Act by confirming
that the investment adviser's fiduciary duty therein proves of such import
that Jones: (1) foreclosed the categorical denial of the captive mutual
fund/independent client fees comparison; (2) backed courts away from over-
reliance upon those fees charged to mutual funds by other advisers-the im-
perative behind their warning, spelled out by the Supreme Court advancing
without a single dissent, is that to do so could tend to overly-insulate invest-
ment advisers from section 36(b) liability-and; (3) summoned judicial eval-
uation of a mutual fund board's consideration of the relevant factors behind
the investment advisory fee it approves, the more aggressively for courts to
examine the outcome should a board's consideration be deficient (proce-
dure); and (4) further affirmed the role of the judge in repudiating a fee as
uncalled-for even when negotiated by a board possessed of all relevant in-
formation (substance).4 94 Jones holds that the section 36(b) standard of fidu-
ciary breach excludes the judiciary's second-guessing of informed board
decisions, apparently to be distinguished from simply those decisions deli-
vered by a board advised of the relevant data.4 95 Atop this, Justice Thomas'
concurrence stipulates that the Jones opinion incarnating these features "does
not countenance the free-ranging judicial 'fairness' review, 496 which Con-
gress definitively discarded in 1970.
494. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1428-29 (2010).
495. Id. at 1430-31.
496. Id. at 1431 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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XII. CONCLUSION
A. The Law and Economics of Litigation
The preceding discussion has reviewed the 2010 Jones v. Harris Asso-
ciates L.P. Supreme Court opinion by Justice Alito. It beckoned future law-
suits brought by mutual fund shareholders challenging the fees paid to the
investment advisers of their funds. Such advisers erect the captive mutual
funds they then advise and dominate. The Investment Company Act of
1940, as amended in 1970, laid upon the investment adviser of a registered
investment company a fiduciary duty as to that adviser's services compensa-
tion laid out by such company. The extent, or even the existence, of private,
plaintiff-driven litigation to enforce federal enactments is in great measure
the outcome of Congressional choice among options of statutory design.497
Large-scale Congressional interventions into the marketplace can pivot, in-
stead, upon bureaucratic enforcement regimes, entailing administrative in-
vestigations, hearings, and issuance of orders. 49
The model of rational litigant behavior as developed in the literature of
law and economics hearkens to a plaintiffs expected monetary benefit (EB),
expected litigation costs (EC), probability of victory (p), and the perceived
claim's consequent monetary value (EV).4 99 These variables impinge like-
wise, of course, upon her for-profit sector attorney's evaluation of his case.5"
Exploiting this law and economics formula for the litigation decision (EV =
EB(p)-EC) illuminates systematically the means whereby Congress can regu-
late the volume of private enforcement litigation. Congress twists the vo-
lume-dials by manipulating the anticipated dollar payoff from lawsuits. °1
497. SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 3 (2010); see, e.g., ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE
AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001); R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING
WELFARE RIGHTS (1994); R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE
CLEAN AIR ACT (1983); THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE
BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (2004).
498. FARHANG, supra note 497, at 3.
499. Id. at 22.
500. See id. at 23-24.
501. Id. at 25. Farhang analyzes from the perspective of new institutionalism in political
science, in his stress upon political/strategic/policy forces impelling statutory design out-
comes. Id. at 24. These variables can explain the resultant nativity of a statute that is quite
inefficient economically. FARHANG, supra note 497, at 24. In any event, the new institutio-
nalism emergent a generation ago, see, e.g., James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, The New
Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life, 78 AM. POL. Soi. REV. 734 (1984),
the dominant political science approach since 1990, MARK BEVIR & R.A.W. RHODES, THE
STATE AS CULTURAL PRACTICE 25 (2010), and now the leading expression of modernist-
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And Jones arrived at the Supreme Court only following dueling in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit by such swashbucklers of
law and economics as Chief Judge Frank H. Easterbrook and Judge Richard
A. Posner.
B. Jones Steers America A right
Gartenberg, an opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, so read the fiduciary duty feature of the 1970 amendments
that subsequent litigation in exorbitant fee controversies elicited judgments
nearly uniformly for defendants. Thereafter, economic analysis of law hea-
vyweights Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fishel propounded that naught special
adheres to the fiduciary relationship. Fiduciary duty is instead a transaction-
cost function. In Jones, Chief Judge Easterbrook reacted to an attack under
the amendments to the Investment Company Act from shareholders in mu-
tual funds against their captive funds' adviser's recompense. His opinion
hearkened virtually altogether to the feature of the fiduciary adviser's disclo-
sure to its captive mutual fund's board. Both the intermediate-court appel-
late opinions in Gartenberg and Jones snorted at respective plaintiff pushes
to benchmark investment advisory fees levied upon their captive mutual
funds against fees imposed on independent clients, e.g., pension funds. In
dissenting from a Jones denial of a rehearing en banc, Judge Posner concen-
trated rather upon an adviser's charging its captive funds over twice what it
charged to independent funds.
The Alito opinion opted less for the Easterbrook rationale in Jones than
for the Gartenberg route. To run the risk of liability for its breach of fidu-
ciary duty, the investment adviser must amass compensation so disproportio-
nately great as to entail no reasonable relation to the rendered services: the
fee cannot be the fruit of an arm's-length bargain. Yet Alito gives birth to a
Gartenberg-plus opinion. Jones disavows any categorical rule bar against
comparisons between those fees an adviser levies upon a captive mutual fund
and fees it charges its independent clients. Justice Alito expounds that fees
can be excessive even when negotiated by a board in possession of all rele-
vant information.
Comprehended at once by numerous commentators was the potential
impact of Alito's Gartenberg-plus opinion in Jones. The bottom line: There
might be mounting pressure on the investment advisers of captive mutual
empiricism, id. at 79, in 2011 confronts challenge from alternative theories of the state. See id.
at 198.
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fund boards to make detailed accountings of, and perhaps reductions of, their
investment advisory charges. Any such pressure would redound to the fi-
nancial benefit of retail rather than to institutional investors. Disappointing-
ly, such salutary payoffs as might be hoped-for from Jones had not already
been laid on the table for investors by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion. The naive might believe themselves watched-over by a benign, guar-
dian-angel S.E.C. But that blind administrative-watchdog slumbers.
This Alito opinion in Jones snugly squares with the law and economics
thinking posited neither by Easterbrook-with a linking of fiduciary duty
with transaction costs-nor by Posner, who ties the fiduciary duty to the un-
equal information costs problem. It rather comports with contributions of
Nobel laureate economist Sir James A. Mirrlees, and of the fiduciary law
scholar Tamar Frankel of Boston University. The former comprehends the
distinguishing element of principal-agent relationships to be asymmetry in
responsibilities, with the principal as first mover and the agent as the second.
Frankel perceives that first mover-mutual fund investors (principals) might
become hostages of the lupine second mover-investment advisers (agents).
The Jones advance beyond Gartenberg is probably, if tenuously, for the
best from a libertarian perspective. As the law and economics scholar and
expert in the law of fiduciary duty Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos 50 2 frames it:
[Clontracting parties cannot create levels of fiduciary obligations
outside the two choices: arm's-length or fiduciary relations. That
is, parties cannot agree to give the investor fewer opportunities
than a pure arm's-length relationship or more opportunities than a
pure fiduciary relationship. The farther apart the legal system
keeps the definitions of the two, the more latitude parties have to
fine-tune their relationships. In order to expand contracting choic-
es, the two levels of loyalty available must be kept as far apart as
possible.5 °3
At least as a general principle, free market contracting must welcome
strong enunciations of fiduciary duty."
502. See, e.g., Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Meinard v. Salmon and the Economics of
Honor, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 137, 137.
503. Id. at 153.
504. Also, even acclaimed scholars of law and economics can assert that a widely-sensed
impulse of conscience, and not merely some presumably-widespread application of cost-
benefit analysis, see, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit
Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105 (2000), properly is to be
heeded by the architects of legal frameworks. See generally LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING
CONSCIENCE: How GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE (2011).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,1 the Supreme Court of the United
States handed down a decision expressly mandating that judges disqualify
* Scott B. Gitterman earned his J.D. from Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center and his Bachelors in Political Science from Florida Atlantic University.
The author would like to thank his parents, Neil and Michele, for all their guidance and sup-
port they have shown throughout his entire life and to his big sister, Liz, for always being
there for him. And to Fred A. Schwartz who has been a great mentor along the way and to the
staff of the Nova Law Review for all their hard work in preparing this article.
1. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
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themselves when a case involves their big donors.2 The Supreme Court held
that a judge must be disqualified when an interested party's spending created
actual bias because it had a "disproportionate influence" on the ruling judge.3
The focal point of the decision is to show how campaign contributions can
create grounds for necessary disqualification for elected judges-not just
bias, prejudice, or pecuniary gain any more.4
This article will provide an overview of the recent Supreme Court deci-
sion in Caperton. Section II will showcase background information that led
to the decision in Caperton. Section III will review the grounds that require
a judge to be disqualified; and will discuss what led to the recent decision in
Caperton. Section IV will begin by highlighting the purpose of the opinion;
it will discuss the Court's new financial outlook toward mandatory disquali-
fication. Section V will discuss the possible future consequences of the deci-
sion. The latter part of Section V will review the dissenting opinions that
were entered in the decision. Section VI will discuss the writer's conclusion
as to whether this decision will put an end to any sort of bias or prejudice
that a litigant might have to face and whether this decision will do more
harm than good.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The initial cost of judicial elections has continued to rise for years, and
contributors are donating more than ever to try to gain favor among judges.5
The costs of running or keeping a judicial office has increased to such a de-
gree that a judge must take donations or take the chance of losing.6 There-
fore, more judges are susceptible to being bought by contributors giving
large campaign contributions. 7 The question of whether judges must disqua-
lify themselves when a case involves one of their big donors is one that has
been left unanswered for years. Hugh M. Caperton, the owner of various
mining industries in West Virginia, sued A.T. Massey Coal Co. for tortious
interference in 1998.8 The suit was brought because Mr. Caperton felt Mr.
Don L. Blankenship, the chief executive officer of A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
2. Id. at 2265-66.
3. Adam Liptak, Justices Issue Recusal Rule for Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2009, at
A].
4. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263.
5. David Barnhizer, "On the Make": Campaign Funding and the Corrupting of the
American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 378 (2001).
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 233 (W. Va. 2008), rev'd by 129
S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
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interfered with his existing contracts and tried to devalue his mine in order to
cause him to go into bankruptcy.9 A circuit court in West Virginia found
A.T. Massey Coal Co. liable for tortious interference and awarded Caperton
$50 million in punitive and compensatory damages.' °
Coincidently, the race for West Virginia State Supreme Court of Ap-
peals occurred in 2004." The incumbent Justice Warren McGraw was being
challenged by Brent Benjamin.' 2 Mr. Blankenship opposed Justice McGraw
being reelected because he felt Mcgraw was not the right person for the job.'3
Blankenship spent $3 million trying to get Justice McGraw off the bench and
replaced with Benjamin." The race was won by Benjamin, and after the
victory, Blankenship immediately filed his petition to have the State Su-
preme Court of Appeals re-hear his punitive damages case. 5 Caperton
moved to disqualify Justice Benjamin and two of the other sitting Justices
under the Due Process Clause because of Blankenship's campaign involve-
ment.' 6 Photographs of Chief Justice Maynard had been leaked to the public
showing him vacationing with Blankenship in the French Rivera during the
time the case was still pending.' 7 Chief Justice Maynard immediately disqu-
alified himself from the proceedings after the pictures surfaced.' 8 Also, Jus-
tice Starcher granted Massey's disqualification motion because of the public
criticism Justice Benjamin had received due to his involvement with Blan-
kenship.' 9 However, Justice Benjamin dismissed the motion and commented
that there was no sort of bias involved in the suit.
20
9. Id. at 232-33.
10. Id. at 233.
11. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009).
12. Id.
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2258.
16. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
17. Id. at 2258.
18. Id.
19. Id. Justice Starcher commented: "Blankenship's bestowal of his personal wealth,
[political tactics], and friendship have created a cancer in the affairs of this Court. And I have
seen that cancer grow and grow .... I believe that my stepping aside in the instant case might
be a step in treating that cancer .... Penny J. White, "The Appeal" to the Masses, 86 DENy.
U. L. REV. 251, 279 (2008) (quoting Notice of Voluntary Disqualification of the Hon. Larry
V. Starcher, Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, A.T. Massey Coal Co.
v. Caperton, No. 33350 (Feb. 15, 2008), reprinted in SAMPLE ET AL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, FAIR COURTS: SITING RECUSAL STANDARDS 19 (2008)).
20. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257-58.
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In 2007, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the $50
million verdict against Blankenship and his company.2 Caperton wanted
another hearing and moved to disqualify three of the five justices that sat for
the prior trial. 22 All but Justice Benjamin recused themselves, and the hear-
ing was held; however, the verdict was reversed once again.2 3 Justice Ben-
jamin filed a concurring opinion in the Caperton case, where he defended his
decision not to disqualify himself as well as the majority opinion.24 Justice
Benjamin, in his concurring opinion, stated he had no "'direct, personal, sub-
stantial, [or] pecuniary interest"' in the result of the case.25 Caperton then
applied for and was granted certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States.26
III. BEFORE CAPERTON v. A.T. MASSEY COAL CO.
A. When Disqualification is Necessary
Judicial disqualification has been around longer than the Constitution it-
self.2 7 Disqualification procedures were derived from English common law;
however, the United States has developed the procedures into what they are
now. 28 The Roman Code of Justinian and Jewish law also had provisions for
the disqualification of judges based on the suspicion of bias or pecuniary
gain.29 In English common law, the "rule of necessity" required a judge to
hear a case even if there was direct pecuniary gain, if there was no sufficient
21. Id. at 2258.
22. Id.
23. Id. "Not only is the majority opinion unsupported by the facts and existing case law,
but it is also fundamentally unfair. Sadly, justice was neither honored nor served by the ma-
jority." Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 284 (W. Va. 2008) (Albright, J.,
dissenting), rev'd by 129 Ct. 2252 (2009).
24. See Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 258-309 (Benjamin, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 301. Justice Benjamin further noted that by adopting "a standard merely of
appearances,' [he concluded], seems little more than an invitation to subject West Virginia's
justice system to the vagaries of the day-a framework in which predictability and stability
yield to supposition, innuendo, half-truths, and partisan manipulations." Id. at 306.
26. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259.
27. John A. Meiser, Note, The (Non)Problem of a Limited Due Process Right to Judicial
Disqualification, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1799, 1803 (2009). "'[D]isqualification' describes
the statutorily or constitutionally mandated removal of a judge (typically on motion by one of
the parties), whereas 'recusal' refers to a judge's voluntary decision to step down from a case.
.Id. at 1802 n.29 (emphasis omitted).
28. Id. at 1803.
29. Id. at 1803--04.
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substitute available.3° Therefore, judges in early common law were only
required to disqualify themselves in the slimmest of situations.31 All judges
are different in their concepts of ethical conduct and in their motivations.32
Judicial disqualification matters will probably continue to be decided mainly
on a case-by-case basis, and many additional decisions are likely to be essen-
tial in fleshing out the components of mandatory disqualification. 33 There
are rules set in place to ensure judges uphold a level of impartiality when
ruling in any type of case. 4 "[T]he importance of maintaining the appear-
ance of impartiality in the judiciary" has always been at the heart of the
American system.35 The right to be heard in a neutral tribunal before an im-
partial judge is guaranteed in the Due Process Clause in the Constitution of
the United States.36
30. Id. at 1804; see Paul B. Lewis, Systemic Due Process: Procedural Concepts and the
Problem of Recusal, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 381, 383 (1990).
31. Meiser, supra note 27, at 1804.
32. Todd Lochner, Judicial Recusal and the Search for the Bright Line, 26 JUST. SYS. J.
231, 232 (2005).
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 2.11 (2007); see also Cnty. of Santa
Clara v. Superior Court, 235 P.3d 21, 35 (Cal. 2010). "It is well established that the disquali-
fication rules applicable to adjudicators are more stringent than those that govern the conduct
of prosecutors and other government attorneys." Cnty. of Santa Clara, 235 P.3d at 35 n.12
(citing People v. Freeman, 222 P.3d 177, 178 (Cal. 2010)).
35. Wersal v. Sexton, 613 F.3d 821, 846 (8th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Bye, J., dissenting).
Alexander Hamilton captured this need for an impartial judiciary when he wrote:
The benefits of the integrity and moderation of the judiciary have already been felt in more
States than one; and though they may have displeased those whose sinister expectations they
may have disappointed, they must have commanded the esteem and applause of all the vir-
tuous and disinterested. Considerate men of every description ought to prize whatever will
tend to beget or fortify that temper in the courts; as no man can be sure that he may not be to-
morrow the victim of a spirit of injustice, by which he may be a gainer today. And every man
must now feel, that the inevitable tendency of such a spirit is to sap the foundations of public
and private confidence and to introduce in its stead universal distrust and distress.
Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 454 (Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass'n ed.,
2009)).
36. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 798-99 (1987)
(citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)). "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
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1. Grounds for Disqualification
Judges are not afforded the same kind of "across-the-board 'out"' that
lawyers receive, even when they elect to join the judiciary.37 Taking on the
role of a judge could entail being an "impartial umpire" or a "trustee of the
common law," but whatever role the judge has, he cannot let individual mor-
al judgment get in the way of applying just the law.38 "The judicial judgment
in applying the Due Process Clause must move within the limits of accepted
notions of justice and is not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely
personal judgment .... An important safeguard against such merely individ-
ual judgment is an alert deference ....
Under the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge has an
obligation to disqualify himself "in any proceeding in which the judge's im-
partiality might reasonably be questioned."' ° The grounds for which a judge
is to be disqualified from hearing a case include when there is actual bias or
prejudice against an interested party.41 Another ground for disqualification is
when the judge has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case.42
a. Actual Bias or Prejudice
A judge must be disqualified in cases where actual bias or prejudice can
be shown.43 However, this is a hard burden to prove because there is a pre-
sumption that judges are impartial whenever trying a case."n In Black's Law
37. Sarah M. R. Cravens, In Pursuit of Actual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1, 28 n.133
(2007). For instance, a judge cannot avoid ruling on a mass tort case "just because she thinks
it would be too time consuming or" inject personal feelings while he is involved in a case. Id.
at 20 n.93. This ought to mean not only that he will not decline the case, but that he will not
let his personal views into the rationale and decision of the case to affect the outcome of the
proceeding. Id. This is all part of the duty of being a judge. Id.
38. Id.at28n.133.
39. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
40. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (A) (2007).
41. Id. R. 2.11 (A)(I). A judge shall disqualify himself if he has "a personal bias or pre-
judice concerning a party or a party's lawyer." Id.
42. Id. R. 2.11(A)(2)(c). A judge shall disqualify himself when the
judge knows that the judge, the judge's spouse or domestic partner, or a person within the third
degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse or domestic partner of such a person is a
person who has more than a de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the pro-
ceeding.
Id. R. 2.11 (A)(2), (A)(2)(c).
43. See MacDonald v. Ford Motor Co., 324 N.W.2d 489, 491 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (per
curiam).
44. See id.
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Dictionary, the phrase "actual bias" is defined as "[g]enuine prejudice that a
judge, juror, witness, or other person has against some person or relevant
subject."45 Also, the word "prejudice" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary
as "[d]amage or detriment to one's legal rights or claims."'  Judges are not
perfect; prejudice and bias cannot always be kept out of court.47 "Judges are
human beings, and so they can never completely transcend the limits of their
own experiences and perspectives.' In Public Utilities Commission of the
District of Columbia v. Pollak,49 Justice Frankfurter commented:
The judicial process demands that a judge move within the frame-
work of relevant legal rules and the covenanted modes of thought
for ascertaining them. He must think dispassionately and sub-
merge private feeling on every aspect of a case. There is a good
deal of shallow talk that the judicial robe does not change the man
within it. It does. The fact is that on the whole judges do lay aside
private views in discharging their judicial functions. This is
achieved through training, professional habits, self-discipline and
that fortunate alchemy by which men are loyal to the obligation
with which they are entrusted.50
Actual bias and prejudice really matter "when it moves the deci-
sion[maker] away from reasoning or outcomes that are in accordance with
the law and towards those that are in accordance with something else (e.g.,
personal, non-legal reasons)."" The burden to show that a judge is biased
for or against a party, or that prejudice has been shown, is on the shoulders of
the petitioners.52 In order for a judge to be disqualified, the bias or prejudice
must also be personal rather than judicial.5 3 An interested party is "entitled
to a judge who will hear both sides and decide an issue on the merits of the
45. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 145 (9th ed. 2009). The term "bias" is defined as:
"[i]nclination; prejudice; [or] predilection." Id.
46. Id. at 1018. Legal prejudice is defined as: "A condition that, if shown by a party,
will usu[ally] defeat the opposing party's action; esp[ecially], a condition that, if shown by the
defendant, will defeat a plaintiffs motion to dismiss a case without prejudice." Id.
47. See Bracy v. Schomig, 286 F.3d 406, 426 (7th Cir. 2002).
48. Id.
49. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
50. Id. at 466 (Frankfurter, J.) (explaining nonparticipation in decision).
51. Cravens, supra note 37, at 29.
52. See Bracy, 286 F.3d at 411.
53. Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810, 821 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (citing State ex rel.
Wesolich v. Goeke, 794 S.W.2d 692, 697 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)); State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d
320, 324 (Iowa 1976).
2011]
203
: Nova Law Review 35, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
law. 54 However, an interested party is not guaranteed a judge with a clean
slate. 55 "Each judge brings to the bench the experiences of life, both personal
and professional. A lifetime of experiences that have generated a number of
general attitudes cannot be left in chambers when a judge takes the bench."56
An interested party seeking judicial disqualification must visibly and affir-
matively prove bias or prejudice.57
In order to succeed on a motion to disqualify under the general rule, an
interested party must demonstrate that conditions "exist which reflect pre-
judgment of the case by the judge or a leaning of his mind in favor of one
party to the extent that his decision in the matter is based on grounds other
than the evidence placed before him. '58 Also, the bias or prejudice must
stem from an extrajudicial basis in order to be disqualifying. 59 If the bias or
prejudice does not stem from an extrajudicial source, the judge is not re-
quired to disqualify himself unless his behavior demonstrates "pervasive
bias" against a litigant.60
b. Pecuniary Interest
Impartiality is missing when judges have a pecuniary interest in the re-
sult of the case. 6' The Supreme Court has held that judges must disqualify
themselves in situations where they have a pecuniary interest in fees, forfei-
tures, or fines payable by parties before them.62 Additionally, federal law
requires judges be disqualified if they or any member of their family have a
54. Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Servs. & Loans Ass'n, 767 P.2d 538, 546 (Utah 1988); see
Alley, 882 S.W.2d at 819.
55. Madsen, 767 P.2d at 546.
56. Id.; see also Dep't of Revenue v. Golder, 322 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 1975) (citing Laird v.
Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972)).
57. Cliche v. Fair, 487 A.2d 145, 148 (Vt. 1984) (quoting In re Shuttle, 306 A.2d 667,
670 (Vt. 1973)).
58. TZ Land & Cattle Co. v. Condict, 795 P.2d 1204, 1211 (Wyo. 1990) (quoting Pote v.
State, 733 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Wyo. 1987)). The Due Process Clause frequently requires judges
to disqualify "themselves when they face possible temptations to be biased, even when they
exhibit no actual bias against a party or a case [sic]." Bruce A. Green, May Judges Attend
Privately Funded Educational Programs? Should Judicial Education be Privatized?: Ques-
tions of Judicial Ethics and Policy, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 941, 946 (2002) (quoting Del Vec-
chio v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 1372 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
59. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 564 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The
term "extrajudicial" is defined as: "Outside court; outside the functioning of the court sys-
tem." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (9th ed. 2009).
60. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551.
61. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927); see generally 16B AM. JUR. 2D Consti-
tutional Law § 582 (2004).
62. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 535.
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pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceeding.63 No amount of money
received by a judge is minor enough to fall within the maxim "de minimis
non curat lex."'  Furthermore, in no case has the Court ever found any
amount of money to be so trifling as to be overlooked, and it has been stated
that any pecuniary interest of a judge in a case heard by the judge, however
isolated, may disqualify the judge.65
2. Landmark Decisions
There are a plethora of cases that helped shaped what modern disquali-
fication law is today. However, Caperton has stepped in and changed the
landscape of judicial disqualification forever.6 6 The Caperton Court held
that there were two instances where disqualification was necessary that place
67Thfisthe facts of Caperton in perspective. The first instance is where a judge has
a pecuniary interest in the result of the proceeding.68 The second instance is
in criminal contempt hearings, where a judge has ruled in an earlier proceed-
ing then went on to try and convict the same litigant.69 These six landmark
decisions illustrate these two distinct types of instances where judicial disqu-
alification was required.
a. Tumey v. Ohio
The Court in Tumey v. Ohio70 held that the Due Process Clause requires
a judge to disqualify himself when he has "a direct, personal, substantial, [or]
63. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (2006). A judge shall be disqualified if:
He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his
household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the pro-
ceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the pro-
ceeding.
Id. The term "'financial interest' means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however
small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of a party."
28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4); see generally Leslie W. Abramson, Specifying Grounds for Judicial
Disqualification in Federal Courts, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1046 (1993).
64. Rollo v. Wiggins, 5 So. 2d 458, 462 (Fla. 1942) (en banc); see also Tumey, 273 U.S.
at 531; Conkling v. De Lany, 91 N.W.2d 250, 255 (Neb. 1958); In re Tullius, 137 N.E.2d 312,
315 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1955). The maxim "de minimis non curat lex" is defined as: "[t]he law
does not concern itself with trifles." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (9th ed. 2009).
65. See Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532.
66. See generally Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
67. Id. at 2259-61.
68. Id. at 2259-60.
69. Id. at 2261.
70. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
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pecuniary interest" in the outcome of the proceeding. 7' In Tumey, the defen-
dant was arrested, charged, and convicted with unlawfully possessing intox-
icating liquor by a mayor of a village.72 Ed Tumey was fined $100 and or-
dered to stay in jail until the time he could pay the fine.73 Tumey moved to
disqualify the Mayor because the Mayor had a pecuniary interest in sentenc-
ing him, thus requiring disqualification under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause.74 The Mayor received a portion of his salary from per-
forming judicial duties that were funded by the fines collected, and the mo-
nies collected from the fines went to the village treasury. 7' The Court held
disqualification was necessary under the principle:
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the
average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to
convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the bal-
ance nice, clear and true between the [sitate and the accused, de-
nies the latter due process of law.
76
Therefore, the Tumey Court held the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment required disqualification "both because of [the judge's]
direct pecuniary interest in the outcome, and because of his official motive to
convict and to graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the village."77
b. Withrow v. Larkin
The Supreme Court in Withrow v. Larkin78 held disqualification is re-
quired in circumstances where "the probability of actual bias on the part of
71. Id. at 523; see John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609
(1947). 'The common law of disqualification.., was clear and simple: ajudge was disquali-
fied for direct pecuniary interest and for nothing else." Id. at 609. The Due Process Clause
"may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best
to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties." In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 136 (1955).
72. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 515.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 517, 520.
76. Id. at 532.
77. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 535. "A situation in which an official perforce occupies two
practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other judicial, necessarily
involves a lack of due process of law in the trial of defendants charged with crimes before
him." Id. at 534 (citing City of Boston v. Baldwin, I N.E. 417, 418 (Mass. 1885); State ex rel.
Colcord v. Young, 12 So. 673, 676 (Fla. 1893)).
78. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
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the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable."'7 9
Some of those circumstances include: when the adjudicator has a pecuniary
interest in the result8° and when the judge has been a personal target of abuse
or criticism from the parties.8 Furthermore, the Withrow Court held disqua-
lification is necessary if "under a realistic appraisal of psychological tenden-
cies and human weakness" the interest "poses such a risk of actual bias or
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due
process is to be adequately implemented."82
c. Ward v. Village of Monroeville
The Court, in Ward v. Village of Monroeville,83 addressed whether a
mayor's court decision was allowable, even though the fines levied went to
the town rather than to the mayor himself.84 In Ward, the defendant was
convicted of two traffic offenses and was assessed a fine.85 The defendant
argued his due process rights were infringed upon because the judge was not
impartial.86 Although the Mayor did not receive direct compensation from
the fines imposed, the town received a monetary benefit from the fines.87
The Court held that "'the mere union of the executive power and the judicial
power in him cannot be said to violate due process of law .. . ."88 The test
to decide whether disqualification is necessary in situations such as the
mayor's is one "'which would offer a possible temptation to the average man
as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or
which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the
State and the accused."' 89
79. Id. at 47.
80. Id. (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973); Ward v. Village of Mo-
nroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972); Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393
U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968) (discussing the consequences of pecuniary interests with regards to
judges); Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523).
81. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47 (citing Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501 (1974); Mayberry
v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 578-79
n.2 (1968); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 584 (1964)).
82. Id.
83. 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
84. Id. at 59-60.
85. Id. at 57.
86. Id. at 58.
87. Id.
88. Ward, 409 U.S. at 60 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 534 (1927)).
89. Id. (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532).
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d. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie
In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie,90 the Court required the disquali-
fication of a state Supreme Court Justice where the Justice casts the deciding
vote in a punitive damages award, while being the main witness in a very
similar case in a lower court.9 The Lavoie Court further articulated:
The Due Process Clause "may sometimes bar trial by judges who
have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the
scales of justice equally between contending parties. But to per-
form its high function in the best way, 'justice must satisfy the ap-
pearance of justice.' ' 92
Additionally, the Lavoie Court emphasized that "what degree or kind of
interest is sufficient to disqualify a judge from sitting 'cannot be defined with
precision.' '' 93 Furthermore, the Court felt having an objective component in
the test was essential. 94
e. In re Murchison
The In re Murchison95 Court addressed instances where a judge shall be
disqualified when they have no pecuniary interest, but a conflict still arises
because the judge participated in an earlier proceeding.96 The judge ex-
amined the petitioners to determine if charges of bribery and gambling
should be assessed.97 The first petitioner answered the judge's questions, but
the judge found the petitioner's answers untruthful and charged him with
perjury. 98 The second petitioner refused to answer the judge's questions be-
cause he did not have counsel, which was required by state law.99 The judge
90. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
91. Id. at 828.
92. Id. at 825 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
93. Id. at 822 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136).
94. See id. "The Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial dis-
qualification. Congress and the states, of course, remain free to impose more rigorous stan-
dards for judicial disqualification .... " Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 828; see also State v. Harris, 786
N.W.2d 409, 424 (Wis. 2010). "'[T]he difficulties of inquiring into actual bias ... simply
underscore the need for objective rules."' Id. (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129
S. Ct. 2252, 2263 (2009)).
95. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
96. Id. at 134.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 134-35.
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proceeded to charge the second petitioner with contempt."° The judge then
tried and convicted both petitioners.' °' The Court set aside the criminal con-
victions because the judge had a conflict of interest due to the fact he partici-
pated in the trial and sentencing stage.1
0 2
The Court explained the general rule that "no man can be a judge in his
own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the
outcome.' 1 3 Therefore, disqualification was required by the judge in this
situation because "[h]aving been a part of [the entire] process a judge cannot
be, in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the conviction or ac-
quittal of those accused.' 4 The Court concluded this point because "[a]s a
practical matter it is difficult if not impossible for a judge to free himself
from the influence of what took place in his 'grand-jury' secret session."' 0 5
f. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania
In Mayberry v. Pennsylvania,'0 6 the petitioner was tried for attempting
to break out of prison and holding hostages inside a prison.'07 Mayberry
represented himself in the proceedings. 0 8 The trial concluded with a verdict
of guilt against Mayberry.' °9 When the petitioner was brought in for sentenc-
ing the judge found him guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced him to a
term of eleven to twenty-two years. "0 The Court dismissed the criminal con-
tempt charges because a litigant "should be given a public trial before a
judge other than the one reviled by the contemnor."''. Therefore, the Court
articulated the question to be asked when trying to decide whether disqualifi-
cation is necessary is not whether the judge was biased, but whether the typi-
cal judge is going to be neutral, because if not, there will be an unconstitu-
tional "potential for bias."
' 12
100. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 135.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 138-39.
103. Id. at 136.
104. Id. at 137.
105. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 138.
106. 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
107. Id. at 455.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
1I1. Mayberry, 400 U.S. at 466.
112. Id. at 465-66; see Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501 (1974).
2011]
209
: Nova Law Review 35, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
Similarly, in Offutt v. United States, 13 the defendant was charged and
convicted of criminal contempt because he showed countless displays of
disrespect to the judge during his trial for abortion." 4 The Court held that a
judge who had become personally involved in an antagonistic relationship
with the litigant before him should have transferred the case to another judge
based on the concept of justice."'
B. The Lead-Up to Caperton
The issue of whether large campaign contributions can constitute
grounds for disqualification of a judge is a question that has been left unans-
wered for years."16 A large number of state court judges are elected and
count on campaign contributions to help them win over the public and get
elected.'1 7 More likely than not, once such judges are elected, a case will
come before them involving a person who donated to their judicial cam-
paign." 8 Once this happens, the opposing party will often file a motion to
disqualify the judge based on lack of impartially because of campaign con-
tributions, but oftentimes these motions fail." 9 The courts argue a reasonable
person would not interpret a judge as being biased simply because a person
has contributed to the judge's campaign. 20 Also, it would be unrealistic to
113. 348U.S. 11(1954).
114. Id. at 1-12.
115. Id. at 17-18.
[Where conditions do not make it impracticable, or where the delay may not injure public or
private right, a judge called upon to act in a case of contempt by personal attack upon him,
may, without flinching from his duty, properly ask that one of his fellow judges take his place.
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925).
116. James Sample & Michael Young, Invigorating Judicial Disqualification: Ten Poten-
tial Reforms, 92 JUDICATURE 26, 26 (2008). "'The improper appearance created by money in
judicial elections is one of the most important issues facing our judicial system today. A line
needs to be drawn somewhere to prevent a judge from hearing cases involving a person who
has made massive campaign contributions to benefit the judge."' Id. at 29. (quoting Theor-
dore B. Olson, former U.S. Solicit. Gen.).
117. John Copeland Nagle, The Recusal Alternative to Campaign Finance Legislation, 37
HARV. J. ON LEGiS. 69, 87 (2000).
118. Id.
119. Id.; see Shepherdson v. Nigro, 5 F. Supp. 2d 305, 307 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Texaco, Inc.
v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 844-45 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). In Texaco Inc., a judge re-
fused to disqualify himself after he received a large campaign contribution from Pennzoil's
counsel after Pennzoil filed its answer. Id.; see also Coley v. Bagley, No. 1:02CV0457, 2010
WL 1375217, at *37 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2010); Ala. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Prince, 34 So. 3d
700, 706 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009); see In re Marriage of Thesing, No. H034272, 2010 WL
602555, at *16-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
120. See Nagle, supra note 117, at 88.
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expect to never see a campaign contributor, because it is an inevitable conse-
quence to judicial elections. 121
One court made a noteworthy statement when it wrote, "[t]he overriding
priority ... is to assure that our courts are impartial, and that they have the
appearance of impartiality."' 122 This sentiment alone should be the overriding
factor in any case before any judge.123 The problem of campaign contribu-
tions potentially creating bias is growing more and more, as elections be-
come more expensive. 124 When judges refuse to disqualify themselves in
situations where "their campaign finances reasonably call into question their
impartiality," the ABA has suggested the disqualification of any judge who
accepted a large campaign contribution from a litigant appearing before
them. 125
The ABA drafted a rule for campaign contributions: Disqualification is
mandatory when a party, a party's lawyer, or a party's law firm has provided
the judge aggregate contributions above a certain amount, within a certain
amount of time.'2 6 One problem with the ABA rule is that, in states with
reasonable restrictions, the possibility for apparent or real corruption is ad-
dressed by the restrictions, which no one may legally go beyond. 127 Another
problem this rule invites is that gamesmanship could defeat its purpose.12 8
"If the contribution threshold were set at a reasonable level, parties or law-
yers could disqualify an unfavorable judge by making contributions . . .
121. See Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Tex. App. 1983).
A candidate for the bench who relies solely on contributions from nonlawyers must reconcile
himself to staging a campaign on something less than a shoestring. If a judge cannot sit on a
case in which a contributing lawyer is involved as counsel, judges who have been elected
would have to recuse themselves in perhaps a majority of the cases filed in their courts.
Id.
122. Breakstone v. Mackenzie, 561 So. 2d 1164, 1172 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (en
banc), aff'd in part, quashed in part sub nom. MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, 565
So. 2d 1332, 1340 (Fla. 1990); see also Wersal v. Sexton, 613 F.3d 821, 844 (8th Cir. 2010)
(enbanc).
123. Breakstone, 561 So. 2d at 1172. See Wersal, 613 F.3d at 844 (Bye, C.J., dissenting).
124. Sample & Young, supra note 116, at 29.
125. Deborah Goldberg et al., The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recus-
al Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 528-29 (2007). See Sample & Young, supra note 116, at
26; RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
§ 3.8 (3d ed. 1996). The concept that a party should be allowed "to peremptorily challenge a
judge suspected of bias formed the basis for the ... judicial disqualification statutes that" are
still in place in most countries. Id.
126. Sample & Young, supra note 116, at 29. "'Aggregate contributions' are meant to
include both direct and indirect gifts made to a candidate." Id. (quoting MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (A)(4) (2007)).
127. Goldberg et al., supra note 125, at 529.
128. Id.
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above that amount to her campaign committee."'' 29 These are the main rea-
sons no state has adopted the per se ABA rule. 130 The states with reasonable
limits to campaign contributions would be better off making a rule that re-
quires disqualification after the acceptance of aggregate contributions of a set
amount-not from a sole donor but jointly from all donors related to a liti-
gant.13' Almost every court has discarded the thought that campaign contri-
butions require judicial disqualification. 32 Thus, the respondents in Caper-
ton felt that if the Court imposed a "probability of bias" standard, it would
also apply "to other types of support [that] a judge receives-including en-
dorsements from newspapers, trade and labor organizations, and civic
groups.''33 The respondents in Caperton further argued that a "probability of
bias" standard is unfeasible, because "it fails to propose "'any test for distin-
guishing what the Constitution prohibits from what it permits."",134 The res-
pondents felt as though these types of judicial disqualification motions would
encourage more unnecessary litigation.
35
Justice Benjamin's behavior is nothing new to the Court. 36 Supreme
Court Justice Hugo Black did not disqualify himself in a case involving his
former law partner, which drew criticism from his fellow Justices. 137 Su-
preme Court Justice William Rehnquist drew harsh criticism for ruling in a
case about a federally funded surveillance program that was started while he
was still employed at the United States Department of Justice.13 Additional-
ly, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia received harsh criticism from his
fellow Justices and the legal community for taking part in a case involving
then Vice President Dick Cheney, with whom he had recently gone hunt-
ing. 39 The legal community has high hopes that the Caperton decision has
finally put to rest the issue of whether judicial disqualification is necessary in
129. Id.
130. See id. Before the decision in Caperton, Alabama was the only state that clearly
required elected judges to disqualify themselves when major contributors were before them.
Peter A. Joy, A Professionalism Creed for Judges: Leading by Example, 52 S.C. L. REV. 667,
675 n.28 (2001) (citing Ex parte Kenneth D. McLeod, Sr., Family Ltd. P'ship XV, 725 So. 2d
271, 274 (Ala. 1998) (per curiam)) [hereinafter Ex Parte McLeod Family P'Ship].
131. See Goldberg et al., supra note 125, at 529.
132. Conrad C. Daly & Evan Ennis, Supreme Court Previews: Caperton v. Massey Coal
Company 08-22, FED. LAW, May 2009, at 62, 64 (Carrie Evans ed.).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Meiser, supra note 27, at 1800-01.
137. Id. at 1801-02.
138. Id. at 1802.
139. Id.
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cases involving a "probability of bias" when judges are hearing cases involv-
ing their big donors.
V. THE INTEGRATION OF CAPERTON
A. The Purpose of the Opinion
The Court in Caperton held that a judge must now disqualify himself in
cases involving big donors where there is a "probability of bias. 14° Judicial
autonomy "declines in direct proportion to a judge's [reliance] on others for
[monetary] support" in order to get and keep judicial office. 14 ' A judge's
need to gain or keep judicial office is at the "heart of judicial corruption." 14 2
"Anecdotal evidence suggests that judicial candidates believe that being able
to outspend opponents is critical to winning elections.' ' 143 Thus, this decision
has determined that a judge must disqualify himself in cases involving the
judge's big donors to avoid ruining the judge's own reputation, as well as the
integrity of the judgment and the court system as a whole.144 However, the
Court has stipulated that not every campaign contribution by an interested
party or the party's attorney creates a probability of bias that requires a
judge's disqualification.1 45
B. The Court's New Financial Outlook
The inquiry into whether a judge must now disqualify himself depends
on the contribution's relative amount compared to the total sum of money
given to the campaign, the entire amount spent in the election, and the ob-
vious effect the contribution had on the result of the election. 146 The Caper-
ton Court noted that:
140. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263-64 (2009); see State v.
Cooke, No. 0506005981, 2010 WL 3734113, at *34 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 19, 2010); see also
Priceline.com, Inc. v. City of Anaheim, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 521, 536 (Cal. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2010).
141. Barnhizer, supra note 5, at 370.
142. Id. at 394.
143. Aman McLeod, Bidding for Justice: A Case Study About the Effect of Campaign
Contributions on Judicial Decision-Making, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 385, 388 (2008) (cit-
ing Stuart Banner, Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign Con-
tributors, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449, 457 (1988)).
144. Daly & Ennis, supra note 132, at 63.
145. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263. The Court in Lavoie determined that some pecuniary
interests are "too remote and insubstantial" to be disqualifying. Id. (quoting Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 826 (1986)).
146. Id. at 2264.
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[T]here is a serious risk of actual bias-based on objective and
reasonable perceptions-when a person with a personal stake in a
particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in
placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the
judge's election campaign when the case was pending or immi-
nent.14
7
"The temporal relationship between the campaign contributions, the jus-
tice's election, and the pendency of the case is also critical" when determin-
ing whether a campaign contribution should disqualify a judge. 148 Judicial
integrity is an essential state interest. 49 Therefore, it is of the upmost impor-
tance to make sure every case comes before an impartial judge.1 50 The Court
reiterated the point that states may decide to "'adopt recusal standards more
rigorous than due process requires."'' 5' The Court further commented that
"the codes of judicial conduct provide more protection than due process re-
quires" and that the majority of disputes over judicial disqualification could
be solved without turning to the Constitution.152
V. THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS
A. The Potential Consequences of the Decision
The decision in Caperton will have a drastic impact on elected judges
who receive campaign contributions from supporters. 5 3 The decision further
changes the grounds for disqualification to include a benefit a judge receives,
rather than a payment."' From this point on, judges must disqualify them-
selves in cases involving their big donors if a motion for disqualification is
filed in a timely fashion. 55 This new standard of necessary disqualification
for judges could cause federalism problems because this new rule requires all
states to throw away their disqualification procedures and to adopt a univer-
sal standard.5 6 The federal government has put its foot down when it comes
to disqualification when there is a "probability of bias," thereby invading
147. Id. at 2263-64; Wersal v. Sexton, 613 F.3d 821, 839 (8th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
148. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264.
149. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring).
150. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265-66.
151. Id. at 2267 (quoting White, 536 U.S. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
152. Id.
153. Daly & Ennis, supra note 132, at 63.
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. Meiser, supra note 27, at 183 1.
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states rights that were supposed to be protected by the idea of federalism.' 57
The Court has even commented that federalism problems might limit the
power the federal government has over the state courts.
158
In Gregory v. Ashcroft,159 the Court faced the issue of whether state-
imposed age qualifications were constitutionally permissible.' 60 The Court
held, "Congressional interference with this decision of the people of Mis-
souri, defining their constitutional officers, would upset the usual constitu-
tional balance of federal and state powers. For this reason, 'it is incumbent
upon the federal courts to be certain of Congress' intent before finding that
federal law overrides' this balance." 16' This new disqualification standard
should be interpreted as a means to force judges to disqualify themselves, not
as a measure to give interested parties any new due process rights. 162 There-
fore, this new burden on judges to prove there is no bias for or against any
litigant is in no way in line with the belief that judges are sworn to administer
unbiased justice. 163
B. The Dissenters
Justices Roberts and Scalia both authored dissenting opinions in Caper-
ton because they each felt the decision left too much open for discussion."
They shared the view that this decision would come back and haunt the
Court for years to come. 165 Furthermore, both of the Justices share the pre-
diction that this decision would clog up the judiciary with unnecessary dis-
157. Id. at 1831-32. The Fourteenth Amendment was not supposed to weaken the idea of
federalism, leaving states at the mercy of the federal government. See Steven G. Calabresi,
We Are All Federalists, We Are All Republicans: Holism, Synthesis, and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 87 GEO. L.J. 2273, 2301 (1999) (reviewing AKHIL REID AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUcTION (1998)). The Fourteenth Amendment is an element
of a bigger constitutional system that incorporates certain structural features, such as federal-
ism, and it is through this light that it should be explained. Id.
158. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
159. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
160. Id. at 455.
161. Id. at 460 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985),
superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(l)).
162. Meiser, supra note 27, at 1833.
163. Id.
164. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
165. See id. at 2274 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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qualification motions and as a pitfall of this the American citizens would lose
respect for the bench."6
1. Justice Roberts
Justice Roberts felt the majority's decision will not promote the values
of judicial impartiality, but rather undermine them. 67 He viewed the Court's
interpretation that the Due Process Clause now requires judges to disqualify
themselves because of a "probability of bias" as a misinterpretation. 68 Jus-
tice Roberts urged that a "probability of bias" cannot always be looked at in
a defined way. 169 Justice Roberts felt the majority's new rule requiring judi-
cial disqualification provided no direction to judges and interested parties
about when disqualification will be constitutionally necessary. 170 He pro-
posed forty fundamental questions that all federal and state court judges must
answer to decide if they are required to disqualify themselves in any matter
before them.'7 ' All members of the judiciary take an oath to apply the law
166. Id. at 2274 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also People v.
Aceval, 781 N.W.2d 779, 782-83 (Mich. 2010); Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985, 1000 (Ha.
2009) (per curiam); Bradbury v. Eismann, No. CV-09-352-S-BLW, 2009 WL 3443676, at *3-
4 (D. Idaho Oct. 20, 2009), aff'd by 395 F. App'x 410 (9th Cir. 2010); see generally State v.
Allen, 778 N.W.2d 863 (Wis. 2010) (per curiam); U.S. Fid. Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Mich. Cata-
strophic Claims Ass'n, 773 N.W.2d 243 (Mich. 2009).
167. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. The Court's failure to express a "'judicially discernable and manageable stan-
dard' strongly counsels against the recognition of a novel constitutional right." Id. at 2272
(quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004)).
171. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2269-72 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts pro-
posed these forty fundamental questions that state and federal judges will now have to deter-
mine:
(I) How much money is too much money? What level of contribution or expenditure gives
rise to a "probability of bias"? (2) How do we determine whether a given expenditure is "dis-
proportionate"? Disproportionate to what? (3) Are independent, non-coordinated expendi-
tures treated the same as direct contributions to a candidate's campaign? What about contribu-
tions to independent outside groups supporting a candidate? (4) Does it matter whether the li-
tigant has contributed to other candidates or made large expenditures in connection with other
elections? (5) Does the amount at issue in the case matter? What if this case were an em-
ployment dispute with only $10,000 at stake? What if the plaintiffs only sought non-monetary
relief such as an injunction or declaratory judgment? (6) Does the analysis change depending
on whether the judge whose disqualification is sought sits on a trial court, appeals court, or
state supreme court? (7) How long does the probability of bias last? Does the probability of
bias diminish over time as the election recedes? Does it matter whether the judge plans to run
for reelection? (8) What if the "disproportionately" large expenditure is made by an industry
association, trade union, physicians' group, or the plaintiffs' bar? Must the judge recuse in all
cases that affect the association's interests? Must the judge recuse in all cases in which a party
or lawyer is a member of that group? Does it matter how much the litigant contributed to the
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association? (9) What if the case involves a social or ideological issue rather than a financial
one? Must a judge recuse from cases involving, say, abortion rights if he has received "dis-
proportionate" support from individuals who feel strongly about either side of that issue? If
the supporter wants to help elect judges who are "tough on crime," must the judge recuse in all
criminal cases? (10) What if the candidate draws "disproportionate" support from a particular
racial, religious, ethnic, or other group, and the case involves an issue of particular importance
to that group? (II) What if the supporter is not a party to the pending or imminent case, but
his interests will be affected by the decision? Does the Court's analysis apply if the supporter
"chooses the judge" not in his case, but in someone else's? (12) What if the case implicates a
regulatory issue that is of great importance to the party making the expenditures, even though
he has no direct financial interest in the outcome ... ? (13) Must the judge's vote be outcome
determinative in order for his non-recusal to constitute a due process violation? (14) Does the
due process analysis consider the underlying merits of the suit? Does it matter whether the de-
cision is clearly right (or wrong) as a matter of state law? (15) What if a lower court decision
in favor of the supporter is affirmed on the merits on appeal, by a panel with no "debt of grati-
tude" to the supporter? Does that "moot" the due process claim? (16) What if the judge voted
against the supporter in many other cases? (17) What if the judge disagrees with the suppor-
ter's message or tactics? What if the judge expressly disclains the support of this person? (18)
Should we assume that elected judges feel a "debt of hostility" towards major opponents of
their candidacies? Must the judge recuse in cases involving individuals or groups who spent
large amounts of money trying unsuccessfully to defeat him? (19) If there is independent re-
view of a judge's recusal decision, e.g., by a panel of other judges, does this completely forec-
lose a due process claim? (20) Does a debt of gratitude for endorsements by newspapers, in-
terest groups, politicians, or celebrities also give rise to a constitutionally unacceptable proba-
bility of bias? How would we measure whether such support is disproportionate? (21) Does
close personal friendship between a judge and a party or lawyer now give rise to a probability
of bias? (22) Does it matter whether the campaign expenditures come from a party or the par-
ty's attorney? If from a lawyer, must the judge recuse in every case involving that attorney?
(23) Does what is unconstitutional vary from State to State? What if particular States have a
history of expensive judicial elections? (24) Under the majority's "objective" test, do we ana-
lyze the due process issue through the lens of a reasonable person, a reasonable lawyer, or a
reasonable judge? (25) What role does causation play in this analysis? . .. (26) Is the due
process analysis less probing for incumbent judges-who typically have a great advantage in
elections-than for challengers? (27) How final must the pending case be with respect to the
contributor's interest? What if, for example, the only issue on appeal is whether the court
should certify a class of plaintiffs? Is recusal required just as if the issue in the pending case
were ultimate liability? (28) Which cases are implicated by this doctrine? Must the case be
pending at the time of the election? Reasonably likely to be brought? What about an impor-
tant but unanticipated case filed shortly after the election? (29) When do we impute a proba-
bility of bias from one party to another? Does a contribution from a corporation get imputed to
its executives, and vice-versa? Does a contribution or expenditure by one family member get
imputed to other family members? (30) What if the election is nonpartisan? What if the elec-
tion is just a yes-or-no vote about whether to retain an incumbent? (31) What type of support
is disqualifying? What if the supporter's expenditures are used to fund voter registration or
get-out-the-vote efforts rather than television advertisements? (32) Are contributions or ex-
penditures in connection with a primary aggregated with those in the general election? What if
the contributor supported a different candidate in the primary? Does that dilute the debt of gra-
titude? (33) What procedures must be followed to challenge a state judge's failure to recuse?
May Caperton claims only be raised on direct review? ... (34) What about state-court cases
that are already closed? . . . (35) What is the proper remedy? After a successful Caperton mo-
tion, must the parties start from scratch before the lower courts? Is any part of the lower court
judgment retained? (36) Does a litigant waive his due process claim if he waits until after de-
cision to raise it? Or would the claim only be ripe after decision, when the judge's actions or
vote suggest a probability of bias? (37) Are the parties entitled to discovery with respect to the
judge's recusal decision? (38) If a judge erroneously fails to recuse, do we apply harmless-
2011]
217
: Nova Law Review 35, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAWREVIEW
impartially and uphold the Constitution, and they should be trusted to live up
to this standard. 172  Furthermore, Justice Roberts felt there were only two
situations where the Due Process Clause requires disqualification: 1) "when
the judge has a financial interest in the outcome of the case" and 2) when a
judge presides over certain types of criminal contempt hearings.' 73 In most
instances, the Constitution of the United States leaves the issues of judicial
disqualification and judicial ethics to be handled by state legislators.174 Jus-
tice Roberts further commented that questions of disqualification are regu-
lated by statute, common law, and by the ethics boards of the bar and
bench. 75 In any particular case, a number of factors could lead to prejudice
or the appearance of bias. 176 Those factors could include: prior employment
history, friendship with a party or the party's lawyer, religious affiliation,
and many more situations. 77 Furthermore, never before has the Court ruled
that the "probability of bias" required disqualification in any case. 178
Justice Roberts sees the majority's decision leaving judges at the federal
and state level "to act as political scientists (why did candidate X win the
election?), economists (was the financial support disproportionate?), and
psychologists (is there likely to be a debt of gratitude?).' ' 179 He feels this
decision will lead to a clogging of our judicial system with unnecessary Ca-
perton motions. 80  Justice Roberts is also of the opinion that opening the
error review? (39) Does the judge get to respond to the allegation that he is probably biased,
or is his reputation solely in the hands of the parties to the case? (40) What if the parties settle
a Caperton claim as part of a broader settlement of the case? Does that leave the judge with no
way to salvage his reputation? Id.
172. Id. at 2267 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (citing Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536
U.S. 765,796 (2002)).
173. Id. at 2267 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
174. Green, supra note 58, at 947 (citing Del Vecchio v. I11. Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363,
1391 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J., concurring)). "All questions of judicial quali-
fication may not involve constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal bias, state
policy, remoteness of interest, would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discre-
tion." Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
175. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2268 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (citing Bracy v. Gramley, 520
U.S. 899, 904 (1997)). "[M]ost questions concerning a judge's qualifications to hear a case
are not constitutional ones, because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
establishes a constitutional floor, not a uniform standard." Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904.
176. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2268 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2272.
180. Id. at 2273; see Zurita v. Lombana, 322 S.W.3d 463, 470 n.1 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010).
In Zurita, the appellants made a Caperton motion claiming that there was sufficient evidence
to show actual bias by the trial judge. Id. The appellate court dismissed this motion and held
the facts were not applicable to the Caperton holding. Id.; see also Fine v. Sheriff of L.A.
Cnty., 356 Fed. App'x 998, 999 (9th Cir. 2009); Smith v. Bender, No. 09-1003, 2009 WL
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door to disqualification motions under the Due Process Clause brought under
claims of "probability of bias" will "diminish the confidence of the American
people in the fairness and integrity of their courts.''
2. Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia points out the majority's reasoning for implementing this
new disqualification rule was to keep the public's confidence in the judicial
system. 82 He urges that this ruling will have the opposite effect due to all
the unnecessary Caperton motions that will be passing through the court
system. 183 Justice Scalia also feels a plethora of billable hours will be wasted
by attorneys reading through countless volumes of campaign finance reports,
and countless more in contesting non-disqualification decisions through
every available means possible as a result of the Caperton decision.' 84
Also, Justice Scalia poses the question: "[S]hould judges sometimes re-
cuse even where the clear commands of our prior due process law do not
require it?' ' 85 He feels some imperfections and wrongs are nonjusticiable
and that is why it is sometimes ineffective to try to right every wrong that
comes before the Court. 186 Therefore, Justice Scalia feels some problems
with the Constitution cannot be fixed, and trying to fix them will only lead to
more harm. 1
87
2902563, at *3 (10th Cir. Sept. 11, 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2097 (2010); W.T. and K.T.
ex rel. J.T. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Sch. Dist. of N.Y.C., 716 F. Supp. 2d 270, 285-86 (S.D.N.Y.
2010); Wilson v. Warden, No. 3:10-cv-54, 2010 WL 717273, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 1, 2010);
Henry v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm'n, No. 3:06-CV-33, 2009 WL 2857819, at *2-6 (N.D. W. Va.
Sept. 2, 2009); Blackwell v. United States, No. 2:08-cv-00168, 2009 WL 6315322, at *41
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 22, 2009); Valente v. Univ. of Dayton, No. 3:08-cv-225, 2009 WL 4255508,
at *4 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 19, 2009); Weisshaus v. New York, No. 08 Civ. 4053(DLC), 2009 WL
4823932, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2009); Littrell v. United States, No. 4:07CV1707 CDP,
2009 WL 5220156, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 31, 2009); Rhiel v. Hook (In re Johnson), 408 B.R.
123, 127 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2009); People v. Garza, No. E049043, 2010 WL 3530425, at *1-2
(Cal. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2010); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Aquamar S.A., 24
So. 3d 585, 585-86 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam); In re Marriage of O'Brien, 912
N.E.2d 729, 742-43 (I11. App. Ct. 2009).
181. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2274 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 2274 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183. Id.; see United States v. Basciano, 382 Fed. App'x 28, 33 (2d Cir. 2010); Gaddy v.
Brewer, No. 1:10-cv-59-LG-RHW, 2010 WL 3025025, at *2 (S.D. Miss. June 18, 2010).
184. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2274 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 2275; see Bauer v. Shepard, 634 F. Supp. 2d 912, 949-50 (N.D. Ind. 2009),
affd by 620 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. Ind. 2010).
186. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2275 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
187. See id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The decision in Caperton will change the landscape of the legal com-
munity in more ways than one. Caperton will allow litigants to always have
a fair tribunal before an impartial judge.' 88 However, I have to agree with the
dissenting opinions in this case. Both of the dissenting Justices warn of the
ramifications this case will bring because of unnecessary disqualification
motions that will plague our judicial system as a result.' 89 The majority
failed to set up any framework for state and federal judges to look at in order
to determine if they should be disqualified.'90
Judicial autonomy is at the heart of the Constitution.' 91 The Framers
gave federal judges life terms and protected their salaries from Congress to
make them independent and not susceptible to outside influence. 192 There-
fore, taking away a judge's freedom to decide if he should be disqualified
ultimately turns into an outcome-oriented affair. 193 From this point on, or
until the Caperton decision is modified, litigants, journalists, and other con-
cerned individuals will search for grounds to challenge a judge's impartiali-
ty. 194 There is also the pitfall of not having enough state or federal justices
at the Supreme Court level to constitute a quorum to even hear the case. 95
The biggest advantage of leaving the decision to judges to disqualify them-
selves was that it stopped "judicial forum shopping."' 96 The new Caperton
disqualification standard will unavoidably encourage the concept. 97 In the
aftermath of the Caperton scandal, former Chief Justice Maynard lost his
seat on the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, and likely, Justice Ben-
jamin will not be far behind him.' 98 West Virginia and many other states are
188. Id. at 2259 (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
189. Id. at 2274 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
19 1. Jack N. Rakove, The Original Justifications for Judicial Independence, 95 GEO. L.J.
1061, 1062 (2007).
192. Id.; see also Cravens, supra note 37, at 18-21 (pointing out that stringent disqualifi-
cation rules are not precise enough to figure out the often unapproachable question of what
actual bias is and when it is present).
193. See Julie A. Robinson, Judicial Independence: The Need for Education About the
Role of the Judiciary, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 535, 539 (2007). "[T]he founders, in their consi-
dered and educated judgment, determined that on [the] balance, the need for a judiciary free of
political or undue influence necessitated a judiciary that could render decisions without alle-
giance to the popular opinions or the most vocal proponents in the community." Id. at 540.
194. Meiser, supra note 27, at 1828.
195. See Lewis, supra note 30, at 385.
196. See Lochner, supra note 32, at 231-32.
197. Id.
198. Meiser, supra note 27, at 1834.
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considering judicial reform to add on to the Caperton framework. 99 No sys-
tem can ever be perfect and not every decision can be free of any sort of bias
or prejudice. 2°°
I wholeheartedly agree that a judge should be disqualified in cases
where actual bias or prejudice exists due to campaign contributions. Howev-
er, to assume that every judge will be biased is a plunge I am not willing to
take. In order for this new judicial disqualification rule to succeed, the Court
needs to provide more guidelines or a basic framework so the judiciary can
be symmetrical and fair throughout.2 1 The way the new disqualification rule
is written, judges might disqualify themselves when it is not needed or not
disqualify themselves when it is needed. Furthermore, judges need to know
how much a donor needs to contribute to the judicial campaign before the
individual is considered a big donor and what exactly is considered a large
campaign contribution. The forty fundamental questions Chief Justice Ro-
berts proposed in his dissenting opinion will need to be addressed in later
decisions by the Court because if judges have to consider these factors before
even hearing any facts of a case, it might cause our judicial system to come
to a complete standstill.
202
Currently, judges at the state or federal level are not required to provide
any written or oral reasons as to why they are denying a litigant's motion for
disqualification.2 3 This has always been a major problem in our judicial
system because it creates uncertainty and does not provide any clarity to the
litigant who requested the disqualification.204 Thus, if the Supreme Court
were to hand down a decision expressly requiring judges to give written or
oral reasons as to why they are denying a litigant's motion for disqualifica-
tion, it could be a better solution than the one Caperton has surmised. The
decision in Caperton was a good start in the right direction to finally put an
end to any sort of judicial bias or prejudice that takes place, but since the
Court failed to set up a workable framework for judges to follow, it might
end up being a major setback. Therefore, I believe all the unnecessary Ca-
perton disqualification motions that will be filed as a result of this decision
will become a major epidemic in our country and one in which we certainly
do not need.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
202. Id. at 2269-72.
203. Cravens, supra note 37, at 29.
204. See id.
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LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP INTRODUCTION
JOHN SANCHEZ*
In 1960, Daniel Bell wrote about the end of ideology.' On April 8,
1966, the cover of Time Magazine asked, "Is God Dead?"'2 In 1992, Francis
Fukuyama pronounced the end of history.' The worst financial crisis since
the Great Depression that occurred a couple of years ago brought forth eulo-
gies for American-style capitalism. Grant Gilmore wrote of the death of the
contract,4 and my own favorite as a teacher of Remedies, Douglas Laycock
announced the death of the irreparable injury rule. Into this mix, we have
Professor Pierre Schlag proclaiming that "legal scholarship is dead-totally
dead."
In 2006, Professors David Kennedy and William W. Fisher published a
book, "The Canon of American Legal Thought," in which they cite twenty
law review articles they regard as the most influential in shaping American
legal thinking and reasoning.6 Twelve were published before 1964 and only
one came out after 1988. 7 If this list is to be believed, 1974-75 would stand
as the high water mark of legal scholarship since four of the top twenty ar-
ticles were published in that short period of time. Perhaps this fact alone
supports Professor Schlag's claim that the golden era of legal scholarship is
over.
Of course, debates over the end of ideology, history, capitalism, and of
legal scholarship are parlor games played by intellectuals with perhaps too
much time on their hands. In response to Professor Schlag's bold pro-
nouncement, Nova's own David Cleveland and Olympia Duhart accepted the
challenge and in the following pages put forth powerful arguments to the
effect that rumors of the death of legal scholarship are vastly exaggerated.
* B.A. Pomona College (1974) cum laude; JD, University of California (Berkeley)
(1977); LLM, Georgetown Law School (1984). Professor of Law at NSU since 1988.
1. DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY: ON THE EXHAUSTION OF POLITICAL IDEAS IN
THE FIFTIES (1960).
2. Is God Dead? TIME (Apr. 8, 1966).
3. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
4. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
5. Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687
(1990).
6. See generally THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT (David Kennedy & Wil-
liam W. Fisher III eds., 2006).
7. See generally id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I agree with Professor Schlag-and his unnamed colleague-that being
a law professor is truly one of the last great jobs on earth.' It is not quite, as
one of my former fellow law firm associates called it, "the loophole in legal
life," but it is a grand vocation. Part calling and part privilege, the ability to
+ In March 2010, Nova Southeastern University's Shepard Broad Law Center spon-
sored an invited lecture by Pierre Schlag, the Byron R. White Professor at the University of
Colorado Law School. Professor Schlag, a widely-published author and thinker on topics
such as the culture of legal thought, was invited to speak on the state of legal scholarship. His
lecture to the faculty was followed by faculty responses by Professors David R. Cleveland,
Olympia Duhart, and Anthony Niedwiecki. As a result, the Nova Law faculty enjoyed a live-
ly and enriching discussion on the state of legal scholarship, which Nova Law Review had
hoped to publish. Professor Schlag has declined to publish his lecture believing his comments
were sufficiently covered in his prior article, Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank
Anxiety of Nothing Happening (A Report on the State of the Art), 97 GEO. L.J. 803 (2009).
Professors Cleveland and Duhart have decided to publish their responses, in answer to Profes-
sors Schlag's lecture and also to his Spam Jurisprudence piece. The Nova Law Review is
pleased to publish these brief, informal, and lively pieces.
* Associate Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, J.D. Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center, B.A. Western Michigan University.
I. Based on his provocative essay, Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety
of Nothing Happening (A Report on the State of the Art), 97 GEO. L.J. 803 (2009) [hereinafter
Spare Jurisprudence], Pierre Schlag was invited to speak at Nova Southeastern University,
Shepard Broad Law Center in March 2010. This brief essay is written in response to that
speech, the text of which he has declined to publish. The initial essay drew invited responses,
and it is not my intention to duplicate or rehash their assessment of Spam Jurisprudence but to
address the permutation addressed by Pierre Schlag in his March 2010 speech. See Daniel R.
Ortiz, Get a Life?, 97 GEo. L.J. 837 (2009); Richard A. Posner, The State of Legal Scholarship
Today: A Comment on Schlag, 97 GEo. L.J. 845 (2009); Richard H. Weisberg, Daniel Arises:
Notes (Such as 30 and 31) from the Shlagaground, 97 GEO. L.J. 857 (2009); Robin West, A
Reply to Pierre, 97 GEO. L.J. 865 (2009).
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think, write, and teach about whatever you want is the dream of many prac-
ticing lawyers and the joy of academics in America's legal academy. I also
agree with Professor Schlag that legal academics ought to "do something
intellectually edifying, politically admirable, or aesthetically enlivening. 2
What I disagree with is his premise that nothing good is happening in legal
scholarship, or, as he hyperbolically puts it, "legal scholarship today is
dead-totally dead."3 If only that were true; my reading list would suddenly
become manageable, people would stop provoking me with interesting new
ideas, and I could tell my grand ideas about the law to my friends and col-
leagues without all the effort that goes into traditional scholarship. The
"problem" is that there is a whole lot happening.
Reading Spam Jurisprudence and hearing Professor Schlag's speech
bemoaning the death of legal academic scholarship, I envision the legal
academy cast in the role of the poor old man in Monty Python and the Holy
Grail who is being carried off to be buried by medieval undertakers, proc-
laiming loudly that he's not dead, only to be told, "yes you are," and "shut
up, you'll be stone dead in a moment."'4 I assure you, I'm not dead. I've got
things I want to say-more things than I have time to commit to writing-
and while I'd admit my few articles are de minimus in the grand scheme of
things, it seems unlikely that I'm the only one with something to say who is
trying to say it.5 In fact, my reading list grossly exceeds my reading time, so
there are certainly lots of interesting ideas being put forward. My first major
point of disagreement with Professor Schlag then is that things are, indeed,
happening-good things, interesting things, provocative things. I encourage
everyone to go look6 and see if there aren't a host of interesting articles on
2. Spam Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 806. It seems a bit stilted to call a fellow aca-
demic "Professor Schlag," particularly in so light-hearted an exchange, but alas the respectful
and slightly formal Midwesterner in me would not permit me to call him "Pierre" as his col-
leagues who know him better have done. See supra note 2.
3. Spam Jurisprudence, supra note 2, at 804.
4. MONTY PYTHON AND THE HOLY GRAIL (Python (Monty) Pictures 1975).
5. In fact, I appear to be fixated on a single federal court reform issue. See generally
David R. Cleveland, Clear as Mud: How the Uncertain Precedential Status of Unpublished
Opinions Muddles Qualified Immunity Determinations, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 45 (2010) [herei-
nafter Cleveland, Clear as Mud]; David R. Cleveland, Local Rules in the Wake of Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, 11 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 19 (2010); David R. Cleve-
land, Draining the Morass: Ending the Jurisprudentially Unsound Unpublication System, 92
MARQ. L. REV. 685 (2009) [hereinafter Cleveland, Draining the Morass]; David R. Cleveland,
Overturning the Last Stone: The Final Step in Returning Precedential Status to All Opinions,
10 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 61 (2009).
6. After you finish reading this piece and sending a note of praise and support to its
author, of course.
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your topic of choice, ranging from theoretical to empirical to practical.7
Though I give you this caveat: Toni Morrison has purportedly said, "If
there's a book you want to read, but it hasn't been written yet, then you must
write it," and the same may be true of legal scholarship.8 Now, perhaps none
of these articles are inventing the next Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race
Theory, or Law and Economics model, but it is an unfair and unnecessary
burden to put on every legal scholar the obligation to make every article a
ground-breaking, paradigm-shifting, or field-creating piece. Rather, legal
scholarship can, and regularly does, advance our knowledge and understand-
ing in more modest, and frankly more useful, ways. This is truer than ever
given the quantity of publications, breadth of subject matter, increased out-
lets for publication, and greater access to those publications.
This brings me to my second significant point of disagreement with
Professor Schlag. Far from the Dark Age (or is it post-apocalypse?) he
perceives us to be in, where our intellectual landscape is a mere echo of
times gone by, littered only with the sun-bleached bones of past paradigms
and rusted out husks of interpretive mechanisms of the past, I see an active,
growing, and vibrant vista-a world where people really do "'have things to
say . . . and [are] going to say them."' 9 Many scholars are out there living
the proposed utopia right now-they are writing where they have something
to say, knowing it will be published, and they're doing it in a way that is
personally and professionally satisfying. The landscape you'll find in legal
scholarship is far more hospitable than ever before. This is a golden age of
legal scholarship. The reasons are many, but perhaps I can artificially cabin
them into three categories: freedom, access, and professionalism.
7. For example, in the narrow area of treatment of unpublished opinions within the
federal appellate system, a quick search reveals: Penelope Pether, Constitutional Solipsism:
Toward a Thick Doctrine of Article III Duty; or Why the Federal Circuits' Nonpreceden-
tial Status Rules Are (Profoundly) Unconstitutional, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 955,
958-60 & nn.14-19 (2009) (examining the theoretical limitations of prior analyses on both
sides of the unpublished opinion debate); Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking
Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L.
REv. 71 (2001) (detailing an empirical study of the effect of non-publication on case out-
comes); Cleveland, Draining the Morass, supra note 6 (giving a practical assessment the
likelihood of high Court review and the best arguments for certiorari).
8. Toni Morrison Quotes, GoODREADS.COM, http://www.goodreads.comauthor/quotes/
3534.ToniMorrison (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
9. Spam Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 807.
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II. FREEDOM
There exists now an unprecedented freedom in legal scholarship. No
one mode of legal thought holds sway. No one outlet of publication controls
distribution of ideas. No one audience for legal scholarship must be catered
to or appeased. Legal scholarship can be written to serve many different
purposes, not just to establish doctrine and theory among scholars, but to
improve the law by influencing courts, legislatures, and executives.'° Legal
scholarship can also be written with an eye toward aiding and improving the
practicing bar," informing law, and even pre-law, students. 12 It can be aimed
at making us better teachers, 13 informing and influencing public and private
policy decisions, 4 and, yes, even for humor. 5
10. See David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, The Use of Legal Scholarship by the
Federal Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 9 (forthcoming 2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so]3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1640681 (empirically demon-
strating an increase in citation to law reviews in federal appellate opinions); Harry T. Ed-
wards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91
MICH. L. REV. 34, 43-44 (1992) (discussing types of "practical legal scholarship").
11. These can include things such as health benefit plans and the American with Disabili-
ties Act. See generally Gwen Thayer Handelman, Qualified Medical Child Support Orders:
Recent Developments, Am. Bar. Ass'n Section of Taxation Meeting Materials (2000); Gwen
Thayer Handelman, Find the Client (with a Little Help from Your Friends in the Federal
Courts), 26 J. PENSION PLAN & COMPLIANCE, 2000, at 1; Steven Wisotsky, Sounds and Images
of Persuasion: A Primer, 84 FLA. B. J. 40 (2010).
12. See generally LINDA F. HARRISON & DAWN BENNE'T-ALEXANDER, THE LEGAL
ENVIRONMENT OF BUSINESS, (edition and year); LINDA F. HARRISON, DAWN BENNETT-
ALEXANDER & LAURA HARTMAN, BUSINESS LAW (forthcoming 2012); LINDA F. HARRISON,
DAWN BENNETT-ALEXANDER & LAURA HARTMAN, BUSINESS LAW "M" (forthcoming 2012).
13. See generally Debra Moss Curtis & David M. Moss, Curriculum Mapping: Bringing
Evidence-Based Frameworks to Legal Education, 34 NOVA L. REV. 473 (2010); Debra Moss
Curtis, Teaching Law Office Management: Why Law Students Need to Know the Business of
Being a Lawyer, 71 ALB. L. REV. 201 (2008); Debra Moss Curtis & Judith R. Karp, In a Case,
on the Screen, Do They Remember What They've Seen? Critical Electronic Reading in the
Law School Classroom, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 247 (2007); Debra Moss Curtis, Everything I
Wanted to Know About Teaching Law School I learned From Being a Kindergarten Teacher:
Ethics in the Law School Classroom, 2006 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 455 (2006); Debra Moss Curtis,
You've Got Rhythm: Curriculum Planning and Teaching Rhythm at Work in the Legal Writ-
ing Classroom, 21 TOURO L. REV. 465 (2005); Debra Moss Curtis & Judith F. Karp, "In a
Case, in a Book, They Will Not Take a Second Look!" Critical Reading in the Legal Writing
Classroom, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 293 (2005); Camille Lamar Campbell, How to Use a
Tube Top and a Dress Code to Demystify the Predictive Writing Process and Build a Frame-
work of Hope During the First Weeks of Class, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 273 (2010).
14. Jessica B. Wilkinson & Robert Bendick, The Next Generation of Mitigation: Ad-
vancing Conservation Through Landscape-Level Mitigation Planning, 40 Envtl. L. Rep. News
& Analysis 10023 (2010); Joel A. Mintz, Some Thoughts on the Merits of Pragmatism as a
Guide to Environmental Protection, 31 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1 (2004).
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But there is great freedom not only in why we write but in what we
write. The current legal academy is perhaps more welcoming than ever of
works that go beyond the traditional model of proposition of doctrine and
theory and the recitation of history or arm-chair sociology. Legal scholar-
ship today openly embraces empirical work on both the legal system itself
and on the world in which it operates. 16 It also encourages both interstate
and international comparative law as well as inquiries into professional du-
ties and ethics. 17 As skills training and preparation for law practice becomes
increasingly important to the profession, legal scholarship has expanded to
include works on pedagogy, cognition and metacognition, integration of sub-
jects across the curriculum, and related fields aimed at improving teaching of
law students. There is even a body of scholarship aimed at demystifying the
process of legal education for educators and law students alike.
18
This overwhelming freedom in why we write and what we write is
matched also with a great deal of liberty in how we write. Both the written
form that we give our thoughts and the process by which we get them there
are less constrained than ever before. In regard to form, it is safe to say that
legal scholarship takes more varied forms now than ever before. There is
15. See Robert M. Jarvis, If Law Professors Had to Turn in Time Sheets, 86 CALIF. L.
REV. 613 (1998); Robert M. Jarvis, W(h)ine and Roses, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 465 (2004).
16. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 209-10 (1995) ("In any sensible division
of responsibilities among branches of the legal profession, the task of conducting detailed
empirical inquires into the presuppositions of legal doctrines would be assigned to the law
schools. Too many constitutional scholars conceive their role as that of shadow judges, writ-
ing, in the guise of articles, alternative judicial opinions in Supreme Court cases."); Debra
Moss Curtis, Licensing and Discipline of Fiscal Professionals in the State of Florida: Attor-
neys, Certified Public Accountants, and Real Estate Professionals, 29 NOVA L. REV. 339, 340
(2005); Debra Moss Curtis & Billie Jo Kaufman, A Public View of Attorney Discipline in
Florida: Statistics, Commentary, and Analysis of Disciplinary Actions Against Licensed
Attorneys in the State ofFloridafrom 1988-2002, 28 NOVA L. REV. 669, 669 (2004).
17. GWEN THAYER HANDELMAN, RESEARCHING ETHICAL ISSUES, THE COMMUNITY TAX
LAW REPORT (Spring/Summer 2004); Gwen Thayer Handelman, Ethics, Privilege, and Re-
lated Issues in Employee Benefits Practice, J. Deferred Compensation, Spring 2004, at 1,
reprinted in Corporate Counsel's Guide to ERISA (Aug. 2004) and ALI-ABA, Fundamentals
of Employee Benefits Law (Feb. 2004); Gwen Thayer Handelman, Ethics, Am. Bar Ass'n
Section of Labor and Emp't Law, Emp. Benefits Law (ABA/BNA 2d. ed. 2000).
18. See generally McKay Cunningham, Freshman Professor: The First Year; The First
Semester; The First Day, 3 PHOENIX L. REV. 389 (2010); Gerald F. Hess & Sophie M. Spar-
row, What Helps Law Professors Develop as Teachers?-An Empirical Study, 14 WIDENER L.
REV. 149 (2008); Gerald F. Hess, Improving Teaching and Learning in Law School: Faculty
Development Research, Principles, and Programs, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 443 (2006); Gerald F.
Hess, The Legal Educator's Guide to Periodicals on Teaching and Learning, 67 UMKC L.
REV. 367 (1998); William P. Quigley, Introduction to Clinical Teaching for the New Clinical
Law Professor: A View from the First Floor, 28 AKRON L. REV. 463 (1995); JOURNAL OF
ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS (2007), http://www.alwd.org/lc&r.html.
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still plenty of legal scholarship in the form of treatises distilling the mass of
case law into coherent rules and doctrinal law review articles arguing for a
legal result that fits the author's descriptive or normative view. 9 But the
current landscape, lush and green with possibility, extends far beyond the
traditional confines. There is an expansion of empirical scholarship on both
the law's operations and its effects. There is an increase in interdisciplinary
work and collaboration. There is greater interest than ever in shorter, more
immediate, and more interactive scholarly commentary on current legal
events.
In addition, there are more numerous and more interesting outlets for
legal scholarship than ever before. Not only are there law reviews, but sub-
ject matter journals, journals published in other countries, online law jour-
nals, and even online versions and inter-issue updates to prestigious law re-
views. If one so desires, an author can circumvent the law review scene en-
tirely and self-publish on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) or
BePress's online catalog. Those authors who want to write shorter written
pieces will find law reviews more accepting than ever of shorter pieces and
widely read blogs eager for interesting content of the shorter variety.
How we write has also become considerably less constrained. While
most scholars that I know still collect a box, pile, or file of research mate-
rials, the laptop computer and widely available internet access have made the
world our office. With adequate preparation, one can easily research and
write from anywhere. To the extent that one's work involves the input of
others, modem communications have made it easy to share entire works with
others instantly and over great distances.
Legal scholars in America seem incredibly, unprecedentedly free to
write about what they want in the way that they want from wherever they
want. In addition, access to both the sources of legal scholarship and to the
legal scholarship itself seems to be far greater than ever before.
III. ACCESS
This great freedom is matched by an unprecedented access to legal and
non-legal sources, colleagues, and, eventually, each scholar's work. What
used to be available only by visits to the physical home of the document are
increasingly available online. Not only through major information services
19. The author has written such an article but denies having been oppressed by the domi-
nant paradigm into doing so. See, e.g., Cleveland, Clear as Mud, supra note 6 (arguing for
uniform use of unpublished opinions in qualified immunity analyses, preferably by according
all such opinions full precedential value).
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like Westlaw and Lexis, but also up free services like GPO Access.gov,
Thomas, Google Scholar, and many others. Access to source materials is
coupled with access to the ideas and thoughts of colleagues, even pre- or
mid-drafting. First, the previously mentioned expansion of empirical and
interdisciplinary work has opened the doors of the legal academy to greater
collaboration with a wide variety of other professionals and academics in
other disciplines. Whether the nature of the relationship is idea development,
co-authorship, or review of your own written work, the body of legal scho-
larship is enriched and certainly enlivened by this cross-pollination. Second,
technological advancements in communications such as email, internet doc-
ument repositories, blogs, webpages, and the like, make instantaneous and
detailed collaboration (and disputes) easier than ever before. Whether it's
running your work past other scholars you respect, or reading the thoughts of
another scholar with whom you vehemently disagree that plants the seed for
your scholarship in the first place, modern technology facilitates the scholar-
ly dialog in way that used to be more time consuming and less common.
Finally, if you want your work to be read, access to published works has
never been better. While electronic publication of law reviews is not new, it
is worth noting the field-leveling effect this has. First, access is no longer
limited to the top few law reviews that a given school, law firm, or court can
afford. All the law reviews and journals are present in the commercial data-
base for the same fixed fee. Second, articles in these databases are common-
ly located via word searches, which pull up all relevant articles, not just those
in the top law reviews. Even within the traditional law review publication
structure, this results in a significant increase in access to works not placed in
a top law review. Even article authors who lack the proxies for qualities
often used by top law reviews in selecting works can still expect their works
to be read by interested parties given the database system. Outside the tradi-
tional law review form of publication lies a wide variety of other publication
venues. These venues allow for publication of scholarship in forms both
brief and long. Examples include, SSRN, BePress, AALS Section Newslet-
ters, legal webpages, and legal blogs. These venues provide not only outlets
for scholarly thoughts but access by a wide audience to those thoughts.
What is even more exciting is the immediacy and ease with which these pub-
lication venues can be used and the way that they encourage feedback from
readers.
IV. PROFESSIONALISM
While this added freedom and access is sufficient to convince me that
it's a good time to be reading and writing legal scholarship, there is one other
issue that makes this a good time to be legal scholar. Professionalism of
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legal scholarship is a beneficial movement, not an occurrence to be be-
moaned. The legal academy has clearly resolved the scholarship vs. teaching
debate in favor of requiring both. This puts added pressure on law profes-
sors, pressures that are lessened by formalized scholarship opportunities,
mentoring, and clear, but flexible and inclusive, standards for publication
expectations. Perhaps my experience is not representative, but I have found
these forces to increase my ability to say what I want to say rather than, as
Professor Schlag suggests, indoctrinating or limiting me to the reigning legal
hegemony. 20 The proliferation of scholarship presentation opportunities,
both targeted to junior faculty and otherwise, provide forums to express ideas
not just in the written medium but conversationally. They allow an author to
gauge the reactions of their audience and not only learn of specific criticisms
or skepticism, but to address it on the spot. I cannot say enough about the
benefit of the mentorship I have received from colleagues both here at Nova
and elsewhere. To say that those folks have merely been perpetuating an
oppressive or repressive entrenched paradigm is insulting to those efforts.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, conditions seem right for a greater breadth and depth of legal
scholarship than ever before. The landscape of legal scholarship seems to
me anything but dead. To me, it appears wide-open, vibrant, and full of pos-
sibility.
Perhaps I am not the audience Professor Schlag is writing to, for, or
about. I am not someone who has been around the academy a long time,
which may disqualify me in his eyes to present a response. First, as a newer
member of the academy, it may well be that I am writing merely to "make
my bones" and will one day go quietly into the night of legal scholarship,
never to be heard from again. Second, as a newer member of the academy, it
may also be the case that nothing interesting is happening, but I just think
that everything is interesting because it's all new to me. But even if both of
these are true, and I am not Professor Shlag's target audience, I would still
implore him to speak more plainly to those who are. His professed purpose:
to provoke some sense that we legal thinkers can "turn [our] backs on the
dominant paradigm" of legal scholarship and try to "do something intellec-
tually edifying, politically admirable, or aesthetically enlivening," needs elu-
cidation.21 What paradigm of legal scholarship are we shedding when the
present paradigm is unfettered freedom, access, and support? What does this
20. Spare Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 806-07.
21. Id. at 806.
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avant-garde intellectually, politically, and esthetically advanced work look
like? What benefit is obtained by producing more of it?
I am certainly not willing to say that this is the Golden Age or that legal
scholarship has reached a pinnacle, but it seems clear to me to we are at a
time in legal scholarship with great possibilities. Write about what you want,
publish in your choice of formats, participate in a culture that encourages
scholarship, both formally and informally. What is perhaps most interesting
is that on his ultimate point,22 Professor Schlag and I agree: We should
probe and examine and discuss those things about the law that trouble or fail
to make sense to us and we should all think and write and explore.
Professor Schlag, inspired by the 1966 film Endless Summer, would tell
putative scholars: "'You guys reeeeeaaaaaaaally missed it. You should have
been here yesterday."' 23 In contrast, the voice I hear and the message I
would give you is that of Mickey from the 1976 film Rocky. I suggest to
you that this is your moment and you're going to be great: "You're gonna
eat lightnin' and you're gonna crap thunder!"24
22. Id. at 835.
23. Id. at 804; see also THE ENDLESS SUMMER (Bruce Brown Films 1996).
24. ROCKY (Chartoff-Winkler Prods. & United Artists 1976).
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I. INTRODUCTION
William Shakespeare wrote, "commit the oldest sins the newest kind of
ways."' I believe that this adage is an appropriate way to frame the response
that I will offer today. Shakespeare urges us to reinvigorate familiar terrain
with a personal touch. To transform it with our own innovation. And I think
it is highly applicable to the current state of legal scholarship. Professor
Schlag is right; in many ways legal scholarship has become a bit of an arti-
fact,2 it has become an old sin, and for a lot of us it can be exhaustive. More
+ Pierre Schlag, Professor, Univiversity of Colorado Law School, Lecture at Nova
Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center (Mar. 12, 2010).
* Associate Professor of Law at Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law
Center. B.A. in English, University of Miami; J.D., Nova Southeastern University Shepard
Broad Law Center. Thanks to Joshua Blasberg and Arlette Abdallah for their assistance with
this essay. I also thank Professor John Sanchez and the Faculty Development Committee at
Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center for inviting me to engage with my
colleagues in such an interesting discussion.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE FOURTH, act 4, sc. 5,
lines 124-26 (A.R. Humphreys ed., The Arden Shakespeare 1967) (n.d.) ("Have you a ruffian
that will swear, drink, dance, [r]evel the night, rob, murder, and commit [t]he oldest sins the
newest kind of ways?"); see also P.V. GOPALAKRISHNAN, SHAKESPEARIAN REFERENCES 281
(1998).
2. Professor Pierre Schlag, the Byron R. White Professor of Constitutional Law at Uni-
versity of Colorado Law School, was invited to speak at Nova Southeastern University She-
pard Broad Law Center on March 12, 2010 based on his deliberately provocative essay about
the "sorry" state of legal scholarship. See Pierre Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law and
the Rank Anxiety of Nothing Happening (A Report on the State of the Art), 97 GEO. L.J. 803,
804 (2009). In the essay, Professor Schlag announces emphatically the "death" of American
legal scholarship. He writes: "American legal scholarship today is dead-totally dead, deader
than at any time in the past thirty years." Id. Specifically, Professor Schlag criticizes the
frequent use of the dominant paradigm, asserts that the paradigm is uninteresting, and suggests
that traditional law review paradigms are both "impoverished" and "impoverishing." Id. at
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than that, it can be irrelevant, it can be derivative, it can be reductive. But I
am asserting that with fresh eyes, minds, and hands, we can bring it back
from the brink and, in keeping with the "death" metaphor offered by Profes-
sor Schlag, we can perform a miracle and bring it back to life. Many of us
have already been successful at resurrection.
.I. RESPONSE
I agree with Professor David R. Cleveland that legal scholarship is
alive, and the technological advances available to legal scholars in the twen-
ty-first century can improve our writing.3 We can reach more people, and we
can talk about more things. There is a very expansive definition about what
constitutes legal scholarship. Today it includes pedagogy, practice, interdis-
ciplinary work, and entertainment.4 Therefore, writing can be more relevant,
it can be more accessible, it can be more responsive and exciting. It can be
more alive and necessarily less "dead."
In his lecture, Professor Anthony S. Niedwiecki addressed the issue of
entrenched paradigms of legal scholarship and how we perpetuate those pa-
radigms.5 I will, in full disclosure, announce that I particularly contribute to
the problem because I am an LSV6 professor and a seminar instructor who
807-08. He also argues that "law review articles are causally and constitutively pretty far
removed from any real stakes, save perhaps for the career of the author and a few other
people." Id. at 813. Professor Schlag's criticism has been met with several responders, who
have penned their own comments. See. e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, Get a Life?, 97 GEO. L.J. 837
(2009); Richard A. Posner, The State of Legal Scholarship Today: A Comment on Schlag, 97
GEO. L.J. 845 (2009); Robin West, A Reply to Pierre, 97 GEO. L.J. 865 (2009). My own re-
sponse published here represents the lecture I gave at Professor Schlag's Nova appearance as
one of three faculty "responders." My colleagues, Professor David R. Cleveland, Associate
Professor of Law at Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, and Professor
Anthony S. Niedwiecki, formerly at Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center
and now Director of the Lawyering Skills Program at The John Marshall Law School, were
also responders at the forum.
3. David R. Cleveland, Clarion Call or Sturm Und Drang: A Response to Pierre
Schlag's Lecture on the State of Legal Scholarship, 35 Nov. L. REv. 503 (2011). Professor
Cleveland's essay response notes that modem technological advances in communication allow
us to write from anywhere, collaborate with others over great distances, and "circumvent the
law review scene entirely" by publishing on "the Social Science Research Network (SSRN)".
Id. at 508.
4. Id. at 508. ("It can be aimed at making us better teachers, informing and influencing
public and private policy decisions, and, yes, even for humor.").
5. Anthony S. Niedwiecki, Professor, Nova Southeastern Univ. Shepard Broad Law
Ctr., Lecture at Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center (Mar. 12, 2010).
6. "LSV" refers to Lawyering Skills & Values, the first year, two-semester writing,
research, and skills program for law students at Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad
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teaches students to use the CREAC formula. I enjoy highly routinized writ-
ing instruction for the benefit of others, but primarily, I think, for myself.
So, I share blame in this, but I want to defend the structure I teach as an effi-
cient vehicle and point out that it is just really one of the methods you can
employ to make your writing clear and understandable.7
In talking about our creative format, as always, exceptionality is in the
eye of the beholder. Professor Schlag challenged us to become less tradi-
tional regarding the law review format, which in many ways imitates a judi-
cial opinion or brief.8 He warns that we should be less dependent on the le-
galist form. 9 However, when Professor Richard Delgado did just that in The
Rodrigo Chronicles,'° he was criticized by some of his colleagues for ex-
ploiting his status as a minority and being paid lots of money to write "chil-
dish stories" about minority groups."
Law Center. This course is an expansion of the traditional Legal Research and Writing class
offered at most American law schools.
7. Of course I am not alone in my reliance and defense of the CREAC method for teach-
ing students how to draft legal memoranda. Other writing experts advance the CREAC for-
mula for legal memos. See generally RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR. & SHEILA SIMON, LEGAL
WRITING (2008). Of course there are countless ways to organize an effective legal memo.
Adherence to the CREAC method in my writing courses helps me give the students a "de-
fault" organizational structure so that I can focus their attention on higher level skills such as
analysis and synthesis. The CREAC structure also has an intuitive appeal for identifying a
legal issue, stating the rule, applying the rule, and supporting a predictive or persuasive con-
clusion; in many ways, this structure mimics the way we solve problems outside of the law
school classroom. Such elements have proven quite helpful to the first year writing student.
See Camille Lamar Campbell, How to Use a Tube Top and a Dress Code to Demystify the
Predictive Writing Process and Build a Framework of Hope During the First Weeks of Class,
48 DUQ. L. REV. 273, 309-310 (2010). As a former newspaper reporter, I confess that I was
initially resistant to the formulaic writing style forced on most first year students, but after
years of practice I am convinced it works-at least in this little arena.
8. Schlag, supra note 2, at 813. More to the point, Professor Schlag criticizes the law
review format for being an "imitation of the legal brief and the judicial opinion." Id.
9. See id.
10. See generally RICHARD DELGADO, RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT
AMERICA AND RACE (1995). In a ground-breaking departure from the traditional law review
paradigm, Professor Delgado makes use of the narrative technique and employs the fictional
character "Rodrigo"-the son of an African-American serviceman and an Italian mother-to
engage with a fictional professor of color and have a series of discussions on law; the topics
have included law and economics, civic republicanism, essentialism and anti-essentialism, and
black crime, among other things. See id.; see also Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Final Chroni-
cle: Cultural Power, Law Reviews, and Attack on Narrative Jurisprudence, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 545, 546 n.3 (1995). The esteemed Professor Derrick Bell has also, of course, demon-
strated the strength of legal storytelling. See generally Derrick Bell, The Power of Narrative,
23 LEGAL STUD. F. 315 (1999).
11. See Richard A. Posner, The Skin Trade, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 40, 42
(reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
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So do you fall into the paradigm or do you try something different?
Basically, we are getting stuck with the battle of the experts. So the question
still remains, what makes scholarship exceptional? How can we pull it out of
mediocrity? Is it merely innovation--either substantively or in format?
(You can debate about that all day.) Is it the controversy that it engenders?
Is it compliance with normative expectations? Is it influence over the law?
Is it the mentor that you are able to convince to review your article and who
was conspicuously thanked in that little cover footnote with hopes of secur-
ing a higher placement? Is it how frequently you are cited? Is it the quality
or the ranking of the law review that decides to publish you? Or is it some-
thing else? Is it intellectual rigor? Is it the aesthetic value?
Let's consider this picture 12 from Mark Rothko, 3 and if you could take
a second to look at it I think that this picture from Rothko can give us a little
guidance here. Just take a second and figure out what you truly think of this
picture. Perhaps, like me, you believe this is an exceptional image and you
feel transported by its simplicity. 14 It looks vast, overwhelming, lonely, and
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997)) ("[C]ritical race theorists teach by example
that the role of a member of a minority group is to be paid a comfortable professional salary to
write childish stories about how awful it is to be a member of such a group."). See generally
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narra-
tives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 808-09 (1993) (critiquing the value of legal storytelling as legal
scholarship). In their essay, Professors Farber and Sherry recognize the impact of narrative
among members of minority groups, but challenge the status of such narrative as scholarship:
One frequent claim on behalf of storytelling is that stories build solidarity among the members
of an oppressed group, thereby providing psychological support and strengthening community.
We have no reason to question these effects, or to dismiss them as negligible. Nevertheless,
we do not believe that these effects in themselves are sufficient to validate the stories as scho-
larship.
Id. at 824). But see Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical
Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1784 (2003) (reviewing CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A
NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (2002)) (defending the use of narrative, especially in Critical
Race Theory, as expanding a set of methodologies "to articulate concerns about race and
equality.").
12. See sample work in Appendix, infra page 525 and accompanying notes.
13. Artist Mark Rothko, who lived from 1903 to 1970, is widely regarded as one of "the
preeminent artist[s] of his generation." KLAUS OTrMANN, THE ESSENTIAL MARK ROTHKo 7
(2003). He painted abstract expressionism early in his career and eventually incorporated
surrealism into his work. See Mark Rothko: Biography, GUGGENHEIM COLLECTION,
http://www.guggenheimcollection.org/site/artist bio_138.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
"[I]n 1961 he received the singular honor of becoming the first living member of his genera-
tion to be given a retrospective at the Museum of Modern Art." Jed Perl, The Anatomy of
Melancholy, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 24, 1994, at 27 (reviewing JAMES E.B. BRESLIN, MARK
ROTHKO: A BIOGRAPHY (1993)).
14. The balance, texture and tonality of Rothko's work cement his exceptionality:
The artist invented his own rules as his creations emerged from within him. The combination
of red and yellow generally produces orange, but when Rothko combined these two colors they
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beautiful. Or maybe you are thinking "my kid can do that, it's just a bunch
of rectangles in a square."' 5
Without a doubt, there is a real impossibility in ever trying to quantify
quality. We will never all agree on this painting, but the value still remains
undisturbed even if we don't reach a consensus. This is true whether we are
trying to evaluate the quality of writing 16 or Rothko. This correlates with the
message we heard today from Professor Schlag about Constitutional interpre-
tation: Essentially it is entirely dependent on our preconscious conceptions
of the Constitution. 7 This is a message I have been trying to relay all seme-
ster to my first year Constitutional Law students: Constitutional interpreta-
tion is nothing new-see McCulloch v. Maryland 8-but our own percep-
tions, experiences, and judgments can make it so.
There is a point where I respectfully disagree with our guest today.
Specifically, I dispute Professor Schlag's assertions that our articles are
didn't necessarily lead to orange as we know it. Instead, his colors-and therefore, his paint-
ings-have their own emotion, sense of mystery, and meaning. Each of Rothko's works is
larger than the sum of its parts.
OTFMAN, supra note 13, at 105; see also DIANE WALDMAN, MARK ROTHKO 1903-1970: A
RETROSPECTIVE 60 (Carol Fuerstein ed., 1978) (recognizing the effective use of "[slpatial
illusionism" in Rothko's work).
15. "Rothko had, and continues to have, his share of adverse criticism." Rachel Barnes,
Divine Art, Dark Souls, THE GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 27, 1993, at 5. Furthermore, I would
not assert that my personal appreciation of Rothko's work, nor his historical status among
preeminent artists would place his work above criticism. Another writer adds: "Mark Rothko
is awash in such contrast, contradiction and confusion." Jonathan Mandell, Being and No-
thingness/Mark Rothko's Reputation Is Built on Work That's at Once Quite Something and
'Very Close to Nothing,' NEWSDAY, Sept. 22, 1998, at B6. The characterization merely makes
my point that both art and writing are what you make them or see them to be. Indeed, others
with much more experience and expertise in assessing art have been dismissive of Rothko's
work. Former New York Times critic Edward Alden Jewell, for instance, deemed Rothko's
work "obscure," and said the artist's creations left him completely "befuddled."' Eva Hogan,
Real Red: Art Critics and Mark Duel, Broadway, http://www.broadyway.tv/broadway-
features-reviews/real-red (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
16. Back to writing, the attempt to evaluate or quantify legal scholarship is nothing new.
See, e.g., Philip C. Kissam, The Evaluation of Legal Scholarship, 63 WASH. L. REV. 221, 221
(1988) ("Researchers, readers, academic committees, law school deans, research agencies, and
editors of publications frequently evaluate works of legal scholarship.").
17. See comments of Professor Pierre Schlag, Lecture at Nova Southeastern University
Shepard Broad Law Center Symposium (Mar. 12, 2010) (unpublished manuscript on file with
author). Professor Schlag addressed the inherent difficulty of Constitutional interpretation:
What I got out of this is the recognition that the antagonists in the interpretation debates are not
talking about the same thing. Their disputes are not about how to interpret the Constitution,
but rather a much more fundamental and interesting dispute about what it is. For some, it is a
unitary text, for others it is a structured charter, for others it is a political event, for some an
originary source of meaning, for others a bridge to the past and so on.
Id.
18. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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"pretty far removed from any real stakes, save perhaps for the career of the
author and a few other people."' 9 Here I'm going to rely on another quote,
"if you miss your mark aim wider"20 and at this point you should consider a
bull's-eye. Very narrowly, I think we sometimes measure the success of our
scholarship by looking for that little circle in the middle of the bull's-eye and
I think we have to consider the whole target and look beyond the bull's-eye
to measure the value of our writing.
Our scholarship does matter to policy makers. We have colleagues in
the room who have influenced policy makers both in Florida and in other
states about the legitimacy and the need to preserve DNA evidence 21 to pro-
tect innocent people. We have colleagues who have influenced Congress
over Forestry measures; 22 colleagues who have helped direct the path of the
Environmental Protection Agency.23 So, there is a very direct link between
what we are writing and the influence we have.2'
19. Schlag, supra note 2, at 813.
20. The quote is inspired by Henry David Thoreau's "In the long run, men hit only what
they aim at. Therefore, though they should fail immediately, they had better aim at something
high." HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN AND OTHER WRITINGS 132 (Joseph Wood Krutch
ed., 1981).
21. Catherine Arcabascio, Freeing the Innocent: Obtaining Post-Conviction DNA Test-
ing in Florida, 28 NOVA L. REV. 61 (2003). Professor Arcabascio's article was used as a re-
source for, among other things, the American Bar Association's Death Penalty Moratorium
Implementation Project. See Death Penalty Moratorium Implementation Project Assessments
Project, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Sept. 18, 2006), http://www.abanet.org/moratorium
assessmentproject/florida.html.
22. See Kimberly Hausebeck, The Little Engine That Could: The Success of the Ste-
wardship Contracting Authority, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 33 (2007).
23. See, e.g., JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD
CHOICES (1995). Professor Mintz continues to publish numerous law review articles and book
chapters that contribute significantly to the environmental law field. "His journal articles have
repeatedly been considered to be among the 30 best articles of the year in the environmental
law field by peer reviewers." Joel A. Mintz, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM,
http://www.progressivereform.org/MintzJoelBio.cfm (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). Professor
Mintz has consulted with the EPA on environmental policy matters. Id.
24. In myriad ways, colleagues have used their law review articles as a tool for social
justice work. Recently, a colleague highlighted defects in the criminal justice system. See
generally Heather Baxter, Gideon 's Ghost: Providing the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
in Times of Budgetary Crisis, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 341 (2010) (discussing how attorneys
who represent indigent criminal defendants are not getting the proper funding and, as a result,
citizens are being deprived of their Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel). Others have used
their law review platform to advance quality of life for people wading through the civil litiga-
tion process on personal matters. See generally Elena Langan, "We Can Work It Out": Using
Cooperative Mediation-a Blend of Collaborative Law and Traditional Mediation-to Re-
solve Divorce Disputes, 30 REV. LITIG. 245 (2011) (suggesting that a blended ADR method
can be used to resolve high-conflict divorce cases extra-judicially as an alternative that allows
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I want to point out that there really isn't necessarily a linear path.
Sometimes, it goes back and forth. Therefore, if we examine the bull's-eye,
our legal scholarship can have a very wide-reaching impact and my hope is
that it does stretch beyond the Capitol and the courtroom. I'd like to think
that some members of the legal academy actually wrote about something
they didn't understand and they were successful for it.
Here are a few examples I want you to consider: Professor Anne En-
quist didn't understand why her first year legal research and writing students
did not know how to write. To help introduce them to the new world of writ-
ing at law school, she had to unpack for them how undergraduate writing is
so radically different from legal writing, and she did so in an article.25 For
example, she explains that undergraduate writers are typically rewarded for
dressing up ideas, making them seem more sophisticated and making "simple
things seem complex. 26 Professor Enquist contrasted this practice with the
goal in most legal writing "to make complex things seem simple. '27 In short,
she didn't understand the dilemma she faced as she tried to help new law
students make the transition into legal research and writing and she wrote an
article about it.
28
Professors Cheryl Harris and Devon Carbado didn't understand why
black Hurricane Katrina survivors were termed looters and not treated fairly
by the media following the storm; they wrote about it.29 They argued that
Katrina provided insight into how social life is interpreted through various
frames (both literally and figuratively).3 ° They wrote: "As a result of racial
frames, black people are both visible (as criminals) and invisible (as vic-
tims). 31
Professor Ediberto Roman and Christopher Carbot didn't understand
why there were so few Latino and Latina tenure-track faculty members at
lawyers to comply with their ethical obligation of providing zealous representation). I main-
tain that both types of scholarship are legitimate, worthwhile, and important contributions
both to the legal academy and to society.
25. Anne Enquist, Talking to Students About the Differences Between Undergraduate
Writing and Legal Writing, 13 PERSP. 104 (2005). Professor Enquist makes great uses the
epistle form in this piece and offers her advice in the form of a "letter" to new law students. I
thank my colleague Professor Camille Lamar for suggesting that I include this excellent article
as mandatory day-one reading for my first semester LSV students.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Cheryl I. Harris & Devon W. Carbado, Loot or Find: Fact or Frame?, in AFTER
THE STORM: BLACK INTELLECTUALS EXPLORE THE MEANING OF HURRICANE KATRINA 87 (Da-
vid Dante Troutt ed., 2006).
30. Id. at 103.
31. Id.
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American law schools and they wrote an article about it.32 They used their
article as a vehicle to raise the sometimes delicate issue of diversity and to
enable other colleagues to do the same thing at their own schools. 33 Specifi-
cally, Professor Roman and Carbot addressed the abysmal figures of Lati-
no/Latina law professors, analyzed data measuring credentials and place-
ment, and laid out a case for the benefits of diversity in the academy.
Professor Francisco Valdes didn't understand why hierarchies are so
difficult to overcome for "outsiders" and he wrote about it.35 He examined
the culture wars, backlash jurisprudence and social retrenchment as a means
of understanding the "jurisprudential follow-up" to "social and legal antidi-
scrimination legacies. 36
Professors Keith Aoki and Kevin Johnson did not understand why, in
their assessment, LatCrit did not focus more on "quality control" in its scho-
larship symposia.37 The two issued some tough love about LatCrit scholar-
ship.38 Essentially, they argued that there wasn't enough "Crit" in LatCrit
and they wrote a law review article about it. 39 And in response, of course,
came a retort. Professors Valdes and Margaret Montoya didn't understand
why LatCrit's scholarship project that reflected the "democratic" model of
knowledge production wasn't being recognized as another manifestation of
its anti-subordination mission4n  They wrote an article about it. 41 In their
32. Ediberto Roman & Christopher B. Carbot, Freeriders and Diversity in the Legal
Academy: A New Dirty Dozen List?, 83 IND. L.J. 1235 (2008). The article built on the work
of Professor Michael Olivas, who worked with the Hispanic National Bar Assocation, to pro-
duce the "List" of the top U.S. law schools located in high Latino/Latina area but had no Lati-
no/Latina professors on faculty. Id. at 1238; see also Michael A. Olivas, The Education of
Latino Lawyers: An Essay on Crop Cultivation, 14 CHICANO-LATiNO L. REV 117 (1994).
33. Roman & Carbot, supra note 32, at 1238.
34. Id. at 1241. "Increasing Latina professor representation also stands to enrich the
academic and scholarly exchange of ideas between colleagues, and to facilitate a more diverse
learning experience for students." Id.
35. Francisco Valdes, Culture, "Kulturkampf" and Beyond: The Antidiscrimination
Principle Under the Jurisprudence of Backlash, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND
SOCIETY 271, 271 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004).
36. Id.
37. See Keith Aoki & Kevin R. Johnson, An Assessment of LatCrit Theory Ten years
After, 83 IND. L.J. 1151, 1160 (2008).
38. Id. at 1159 ("Ultimately, we conclude that LatCrit has been relatively successful at
establishing a community and at institution-building, but less successful with respect to the
production of high quality scholarship.").
39. See id.
40. See Margaret E. Montoya & Francisco Valdes, "Latinas/os" and The Politics of
Knowledge Production: LatCrit Scholarship and Academic Activism as Social Justice Action,
83 IND. L.J. 1197, 1205 (2008). In response to the criticism of LatCrit scholarship in Profes-
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article, Professors Valdes and Montoya vigorously defended the LatCrit ex-
periment as a conscious avoidance of the re-inscription of hierarchy found in
some vanguardist models.
42
Professor Doug Colbert didn't understand why we as law professors
were not doing a better job of training young lawyers to honor their charge to
serve the public good, and he wrote about it.43 Professor Colbert called for
law professors to take seriously the charge of the Preamble of the ABA's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct to enhance every person's access to a
lawyer.44 He challenges law professors to train a generation of lawyers who
will "embrace its duty to serve when entering the profession. 45
The list could go on and on, but this is as good a starting place as any
for us to examine the times and life of legal scholarship. And for more tradi-
tional authority here, you can always pick up a court opinion--clearly some-
thing that does have an impact on real, living people. At least one recent
empirical study challenges the "conventional wisdom" that legal scholarship
has lost its relevance to courts.46 Over the past two decades, there has been a
"marked increase in the frequency of citation to legal scholarship in the re-
ported opinions of the circuit courts of appeals. 47
sors Aoki and Johnson's article, Professors Montoya and Valdes asserted the "lump-sum"
treatment of entire body of published works was "intellectually irresponsible." Id. at 1203.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 1229. Professors Valdes and Montoya argued that the LatCrit scholarship mod-
el fostered social justice action and change:
[Tihis proactive engagement of difference in multiple ways across multiple axes of identifica-
tion produces not only knowledge but also solidarity in the service of social justice action.
These multiple forms and levels of engagement tend to cultivate the openness, understanding,
and motivation necessary for antisubordination collaboration across multiple categories of
identity-including across intra-"Latina/o" axes of difference; this attention to difference and
diversity helps to set the stage for critical coalitions that stand on shared and enduring prin-
ciples rather than temporarily converging interests. In our experience, the act and process of
collaboration over time deepens levels of mutual understanding and trust that progressively en-
able greater intellectual and discursive risks, which oftentimes yield important epiphanies, and
create bonds of mutual respect and engagement that can only enrich any kind of knowledge
production activity both in the short and long term.
Id. at 1227-28.
43. See generally Douglas L. Colbert, It's Not Funny: Creating a Professional Culture
of Pro Bono Commitment, in VULNERABLE POPULATIONS AND TRANSFORMATIVE LAW
TEACHING: A CRITICAL READER 31 (Soc'y of Am. Law Teachers & Golden Gate Univ. Sch. of
Law eds., 2011).
44. See Colbert, supra note 43, at 33-34.
45. Id. at 7.
46. See David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, The Use of Legal Scholarship by the
Federal Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL L. REV (forthcoming 2011) (on
file with Nova Law Review).
47. Id. (manuscript at i). The study tracked trends in the citation of legal scholarship by
United States circuit courts of appeals over the past 59 years. Id. A review of figures indi-
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III. CONCLUSION
So we are going to aim wider and look beyond the bull's-eye and hope
that our scholarship is no longer limited in its ability to influence judges and
courts of law? If we do this in a wider way we can reach the Courts, the Ca-
pitol, the students who read it, the colleagues who disagree with it, the re-
searchers who review it, the committees who vet it, and some of our friends
who we pull in to proof-read it for us.
All of these continued efforts will expand the universe of the people
who can accept the challenge and press hard on those aspects of the law that
don't make sense to us. Such efforts will help us perform a few modern-day
miracles and breathe new life into what has been called a dying breed. After
all, these are the same people who are going to one day become policy mak-
ers, judges, attorneys, and law professors. And despite Professor Schlag's
dire pronouncements, these people will hopefully go out, change the world
and maybe even one day write a law review article about it. As the great
philosopher Yogi Berra48 said, "It's d6j vu all over again!
49
cates that there is an upward trend; "circuit judges have written more opinions citing legal
scholarship and cited to legal scholarship in a higher proportion of reported opinions." Id. at
21.
48. Baseball icon Yogi Berra is not only a member of the Baseball Hall of Fame, he is
known off-the field for his astute and amusing observations about life. See generally YOGI
BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK "I REALLY DIDN'T SAY EVERYTHING I SAID" 30 (1998).
49. Id. at 30.
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IV. APPENDIX
No. 13 (White, Red, on Yellow) 19-'5
50. MARK ROTHKO, No. 13 (WHITE, RED, ON YELLOW), (1958). A black and white repro-
duction of a Mark Rothko painting could never do justice to this brilliant work. You have to
imagine it in white, red and yellow color blocks, or find online a digital image of the painting
at The Metropolitan Museum of Art's website. See Mark Rothko, METRO. MUSEUM OF ART,
http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/works-of-art1985.63.5 (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). But I do
believe that even a black and white reproduction of the piece will illustrate the point I am
making about the potential dismissal of the work for its sheer simplicity. Abstract expression-
ism, like much of what we write, is in the "eye of the beholder."
20111
243
: Nova Law Review 35, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
IS MIRANDA ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION? THE
SUPREME COURT LOOSENS MIRANDA 'S GRIP IN FAVOR OF
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1964, the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment was
held applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.' Just two years later, the Supreme Court of the United
States would issue arguably the single most important opinion in criminal
procedure in Miranda v. Arizona.2 This landmark case would go on to set
the tone for criminal interrogations for the next half-century. Miranda was
attempting to achieve a balance between the need to protect a suspect's privi-
lege against self-incrimination and law enforcement's interests in interrogat-
ing criminals and legally obtaining a confession.3 In doing so, the Court
* The author is a J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center and a graduate of Florida State University. The author wishes to thank his
family and friends for all of their encouragement and support, with a special thanks to Alyssa
Posar for her love and motivation. The author extends special recognition to Professor Joseph
Harbaugh and Professor Barbara Britzke for their continual advice and guidance over the
years. He would also like to thank the members of Nova Law Review for their hard work.
1. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,6 (1964).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Id. at 439, 441-42.
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created what is now known as the Miranda warning to be given any time a
suspect is brought into custody and interrogated.4 The warnings inform a
suspect of his right to remain silent and his right to an attorney before and at
any time during the interrogation.5 Miranda is now considered "one of the
court's best-known creations" and is constantly the subject of criminal pro-
cedure in the courtroom, interrogation room, and in TV crime dramas alike.6
Over the years, Miranda has sustained subtle setbacks and restrictions
to provide police with more leeway in seeking confessions and avoiding the
suppression of evidence.7 However, Miranda fought, scratched and clawed
its way to survival. But, it was not until this year when the Supreme Court
issued a devastating three-punch combination of opinions which may have
put Miranda out for good. Florida v. Powell,8 Maryland v. Shatzer,9 and
Berghuis v. Thompkins' ° all appear to demonstrate a trend toward an ap-
proach inconsistent with the principles outlined in Miranda. In the span of
roughly six months, the Court has decided that a suspect's rights now expire
after fourteen days," an incarcerated inmate is no longer considered to be
"in-custody,"'' 2 police no longer need to expressly inform a suspect that he
has the right to have an attorney present during the interrogation, 3 and a
suspect must speak in order to remain silent, or he risks waiving his right to
remain silent.'
4
This article will present a look at the cases which have come to shape
the law of the United States and illustrate how the Court's most recent opi-
nions do or do not pose a threat to the viability of Miranda. Part II of this
4. Id. at 444.
5. Id.
6. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court: Suspects Must Invoke Right to Remain Silent in
Interrogations, WASH. POST, June 2, 2010, at A5.
7. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 644 (2004) (holding that although an un-
Mirandized statement itself may be inadmissible, physical evidence obtained or discovered
from un-Mirandized statements is admissible at trial as long as the statements were not com-
pelled); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) (noting that failure to administer Miranda
warning before a confession will not necessarily exclude admissibility of a second confession
after Miranda warning, where the statement was voluntary and uncoerced); New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984) (accepting that situations exist where the rules of Miranda
should not apply); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975) (allowing statements made in
violation of Miranda to be admitted for impeachment purposes).
8. 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010).
9. 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010).
10. 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
II. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1223.
12. Id.
13. Powell, 130 S. Ct., at 1204-05.
14. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2260.
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article will present a brief history into the Miranda decision and provide its
rationale and underlying purpose. Part III will discuss an important decision
by the Supreme Court of the United States which essentially set the record
straight and established Miranda's constitutional underpinnings once and for
all. Part IV of the article will look at three significant Supreme Court deci-
sions rendered so far this year. It will present the facts, holdings and ratio-
nales given by the Court in Florida v. Powell, Maryland v. Shatzer, and
Berghuis v. Thompkins. The article will illustrate how each of these cases
dealt significant blows to the long standing Miranda warning requirements
and its underlying purpose, with the bulk of the analysis pertaining to the
Berghuis case. The Berghuis analysis will point out what has historically
been required for a defendant to invoke and waive his right to remain silent
and discuss how the decision defies the principals set forth in Miranda. Part
V will present the arguments that Berghuis is inconsistent with Miranda and
the Constitution by pointing out the flaws in the majority's reasoning. This
section will also present the views of supporters of the decision. Lastly,
Parts VI and VII, respectively, will provide the author's critical analysis of
the Berghuis decision and reach an ultimate conclusion and recommendation
going forward.
II. THE MIRANDA WARNING Is BORN
The rights and protections afforded to suspects have come a long way
since the days of torture and third degree brutality as a customary method of
extracting confessions.' 5 However, this created a shift to psychologically
based interrogation tactics which can still lead to coercion. 6 Regardless of
which method of coercion may have been used, none of the cases prior to
Miranda v. Arizona provided a suspect with "appropriate safeguards . . .to
15. See Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59, 61-62 (7th Cir. 1958) (noting that the defendant
was beaten by five police officers, sustaining multiple bruises and broken bones and spent
eight months in the hospital); People v. Matlock, 336 P.2d 505, 511-12 (Cal. 1959) (finding
that the defendant was interrogated under sleep deprivation tactics and placed on a cold board
every time he became sleepy); Bruner v. People, 156 P.2d 11I, 120 (Colo. 1945) (stating that
the defendant was not allowed to eat for a period of fifteen hours, could not use the toilet
without taking a lie detector test, and was held for over two months); Kier v. State, 132 A.2d
494, 496 (Md. 1957) (recognizing that the defendant was strapped naked to a chair and threat-
ened to think police would take skin and hair scraping from anywhere on his body where
blood or sperm could be found); People v. Portelli, 205 N.E.2d 857, 858 (N.Y. 1965) (noting
that there was beating and torturing of the suspect to acquire incriminating statements).
16. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966) ("[M]odern practice of in-custody
interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented. '[C]oercion can be mental as
well as physical ....') (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960)).
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insure that the statements were truly the product of free choice."'17 The Mi-
randa holding implemented those safeguards.
The seminal case of Miranda v. Arizona clarified and established the
rights afforded to criminal suspects during police custodial interrogations. 18
The Supreme Court of the United States cited a need for precise procedures
and guidelines in order to guarantee and protect an individual's Fifth
Amendment privilege against self incrimination.' 9 In general, Miranda es-
tablished the rule that before any custodial interrogation,2° the suspect must
be made aware of his or her right to remain silent and right to have an attor-
ney present.2' This warning provides the best avenue for protection of an
individual's privilege against self incrimination when being questioned in an
inherently coercive environment under the pressure and intimidation of his
adversary.22 Once provided, interrogation must cease "[i]f the individual
indicates in any manner ... that he wishes to remain silent. '23 Any statement
obtained without this warning or after the privilege has been invoked is con-
sidered compelled and may not be admitted into evidence. 4
III. ESTABLISHING THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF MIRANDA
Since the Miranda ruling, there has been widespread debate over
whether the Miranda safeguard is a constitutional rule or just a regulation
created under the Court's supervisory authority.25 Some courts held firm that
Miranda safeguards were merely prophylactic rules to protect the Fifth
17. Id. at 457. "[P]rivilege [against self-incrimination] is fulfilled only when the person
is guaranteed the right 'to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise
of his own [free] will."' Id. at 460 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)).
18. Id. at 479.
19. Id. at 439.
20. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. The Supreme Court defined custodial interrogation as
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id.
21. Id. at 479. The Court specifically delineated the instructions needed to protect the
suspect's constitutional rights as follows:
[A suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence
of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires.
Id.
22. Id. at 467.
23. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74.
24. Id.
25. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000).
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Amendment privilege against self incrimination.26 Others have preached the
constitutional roots of Miranda and its own distinct constitutional status.
Much of the debate has stemmed from the language of the Miranda opinion
itself.28 The Supreme Court of the United States settled the debate in Dicker-
son v. United States29 by expressly refusing to overrule Miranda and reiterat-
ing the Miranda warning's status as "a constitutional rule that Congress may
not supersede legislatively. 30
Dickerson dealt with the issue of whether Congress had proper authority
to statutorily overrule Miranda.31 Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501 two
years after the Miranda decision.32 This statute would turn the analysis of
admissibility of a statement on whether the statement was voluntary and ig-
nore whether Miranda was satisfied.33 Experts debated that the statute
should be upheld because the Constitution does not forbid the use of a volun-
tary statement in a federal case. 34 However, the Court relied on stare decisis
for support that Miranda is a constitutional decision and has been consistent-
ly applied to state court prosecutions.35 The Court officially dubbed Miran-
da's warning requirement as Constitutional, stating that "Congress may not
legislatively supersede [judicial] decisions interpreting and applying the
26. See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987) ("Miranda Court adopted
prophylactic rules designed to insulate the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights"); New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984) (stating Miranda warning requirement is only a "prophy-
lactic" and does not always need to be rigidly followed); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
444 (1974) (agreeing that Miranda protections are not required by the Constitution).
27. See Winthrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691 (1993) ("'Prophylactic' though it may
be, in protecting a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Miranda
safeguards a 'fundamental trial right."') (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259, 264 (1990): Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990) (explaining Miranda rests on
the Fifth Amendment); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986) (describing Miranda as
an "interpretation of the Federal Constitution").
28. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (stating that the Miranda decision "in no way creates a
constitutional straitjacket" and "encourage[s] Congress and the States to ... search for...
effective ways of protecting [individual] rights."). But see id. at 445 (referring to Miranda as
a "constitutional issue").
29. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
30. Id. at 444.
31. Id. at 437 ("Congress may not legislatively supersede [judicial] decisions interpreting
and applying the Constitution.").
32. Id. at 435.
33. Id. at 436.
34. Paul Cassell & Robert Litt, Will Miranda Survive?: Dickerson v. United States: The
Right to Remain Silent, The Supreme Court, and Congress, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1165, 1191
(2000).
35. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 438. The Supreme Court does not have supervisory authority
over state courts-it only has authority to enforce Constitutional requirements. Id.
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Constitution."36 This decision "reject[ed] the only alternative that has been
presented to [Miranda] for thirty years ... lock[ing] our country into this
particular approach. 37
V. LOOSENING MIRANDA 'S GRIP ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Florida v. Powell
Florida v. Powell was the first of three cases this year to significantly
loosen the long standing strictures of the Miranda warning requirement.38
Ignoring the Miranda requirement that suspects be "clearly informed" of
their rights before any custodial interrogation,39 the Supreme Court of the
United States allowed police officers in Tampa to vary the wording of the
Miranda warning despite the potential for confusion and misunderstanding 40
So long as the warning "reasonable conveyed" the suspects rights, the Court
would allow it.4 The officers in Powell gave the defendant the following
warning:
You have the right to remain silent. If you give up the right to re-
main silent, anything you say can be used against you in court.
You have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our
questions. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer one will be ap-
pointed for you without cost and before any questioning. You
have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want dur-
ing th[e] interview.
4 2
Powell subsequently waived his rights and confessed4 3  On appeal,
Powell argued that the warning he received was inadequate because it did not
inform him of his right to an attorney during the interrogation.44 The Su-
36. Id. at 437.
37. Cassell & Litt, supra note 34, at 1189. "Nothing in the Constitution requires a draco-
nian rule that a voluntary confession be suppressed whenever there has been some departures
from the Miranda procedures." Id. at 1172.
38. Adam Liptak, You Have the Right to Remain Silent. But Don't, if You Want to Use
It., N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2010, at A15; see Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1199-1200
(2010).
39. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).
40. Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1199. The Court itself noted that the warnings given to Powell
were not the clearest possible formulation" for informing a suspect of his rights. Id. at 1205.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1200 (emphasis added).
43. Id.
44. Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1200.
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preme Court of Florida agreed with Powell and held that the warning did not
meet the "clearly informed" standard articulated in Miranda.4 5 The Supreme
Court of Florida further noted that this warning was misleading and indicated
to the suspect that his right to an attorney only existed before questioning.46
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to resolve the is-
sue.
47
The Court took the view that the Miranda warning, or its equivalent,
only needs to reasonably inform suspects of their rights.48 Otherwise, a
"suspect would have to imagine an unlikely scenario ... [where] he would
be obliged to exit and reenter the interrogation room after each query. 49
However, this contradicts the notion that Miranda refuses to assume any-
thing from the suspects.5° Further indicating a steer from requiring a suspect
be "clearly informed," the Court expressly admits that the warning Powell
received were not the clearest of warnings.5' The majority relied mainly on
the catchall phrase given to Powell stating that he could invoke his rights "at
any time"-including his right to an attorney before questioning.52 While
some courts have accepted an altered reading of the Miranda warning,"
Powell marks "the first time the Court has approved a warning which ...
entirely omitted an essential element of a suspect's rights"-the right to have
an attorney present during the interrogation.54
The Powell decision wasted no time before flexing its muscle.55 Rigte-
rink v. State56 was one of the earliest cases to be reconsidered in light of
Powell.57 Rigterink, like Powell, dealt with a Miranda warning which failed
to expressly inform the suspect of his right to counsel before and during the
interrogation.58 The Supreme Court of Florida initially made its ruling that
45. State v. Powell, 998 So. 2d 531, 542 (Fla. 2008), rev'dby 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010).
46. Id.
47. Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1201.
48. Id. at 1205.
49. Id.
50. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471-72 (1966) ("[T]his warning is an absolute
prerequisite to interrogation. No amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may have
been aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead.").
51. Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1205.
52. Id.
53. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (accepting Miranda warning telling a
suspect that his lawyer "would be appointed 'if and when' he went to court).
54. Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1210-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. See Florida v. Rigterink, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (vacating the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Florida and remanding the case in consideration of Florida v. Powell).
56. 2 So. 3d 221 (Fla. 2009) (per curium), vacated by 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010).
57. Rigterink, 130 S. Ct. at 1235.
58. Rigterink, 2 So. 3d at 234.
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the warning was constitutionally and materially defective based on what ap-
peared to be the long standing rules illustrated in Miranda.59 Under the exact
reading of the Miranda decision, anything that does not "clearly inform" a
suspect of his rights "constitutes a narrower and less functional warning than
that required by Miranda."6 But, as illustrated above, these Miranda rules
that have been applied for so long, are not as relevant in light of Powell."
B. Maryland v. Shatzer
Just a day after Powell, the Supreme Court continued to craft a more po-
lice-friendly version of Miranda in Maryland v. Shatzer.62 In this case, the
Court held that police may re-interrogate a suspect who has previously in-
voked his Miranda right to counsel.63 While not expressly declaring it so,
the ruling modified another long standing rule of criminal procedure that was
articulated in Edwards v. Arizona.64 The Edwards rule created a perpetual
ban in which police were barred from interrogating a suspect who invoked
his Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel, until counsel is provided or
the suspect initiates the conversation on his own volition.65 Shatzer based his
argument to suppress his confession pursuant to Edwards.66
In 2003, while incarcerated on an unrelated crime, Shatzer was ques-
tioned by police regarding a sex offense.67 Shatzer indicated that he would
59. Id. at 253-54.
This [holding] is not because Rigterink is innocent; rather, it is because the rules established to
guard fundamental constitutional protections were not followed, and, under these facts, we
cannot say that the videotape-which should have been suppressed based upon proper legal
analysis-Aid not "contribute to" his convictions. The murders committed in this case were
horrific, gruesome, and worthy of condemnation; moreover, there is evidence to support the
verdicts returned by the jury. However, the rule of law must prevail and we must not allow the
ends of punishment to trump the means that our state and federal Constitutions require.
Id. at 256.
60. Id. at 253.
61. See Rigterink, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (vacating the judgment of the Supreme Court of Flori-
da and remanding the case in consideration of Florida v. Powell).
62. 130S. Ct. 1213, 1218 (2010).
63. Id.
64. 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981); see Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1219 (refusing to extend Ed-
wards and allowing a suspect who has previously invoked his right to counsel, to be question-
ing again despite counsel being unavailable).
65. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 ("[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have
counsel present during custodial interrogation .... [he] is not subject to further interrogation
by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself
initiates further communication ... with the police.").
66. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1218.
67. Id. at 1217.
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not talk without his attorney and invoked his right to counsel. 68 The ques-
tioning ceased, and Shatzer was sent back into the prison's general popula-
tion.69 Two and a half years later, police returned to question Shatzer on the
same offense.7° He was again read his Miranda rights, but this time he
waived them and began to talk.71 It was only until Shatzer made incriminat-
ing statements, which were later used to convict him, when he again re-
quested his attorney.72 Shatzer argued to suppress his statements under the
Edwards rule.73 The Edwards theory is that once a suspect invokes his Fifth
Amendment right to counsel, a subsequent waiver of the right to counsel in
another interrogation is presumed to be involuntary.74 The implicit assump-
tion is that the second waiver was a result of police persistently attempting to
get a waiver of rights and a subsequent confession.7 ' The Court held that the
implicit dangers prevented by the Miranda safeguards and the Edwards rule
were eliminated due to the extended interval between interrogation sessions
and refused to extend Edwards to an "eternal" ban on interrogation; instead
the Court ruled that a break in Miranda custody shall create an exception to
the Edwards rule.76
The Court did not stop there. Refusing to leave any open ends, the next
step was to determine how long of a break in Miranda custody is sufficient
to still meet the suspects constitutional guarantees and dissipate any pre-
sumption of coercion.7 7 With very little thought, the Court spit out a number
and agreed that a fourteen day break in Miranda custody is sufficient.78
"That provides plenty of time for the suspect to get reacclimated to his nor-
mal life, to consult with friends and counsel, and to shake off any residual
coercive effects of his prior custody. 79
Lastly, the Court was left to determine if sending an inmate back into
the prison from which he was retrieved, constitutes a break in custody to
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1218.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1219-20.
75. Id. at 1220.
76. See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1219-22.
77. Id. at 1223.
78. Id.
79. Id. But see Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 156 (1990) (holding that the Ed-
wards rule preventing officers from reinitiating questioning with a suspect without counsel
present once the suspect has previously requested counsel, exists even after the suspect has
had a chance to consult with counsel).
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allow the Court to apply the newly created fourteen day rule. ° The Court
went on to draw the connection that an incarcerated inmate now makes his
home in the cell he has been assigned and that returning the inmate back to
the general population only sends him back to the environment in which he
has become most accustomed. 81 "The majority ruled that a prison sentence
was not custody in the relevant sense and that a return to the general prison
population after questioning amounted to a break in custody for the purposes
of Miranda and Edwards.82 While the dissent agrees in part that perhaps
the Court ultimately reached the proper substantive conclusion, it criticizes
the fourteen day period established by the majority and argues that the hold-
ing ignores the Edwards rationale "that custodial interrogation is inherently
compelling. '83 The dissent uses the present facts of this case-"a suspect
who is in prison"-to distinguish that a suspect who is returned back to his
cell is hardly placed back into a situation where he "returns to his normal
life" to the extent that all coercive pressures have been eliminated. 8
Shatzer was another major limitation to the Miranda protections af-
forded to suspects. The purpose of Miranda is to protect a suspect's consti-
tutional privilege against self incrimination when exposed to inherently com-
pelling pressures 85 of a police-dominated atmosphere; 86 pressures which can
80. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1224; see also New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984)
(stating Miranda custody as "a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the
degree associated with a formal arrest").
81. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1224.
Interrogated suspects who have previously been convicted of crime live in prison. When they
are released back into the general prison population, they return to their accustomed surround-
ings and daily routine-they regain the degree of control they had over their lives prior to the
interrogation. Sentenced prisoners, in contrast to the Miranda paradigm, are not isolated with
their accusers. They live among other inmates, guards, and workers, and often can receive vis-
itors and communicate with people on the outside by mail or telephone.
Id.
82. Adam Liptak, Court Says Miranda Rights Don't Bar Requestioning, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 2010, at A18.
83. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1231-32 (Stevens J., concurring) ("The Court ignores these
understandings from the Edwards line of cases and instead speculates that if a suspect is rein-
terrogated and eventually talks, it must be that 'further deliberation in familiar surroundings
has caused him to believe (rightly or wrongly) that cooperating with the investigation is in his
interest."').
84. Id. at 1221, 1232.
A prisoner's freedom is severely limited, and his entire life remains subject to governmental
control. Such an environment is not conducive to "shak[ing] off any residual coercive effects
of his prior custody." Nor can a prisoner easily "seek advice from an attorney, family mem-
bers, and friends," especially not within [fourteen] days; prisoners are frequently subject to re-
strictions on communications. Nor, in most cases, can he live comfortably knowing that he
cannot be badgered by police.
Id. at 1232.
85. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
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cause an individual to be compelled to speak rather than exercise his own
free will. 87 However, Shatzer assumes all coercive pressures placed on an
individual expire after fourteen days.88 This holding expressly permits police
to engage in a tactic where, once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, po-
lice simply release the suspect, wait fourteen days, and try again hoping this
time the suspect is not intelligent enough to invoke his right to counsel,
which may not have been provided to him the first time around.89
C. Berghuis v. Thompkins
Berghuis v. Thompkins is the most recent Supreme Court of the United
States case concerning Miranda warnings and arguably the most damaging
to Miranda's protection of a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights.90 The de-
fendant, Thompkins, was arrested for suspicion of murder, placed in a small
interrogation room, and made to sit in a make-shift school desk.9' The offic-
ers handling the investigation then read Thompkins his Miranda rights,
which he refused to sign.92 The officer then proceeded to attempt to interro-
gate Thompkins for the next three hours.93 Thompkins remained silent dur-
ing the interrogation with the exception of "a few limited verbal responses. 9 4
After nearly three hours, the officer asked Thompkins, "'Do you believe in
God?' 95 This question finally elicited a response from Thompkins who rep-
lied "Yes" as he began to cry.96 He was then asked if he prayed to God,
which he again replied, "Yes. 97 The next question was, "Do you pray to
God to forgive you for shooting that boy down?" to which Thompkins defea-
tedly replied, "Yes. '98 "Thompkins refused to make a written confession,
86. Id. at 456.
87. Id. at 467.
88. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1223.
89. Id.
90. Barnes, supra note 6.
91. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2256 (2010).
92. Id. ("[S]ign[ing] the form [would] demonstrate that [Thompkins] understood his
rights."). Cf United States v. Plugh, 576 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2009) (refusing to sign a
waiver form is an unequivocal assertion that the suspect is not willing to waive his rights).
93. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2256.
94. Id. Thompkins remained silent during the interrogation, with the exception of declin-
ing a peppermint and making a comment "that the chair he was sitting in was hard." Id. at
2256-57 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id. at 2257.
96. Id.
97. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2257.
98. Id. at 2258.
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and the interrogation ended 15 minutes later."99 His limited responses were
used to convict him."° The issue for the Court was "whether an invocation
of the fight to remain silent can be ambiguous or equivocal."' 0 ' This requires
a look as to whether Thompkins invoked his right to remain silent and
whether he waived his fight to remain silent."0 2
1. Invoking the Right to Remain Silent
The Supreme Court has never specifically addressed the steps required
of a suspect to invoke the right to remain silent.'0 3 The ultimate precedent
regarding the right to remain silent has always been Miranda, which states
that when a suspect "'indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during
questioning, that he wishes to remain silent . . . the interrogation must
cease."' 04 Davis v. United States'0° addressed the issue of whether an ambi-
guous or unequivocal statement could trigger Miranda protection.' °6 But, the
Court did so in relation to an ambiguous request or invocation of the right to
counsel subsequent to a valid express waiver.) 7 The Court held that after a
suspect has waived his Miranda fights, the suspect may invoke his fight to
counsel only by making an unambiguous, unequivocal statement requesting
counsel; otherwise, police are not required to honor the request or seek clari-
fication.0 8 Davis expressly waived his rights under Miranda and then sug-
gested that "'maybe [he] should talk to a lawyer"' during the interrogation."
This statement was not sufficient to equate to an invocation of the fight to
counsel.
Unlike a request for counsel, an invocation of the right to remain silent
does prevent the police from attempting to interrogate the suspect again after
a period of time has elapsed."0 Nevertheless, other courts have still applied
99. Id. at 2257.
100. Id. at 2256.
101. Id. at 2260.
102. Berghuis, 130. S. Ct. at 2258.
103. Id. at 2260.
104. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420 (1986) (emphasis added) (quoting
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966)).
105. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
106. Id. at 456.
107. See id. at 455.
108. Id. at 459.
109. Id. at 455.
110. Compare Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (allowing police to re-
question suspect on a different crime, two hours after he invoked his right to remain silent)
with Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981) (holding that a suspect who invokes the
right to counsel bars any police-initiated interrogation without counsel present).
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the Davis rule to the right to remain silent, although providing very little
explanation on its reasons for doing so."' Other courts have provided that
Davis applies only when there is a request for counsel subsequent to a valid
waiver. 12 The Davis rule merely requires that a suspect clarify his desire to
revive a privilege that has already been waived."
3
The Court in Berghuis rejected the argument that remaining silent was
an invocation of the right, finding it to be unpersuasive.' 14 It chose to rely on
Davis and treat the Miranda right to counsel exactly the same as the Miranda
right to silence." 5 The Court stated that requiring an express and unambi-
guous invocation of the right to remain silent creates an objective test and
makes proving the voluntariness of a confession easier.'16 The Court shifted
the focus of the analysis from the individual suspect's constitutional rights
and placed an overriding importance on the burden society would face in
prosecuting criminals." 7 Two hours and forty-five minutes of silence was
not enough for the Court to conclude that Thompkins wanted to remain silent
during the interrogation and invoke his rights." 8
2. Waiving the Right to Remain Silent
The prosecution bears the high standard and heavy burden of proving a
defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights." 9 The
111. Marcy Strauss, The Sounds of Silence: Reconsidering the Invocation of the Right to
Remain Silent Under Miranda, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 773, 786 (2009).
112. See United States v. Plugh, 576 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2009) ("Davis only provides
guidance . . . [when] a defendant makes a claim that he subsequently invoked previously
waived Fifth Amendment rights."); United States v. Rodriguez, 518 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir.
2008) ("[Tlhe 'clear statement' rule of Davis applies only after the police have already ob-
tained [such a waiver], . . . however, an officer must clarify the meaning of an ambiguous or
equivocal response to the Miranda warning before proceeding with general interrogation.")
(emphasis omitted); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me. 2000) (declining to extend
Davis to require a suspect to unambiguously invoke his rights when there has not been a prior
waiver); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D. 2002) ("Davis, in sum, applies to an equi-
vocal postwaiver invocation of rights."); State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1997)
("[Tihe requirement ... that an officer limit his questioning to clarifying a suspect's ambi-
guous or equivocal statement must be limited to prewaiver scenarios.").
113. Brief for Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers & Am. Civil Liberties Union as Ami-
ci Curiae Supporting Respondent at 29, Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010) [he-
reinafter Brief Supporting Respondent].
114. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2253-54 (2010).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2254.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2258-59.
119. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
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defendant must fully know "the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it.' 20 Miranda illustrated the range
of the spectrum when attempting to discern the validity of a waiver as fol-
lows:
An express statement that the individual is willing to make a
statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a
statement could constitute a waiver. But a valid waiver will not be
presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings
are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact
eventually obtained. 121
North Carolina v. Butler' 22 appropriately held that the language in Mi-
randa should not be read to require a per se rule that only an express waiver
is sufficient to illustrate a waiver. 23 Butler allowed for an implicit waiver
based on "the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his
rights and a course of conduct indicating a waiver., 2' But a waiver shall not
be presumed from a suspect's silence even if the suspect eventually con-
fesses. 12 5 In Butler, the defendant refused to sign the waiver, but he express-
ly agreed to talk to the interrogating officer. 126 The determinative factor thus
turns on whether the defendant understands his rights and the consequences
of his actions. 27 However, if a suspect does express his desire to remain
silent, a statement made thereafter may be admissible as a subsequent waiver
of the right if the suspect's right to cut off questioning was scrupulously
120. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (noting that waiver must also be "volun-
tary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,
coercion or deception").
121. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
122. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
123. Id. at 375.
124. Id. at 373.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 371. But see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (holding that the
"voluntariness" of a waiver of the right to remain silent depends on the absence of an over-
reaching police probe and that a mentally ill defendant may waive his rights as long as there is
no police coercion).
127. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2262 (2010). "The prosecution must make
the additional showing that the accused understood these rights." Id. at 2261; see also Colo-
rado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987) ("The Miranda warnings ensure that a waiver of
these rights is knowing and intelligent by requiring that the suspect be fully advised of this
constitutional privilege, including the critical advice that whatever he chooses to say may be
used as evidence against him."); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 530 (1987) (rejecting
defendant's argument upon a finding that he understood the consequences of making incrimi-
nating statements).
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honored. 2 8 This requires an examination into the amount of time between
interrogations, the subject matter of the second interrogation, whether a new
Miranda warning was given, and the degree to which police officer pursued
further interrogation. 1
29
In Berghuis, the Court relied on the fact that Thompkins "could read
and understand English" and knew "that police would have to honor his right
to be silent . . . during the whole course of the interrogation" in concluding
that he understood he was waiving his rights when he made the incriminating
statement.130 The Court concluded by stating broadly that "[w]here the pros-
ecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood
[an] uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain
silent." ' 3' In this case, the Court held Thompkins had not invoked his right
to remain silent and cut off questioning and subsequently made a valid waiv-
er of his right to remain silent by voluntarily making a statement, three hours
into the interrogation.
32
V. DOES BERGHUIS OVERRULE MIRANDA?
A. Arguing Against Berghuis
The Berghuis decision is claimed to have "turn[ed] Miranda upside
down."' 33 Even Justice Sotomayor, who is a former prosecutor herself and
knows the difficult task police face during interrogations, has been one of the
decision's biggest critics. '34 The crucial facts in the case are that Thompkins
refused to sign a waiver showing he understood his rights and then sat in
almost complete silence for nearly three hours before making an incriminat-
ing statement. 35 Critics argue this was not sufficient to convince the Court
that Thompkins had invoked his right to remain silent and that he had not
made a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights.
136
128. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975).
129. See id. at 104, 106 (allowing police to attempt to reinitiate questioning with a suspect
who has invoked his right to silence, after two hours).
130. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2262.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2262-63.
133. Id. at 2278 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
134. Barnes, supra note 6 ("[S]ome had speculated [Sotomayor] might be less protective
of the rights of suspects than other [justices] ....").
135. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2266 (Sotomayor J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 2266-67, 2269; see also State v. Rossignol, 627 A.2d 524, 526-27 (Me. 1993)
(holding that suspect had invoked right to remain silent by sitting in silence for twenty mi-
nutes).
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The prosecution bears a heavy burden of demonstrating a knowing and
intelligent waiver.' 37 This burden is intensified when a confession is given
after a lengthy interrogation.' 38 Miranda stops just short of declaring a pre-
sumption of coercion, but courts must still presume that a suspect "did not
waive his rights.' 39 If the Court properly applied Miranda it would clearly
show the prosecution failed to satisfy its heavy burden.140 The words "yes,"
"yes" and "yes" were the only evidence presented to show Thompkins un-
derstood he was waiving his rights.' 4' The decision shifts the burden to the
suspect to invoke his rights rather than keeping the burden on the police to
obtain a valid waiver and relinquishment of rights.142 Previously, a suspect's
rights were intact from the moment he walked into the interrogation room,
and the burden was on the police to obtain a waiver. 143 Now, a suspect must
be aware of how to invoke his rights before he enters the interrogation
room.' 44 Once a suspect has been read and understands his Miranda rights,
anything he does after that, short of expressly stating that he wants to invoke
his right to remain silent, will constitute a waiver. 45
The Court's application of the "clear invocation rule" announced in Da-
vis to the right to remain silent creates an illogical irony that is "unlikely to
convey that [a suspect] must speak" let alone speak in a particular manner. 46
A "statement" is necessary for invoking the right to counsel because "there is
no other way to invoke that right.' ' 147 A suspect cannot express that he wants
a lawyer unless he states at least some variation of "I want a lawyer."'' 48
Berghuis though, uses the act of keeping quiet and remaining silent to indi-
137. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
138. See id. at 476.
139. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979); see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.
140. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2268-70 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Rarely do this Court's precedents provide clearly established law so closely on point with the
facts of a particular case. Together, Miranda and Butler establish that a court must presume
that a defendant did not waive his right; the prosecution bears a heavy burden in attempting to
demonstrate waiver; the fact of a lengthy interrogation prior to obtaining statements is strong
evidence against a finding of valid waiver; mere silence in response to questioning is not
enough; and waiver may not be presumed simply from the fact that a confession was in fact
eventually obtained.
Id. at 2270 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. Id. at 2271.
142. See Barnes, supra note 6.
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2271 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 2276.
147. Brief Supporting Respondent, supra note 13, at 30.
148. Id.
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cate a willingness to talk.149 Logically, it follows that one manner in which a
suspect may indicate that he wishes to remain silent is to remain silent. 5 °
Remaining silent "could be deemed the ultimate invocation.''. The suspect
is indicating what he wants to do as he is doing it. 512 The central goal of Mi-
randa-"ensur[ing] that a suspect makes a free choice to speak to the po-
lice"-is compromised by the fact that Berghuis now forces a suspect to talk
to police, or risk waiving his rights. 5 3 In essence, the decision compels a
suspect to engage in conversation with the police while misinforming the
suspect of his right to silence.
Regardless of whether remaining silent is considered an invocation of
rights, the Berghuis decision erases the Miranda requirement that a suspect
be "clearly informed" and that interrogation must cease when the suspect
"indicates in any manner" his desire to remain silent.154 Surely, the require-
ment of informing a suspect that he has the right to remain silent is left un-
disturbed, but this is no longer sufficient to clearly inform the suspect of all
his rights. "'55 The Miranda warnings give no hint as to the Court's new clear
invocation rule.5 6 Just as easily as a suspect may make a clearly unambi-
guous statement that he wishes to remain silent, the officer can just as easily
ask the suspect for clarification. Requiring an officer to ask for clarification
when a suspect makes an ambiguous statement is currently not required but
still considered good police practice.'57 A suspect who is unaware of how to
invoke his rights is unaware of his rights and is no longer clearly informed.
A suspect who must clearly state that he would like to remain silent-as the
only means of invoking his right to remain silent-can no longer indicate his
desire to do so "in any manner" as Miranda so valiantly advocated.
B. Arguing in Support of Berghuis
Some experts agree with Berghuis mainly because they remain indiffe-
rent on the decision and question the actual effect, if any, that the decision
149. Steve Chapman, The Supreme Court Hears the Sounds of Silence, REASON FOUND.
(June 3, 2010), http://reason.org/news/show/supreme-court-sounds-silence.
150. Brief Supporting Respondent, supra note 113, at 27.
151. Strauss, supra note 111, at 792.
152. Id.
153. Id. at775.
154. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471, 473-74 (1966).
155. Liptak, supra note 38.
156. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2276 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
157. Strauss, supra note I 1, at 783-84.
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will even have on current practice.1 58 Police are still required to inform a
suspect of his Miranda warnings and ask him if he understands his rights.'59
But now, police no longer need to conduct any follow up questions. 160 "If a
criminal suspect is informed of his Miranda rights and understands these
rights, the suspect can remain silent to any questioning or instead can ex-
pressly invoke the right to remain silent." 161 Miranda has been eroding since
its inception, and this is just another case delaying its inevitable extinction. 62
The Court did not take away a suspect's right to remain silent or privilege
against self incrimination. Post-Miranda silence still cannot be used against
a suspect, and the suspect will continue to be questioned until he has invoked
his rights. The decision is rather one of common sense. 63 Where the dissent
urges that silence demonstrates an unwillingness to talk, others argue it only
demonstrates a willingness to be questioned.' 64 Besides, it is human nature
to speak when attempting to clearly articulate an intention, and rarely does a
suspect ever indicate his unwillingness to talk in a manner other than ex-
pressly stating so. 65 As a result, the decision only affects an extreme minori-
ty of cases, and the human rights advocates may be exaggerating the effects
of the decision.
Taking a more cynical approach, Miranda rights are violated constantly
during interrogation, and the defense can seldom win the argument when
going against a police officer's word. 166 Miranda was supposed to put a se-
rious restraint on law enforcement's ability to interrogate a suspect, but near-
ly eighty percent of suspects still agree to talk with police after receiving the
Miranda warning. 67 Miranda is no longer viewed as a formidable obstacle
to police interrogations. 168 Even police training and procedural manuals en-
158. Troy Graham, Little Effect Seen from Court's Miranda Ruling, PHILA. INQUIRER, June
5, 2010, at BI.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Michael Crites & Anjali P. Chavan, Is Thompkins' the Death Knell of Miranda?,
LAW.COM (July 19, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202463214195&rss=
newswire.
162. Graham, supra note 158.
163. Steve Lackner, Berghuis v. Thompkins: Supreme Court Rules That Miranda Right to
Remain Silent Must Be Unambiguously Invoked by Suspect to Stop an Interrogation, STEVE
LACKNER-CONSERVATIVE NEWS, ISSUES, DEBATES, AND COMMENTARY (June 3, 2010, 09:48
PM), http://www.stevelackner.com/2010/06/berghuis-v-thompkins-supreme-court.html.
164. Chapman, supra note 149.
165. Graham, supra note 158.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Mark Berger, Compromise and Continuity: Miranda Waivers, Confession Admissi-
bility, and the Retention of Interrogation Protections, 49 U. PriT. L. REV. 1007, 1061 (1988).
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courage police to begin the interrogation only after the suspect has demon-
strated a willingness to cooperate and to take precautions with suspects
where the Court does not require them to do SO. 169 The bottom line is if a
suspect feels he wants to talk, he will, and if he does not want to talk, he will
say SO. 1
7 0
Others point to the flaws of Miranda to illustrate the need for change,
any change. Problems arising from Miranda stem from the complete lack of
uniformity in procedures and enforcement across jurisdictions.'71 A uniform
rule should advance the underlying goal of the Self-Incrimination Clause by
"protecting the rights of suspects to both non-coercive and constitutionally-
informed interrogation.' 72  Congress no longer has authority to overrule
Miranda, and the power lies now with the Supreme Court. 173 But, the flaws
in Miranda are evidenced by the countless exceptions and loopholes that
have been created through case law.
174
Supporters have focused their arguments on criticizing Miranda and its
broad protections rather than supporting the logic of the Berghuis decision,
referring to Miranda as "an artificial rule" created under the guise of the lib-
eral Warren Court. 175 Miranda debates have created unnecessary costs, ef-
forts, and confusion among law enforcement and defendants alike. 76 Berg-
huis' relies heavily on the voluntariness of the statement and the absence of
any evidence of police coercion. 77 A voluntariness approach steers away
from artificial rules created forty years ago and draws closer towards the
actual words of the Constitution in "that no person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself' in a criminal case. 78 But until uniformity exists, the
goal of achieving constitutionally and legally effective interrogation to con-
vict criminals while ensuring they are informed of their rights cannot be
reached.79 For now, Berghuis reasonably provided much needed aid to po-
169. Brief Supporting Respondent, supra note 113, at 11.
170. Graham, supra note 158.
171. William F. Jung, Not Dead Yet: The Enduring Miranda Rule 25 Years After the
Supreme Court's October Term 1984, 28 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 447, 457 (2009) ("[T]he
most acute need for improvement.., is development of uniform warnings.... [E]ven within
jurisdictions, large differences exist in the nature of the warnings, their words, their length,
their cognitive complexity and indeed their very subject matter."). Id.
172. Id. at 456.
173. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
174. See Jung, supra note 171, at 457.
175. Barnes, supra note 6.
176. Jung, supra note 171, at 457.
177. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010).
178. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Barnes, supra note 6.
179. See Jung, supra note 171, at 457.
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lice and "recognize[d] the 'practical realities that the police face in dealing
with suspects."" 8
It is clear that Miranda tried to achieve uniformity by striking a balance
between protecting a defendant's constitutional rights and providing law
enforcement with strict guidelines for police to follow.' 8' In theory this
seemed ideal. But we have seen how in some circumstances it is counter-
productive to let a criminal go free due to a technical deficiency in Miranda,
as demonstrated by the numerous exceptions to Miranda.82 Miranda thus
created its own contradiction by preaching its constitutional protection and
its need in any custodial interrogation and then creating exceptions when
Miranda does not appear to be as important. 83 Miranda began as a proce-
dural tool to protect a suspect from the pressure of custodial interrogation.
184
But it has since been casted into a limited and unintended role serving only
"to insure the admissibility of post-waiver statements."' 185
It makes more sense to place the burden on a suspect and require the
suspect to invoke his rights. 86 The only burden for the prosecution is to
convince the court that the statements given by the suspect were not com-
pelled and that Miranda warnings were issued. 87 Courts only require this to
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than the harsh-
er, more difficult burden of clear and convincing. 88 But the prosecution
does not also bear the burden of convincing the court that the defendant
made a wise decision by waiving the defendant's rights. 89 The Constitution
itself does not even require police officers to coach a suspect and ensure that
a suspect makes a constitutionally informed decision. Some even argue that
the Constitution requires nothing more than a mere recitation of the Fifth
Amendment and that "the statement should be admissible as long as it is not
compelled."' 90 Ignorance of the law is not a defense although this entails
180. Barnes, supra note 6.
181. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439, 441-42 (1966).
182. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 644 (2004); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.
298, 309 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S.
714, 722 (1975).
183. Cassell & Litt, supra note 34, at 1]73.
184. Berger, supra note 168, at 1063.
185. Id.
186. Liptak, supra note 38.
187. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Criminal Justice Legal Found. at 12, Berghuis v. Thomp-
kins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010) (No. 08-1470) [hereinafter Brief Supporting Petitioner].
188. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986).
189. Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 187, at 11-12.
190. Liptak, supra note 38.
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possible infringement on an individual's due process rights.' 9' Ignorance of
the Constitution should follow, and an argument that a suspect did not know
the extent of his rights should not be a defense absent evidence of police
coercion. Besides, informing the suspect of his right to counsel expressly
provides the suspect with an opportunity to seek assistance from someone
acting in the suspect's benefit. It is an unlikely scenario to envision a suspect
knowingly and expressly waiving his right to silence and invoking his right
to counsel or invoking his right to counsel, but expressly waiving his right to
silence. Both options provide the same rights to the individual to cease the
interrogation upon command. The difference is in how much leeway the
police are afforded to re-question the suspect. The result of Berghuis is that
police will no longer have to guess what the suspect is thinking when he sits
in silence, having understood his rights, but choosing neither to waive them
nor invoke them.
VI. CRITIQUE
The discussion here is not whether Miranda is a constitutional require-
ment or whether it is the only sufficient method of ensuring constitutional
rights. The discussion here is whether Miranda remains intact in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Berghuis. In this respect, the answer appears to
be a definitive "no." The Supreme Court created an even greater confusion
by stating that the four Miranda warnings are still required, but ignoring the
essential principles and underlying reasons for the warnings-to clearly in-
form the suspect of his rights so that a suspect cannot argue, at least in
theory, a violation of the privilege against self incrimination. The problem in
Berghuis is that the Court severed core aspects of Miranda while claiming it
remains intact and leaving little guidance on how police should apply the
decision. What remained was a muddled opinion, chalk full of confusing
logic, that would make at least four scholarly Supreme Court Justices scratch
their heads.
It was only when Thompkins' case reached the Supreme Court that he
was informed of the need to expressly and explicitly invoke his right to re-
main silent. 192 If Miranda's requirement that a suspect be clearly informed
of his rights during the interrogation still exists, this assumes that Thompkins
was fully aware that an express statement was required to invoke his rights.
It ignores the possibility that perhaps he thought he was invoking his right to
191. Velasquez v. United States, 4 F. Supp. 2d 331, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), affd on recon-
sideration, 205 F.3d 1327 (2d Cir. 2000).
192. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259-60 (2010).
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"remain" silent by remaining silent. The Court then states that Thompkins
three one-word responses at the end of a three-hour interrogation demon-
strated a voluntary waiver of rights. 193 This assumes that Thompkins had a
sudden change of heart and decided to cooperate. It ignores the possibility
that perhaps, realizing that sitting in silence was not going to stop the inter-
rogation and his rights were not being honored, his will broke and he suc-
cumbed to the pressures exerted by the police. The same principles Miranda
applied in reaching its conclusion were blatantly ignored by Berghuis.
Since its decision, Miranda placed a heavy burden on police to prove
there was a waiver, citing the need to protect the individual from incriminat-
ing himself. Berghuis alludes to a greater need to protect police from having
to make judgments in the field and risk having a confession suppressed as the
reasoning for developing a clear cut objective test as the standard of proof.194
This clearly shifts the focus of the protection to the police and ignores the
notion that "clear" and "unambiguous" remains a subjective inquiry. The
objective test makes voluntariness easier to prove for police, and it ignores
whether the confession was actually voluntary. It looks only to whether the
defendant specifically stated his desire to remain silent. In the most basic
form, the distinction between Miranda and Berghuis is clear. Miranda pro-
tects the defendant, and Berghuis protects the police. Miranda announces
defendants' rights as the ultimate importance in a confession case and takes
the defendant's side when faced with ambiguity. Berghuis stands for the
complete opposite and renounces defendants' rights. The decision sides with
the police when faced with ambiguity.
Berghuis concludes that "full comprehension of the right to remain si-
lent... [is] sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the interroga-
tion process."' 95 True or not, this assumes that a suspect who is told that he
has the fight to remain silent understands this to mean that he must first ex-
pressly and unambiguously state he would to like to remain silent, before
continuing to remain silent. Without an additional instruction by the interro-
gating officer, the Miranda warning, as it stands, no longer protects the indi-
vidual's Fifth Amendment rights, nor clearly informs him of such rights.
The fact is, telling a suspect that anything he says can be held against him
can reasonably lead to a suspect incorrectly thinking that verbally stating he
would like to remain silent may be used against him as incriminating evi-
dence and using his refusal to talk as evidence of guilt.
193. Id. at 2271.
194. Id. at 2260.
195. Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1985)).
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"Voluntariness" cannot be substituted for "clearly informed" while re-
maining loyal to Miranda. Miranda requires that they both be met in a se-
quence. A suspect must be clearly informed of his rights-given a proper
Miranda warning-and then must voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
choose whether to waive those rights. It is impossible for a suspect to make
such a decision when he has only been partially informed of his rights. A
suspect, who is told he has the right to remain silent, but not told how to in-
voke that right, is left a sitting duck for police to question for countless
hours. Ironically, the first step to keep Miranda intact is to change the warn-
ing that has become part of our society. Informing a suspect of the right to
remain silent no longer satisfies the clearly informed standard. At the very
least, Miranda must now inform the suspect of how to invoke his rights.
Specifically, the warning must tell the suspect he has to expressly state that
he wants to invoke his right to remain silent. Unless the Supreme Court is
willing to adopt similar changes, Miranda hangs in the balance.'
96
If the Supreme Court had only specifically stated it was overturning
many, if not all, of the Miranda principals it could have avoided many of the
critics' arguments. It is well established that the Supreme Court has the
power to overrule its own decisions, and it does so all the time. Of course,
many critics would have focused their arguments stating this could not hap-
pen because Miranda is embedded in our Constitution. But again, there is
nothing that restricts the Court from overturning its own ruling so long as it
abides by the Constitution. The Constitution does not require for warnings
or that a suspect is clearly informed of his rights; it only requires that no sus-
pect be compelled to be a witness against himself. It could be argued that a
mere reading of the Fifth Amendment is sufficient to inform the suspect of
his rights. The binding precedent for what is or is not constitutional begins
first and foremost with the Constitution itself, not the Miranda opinion.
Consequently, the power to make this judgment rests squarely on the Su-
preme Court. However, the Court owes it to everyone who is not sitting on
the bench to clarify the path it seeks to take.
196. See id. at 2271-72 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
At best, the Court today creates an unworkable and conflicting set of presumptions that will
undermine Miranda's goal of providing "concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforce-
ment agencies and courts to follow.". . . At worst, it overrules [silently] an essential aspect of
the protections Miranda has long provided for the constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination.
Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2271-72 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court appears to have left Miranda on life-support and is
changing the face of criminal procedure at an alarming rate. The next case to
come to the Supreme Court on this issue could very well be the last of Mi-
randa. Whether Miranda remains the best balance protecting constitutional
rights and providing concrete guidelines for enforcement is a matter of opi-
nion. But a rule drawing as much criticism as it has support must be ques-
tioned. There is rarely, if ever, a case that satisfies everyone, but what can be
respected is consistency and uniformity. By reversing the lower court's rul-
ing in Berghuis without expressing where Miranda stands, the Court has
only created more confusion. Berghuis stands for the complete opposite of
Miranda and trying to make them exist together is as illogical as requiring a
suspect to speak to remain silent.
If Miranda is to remain alive, the Court has two options. The Court
may erase the Berghuis decision or modify the Miranda warning to eliminate
any argument that a suspect was not clearly informed of his right. If the
Court wants to require an express invocation of rights, it should require an
express instruction on the rights. Both options seem unlikely in light of the
Supreme Court's consistent trend toward deferential police treatment. There
is not enough room atop the criminal procedure pedestal for both of these
landmark cases. Right now it appears the Supreme Court has grown old with
Miranda and is looking for a change. But until the Court specifically over-
rules or addresses the inconsistencies discussed in this article, confusion will
continue to grow in the legal community. Every defendant will cite Miranda
in his brief and the prosecution will cite Berghuis. It remains to be seen
which case the presiding Court will accept. After creating such a stir by re-
quiring a suspect to clearly and unambiguously express his intent to invoke
his rights, the Court could at least follow suit, and clearly and unambiguous-
ly explain to us all what to make of Miranda now.
[Vol. 35
267
: Nova Law Review 35, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
VIRTUAL ADOPTION: THE INEQUITIES OF THE EQUITABLE
DOCTRINE
JAIME P. WEISSER*
I. INTRO DUCTION ................................................................................... 550
II. ADOPTION: FROM LEGAL ADOPTION TO VIRTUAL ADOPTION ......... 553
A. Specific Performance of an Agreement to Adopt: The
C ontract Theory ........................................................................ 556
B. Detrimental Reliance on an Agreement to Adopt: The
E stoppel Theory ........................................................................ 559
III. OTHER STATES AND VIRTUAL ADOPTION .......................................... 561
A. Uniquely Divergent Cultures Necessitate Virtual Adoption:
C alista C orp. v. M ann ............................................................... 561
B. Adoption by Estoppel at Work: Luna v. Estate of Rodriguez.. 562
C. Virtual Adoption Compels the Imposition of Child Support
Obligations: Johnson v. Johnson ............................................. 563
D. The Inequities of a Testate Estate: In re Estate of Seader ........ 565
IV. FLORIDA AND VIRTUAL ADOPTION .................................................... 567
A. Florida Invokes the Doctrine of Virtual Adoption: The Case
of Sheffield v. B arry .................................................................. 568
B. The Doctrine Begins to Take Shape: Laney v. Roberts ........... 569
C. Virtual Adoption and Florida's Homestead Provision:
W illiam s v. D orrell ................................................................... 570
D. The Inequities of the Equitable Doctrine .................................. 570
1. A Contract to Adopt is Insufficient .................................. 570
2. "Enough" Is Not Enough ................................................. 573
V. VIRTUAL ADOPTION OUTSIDE OF PROBATE COURT .......................... 574
A. Florida Fails to Follow Suit: Inconsistencies Lead to an
Inequitable D octrine ................................................................. 576
B. Expanding the D octrine ............................................................ 578
* Jaime P. Weisser will receive her J.D. from Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center, in May 2012. Jaime received a Bachelor's of Science from the University
of Florida, with a Major in Journalism and Communications and a Minor in Anthropology.
Jaime would like to thank The Honorable Mark A. Speiser, Circuit Judge in the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida, for his guidance and assistance in
selecting the topic for this article, as well as his continued support in the research and devel-
opment of the text. She would also like to thank the entire staff of Nova Law Review for their
dedication and skill in editing the article. Most importantly, Jaime would like to thank her
family for their never-ending patience, motivation, and encouragement, without which, this
article could not have come together.
268
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss2/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
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I. INTRODUCTION
American society has long recognized the importance and value of an
individual's right to acquire, control, and transfer private property.' As a
general rule, an individual not only has the ultimate control over such proper-
ty with regard to gifts made during the person's lifetime, but also in the case
of disposition of the individual's property upon his or her death.2
When a person dies, there are generally three ways with which to distri-
bute the decedent's remaining personal property.3 First, the decedent can die
testate, that is, with a will.4 When a person dies testate, he or she is free to
devise property to, or disinherit, whomever he or she sees fit, without being
bound by stringent rules mandating who can, and who cannot, inherit from
the decedent.5 This testamentary freedom allows the decedent to determine
exactly who the intended beneficiaries of his or her will should be, including
individuals or classes of people who are not related to the decedent by mar-
riage, blood, or otherwise.6 Second, the decedent can die with a will substi-
tute, such as a revocable inter vivos trust, or life insurance.7 Lastly, the de-
cedent can die intestate, that is, without a valid will. 8 When a decedent dies
intestate, there is neither a testamentary inheritance nor disinheritance, so it
is difficult to ascertain the proper method of distributing his or her property.9
As a result, an intestate decedent's property will be distributed according to
the governing state's intestacy statutes.10
Intestacy statutes may vary from state to state, but as a general rule, in-
testacy statutes attempt to fill the intent gap and distribute property "in ac-
cordance with the probable intent of the average intestate decedent."" Thus,
1. Lee-ford Tritt, Sperms and Estates: An Unadulterated Functionally Based Approach
to Parent-Child Property Succession, 62 SMU L. REv. 367, 374-75 (2009).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 375.
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 706 (9th ed. 2009).
5. Michael J. Higdon, When Informal Adoption Meets Intestate Succession: The Cul-
tural Myopia of the Equitable Adoption Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223, 253 (2008).
A testator is a person who dies leaving a will. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1268 (9th ed.
2009).
6. See Tritt, supra note 1, at 374.
7. Id. at 375. An inter vivos trust is "[a] trust that is created and takes effect during the
settlor's lifetime." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1301 (9th ed. 2009).
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 706 (9th ed. 2009).
9. Sanderson v. Bathrick (In re Estate of Seader), 76 P.3d 1236, 1245 (Wyo. 2003).
10. Higdon, supra note 5, at 253.
II. Tritt, supra note I, at 380.
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most intestacy statutes provide a default distributive scheme that decedents
would be likely to follow if they had provided for the distribution of their
own estates.' 2 Typically, such statutes distribute the decedent's property first
to the decedent's surviving spouse, and then to the decedent's surviving
children, if any, and then to more remote descendants. 3 That being said,
because intestate succession is primarily a creation of statutory law, it is im-
portant to recognize the difference in treatment between persons authorized
to inherit under the laws of intestate succession and those who are not recog-
nized whatsoever.
Generally, intestacy statutes are explicit in providing children with the
right to inherit from an intestate parent.' 4 What is not clear, however, is the
meaning of "child" according to the statutory language and the bounds of the
parent-child relationship necessary to establish the right to intestate succes-
sion. For example, while "child" is generally understood to refer to the "nat-
ural relationship based upon biological reproduction," a child could also be
someone who was legally adopted by the decedent 5 or even someone who
was not legally adopted by the decedent, but nonetheless maintained a par-
ent-child relationship with the decedent.1 6 Accordingly, differentiating be-
tween the proper meaning of "child" within intestacy statutes will always be
the determining factor in deciding whether a child is entitled to a share of an
intestate decedent's estate.
A biological child will always be entitled to inherit from an intestate de-
cedent, as will a child who was formally legally adopted by the decedent.
7
As to the third scenario, however, in which the child was cared for, sup-
ported by, and educated by the decedent, and maintained a parent-child rela-
tionship with the decedent, it is unclear whether the child will be entitled to
inherit from the intestate decedent when no formal adoption proceedings
have been completed. Such is the case in a virtual adoption.
A virtual adoption occurs when a child was supposed to be legally
adopted but his or her adoptive parents failed to satisfy the legal require-
ments of a formal adoption.' 8 It is an equitable doctrine which generally
arises when the would-be adoptive parent dies intestate, and it operates to
12. Id. at 380-81.
13. Id. at 381.
14. See FLA. STAT. § 732.103(1) (2010).
15. Tritt, supra note 1, at 381.
16. E.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 107 (N.D. 2000).
17. See FLA. STAT. §§ 732.102(1), .108(1).
18. E.g., Miller v. Paczier, 591 So. 2d 321, 322 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per cu-
riam). Virtual adoption is also sometimes called "equitable adoption," "adoption by estop-
pel," or "de facto adoption." McGarvey v. State, 533 A.2d 690, 690 (Md. 1987).
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allow the virtually adopted child to inherit from the intestate decedent.' 9
Thus, while the Uniform Probate Code is the ultimate authority on inherit-
ance in the case of an intestacy proceeding, virtual adoption is the well-
recognized exception to the statutory scheme. 20  Be that as it may, the en-
forcement of the doctrine of virtual adoption has yet to be applied consistent-
ly throughout the courts in this country.2 '
Employing principles of equity and public policy, probate courts have
come to recognize the necessity, legitimacy, and application of virtual adop-
tion in intestacy proceedings. However, with the steady increase in the
divorce rate23 and the rapid changes in "traditional" family life,24 the doctrine
is quickly spreading to other areas of law and is no longer limited to probate
matters.25 Nonetheless, there remain inconsistencies in its application and
the appropriate circumstances in which courts can invoke the doctrine to
provide relief for virtually adopted children. 6 As a result, virtual adoption
should no longer be looked at under limited, narrow circumstances, but
should instead be broadened to prevent unfair results for virtually adopted
children, just as the doctrine was intended to do.
This article will discuss the equitable doctrine of virtual adoption and
the need for, and implications of, expanding the doctrine outside of probate
19. E.g., Miller, 591 So. 2d at 322.
20. See Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at I 11.
21. See generally Tarver v. Evergreen Sod Farms, Inc., 533 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1988) (hold-
ing that a virtual adoption is not sufficient where the decedent is killed in an industrial acci-
dent and the virtually adopted child seeks compensation under the Workers' Compensation
Act); Grant v. Sedco Corp., 364 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that virtual
adoption does not apply to a minor child, who is neither the biological child nor legally
adopted child of the decedent, in the case of wrongful death). But see Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at
IIl (holding that virtual adoption does apply to child support obligations).
22. See generally Calista Corp. v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53 (Alaska 1977).
23. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ADOPTED CHILDREN AND
STEPCHILDREN: 2000, 14 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-
6.pdf.
24. Rebecca C. Bell, Comment, Virtual Adoption: The Difficulty of Creating an Excep-
tion to the Statutory Scheme, 29 STETSON L. REV. 415, 418 (1999).
25. See Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 108 (holding that public policy protects the welfare and
best interests of children, and that "child support guidelines do not preclude the imposition of
a child support obligation on one who has equitably adopted a child"). The court held:
Applying the doctrine of equitable adoption to impose a child support obligation, when the cir-
cumstances of the case require it, fully comports with this public policy.... [Niothing in the
law of [North Dakota] bars application of the doctrine in the context of a child support obliga-
tion. First, the existence of statutory adoption procedures does not forbid the proposed appli-
cation of the doctrine .... Rather, our adoption statutes and the doctrine of equitable adoption
coexist, operating side by side to promote the best interests of the child.
Id. at 105.
26. See Tarver, 533 So. 2d at 765. But see Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 97.
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court. The first section will outline the evolution from formal legal adop-
tions to the equitable virtual adoption, as well as highlighting the differences
in the rights and responsibilities of the respective parties. The second section
of the article will begin by discussing the history and reasoning behind the
doctrine, including the two theories upon which virtual adoption is based.
The third section will analyze each of the theories through a discussion of the
application of virtual adoption in other United States jurisdictions, with care-
ful attention to the specific facts of each case in which the doctrine was in-
voked or struck down. The fourth section will analyze virtual adoption
through a discussion of the application of the doctrine in Florida, specifically
focusing on the differences between Florida and the aforementioned jurisdic-
tions. The fifth section will discuss the major flaws in the application of
virtual adoption thus far and why virtual adoption is not just a probate issue
anymore. Throughout this article's entirety, it should become clear why the
doctrine should be expanded to areas of the law outside of probate court,
should be recognized by state legislatures, and should be given more weight
in today's society in order to afford virtually adopted children the protection
and justice they deserve.
II. ADOPTION: FROM LEGAL ADOPTION TO VIRTUAL ADOPTION
More than 2.1 million adopted children live in the United States. 27 Ac-
cording to the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau, more than 100,000 adopted child-
ren live in Florida alone.28 With such a vast number of children being
adopted yearly, it is no surprise that the legal rights of adopted children have
become exceedingly uncertain.29
Adoption is purely statutory in origin, as it was not recognized at com-
mon law.3" Being purely statutory, the state has a "compelling interest" in
finding stable, permanent homes for adoptive children.3' Moreover, courts
consider the adoptive child's best interest to be of utmost importance with
regard to specific findings in adoption proceedings. 32 Thus, the statutes
27. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 23, at 1.
28. Id. at 4.
29. See, e.g., Tarver, 533 So. 2d at 767 (holding that virtual adoption would not warrant
relief in a worker's compensation proceeding). But see Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 105 (holding
that virtual adoption would warrant relief in a divorce proceeding, obliging the adoptive father
to continue paying child support).
30. E.g., Samek v. Sanders, 788 So. 2d 872, 875 (Alaska 2000).
31. FLA. STAT. § 63.022(l)(a) (2009).
32. Id. § 63.022(2).
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which govern adoption are designed to ensure certainty" and to protect adop-
tive children from being adopted by "unsuitable persons."
3
Adoption is defined as the "establishment or creation of a legal relation-
ship of parent and child between persons who were not so related by nature
or law." 35 When a child has been legally adopted, the child's relationship
with his or her natural parents is deemed terminated, and the child becomes
the legal equivalent of the biological child of his or her adoptive parents.36
As such, the adoptive child is also entitled to the legal rights otherwise con-
ferred upon biological children, including acquiring the status of being the
adoptive parent's "legal heir.",37 Thus, the adopted child has all the rights
and responsibilities that a biological child would have, as an adopted child
and biological child are often regarded as one in the same. It therefore fol-
lows that the adopted child is entitled under the statutes of intestate succes-
sion to the property of his or her adoptive parents.38 Thus, in theory and in
practice, the adopted child is considered both a descendant of the adopting
parent and one of the natural kindred of the adopting parent's family.3 9
Although adoption has become more commonplace in today's society
than in decades past, the necessary steps to "legally" adopt a child have be-
come more extensive and demanding. The dynamic of the "typical" Ameri-
can family is rapidly evolving as well. n° Many Americans have differing
views of what an "adoptive" or "step" parent-child relationship entails, as
well as differing views on whether a formal adoption is deemed acceptable
within a particular cultural group.4  As a result, virtual adoptions are "more
common among some cultural groups than others, as people differ widely in
the way they view family relationships and the process of adoption. 42
Virtual adoption is an equitable remedy that is most often invoked to
protect someone "who was supposed to have been adopted as a child" but
who was not legally adopted because his or her parents failed to complete the
33. Sanderson v. Bathrick (In re Estate of Seader), 76 P.3d 1236, 1248 (Wyo. 2003).
34. Otero v. City of Albuquerque, 965 P.2d 354, 360 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998).
35. In re Estate of Seader, 76 P.3d at 1239. Similarly, Florida defines adoption as "the
act of creating the legal relationship between parent and child where it did not exist." FLA.
STAT. § 63.032(2) (2010).
36. See In re Estate of Seader, 76 P.3d at 1239.
37. Id.
38. FLA. STAT. § 731.201(20). Property is defined as "both real and personal property or
any interest in it and anything that may be the subject of ownership." Id. § 731.201(32).
39. Id. § 732.108(1).
40. See Bell, supra note 24, at 418 ('The issues involved in virtual adoption become
increasingly complex as family structures evolve to encompass relationships forming from
divorce, remarriage, and extended households .... ").
41. U.S. DEP'T OFCOMMERCE, supra note 23, at 2.
42. Id.
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steps necessary to establish a formal adoption.43 The doctrine was not
created as a means to supplement the legal relationship between a parent and
child."a Nor does the application of the doctrine change the status of a vir-
tually adopted child to that of a legally adopted child.45 Instead, the primary
function of virtual adoption is limited to allow a virtually adopted child to
inherit from an adoptive parent who dies intestate.46 Courts reason that when
an adoptive parent dies without a will, "there was neither a testamentary in-
heritance nor a testamentary disinheritance. '47 Accordingly, courts view the
doctrine as the appropriate means with which to fill the "intent 'gap' by al-
lowing the child to inherit as if he or she had been adopted., 48 Further, al-
though the majority of states recognize virtual adoption, the doctrine remains
narrowly tailored49 and is often invoked exclusively in courts of equity in
order to prevent "inequitable and unjust" results stemming from intestacy
statutes.5°
In its most basic form, virtual adoption can be established when a dece-
dent has expressly agreed to adopt a child, there was reliance on the agree-
ment by the child or the child's natural parents, and the decedent treated the
child as his or her own.5' Thus, when an intestate decedent's intent to raise
the child was unambiguous, a court of equity would invoke the doctrine of
virtual adoption so as to carry out the intent of the decedent to adopt and
provide for the child.52
Where a decedent's intent is ambiguous, however, courts face difficult
challenges in invoking the doctrine.53 As a result, a fundamental prerequisite
of virtual adoption is that there is some type of agreement between the natu-
ral and adoptive parents, be it oral or written.54 When an express agreement
has been made and relied upon, a court is more likely to treat a child as
though he or she was virtually adopted, thus allowing the child to inherit
43. Sanderson v. Bathrick (In re Estate of Seader), 76 P.3d 1236, 1240 (Wyo. 2003).
44. See Williams v. Dorrell, 714 So. 2d 574, 575 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
45. Kelley v. Flagship Nat'l Bank of Boynton Beach (In re Estate of Wall), 502 So. 2d
531, 532 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
46. In re Estate of Seader, 76 P.3d at 1240.
47. Id. at 1245.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 1241.
50. Bd. of Educ. v. Browning, 635 A.2d 373, 377 (Md. 1994).
51. E.g., Kelley v. Flagship Nat'l Bank of Boynton Beach (In re Estate of Wall), 502 So.
2d 531, 531 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
52. E.g., Lankford v. Wright, 489 S.E.2d 604, 606 (N.C. 1997).
53. Bean v. Ford (Estate of Ford), 82 P.3d 747, 753 (Cal. 2004).
54. Bell, supra note 24, at 419; Estate of Ford, 82 P.3d at 754; Johnson v. Johnson, 617
N.W.2d 97, 108 (N.D. 2000).
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from the decedent's estate.55 However, while an agreement is necessary to
establish virtual adoption, it is not sufficient.56 Courts weigh several factors
in order to determine if a virtual adoption has taken place.57
To establish virtual adoption, a court of equity will employ one of two
theories.58 Under the contract theory, a court will order specific performance
of an agreement to adopt when the child can prove that there has been re-
liance on the agreement to adopt and partial performance by the decedent in
parenting the adoptive child.59 Under the estoppel theory, the decedent's
estate will be precluded from denying that a child was adopted, effectively
prohibiting the party from preventing the child from inheriting under intesta-
cy statutes. 60 Whichever theory a court applies, however, the authorities
concur that the application of the doctrine of virtual adoption will invariably
produce the same results.61
A. Specific Performance of an Agreement to Adopt: The Contract Theory
When a court grants equitable relief to a child based on the contract
theory, the court is merely enforcing an agreement to adopt between a child's
natural and adoptive parents.62 The object is that when an adoptive parent
acts as a promisor who agrees to raise and legally adopt a child, and there has
been part performance by the parties, courts will order specific performance
of the prior agreement to adopt.63
By its definition, specific performance calls for "[t]he rendering, as
nearly as practicable, of a promised performance through a judgment or de-
cree. '64 Thus, when a court orders specific performance of an agreement to
adopt, it appears as though the court is ordering an adoptive parent to com-
plete the necessary steps to legally adopt the child.65 However, because a
claim of virtual adoption does not come to fruition until after an adoptive
parent has died intestate, requiring the decedent to complete a formal adop-
55. E.g., Browning, 635 A.2d at 376-77.
56. See, e.g., Poole v. Burnett (In re Heirs of Hodge), 470 So. 2d 740, 741 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1985).
57. E.g., id.
58. E.g., Browning, 635 A.2d at 377.
59. See Habecker v. Young, 474 F.2d 1229, 1230 (5th Cir. 1973).
60. Sanderson v. Bathrick (In re Estate of Seader), 76 P.3d 1236, 1240 (Wyo. 2003).
61. Browning, 635 A.2d at 377.
62. Lindsay Ayn Warner, Note, Bending the Bow of Equity: Three Ways Florida Can
Improve Its Equitable Adoption Policy, 38 STETsON L. REV. 577, 589 (2009).
63. Id.
64. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1200 (9th ed. 2009).
65. Bell, supra note 24, at 425.
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tion is impossible.66 As a result, virtual adoption cases that rely on the con-
tract theory often enforce specific performance based on the parties' part
performance of the agreement to adopt.67 Thus, although problems often
arise when a court orders specific performance, the ultimate goal of the con-
tract theory is to alleviate these problems and provide justice and equity for
the child.68
The contract theory is founded on the idea that because adoptive parents
have entered into an oral or written contract to adopt the child, granting a
claim of virtual adoption is best achieved through specific performance.69
However, while the majority of states recognize virtual adoption, the stan-
dards of proof are vague, and the requirements differ between the jurisdic-
tions which have invoked the doctrine.70 Nonetheless, although these ele-
ments may vary slightly across state lines,7' courts in every jurisdiction have
consistently held that in order to enforce specific performance of a contract,
the claimant must first establish an express agreement to adopt.72
In Poole v. Burnett (In re Heirs of Hodge),73 Florida's Fifth District
Court of Appeal held that a claim of virtual adoption would grant a child an
enforceable contract right, pursuant to the satisfaction of five elements.74
The court determined that the five elements required to establish virtual
adoption include:
1. an agreement between the natural and adoptive parents;
2. performance by the natural parents of the child in giving up cus-
tody;
3. performance by the child by living in the home of the adoptive
parents;
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. James R. Robinson, Comment, Untangling the "Loose Threads": Equitable Adop-
tion, Equitable Legitimation, and Inheritance in Extralegal Family Arrangements, 48 EMORY
L.J. 943, 956 (1999).
70. Bell, supra note 24, at 418.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 425. A rule calling for the analysis of the parties' overall relationship would be
vague and subjective. Bean v. Ford (Estate of Ford) 82 P.3d 747, 753 (Cal. 2004). Instead,
courts look to the "particular expressions of intent to adopt," id., and generally require the
existence of the parties' "mutual intent to create a legal relationship." Johnson v. Johnson,
617 N.W.2d 97, 108 (N.D. 2000).
73. 470 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
74. Id. at 741.
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4. partial performance by the foster parents in taking the child into
the home and treating the child as their child; and
5. intestacy of the foster parents.
75
"Sufficient evidence" was the governing standard to prove an agree-
ment to adopt,76 but the majority of courts now require that the claimant
prove the aforementioned elements by "clear and convincing evidence. 77
However, because virtual adoption is meant to carry out the decedent's intent
to adopt a child, a mutually affectionate relationship, absent any direct
agreement to adopt the child, is inherently insufficient to determine the dece-
dent's intent.78 Thus, courts generally permit the decedent's intent to enter
into a contract and adopt the claimant to be shown by a bevy of expressions,
including:
[P]roof of an unperformed express agreement or promise to adopt.
• . other acts or statements directly showing that the decedent in-
tended the child to be, or to be treated as, a legally adopted child..
. the decedent's statement of his or her intent to adopt the child, or
the decedent's representation to the claimant or to the community
at large that the claimant was the decedent's natural or legally
adopted child.79
In determining whether there is evidence of an agreement to adopt, be it
direct or indirect, courts look at the parties' objective manifestations, reason-
ing that the secret intentions of the parties are irrelevant. 80 Further, while an
agreement is necessary to create and enforce a contract, contracts also re-
quire consideration to be valid and binding. 8' That being said, however, con-
sideration is difficult to ascertain in a claim for virtual adoption: 82
[T]he status of the child is unclear. Is the child a third-party bene-
ficiary of the contract, or is the child a party to the agreement?...
[T]he notion that the child is a third-party beneficiary of the con-
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Douglas v. Frazier (In re Estate of Musil), 965 So. 2d 1157, 1160 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2007); Williams v. Estate of Pender, 738 So. 2d 453, 456 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1999);
Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co. v. Singer, 250 S.E.2d 369, 374 (W. Va. 1978).
78. Bean v. Ford (Estate of Ford), 82 P.3d 747, 753 (Cal. 2004).
79. Id. at 754.
80. Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 108 (N.D. 2000); Estate of Ford, 82 P.3d at 754.
81. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 101.
82. Robinson, supra note 69, at 956.
[Vol. 35
277
: Nova Law Review 35, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
VIRTUAL ADOPTION
tract is belied by the fact that he or she provides part of the "con-
sideration" that makes the contract enforceable, that is, living with
the equitably adoptive parents as their child.83
For this reason, upon proof of an unambiguous agreement, courts will
then look at the parties' performance of the contract in order to determine
whether it should be enforced in equity.84 Thus, where an unambiguous con-
tract is proven, both to adopt the child and to allow the child to inherit, 85 and
the contract is supported by valid and adequate consideration, the contract
will be enforced and the child will be treated as though he or she were legally
adopted for certain limited purposes.
86
B. Detrimental Reliance on an Agreement to Adopt: The Estoppel Theory
Like the contract theory, virtual adoption based on the estoppel theory is
also an equitable remedy that grants relief to the claimant when a statutory
adoption is incomplete, notwithstanding a prior agreement to adopt.87 Also
like the contract theory, some proof of an agreement to adopt is required.88
However, unlike the contract theory, the estoppel theory rests on the notion
that a court will uphold a child's adoptive status when the child and the de-
cedent maintained "a relationship consistent with that of [a biological] parent
and child., 89 Thus, when the claimant can prove "1) an agreement to adopt,
2) performance by the child, and 3) the child's reliance on the agreement or
belief in [his or her] adoptive status," then the claimant will be entitled to
equitable relief based on adoption by estoppel. 90
With the estoppel theory, what you see is what you get: as the name
implies, the theory places less emphasis on specific, delineated requirements,
and instead focuses on equity and justice.91 Therefore, when a child has re-
lied upon representations by the decedent as to the child's adoptive status,
the estoppel theory will grant the child the right to inherit from the dece-
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 101.
85. Samek v. Sanders, 788 So. 2d 872, 875 (Alaska 2000).
86. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 101.
87. See, e.g., Luna v. Estate of Rodriguez, 906 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex. App. 1995).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 580 (citing Cavanaugh v. Davis, 235 S.W.2d 972, 974 (Tex. 1951) (emphasis
omitted)).
90. Id. at 579 (citing Defoeldvar v. Defoeldvar 666 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex. App. 1984)
(emphasis omitted)).
91. Bell, supra note 24, at 425-26.
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dent's estate, despite the child's adoptive status. 92  In Calista Corp. v.
Mann,93 the court held:
Where one takes a child into his home as his own, thereby volunta-
rily assuming the status of parent, and by reason thereof obtains
from the child the love, affection, companionship, and services
which ordinarily accrue to a parent, he is thereafter estopped to as-
sert that he did not adopt the child in the manner provided by law.
94
Equity rests on the notion that "equity regards as done what ought to
have been done." 95 In granting relief under the estoppel theory, courts gen-
erally focus on the nature of the relationship between the decedent and the
child.96 When the statements, admissions, and conduct of the decedent are
such that they provide ample proof of an agreement to adopt, it is within the
court's discretion to infer such an agreement from that evidence.97 Thus,
while a court may insist on proof of an express agreement to adopt, it is not
necessary because "equity [will nonetheless] estop[] the foster parent and his
privies from denying the relationship they represented to the child., 98 There-
fore, with or without an express agreement to adopt, where the parties acted
in good faith under the impression that the child was adopted, the decedent's
estate will be estopped from preventing the child from inheriting from the
intestate decedent.
99
92. See, e.g., id. at 426 ("Reliance provides the grounds for promissory estoppel, which is
applied as an equitable remedy when justice requires.").
93. 564 P.2d 53 (Alaska 1977).
94. Id. at 61 (quoting Mize v. Sims, 516 S.W.2d 561, 564 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974)).
95. Bell, supra note 24, at 425-26.
96. E.g., id. at 426.
97. Calista Corp., 564 P.2d at 61.
98. Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get
What and Why (The Impact of Adoptions, Adult Adoptions, and Equitable Adoptions on Intes-
tate Succession and Class Gifts), 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 775 (1984).
99. See id. But see Otero v. City of Albuquerque, 965 P.2d 354, 361 (N.M. Ct. App.
1998) ("[T]he equitably adopted child should not be treated as the legal child of the equitable
parent for all purposes. Only one who has detrimentally relied can claim an estoppel, and
only one who has caused the reliance can be estopped.") (citations omitted).
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III. OTHER STATES AND VIRTUAL ADOPTION
The majority of states will grant equitable relief for a virtually adopted
child in one form or another. 1°° Of at least thirty-eight jurisdictions that have
considered the doctrine, no less than twenty-seven have recognized and
upheld a claim of virtual adoption in intestate proceedings.' However, al-
though the doctrine is generally invoked in limited circumstances, several
courts have broadened the doctrine and applied it in unique situations in or-
der to avoid the unjust results of strict adherence to the law. 10 2 Likewise, a
handful of jurisdictions have upheld claims of virtual adoption in legal pro-
ceedings outside the realm of probate court.
10 3
A. Uniquely Divergent Cultures Necessitate Virtual Adoption: Calista
Corp. v. Mann
In 1977, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that the doctrine of virtual
adoption is an appropriate remedy in intestate proceedings. 104 In Calista
Corp., a case of first impression in Alaska, the claimants were the adoptive
daughters of shareholders of Calista Corp., and each sought the shares of the
corporation that they claimed to be entitled to under the Alaskan laws of in-
testate succession. 05  In order to inherit through the intestacy statutes,
Alaska required that the claimants qualified as "issue" of the decedents,
meaning "lineal descendants of all generations, with the relationship of par-
ent and child at each generation. ' 06 However, neither of the claimants were
the biological children of the decedents; instead, the girls claimed that they
were "culturally" or "traditionally" adopted by the deceased shareholders. 107
100. Sanderson v. Bathrick (In re Estate of Seader), 76 P.3d 1236, 1241 (Wyo. 2003)
(stating that "[t]he majority of states recognize equitable adoption").
101. Lankford v. Wright, 489 S.E.2d 604, 606 (N.C. 1997).
102. See, e.g., Calista Corp., 564 P.2d at 61 (holding that the unique cultural mosaic of the
Alaskan community justified the recognition of a virtual adoption claim); Luna v. Estate of
Rodriguez, 906 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex. App. 1995) (applying a less stringent standard with
which to find that the claimant was the virtually adopted son of the decedent).
103. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 104 (N.D. 2000) (holding that virtual
adoption applies to child support obligations).
104. Calista Corp., 564 P.2d at 61.
105. Id. at 54-55. In Calista Corp., there were two claimants: Katie Mann, who was
seeking shares of Calista Corporation and Sea Lion Corporation stock, and Catherine Peters,
who was seeking shares of Calista Corporation and Bethel Native Corporation stock. Id. at
55.
106. Id. at 59 (emphasis omitted).
107. Id.
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The appellant took the position that adoption, unknown at common law,
is purely statutory and that it must be "affirmatively proved by the person
claiming its existence."'' 0 8 The appellant argued that the laws of Alaska
"provide[d] the exclusive method for adoption" and, therefore, that the clai-
mants were not the children of the decedents for purposes of intestate proper-
ty distribution.'w Despite this argument, however, the appellant's reasoning
was flawed because he ignored the holdings from the twenty-six states that
had recognized virtual adoption and instead relied on the decisions from the
eight states that refused to recognize the doctrine." 0
Nonetheless, the court agreed with the claimants and held that equity
would be employed to avoid hardship to the child of an intestate decedent,
even if there was no valid legal adoption."1 ' The court analyzed the diversity
of cultures in Alaska and reasoned that the "cultural mosaic" of the Alaskan
community made it difficult to achieve "a unified justice system sensitive to
the needs of the various cultures."' 12 Accordingly, the court held that the
unique makeup of the native Alaskan community called for the implementa-
tion of the doctrine of virtual adoption in order to avoid unjust and intolera-
ble results to the adoptive children of intestate decedents." 3
B. Adoption by Estoppel at Work: Luna v. Estate of Rodriguez
In Luna v. Estate of Rodriguez,'14 the appellate court in Texas held that
equity requires a decree of adoption by estoppel when there is convincing
evidence of the necessary elements to establish a cause of action for a virtual
adoption by estoppel." 5 In Luna, Christopher Luna, the claimant, was the
biological son of Mary Helen Luna and the alleged adoptive son of the dece-
dent, Henry Rodriquez." 6 When the decedent died intestate, Christopher
attempted to determine his heirship, alleging his status to be that of the dece-
108. Calista Corp., 564 P.2d at 60 (quoting In re Bradley, 6 Alaska 89,91 (1918)).
109. Id. at 59-60.
110. See id. at 60.
111. See id. at 61-62.
112. Id. at 61.
113. Calista Corp., 564 P.2d at 61-62.
114. 906 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. App. 1995).
115. Id. at 581.
116. Id. at 578. Mary Helen had been awarded custody of Christopher when she divorced
Christopher's biological father, Alfred Luna. Id. Although Alfred's parental rights were
never terminated, Christopher alleged that he had a distant relationship with his biological
father and that his natural father had abandoned him. Id. Christopher also claimed that he
was "reared, cared for, and clothed" by the decedent, that he referred to the decedent as "dad,"
and that he was known in the community as the decedent's son. Luna, 906 S.W.2d at 578.
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dent's equitably adopted son.' 17 However, when Christopher filed his appli-
cation for declaration of heirship, he was met with opposition from the dece-
dent's brother and second wife.1"8 The trial court agreed with the defendants,
holding that Christopher failed to allege certain required elements of virtual
adoption, but the court of appeals ultimately reversed that decision." 9
To establish adoption by estoppel, there must be "clear, unequivocal,
and convincing evidence" of an agreement to adopt, coupled with perfor-
mance by the child in reliance on that agreement. 20 However, in Luna, the
appellate court reassessed the requisite elements to establish adoption by
estoppel and reversed the trial court, holding that proof of an agreement can
be shown by "circumstantial evidence. 12' The court also held that the
agreement can be made "with the child, the child's parents, or someone in
loco parentis. ' '122 Thus, where the child's natural parent has abandoned the
child, an agreement with the other natural parent is satisfactory to prove that
an agreement to adopt has taken place. 23 Looking at the record, the court
determined that an agreement to adopt did take place between the decedent
and the claimant's mother, and that the claimant relied on that agreement "by
conferring love, affection, companionship, and other benefits" to the dece-
dent.' 24 In the end, the court employed a lower standard to prove adoption by
estoppel, determined that Christopher's application for heirship did allege the
essential elements of virtual adoption by estoppel, and reversed the decision
of the trial court.
125
C. Virtual Adoption Compels the Imposition of Child Support Obligations:
Johnson v. Johnson
When a child is the center of a legal proceeding, the court will look to
fulfill the best interests of the child and make decisions which both reflect
and enhance the child's well-being.1 26 In Johnson v. Johnson,127 the Supreme
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 578, 583.
120. Id. at 581. A child who acts in reliance on an agreement does not necessarily act in
reliance "on an agreement to adopt or on representations about adoptive status," but rather he
acts in reliance on his belief in his "status" as an adopted child. Luna, 906 S.W.2d at 581.
121. Id.
122. Id. Loco parentis is defined as "[siupervision of a young adult by an administrative
body such as a university." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 858 (9th ed. 2009).
123. Luna, 906 S.W.2d at 581.
124. Id. at582.
125. See id.
126. See Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 105 (N.D. 2000).
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Court of North Dakota employed this line of reasoning and refused to restrict
the application of virtual adoption, holding that the facts and circumstances
of the case warranted the imposition of child support on the virtually adopted
child's father.'28
In Johnson, Madonna and Antonyio Johnson acted as Jessica's natural
parents since she was three months old, and they led her to believe that she
was their child for all intents and purposes. 129 For example,
Antonyio listed Jessica as his dependent on his federal tax returns.
The Air Force listed Jessica as Antonyio's dependent daughter on
his transfer orders and for medical benefits, placing her under his
social security number.... [T]he Johnsons consistently called her
Jessica Johnson. Jessica was baptized in Antonyio's family's
church in Georgia .... 130
Thus, although they never formally adopted her, the Johnsons instituted
adoption proceedings in two different states and regularly maintained that
Jessica was their daughter. 13' However, when the Johnsons later divorced,
there was some debate as to Jessica's adoptive status and, accordingly, Ma-
donna's right to child support from Antonyio. 132 The trial court ruled in fa-
vor of Antonyio, determining that he was not obligated to pay child support;
however, when Madonna later appealed the decision, the court looked at the
relationship of Jessica and Antonyio and reversed that decision.133
The Supreme Court of North Dakota noted that a contract to adopt is
necessary to establish virtual adoption in inheritance proceedings, but it is
not sufficient in the domestic context.13 4 Courts generally require more di-
rect evidence supporting the notion that there is a true parent-child relation-
ship between the parties. 135 Here, the court likened Jessica and Antonyio's
relationship to that of a stepparent and stepchild, but determined that the con-
tract to adopt Jessica took the case outside the realm of normal stepparent-
stepchild obligations. 36 The court reasoned that in a normal stepparent-
stepchild relationship,
127. 617 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 2000).
128. Id. at 105.
129. Id. at 100.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 100.
132. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 101.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 108-09.
135. See id. at 109.
136. Id. at 107-08.
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the child is aware that the stepparent is just that, the spouse of the
child's natural parent .... [But] [i]n the case at bar, Antonyio and
Madonna led Jessica to believe she was their natural child ....
[T]he parties engaged in an elaborate fiction, which is not a part of
the normal stepparent-stepchild relationship.. ..' 37
Thus, although there was a contract to adopt Jessica, the court also looked at
the nature of the relationship between Jessica and Antonyio.
138
The court ultimately determined that Jessica and Antonyio's relation-
ship was comparable with that of a true parent and child, and therefore justi-
fied the imposition of Antonyio's child support obligations as Jessica's adop-
tive father. 3 9 The court reasoned that statutory adoption and virtual adoption
coexist and that North Dakota's public policy required the "protection of the
welfare and best interests of children."' 40  Moreover, looking at the "in-
creased prevalence of blended families in [today's] society," the court held
that constraining the application of virtual adoption to inheritance proceed-
ings would be "detrimental" to virtually adopted children.' 4'
D. The Inequities of a Testate Estate: In re Estate of Seader
It is well settled that virtual adoption is an equitable doctrine that is
generally limited to intestacy proceedings. 142 However, Sanderson v. Bath-
rick (In re Estate of Seader)143 challenged this long-standing principle when
the decedent's grandsons sought to inherit their mother's share of the dece-
dent's estate, as it was devised to their mother in the decedent's will.'"
The claimants, Kim and Kirk Olive, were the biological children of Ju-
lie, the virtually adopted daughter of the decedent. 145 In his will, the dece-
dent left one-third of his estate to Julie and the remaining interest to his two
biological sons. 14 6 However, Julie died before the decedent, and the other
137. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 107-08.
138. See id. at 109.
139. Id. In its decision, the court noted that North Dakota precedent justified the recogni-
tion of virtual adoption in the context of child support and child custody. Id. at 105. Further,
although virtual adoption had previously been applied primarily to inheritance proceedings,
the court found that the State's child support guidelines did not prohibit the imposition of
child support obligations on a parent who has virtually adopted a child. See id. at 108.
140. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 105.
141. Id. at 107.
142. Sanderson v. Bathrick (In re Estate of Seader), 76 P.3d 1236, 1241 (Wyo. 2003).
143. 76 P.3d 1236 (Wyo. 2003).
144. Id. at 1237-38.
145. Id. at 1238.
146. Id.
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beneficiaries of the estate challenged Kim and Kirk's ability to inherit their
mother's share of her adoptive father's estate. 1
47
The decedent's biological sons argued that Julie's share had lapsed,
prohibiting her sons from inheriting her share, and that Julie's share therefore
was to be divided between her brothers. 148 However, according to Wyoming
statutes, whether or not Julie's share had lapsed would be contingent upon
the court finding Julie to be a "lineal descendent" of the decedent's grandpa-
rent. 1 49 The court ultimately determined that Julie was not the collateral rela-
tive or lineal descendent of the decedent, either biologically or through legal
adoption, and therefore did not qualify as a lineal descendent under the sta-
tute. 150
When a decedent dies testate, the court is to fulfill the decedent's intent
as it is laid out in the terms of the will. 15' Thus, although Julie was not legal-
ly adopted by the decedent, she was nonetheless entitled to a portion of his
estate as per the terms of his will. 52 Notwithstanding Julie's right to inherit-
ance, however, the court ultimately concluded that the statute was unambi-
guous and could not be applied to an equitable doctrine in order to "broaden
the class of persons identified by the statute."'' 53 Accordingly, because Julie
was not a lineal descendent of the decedent, her biological children could not
invoke the doctrine of virtual adoption to a testate estate in order to inherit
their mother's share of the estate. 154
147. Id.
148. See In re Estate of Seader, 76 P.3d at 1245.
149. Id. The court held:
The phrase "lineal descendent" is not defined in the statute. The word "lineal" connotes
"a direct blood relative," and "lineal descent" indicates "[diescent in a direct or straight line, as
from father or grandfather to son or grandson." "Lineal descent" is contrasted with "collateral
descent," which refers to "descent in a collateral or oblique line, from brother to brother or
cousin to cousin. With collateral descent, the donor and donee are related through a common
ancestor.
Id. (citations omitted).
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. See In re Estate of Seader, 76 P.3d at 1245 (holding that equitable adoption is the
judicial remedy for an intent "gap" when the decedent dies intestate, but that a decedent who
dies testate avoids judicial intervention since "there is no gap to be filled. We know the dece-
dent's intent from the terms of the will.").
153. Id. "This case serves as a good example of why the doctrine of equitable adoption
should not be applied to testate estates-the result may negate both legislative and testamenta-
ry intent." Id. at 1245-46.
154. See id. at 1245.
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IV. FLORIDA AND VIRTUAL ADOPTION
Every court that considers a claim for virtual adoption adheres closely
to the equitable maxim "equity regards that as done which ought to have
been done."' 5 In theory, the doctrine serves to promote fairness and justice
and seeks to protect children who were not formally or legally adopted ac-
cording to statutory requirements. 56 The doctrine was originally intended to
allow children of intestate decedents to inherit as though the children were
legally adopted. 57 However, because virtual adoption is an equitable reme-
dy, many courts have broadened the doctrine and applied it in other areas of
the law as well. 158 These courts reason that despite a child's adoptive status,
the child should nonetheless be put in the same position as though he or she
were naturally born or formally adopted.159
The state of Florida first recognized the doctrine of virtual adoption in
1943, but the Supreme Court of Florida stopped short of setting forth any
definitive requirements to establish the doctrine or circumstances that would
render the application of the doctrine appropriate.16° Instead, the court relied
on case law from other jurisdictions and applied a broad standard with which
to determine that the claimant was entitled to equitable relief.
16
'
Although Florida did not set the precedent for virtual adoption cases,
the doctrine has evolved in the almost seventy years that it has been recog-
nized in Florida. 62 Be that as it may, Florida courts have yet to follow their
out-of-state counterparts in granting equitable relief to virtually adopted
children outside of probate court. 163 Thus, while other jurisdictions have
155. Sheffield v. Barry, 14 So. 2d 417, 419 (Fla. 1943); Lankford v. Wright, 489 S.E.2d
604, 606 (N.C. 1997); Kelley v. Flagship Nat'l Bank of Boynton Beach (In re Estate of Wall),
502 So. 2d 531, 532 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
156. Warner, supra note 62, at 583. For a discussion of the statutory elements, see pages
557-59, supra.
157. E.g., Sheffield, 14 So. 2d at 419-20.
158. See, e.g., Williams v. Dorrell, 714 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that the virtually adopted child of the decedent was considered an "heir" and there-
fore entitled to the decedent's property as per Florida's homestead provision); Johnson v.
Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 109 (N.D. 2000) (holding that virtual adoption applies to child sup-
port obligations).
159. See, e.g., Johnson, 617 N.W.2d. at 108.
160. See Sheffield, 14 So. 2d at 419-20.
161. See Part IV(A), infra.
162. Warner, supra note 62, at 584.
163. See Miller v. Paczier, 591 So. 2d 321, 322 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam)
(holding that virtual adoption does not warrant compensation in the case of a virtually adopted
adult); Grant v. Sedco Corp., 364 So. 2d 774, 774-5 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding
that virtual adoption does not warrant compensation in the case of a wrongful death); Tarver
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recognized the rights of virtually adopted children in cases regarding child
support obligations and child custody, Florida courts consistently limit the
doctrine to intestacy proceedings.' 64 As a result, many children in Florida
continue to suffer from the injustice that the equitable doctrine of virtual
adoption was intended to counteract. 65
A. Florida Invokes the Doctrine of Virtual Adoption: The Case of Shef-
field v. Barry
In the landmark case Sheffield v. Barry, 6" the Supreme Court of Florida
held that an oral contract to adopt would be an enforceable contract right
where there was "performance on the one part and partial performance on the
other.' 167 In Sheffield, the child's natural mother and adoptive parents agreed
that the latter would assume all parental rights of the child, but the adoptive
father died intestate before finalizing the child's formal adoption. 68 Thus,
although the child had no adequate remedy at law, the court relied upon
precedent from other jurisdictions and held that the child was nonetheless
entitled to equitable relief. 1
69
In Sheffield, it was unclear whether the agreement to adopt was oral or
written, but the court held that such a distinction would be negligible in a
case of virtual adoption. 70 Instead, the court focused on the relationship
between the child and the decedent in order to determine the child's rights to
the decedent's estate. 17' The court reasoned that although the decedent failed
to legally adopt the child, the partial performance of his parental obligations
v. Evergreen Sod Farms, Inc., 533 So. 2d 765, 767 (Fla. 1988) (holding that virtual adoption
does not warrant compensation in the case of a worker's compensation proceeding).
164. See Warner, supra note 62, at 587-88.
165. See Miller, 591 So. 2d at 322; Grant, 364 So. 2d at 775; Tarver, 533 So. 2d at 767.
166. 14 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1943) (en banc).
167. Id. at 420.
168. Id. at 418-19. The adoptive mother died in 1934 and the adoptive father died intes-
tate in 1942. Id. at 419. However, throughout the adoptive parents' lives, the child was told,
and believed, that she had been legally adopted. Id. at 418. It was not until her adoptive
father died in 1942 that she learned that she was not legally adopted. Sheffield, 14 So. 2d at
418-19.
169. Id. at 419-20. Prior to Sheffield, a child who was not legally adopted had no inherit-
ance rights under Florida's intestacy statutes. See id. at 419. However, it was the plaintiffs
contention that the Court "should invoke in her behalf the equitable maxim: equity regards
that as done which ought to have been done," and the Court agreed, stating: "We have the
view that this relief was justified and that the equitable maxim is appropriate to the condition
reflected in the pleading." Id.
170. Id. at 420.
171. See Sheffield, 14 So. 2d at 419.
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gave the child an enforceable contract right, ultimately allowing her to inhe-
rit from his estate.112 In the end, the court applied basic theories of contract
law, holding that the child was entitled to specific performance of the agree-
ment to adopt between the child's natural mother and adoptive parents.'
73
B. The Doctrine Begins to Take Shape: Laney v. Roberts
In 1982, Florida's Third District Court of Appeal held that a virtual
adoption had taken place, despite the fact that the claimant knew she was not
legally adopted. 174 In Laney v. Roberts, 75 the claimant's biological parents
entered into an agreement with the Merickels, the child's aunt and uncle,
which stipulated that the Merickels were to adopt, raise, and educate the
child to the best of their ability. 76 Accordingly, when Mary Irene (Irene)
began living with the Merickels in 1932, she renounced all ties with her bio-
logical parents and referred to her aunt and uncle as "mother and dad."'77
Moreover, Irene considered the Merickels to be her parents and lived with
them until she got married.'7 8
When Mrs. Merickel died, however, Irene was prevented from inherit-
ing from her estate.' 79 The trial court held that Irene was not the legally or
virtually adopted daughter of the decedent, as evidenced by the fact that she
signed her marriage certificate with her birth name, and not the decedent's
last name. 80 Nonetheless, taking this isolated incident into consideration, the
court determined that "[s]uch paltry evidence" was insufficient to overcome
the breadth of evidence establishing Irene's adoptive status.' 8 '
On appeal, the court applied the reasoning employed in Sheffield and
held that specific performance of an agreement to adopt would be granted
when the last surviving foster parent dies intestate.'82 Thus, in spite of the
fact that Irene did not learn of the agreement between her parents and the
172. Id.
173. See id. (holding that the child should be entitled to the rights of the estate that she
would have had, had her adoption been legalized).
174. See Laney v. Roberts, 409 So. 2d 201, 203 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
175. 409 So. 2d 201 (Ha. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
176. Id. at 202.
177. Id. at 201-02.
178. See id. at 202.
179. Id. at 202-03. Mr. Merickel died intestate in 1979 and Mrs. Merickel died intestate
later that year. Laney, 409 So. 2d at 202. Irene later brought an action against the co-personal
representatives of Mrs. Merickel's estate claiming that she had been virtually adopted by the
Merickels, but the trial court disagreed. Id. at 202-03.
180. See id. at 203.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 203.
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Merickels until Mrs. Merickel's death, the court determined that she had
established the elements of virtual adoption by clear and convincing evi-
dence. 83 The court reasoned that Irene's performance was "satisfied by liv-
ing in the home of the [Merickels]" and that her lack of knowledge of the
agreement was therefore irrelevant."8
C. Virtual Adoption and Florida's Homestead Provision: Williams v.
Dorrell
Florida's homestead provision provides, in pertinent part, that a dece-
dent's property is exempt from a court-ordered sale of the property and that
the exemption "'shall inure to the surviving spouse or heirs of the owner. '-185
Under Florida law, the term "heirs" is defined as "those persons ... who are
entitled under the statutes of intestate succession to the property of a dece-
dent."'86 However, in order to determine legal heirs for the purpose of intes-
tate succession of real or personal property, Florida's homestead provision
applies a loose interpretation of Florida's intestacy statutes.'87
In Williams v. Dorrell,88 Florida's Third District Court of Appeal held
that a virtually adopted child constituted an "heir" for the purpose of Flori-
da's homestead provision.'89 The court determined that the claimant satisfied
the requisite elements necessary to establish that she was the virtually
adopted daughter of the decedent.' 90 As such, the court held that Florida's
homestead provision extended to include a virtually adopted child, and the
claimant was therefore entitled to an interest in the decedent's property. 9'
D. The Inequities of the Equitable Doctrine
1. A Contract to Adopt Is Insufficient
A claim of virtual adoption invariably begins with an agreement to
adopt.' 92 Thus, when a claimant can establish that there is direct evidence of
183. Laney, 409 So. 2d at 203.
184. Id.
185. Williams v. Dorrell, 714 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting FLA.
CONST. art X, § 4(b)).
186. FLA. STAT. § 731.201(20) (2010).
187. Williams, 714 So. 2d at 576.
188. 714 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
189. Id. at 576.
190. Id. at 575.
191. Id. at576.
192. Miller v. Paczier, 591 So. 2d 321, 322 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam).
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an oral or written contract providing for the child's adoption, courts are more
inclined to continue with a virtual adoption analysis. 193 Nevertheless, even if
a claimant can prove the elements of virtual adoption by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, courts are still reluctant to expand the doctrine beyond its con-
ventional reach.
194
In Grant v. Sedco,195 Mikel Marks was raised by the decedent pursuant
to an agreement between the decedent and Marks' biological mother. 96 Al-
though he was never legally adopted, Marks was the decedent's child in the
traditional sense.' 97 However, when the decedent died in an automobile ac-
cident, Marks was denied compensation for his adoptive mother's death. 98
The court recognized that Marks was the virtually adopted son of the
decedent for all intents and purposes, but nonetheless held that virtual adop-
tion would not warrant relief in the case of wrongful death. 99 The court rea-
soned that a virtual adoption provides an equitable remedy through the en-
forcement of a contract right but that it does not create the relationship of a
parent and child.200 Accordingly, the court concluded that the Florida
Wrongful Death Act would not grant relief to a minor child that is neither the
natural or legally adopted child of the decedent.2°'
Ten years later, the Supreme Court of Florida relied on the arguments
set forth in Grant and ruled that a virtual adoption would not warrant relief in
the case of a worker's compensation proceeding.20 2 In Tarver v. Evergreen
Sod Farms, Inc.,2°3 the court ultimately held that a virtual adoption was not
akin to a legal adoption, despite the fact that the elements of virtual adoption
193. See, e.g., id.
194. See generally Tarver v. Evergreen Sod Farms, Inc., 533 So. 2d 765, 767 (Fla. 1988)
(holding that a virtual adoption is not sufficient where the decedent is killed in an industrial
accident and the virtually adopted child seeks compensation under the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act); Grant v. Sedco Corp., 364 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding
that virtual adoption does not apply to a minor child, who is neither the biological child nor
legally adopted child of the decedent, in the case of wrongful death). But see Johnson v.
Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 105 (N.D. 2000) (holding that virtual adoption applies to child sup-
port obligations).
195. 364 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
196. Id. at 774.
197. See id.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 775 ("Although the limitations upon recovery by an equitably adopted child
might seem harsh, the Florida Wrongful Death Act does not compensate all those aggrieved
by the death of another. It only compensates some and in certain ways.").
200. Grant, 364 So. 2d at 775.
201. Id.
202. Tarver v. Evergreen Sod Farms, Inc., 533 So. 2d 765, 766-67 (Fla. 1988).
203. 533 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1988).
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had been satisfied.2°4 The court reasoned that the doctrine of virtual adoption
is intended to avoid unfair results stemming from intestacy statutes, and it is
not to be utilized before the death of an adoptive parent.205 The court con-
cluded that the worker's compensation statute was unambiguous and, accor-
dingly, refused to extend the doctrine of virtual adoption to a worker's com-
pensation claim.
20 6
In 1991, Florida's Third District Court of Appeal again denied the peti-
tioner, the virtually adopted son of the decedent, the relief that he sought.
207
In Miller v. Paczier,208 Florida's Third District Court of Appeal held that a
claim of virtual adoption, while a valid and well-recognized exception to the
Florida Probate Code, is not applicable when the claimant is an adult. 20 9 In
Miller, the claimant was the decedent's adult nephew who asserted that he
was entitled to the decedent's estate as the decedent's adopted son and not as
the decedent's nephew.2 0 Focusing on the nature of the relationship between
the claimant and the decedent, it was evident that the two had developed a
stronger bond than that of a typical nephew and aunt or uncle.21 ' Notwith-
standing his adoptive status, however, the court declined to extend the doc-
trine to virtually adopted adults.212 The court reasoned that expanding the
doctrine "beyond the purpose for which it was conceived [would] open the
door of the probate courts to fraudulent and frivolous claims.
213
204. Id. at 767.
205. Id.
206. Id. Under the worker's compensation statute, "'Child' includes a posthumous child, a
child legally adopted prior to the injury of the employee, and a stepchild or acknowledged
illegitimate child dependent upon the deceased." Id. at 766 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 440.02(5)
(1988)). The court held that a virtual adoption "[did] not create the legal relationship of parent
and child within the meaning of 'legal adoption' as required in the workers' compensation
statute." Tarver, 533 So. 2d at 767.
207. Miller v. Paczier, 591 So. 2d 321, 323 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam).
208. 591 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam).
209. Id. at 323.
210. Id. at 322 The court proffered:
[The claimant] alleges that during his adulthood, he developed a close relationship with his
aunt and uncle, to the point that they regarded him as a son. He contends that this close rela-
tionship gave rise to an implied contract to adopt him and that he should take an intestate share
as a son, rather than the smaller share he would receive as a nephew.
Id.
211. Id.
212. Miller, 591 So. 2d at 322-23.
213. Id. at 323.
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2. "Enough" Is Not Enough
Since 1943, Florida courts have honored and enforced an oral or written
agreement to adopt when a virtually adopted child's parent dies intestate.1 4
In Sheffield, Florida's seminal virtual adoption case, the court recognized a
claim for virtual adoption, 215 but the court's decision did little to develop the
doctrine.21 6 It was not until 1985 that Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal
set forth the essential elements required to establish virtual adoption. 17
In order to determine that a claimant has been virtually adopted, he or
she must prove the necessary elements to establish that an adoption has taken
place.218 When a claimant cannot establish all five elements by clear and
convincing evidence, however, a court will not grant the claimant the relief
that he or she seeks.219
In Urick v. McFarland,220 Florida's Second District Court of Appeal
held that without an agreement to adopt, satisfaction of the remaining ele-
ments of virtual adoption would not suffice.22' In Urick, George Urick lived
with his mother and the decedent in the same capacity as that of a traditional
family, and Urick maintained a true parent-child relationship with the dece-
dent.222 Further, although the decedent never adopted him, "Mr. Urick ac-
cepted [the decedent] as his 'dad,' and [the decedent] treated Mr. Urick like a
214. Poole v. Burnett (In re Heirs of Hodge), 470 So. 2d 740, 741 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
215. Sheffield v. Barry, 14 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1943) (en banc).
216. See, e.g., Williams v. Estate of Pender, 738 So. 2d 453, 454 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1999).
217. In re Heirs of Hodge, 470 So. 2d at 741. Before Hodge, Florida courts deciding
virtual adoption claims often adopted the reasoning set forth by other jurisdictions, noting that
virtual adoption was a "rarity" in Florida. See id. Be that as it may, probate courts throughout
the state have long required that a claim for virtual adoption be proved by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. See Laney v. Roberts, 409 So. 2d 201, 203 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
218. See, e.g., Williams v. Dorrel, 714 So. 2d 574, 575-76 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
219. See, e.g., Douglass v. Frazier (In re Estate of Musil), 965 So. 2d 1157, 1161 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 2007) ("Despite the failure of proof on the fourth element, the probate court
found-based on equitable principles-that a virtual adoption had occurred. Here, the probate
court fell into error."); Urick v. McFarland, 625 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1993) ("Although [the claimant] proved all remaining elements of [virtual adoption], without
proof of the agreement he cannot prevail.").
220. 625 So. 2d at 1253 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
221. Id. at 1254.
222. Id. at 1253-54. George Urick's biological parents got divorced when he was three
years old, but Urick continued to live with his father until he was fifteen. Id. at 1253. When
Urick's biological father died, however, Urick began living with his mother and the decedent.
Id. at 1253. Although the decedent never adopted Urick, they maintained the relationship of a
father and son. Urick, 625 So. 2d at 1254.
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son." '223 When the decedent died, however, Urick was not entitled to any of
the decedent's estate.2 24 The court reasoned that although Urick had "ful-
filled the responsibilities that usually befall a son," Urick had nonetheless
failed to prove an agreement to adopt between the decedent and Urick's nat-
ural parents.2  Consequently, despite Urick's proof of all of the remaining
elements of virtual adoption, the court held that "without proof of the agree-
ment, he cannot prevail. 226 As such, Urick was not the virtually adopted son
of the decedent and, accordingly, the court denied George Urick's claim to
inherit from the decedent's estate.227
Nearly fifteen years after its decision in Urick, Florida's Second District
Court of Appeal again determined that failure to prove all five elements
would not be sufficient to prevail on a claim of virtual adoption.2 8 In Doug-
lass v. Frazier (In re Estate of Musil),229 the court reiterated its previous
holding that the elements of virtual adoption must all be shown by clear and
convincing evidence.230 Thus, while there may be evidence supporting some
of the required elements, anything short of "clear and convincing" is not
enough. 31
V. VIRTUAL ADOPTION OUTSIDE OF PROBATE COURT
A legally adopted child is afforded all the rights and privileges that bio-
logical children enjoy.232 Thus, regardless of the nature of the relationship
between an adoptive parent and child, the child will nonetheless be treated as
the lineal descendent of that parent.233 That being said, when an adoptive
223. Id. at 1253.
224. Id. Both Urick's mother and the decedent died intestate. Id. at 1254. Urick's mother
died before the decedent, and upon her death the decedent received the majority of his wife's
property. Id. Thus, in order for Urick to inherit from the decedent, he would have to be a
"lineal descendent." Urick, 625 So. 2d at 1254.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See id. at 1253.
228. Douglass v. Frazier (In re Estate of Musil), 965 So. 2d 1157, 1161 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2007).
229. 965 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
230. Id. at 1160.
231. See id. at 1161 ("[T]he probate court's findings establish without question that [the
claimant] did not prove the fourth element of virtual adoption by clear and convincing evi-
dence. Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the probate court's final order ... [that the
claimant] was the virtually adopted son of the decedent.").
232. Sanderson v. Bathrick (In re Estate of Seader), 76 P.3d 1236, 1239 (Wyo. 2003).
233. FLA. STAT. § 732.108(l) (2010).
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parent dies intestate, his or her biological children and legally adopted child-
ren will be considered equally under Florida's intestacy statutes.
234
On the contrary, however, when an agreement or promise to adopt a
child has not come to fruition in the eyes of the law, that child may not be
recognized at all.23" Accordingly, regardless of the nature of the relationship
between the alleged adoptive parent and child, the child may nonetheless be
treated as though he or she has no ties whatsoever to the parent. 36 Conse-
quently, when an alleged adoptive parent dies intestate, his or her alleged
adopted children may have no remedy at all, legal or equitable.237
Virtual adoption is the judicially created doctrine intended to resolve
this ethical quandary.238 Being an equitable remedy, it is most often em-
ployed in order to avoid the injustice that flows from intestacy statutes.239 To
date, virtual adoption has been recognized in a number of cases in which the
decedent died intestate, and but for this equitable remedy, the claimants
would otherwise be without any recourse.240 Be that as it may, virtual adop-
tion is an extremely limited doctrine and, needless to say, so too are the
rights of those who are virtually adopted.
Virtual adoption is founded on the notion that when a parent dies intes-
tate, the child should not be precluded from inheriting from the decedent's
estate, despite the parent's failure to procure a legal adoption. 24' Hence, the
doctrine has traditionally been limited to intestacy proceedings and has found
little merit outside of probate court.242 Further, although virtual adoption has
made extensive progress since its inception in Florida in 1943, the doctrine
still remains unpredictable. Unlike other jurisdictions which have already
exhibited their willingness to progress at the same rate as today's population,
Florida has yet to see the correlation between strong public policy in favor of
the family unit and applying this policy in virtual adoption proceedings out-
side of probate court. As a result, Florida is falling by the wayside as it
shockingly seeks to inhibit the rights of its citizens both in law and in equity.
234. Id.
235. See Warner, supra note 62, at 586.
236. See, e.g., Grant v. Sedco Corp., 364 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
237. See id.
238. Warner, supra note 62, at 583.
239. Bd. of Educ. v. Browning, 635 A.2d 373, 377 (Md. 1994).
240. See Calista Corp. v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53, 61-62 (Alaska 1977); Sheffield v. Barry, 14
So. 2d 417, 419-20 (Fla. 1943) (en banc); Laney v. Roberts, 409 So. 2d 201, 203 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Luna v. Estate of Rodriguez, 906 S.W.2d 576, 581 (Tex. App. 1995).
241. Warner, supra note 62, at 583.
242. See, e.g., Grant, 364 So. 2d at 775.
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A. Florida Fails to Follow Suit: Inconsistencies Lead to an Inequitable
Doctrine
Florida courts have many a time granted and denied atypical claims of
virtually adopted children, often leading to ambiguous and inconsistent re-
sults.2 43 For example, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal has pre-
viously held that virtual adoption would warrant relief in an intestacy pro-
ceeding, but not in the case of a wrongful death. 244 Similarly, Florida's Third
District Court of Appeal explicitly denied the claims of virtually adopted
adults, reasoning that expanding the doctrine would propel it beyond its in-
tended purpose.245 Notwithstanding these decisions, however, the court had
no qualms about extending the doctrine to consider a virtually adopted child
an "heir" under Florida's homestead provision.246 The court also willingly
held that a virtually adopted child is entitled to inherit from an intestate de-
cedent's estate, despite the fact that the child is unaware of the agreement to
adopt her.247
Virtual adoption is to be invoked where "justice, equity and good faith
require it,''248 but conflicting decisions from various jurisdictions have cer-
tainly contributed to the discrepancies among the courts. 249 For instance, the
Supreme Court of Florida has said that the doctrine is not to be applied prior
to the death of an adoptive parent,250 while the Supreme Court of North Da-
kota held that the child's welfare and best interests should be protected.251
Accordingly, the Florida court held that virtual adoption would not apply to a
worker's compensation proceeding,252 whereas the North Dakota court used
the doctrine to compel child support obligations. 253 Florida courts adhere to
a strict interpretation of virtual adoption, arguing that equitable remedies do
243. See, e.g., Williams v. Dorrell, 714 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998);
Miller v. Paczier, 591 So. 2d 321, 323 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam); Laney, 409
So. 2d at 203; Grant, 364 So. 2d at 775.
244. Grant, 364 So. 2d at 775; see supra p. 571.
245. Miller, 591 So. 2d at 323; see supra p. 572.
246. Williams, 714 So. 2d at 576; see supra p. 570.
247. Laney, 409 So. 2d at 203; see supra pp. 569-70.
248. Lankford v. Wright, 489 S.E.2d 604, 607 (N.C. 1997).
249. See, e.g., Tarver v. Evergreen Sod Farms, Inc., 533 So. 2d 765, 767 (Fla. 1988) (hold-
ing that virtual adoption would not warrant relief in a worker's compensation proceeding).
But see Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 105-06 (N.D. 2000) (holding that virtual adop-
tion would warrant relief in a divorce proceeding, obliging the adoptive father to continue
paying child support).
250. Tarver, 533 So. 2d at 767.
251. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 105.
252. Tarver, 533 So. 2d at 767.
253. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 105.
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not comport to the statutory scheme.254 Thus, regardless of the negative con-
sequences of limiting the doctrine, Florida consistently maintains that it is to
be invoked exclusively upon the intestate death of an adoptive parent and
solely to provide recourse for virtually adopted children. 55
Nevertheless, when the unique circumstances of a case require it, equity
should resolve what the law cannot. As early as 1977, the Supreme Court of
Alaska followed this logic and determined that the application of virtual
adoption was necessitated by the state's vast cultural landscape. z 6  The
Alaska court reasoned that, where a legal remedy is unavailable, virtual
adoption is an appropriate vehicle with which to avoid hardship to virtually
adopted children.257 Despite this long-standing principle, however, Florida
has yet to follow suit with regard to granting appropriate remedies and equit-
able relief.258 Likewise, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal has often
denied claims of virtually adopted children, arguing that the alleged adoption
was not established by clear and convincing evidence. 2 9 This Florida court
injudiciously ignored the relationship between the claimant and decedent in
spite of the fact that it would be unjust and inequitable to do so.
In each of the aforementioned cases, Florida courts have failed to pro-
vide justice and equity to the virtually adopted children of intestate dece-
dents.260 The courts recognize that the doctrine was intended as a means to
supplement the lack of a legal remedy, but nonetheless refuse to concede to
the reasoning of courts in other jurisdictions. Further, although the doctrine
should be used in good faith to provide relief to virtually adopted children,
Florida courts maintain that applying it to extraordinary circumstances would
inescapably lead to an influx of fraudulent claims. 26 1 Thus, while courts in
other jurisdictions increasingly apply the doctrine outside of probate court,
Florida continues to rely on its own precedent and has thus far declined to
extend the doctrine beyond its conventional reach.262 As a result, virtually
254. See Tarver, 533 So. 2d at 767.
255. See id.
256. Calista Corp v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53, 61-62 (Alaska 1977).
257. Id. at 61.
258. See Douglass v. Frazier (In re Estate of Musil), 965 So. 2d 1157, 1161 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2007); Urick v. McFarland, 625 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
259. In re Estate of Musil, 965 So. 2d at 1161; see Urick, 625 So. 2d at 1254.
260. See, e.g., Tarver v. Evergreen Sod Farms, Inc., 533 So. 2d 765, 767 (Fla. 1988); In re
Estate of Musil, 965 So. 2d at 1161; Urick, 625 So. 2d at 1254; Miller v. Paczier, 591 So. 2d
321, 323 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam); Grant v. Sedco Corp., 364 So. 2d 774,
775 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
261. Miller, 591 So. 2d at 323.
262. Compare, e.g., Tarver, 533 So. 2d at 767 with Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 107 (N.D.
2000).
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adopted children are not getting the recognition they deserve, and they con-
tinue to suffer the harsh consequences of Florida's strict adherence to the
law.
B. Expanding the Doctrine
In theory, virtual adoption is employed "to render a more equitable out-
come," but in practice, the results are quite conflicting.263 If, as the authori-
ties contend, the doctrine truly rests on the theory that "equity regards that as
done that which ought to have been done," 264 then these same authorities
should also contend that limiting the application of the doctrine to intestacy
proceedings is inherently inequitable. Instead, however, courts consistently
deny claims of virtually adopted children, arguing that a virtual adoption
does not supplement or create the relationship of a true parent and child.265
These same courts also argue that virtual adoption is not akin to a legal adop-
tion266 and that virtual adoption merely provides an equitable remedy through
the enforcement of a contract right.
267
In Florida, when the last surviving parent dies intestate, the decedent's
entire estate is to pass to the descendants of the decedent.268 However, Flori-
da statutes strictly define "descendant, '" 269 and when read in conjunction with
the definition of "child," Florida law expressly excludes stepchildren, foster
children, and remote descendants. 270 Thus, although adopted children are
considered descendents of the adopting parent, Florida statutes solely refer to
legally adopted children and do not make reference to those who were mere-
ly virtually or equitably adopted.27'
It may be so that virtual adoption is not wholly analogous to legal adop-
tion, but courts often lose sight of the fact that the doctrine originated as a
means to provide equitable relief in cases where legal relief was not availa-
263. See Warner, supra note 62, at 585.
264. Sheffield v. Barry, 14 So. 2d 417, 419 (Fla. 1943) (en banc); see also Kelley v. Flag-
ship Nat'l Bank of Boynton Beach (In re Estate of Wall), 502 So. 2d 531, 532 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1987); Lankford v. Wright, 489 S.E.2d 604,606 (N.C. 1997).
265. See, e.g., Grant v. Sedco Corp., 364 So. 2d 774, 774 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
266. Tarver v. Evergreen Sod Farms, Inc., 533 So. 2d 765, 767 (Fla. 1988).
267. Grant, 364 So. 2d at 775.
268. FLA. STAT. § 732.103(1) (2010).
269. See id. § 731.201(9) (defining descendants as "a person in any generational level
down the applicable individual's descending line and includes children, grandchildren, and
more remote descendents.").
270. See id. § 731.201(3).
271. See id. § 732.108(1).
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ble.272 When a decedent dies intestate, virtual adoption is designed to allow
the decedent's virtually adopted child to inherit from the decedent's estate as
if the child were legally adopted.273 Virtual adoption has been utilized in
divorce proceedings as well, compelling the parents of virtually adopted
children to continue with their child support obligations.274 Courts have also
applied the doctrine in cases with unusual fact patterns,275 in cases with state-
specific homestead provisions,276 and in cases where the elements of virtual
adoption were not entirely complied with.277
Case law undoubtedly supports the idea that a virtually adopted child
can inherit from an intestate decedent's estate. 278 Even so, there are many
cases in which the court confirmed that a virtual adoption had taken place,
but nonetheless denied the petitioner's claims. 27 9 Thus, it seems wholly con-
tradictory that Florida courts grant equitable remedies to virtually adopted
children in some circumstances, but continually refuse to provide them in
others.
What's more, probate courts generally focus on the testator or dece-
dent's intent in distributing or administering the decedent's estate, while
family law courts generally focus on what is in the best interests of the
child. 28° This, too, is inherently contradictory. How is one court supposed to
put the best interest of the child first, while another court will not even rec-
ognize that same child as being legitimate? It is impossible for a virtually
adopted child to ever be granted relief if courts are continually skirting the
line between decisions which may be equitable and decisions which are
plainly unjust. In order to avoid this anomaly, probate courts and family law
courts need to align and, where appropriate, always focus on what is in the
best interests of the child. Likewise, as virtual adoption is sure to become an
issue of increasing prevalence, courts need to be more steadfast in adopting
principles of equity and public policy in order to more accurately assess in-
dividual cases.
Further, while the criteria may be the same in evaluating claims of vir-
tual adoption, no two courts employ the same reasoning when applying the
272. See Warner, supra note 62, at 585.
273. E.g., Miller v. Paczier, 591 So. 2d 321, 322 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per cu-
riam).
274. Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 105 (N.D. 2000).
275. See Calista Corp. v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53, 61-62 (Alaska 1977).
276. Williams v. Dorrell, 714 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
277. See Habecker v. Young, 474 F.2d 1229, 1230 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that although
the word "adopt" was never used, it would not bar a remedy through virtual adoption).
278. See Warner, supra note 62, at 587.
279. See id.
280. Tritt, supra note 1, at 376.
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requisite elements. Some courts focus too much on the applicable statutes,
while others put too much emphasis on the specific, delineated requirements
of both the contract theory and adoption by estoppel. Additionally, while
some decisions indicate a trend toward more equitable outcomes for virtually
adopted children, there is still a great weight of authority that has prevented
the doctrine from reaching its true potential. Looking at the substantial
amount of case law, there is direct evidence supporting a more comprehen-
sive, cohesive remedy for virtually adopted children. And, comparing the
decisions of the various states that have upheld claims of virtual adoption
inside and outside of probate court, it seems evident that it is time for state
legislatures to formally recognize these informally adopted children.
Similarly, because today's typical family is not the "typical" American
family that once was, Florida's laws are quickly falling behind other jurisdic-
tions which have begun to move in a more appropriate direction. Florida's
sluggish response to support the expansion of virtual adoption is a shortcom-
ing, at best. The longer Florida courts wait to apply the doctrine in all cases
in which equity requires avoiding an unjust outcome, the farther Florida will
be departing from its strong public policy in favor of the cohesive family unit
and doing what is in the best interests of the children. And, while there is
validity to the argument that expanding the doctrine will lead to an influx of
frivolous claims, there are other avenues which are better suited to deal with
these concerns.
VI. CONCLUSION
Florida was not the first state to recognize the equitable doctrine of vir-
tual adoption, and it certainly will not be the last.28' Further, although the
doctrine has progressed significantly in recent years, there still remain a
number of ambiguities and inconsistencies in its application.282 Virtual
adoption was originally intended to be applied to children who were sup-
posed to be legally adopted, but whose adoptive parents failed to complete a
formal adoption prior to dying intestate. 83 The doctrine relies on equitable
principles, and it operates to allow the virtually adopted child to take an in-
281. See Miller v. Paczier, 591 So. 2d 321, 323 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam);
see also Habecker, 474 F.2d at 1229; Douglass v. Frazier (in re Estate of Musil), 965 So. 2d
1157, 1159 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Williams v. Estate of Pender, 783 So. 2d 453, 454
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
282. Compare Williams v. Dorrell, 714 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), with
Miller, 591 So. 2d at 323, and Laney v. Roberts, 409 So. 2d 201, 203 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1982), and Grant v. Sedco Corp., 364 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
283. E.g., Miller, 591 So. 2d at 322.
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testate share from the decedent equal to that of a legally adopted or biologi-
cal child. 284 However, in light of recent decisions, it appears the doctrine is
growing ever more popular, and courts are more frequently called upon to
expand the scope of its applicability.
285
What's more, as the dynamic of the typical American family continues
to evolve, so too do the applicable statutes which dictate the rights of inherit-
ance in both testate and intestate proceedings.286 Further, with the steady
increase in the number of children adopted each year, Florida courts will
likewise see a steady increase in the number of adopted children contesting
their inheritance rights. Nonetheless, Florida has yet to align with other ju-
risdictions and apply the doctrine to provide a wide range of equitable reme-
dies.287 Accordingly, it is unlikely that the claims of virtually adopted child-
ren will withstand even minimal judicial scrutiny in the near future.
In order for virtually adopted children to be granted the relief they seek,
Florida courts need to expand the scope of virtual adoption and apply it out-
side of probate court, and in situations other than intestacy proceedings. The
only way that the doctrine will, in good faith, provide justice and equity is if
Florida accepts the reasoning set forth by other jurisdictions and allows vir-
tual adoption to be recognized both in probate court and in other areas of the
law.
284. Id.
285. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 105 (N.D. 2000).
286. Bell, supra note 24, at 418.
287. See, e.g., Tarver v. Evergreen Sod Farms, Inc., 533 So. 2d 765, 767 (Fla. 1988) (hold-
ing that virtual adoption would not warrant relief in a worker's compensation proceeding).
But see Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 105 (holding that virtual adoption would warrant relief in a
divorce proceeding, obliging the adoptive father to continue paying child support).
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